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PKINCIPLES LIMITING JURISDICTION.
TEFT

T.

STEWART

et al.

(31 Mich. 367.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Jan. Term, 1875.
Appeal from circuit court, Berrien county;
in chancery.

Edward Bacon, for complainant. George
Darwin Hughes, for defend-

S. Clapp and D.

ants.

GRAVES, C. J. The real grievance alleged
by complainant is, that defendants combined to defraud him, and the substance of the
transaction, and its incidents, which he relates at much length, may be stated from the
bill as follows:
The defendant Stewart resided in St. Joseph, Berrien county, and owned a stock of
goods, including
a quantity of boots and
shoes.
This property was at Bangor, Van
Buren county, and was valued by Stewart at
some fourteen thousand doUars, and he wished to sell it.
One Sherwin, residing in Illinois, owned a tract of about two hundred
acres of land in Berrien county, which he desired to dispose of.
Complainant was an
acquaintance of Sherwin, and after some negotiations, it was agreed between the difCerent parties, that Stewart should transfer to
complainant the boots and shoes and onehalf of the remainder of the stock, and that
complainant, in consideration thereof, should
procure Sherwin, upon certain terms agreed
on between Sherwin
and complainant, to
convey the land to Stewart, but subject to
an existing mortgage on it of one thousand
dollars; that Carroll should buy the remaining half of the stock of Stewart, at two thousand five hundred dollars; that complainant
in a few days received from Sherwin the
deed going to Stewart, and called on the latter to deliver it, and get possession of the
boots and shoes and his share of the other
goods; whereupon Stewart stated that complainant would have no trouble about the
goods, as Carroll was at Bangor, in charge
of them and making an inventory; that complainant expressed himself as unwilling to
deliver the deed unless Stewart would give
him some writing which would assure to him
his portion, as he had nothing to do with
Carroll; that Stewart then stated his readiness to give such a paper, and one Devoe, a
brother-in-law of complainant, being present,
it was arranged that the writing should run
to Devoe instead of complainant; although,
as was understood, complainant was solely
interested; that Stewart then made a bill of
sale to Devoe of the boots and shoes, and
half of the rest of the stock, and added an
order to Carroll to make delivery; that complainant then gave up the deed to Stewart,
who subsequently put it on record, and Devoe received the bill of sale and order, and
proceeded to Bangor for the property; that
complainant and Devoe then called on Carroll
for it, when he refused to deliver any of it,
or to allow any of it to be taken, and claimed

y

the whole in virtue of a purchase by himself
of Stewart; that complainant succeeded in
getting a part of the boots and shoes, but
was precluded by Carroll from getting anything more; that complainant discovered, after this claim by Carroll, that subsequent to
the conclusion of the terms of the bargain
as before mentioned, but before the delivery
of Sherwin's deed to Stewart, and the making of the bill of sale and order by Stewart
to Devoe, Carroll and Stewart had fraudulently, and without complainant's knowledge,
and with intent to cheat him, made an arrangement by which Stewart had given a bill
of sale of the whole property to Carroll, ard
had taken back a mortgage on it for two
thousand five hundred dollars;
that complainant had neither knowledge nor notice of
this transaction when the deed was delivered
to Stewart, and the bill of sale and order received from him, and first became aware of
it when CarroU refused to allow anything to
be taken; that Stewart and Carroll refused
to recognize any right of complainant in or
to the property, and refused to allow him to
have any of it; that Stewart and Carroll, or
one of them, have converted a portion of
it and apjjropriated the proceeds, and mixed
with the rest of the old stock other goods
since procured; that Devoe has assigned to
complainant, but that Stewart and Carroll
wholly deny his right.
The bill waived answer on oath, and asked
no preliminary or final relief by injunction.
Neither did It seek to get rid of the deed
made to Stewart, or to obtain the land conveyed by Stewart to complainant.
The defendants answered separately, and
denied the fraud charged, and most of the material matter tending to show the grievance
alleged in the bill.
Their account of the
transaction was in substance, that complainant was not known to Stewart in the trans-,
action as vendee, or as a party in any way to
the trade concerning the goods, and that Carroll was sole vendee.
They further explicitly claimed that the
bill did not make a case of equitable cognizance, and insisted that his remedy, if any,
was at law.
Proofs having been taken, the court on final
hearing decreed that the defendants, within
forty days after the 11th of August, 1874,
should pay to complainant, or his solicitor,
two thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars,
with interest from that date at seven per
cent., together with complainant's costs, and
that he should have execution therefor.
The
defendant Stewart thereupon appealed, whilst
the defendant Carroll acquiesced in the decree.

It appears to me quite impossible, in the
face of the objection taken and Insisted on,
to sustain this decree without sanctioning
the right to come into equity in all cases to
recover damages where the grievance asserted is a fraud committed by one upon another in a dealing in personal property.

PRINCIPLES

LIMITING JUBISDICTION.

If tbe riglit contended for and carried out
by the decree can be maintained, no reason
is perceived why, upon the same principle, a
party claiming to have been cheated in a
horse trade, or in a purchase of any chattels
where the amount is sufficient, may not at
his election proceed to sue in chancery for
damages, and preclude an investigation before a jury.
The principles and course of practice of the
court are, however, not in harmony with any
such procedure.
It is admitted that the boots commonly say
that equity has jurisdiction in all cases of
fraud, but every one knows that the proposition is not to be accepted literally.
It must
always be understood in connection with the
general and specific remedial powers of the
court. These confine it absolutely to civil
suits. They also confine it, when the point
is seasonably and properly made and insisted
on, to transactions where, in consequence
of
the indicated state of facts, there appears to
be ground for employing some mode of action, or some kind of aid or relief not practicable in a court of law, but allowable in
equity.
In the present case no injunction was called for, and there was no ground for discovei-y, and no discovery was sought, as the bill
waived an answer on oath.
No claim was set up to have the deed from
Sherwin to Stewart set aside, or to have the
land conveyed to complainant, and no case is
made to warrant such a claim, since the bill
•contains nothing to show that third persons
may not have acquired interests on the faith
lof Stewart's title.
Indeed, no circumstances are set forth to
call specially for equitable intervention or for
any assistance or mode of redress peculiar to
chancery procedure.
The facts as given, and the case as shaped,
point to just the action and relief peculiar to
They look to a single judg.a court of law.
ment for damages, and nothing else.
The case, then, was really of legal, and not
in strict propriety of equitable cognizance.
The objection was timely made and urged.

and complainant was bound to regard it; and
unless it is to be maintained that in all cases
standing on the same principle, a complaining party is to be allowed by his election to
try in chancery, and prevent an investigation
l)y jury, the point made by appellant must
be sustained, and in my judgment It should
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 72-74; 1 Spence, Bq.
be.
Jur. 691-700; Adams, Eq. Introduction, pp.
5?, 58; Shepard v. Sanford, 3 Barb. Ch. 127;
Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Oh. 125; Monk v.
Harper, 3 Edw. Ch. 109; Pierpont v. Fowle,
2 Woodb. & M. 23, Fed. Oas. No. 11,152; Vose
V. Philbrook,
3 Story, 335, Fed. Cas. No. 17,010; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616;
Hipp V. Babin, 19 How. 271; Parker v. Manufacturing Co., 2 Black, 545; Jones v. Newhall. 115 Mass. 244; Suter v. Matthews, Id.
253; Foley v. Hill, 2 H. L. Cas. 28; Crampton V. Varna R. Co., 7 Oh. App. 562, 3 Eng.
R. 509; Hoare v. Bremridge, L. B. 14 Eq.
522, 3 Eng. R. 824, cited by Lord Hatherly
with approbation in Ochsenbein v. Papelier,
8 Ch. App. 695,
6 Eng. B. 576;
Kemp v.
Tucker, 8 Ch. App. 369, 5 Eng. R. 596; Warne
v. Banking Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 410; HaythOrn v.
Margerem, 7 N. J. Eq. 324.
There would be more reason than there is
for wishing to escape from the objection noticed, if complainant's version of the afCair
was placed by the proofs beyond fair controversy; but it is not. The evidence is extremely conflicting in regard to the true nature of the transaction, and there is room for
arguing in favor of the theory advanced on
each side.
The case is, then, specifically
suited for Investigation by jury, where the
witnesses can be seen and their trustworthiness be better understood.
think that, so far as the defendant Stewart is concerned,
who alone has appealed,
the decree should be reversed, and the bill
dismissed, with his costs of both courts, but
that the dismissal should be without prejudice to any proceedings at law against him
the complainant may think proper to take.

I

CAMPBELL and COOLEY, JJ., concurred.
CHRISTIANCY, J., did not sit in this case.

PKJNCIPLES LIMITING JURISDICTION.
GREEX^ et al. v. SPRING.
(43 111. 280.)

Supreme

Error
Judge.

Court of Illinois.
to

Richland

Jan. Term, 1867.

county; Aaron

Shaw,

J. G. Bowman, for plaintiffs in error. Hayward & Kitchen, for defendant in error.
LAWRENCE, J. This was a bill in chancery for dower and partition, filed in October, 186J:, by Henry Green, and Elizabeth
M. Green, his wife, alleging that, on the 20th
of August, 1843, one Asahel L. Powers died
seized in fee simple of two lots in the town
of Olney, leaving said Elizabeth, his widow,
and without lineal descendants; that the said
1845,
intermarried
Elizabeth,
in August,
with one Henry Green, and that she is entitled to an undivided half of said real estate in fee, and a right of dower in the other
half; and that said lots were held under
claim of title by one Henry Spring, who was
made defendant to the bill. Elizabeth M.
Green died pending the suit, and her heirs
were made parties, and so much of the bill
as prayed dower was dismissed by complainants.
After the bill, so far as it related to dower,
was dismissed, there was nothing left upon
which the jurisdiction of a court of chanIt became, in
cery could be maintained.
substance, simply an action of ejectment.
The defendant Spring was in possession,
claiming title to the entire lots under a sale
made in 1845, by the administrator of Powers for the payment of debts.
If this sale, as alleged by the complainant,
was illegally made, and one undivided half
of the lots belonged to the heirs of Mrs.
Green, the other half belonged to the heirs
of Powers, who are not parties to this proceeding,
and not to the defendant. If he

has any interest In the lots, he owns the entirety. This bill professes to be for dower
and partition. The claim for dower is abandoned,
and the only persons with whom
partition can be made are not parties. So
far as Spring is concerned, it stands a naked
bill to turn him out of possession of land
adversely claimed by him, and to compel
an account of rents and profits. If this bill
can be maintained, we are at a loss to perceive why a bill in chancery cannot be maintained in eveiT instance to recover possession of land adversely held. It is not as if
the bill were filed to set aside the administrator's sale for fraud. No fraud is alleged,
nor other head of chancery jurisdiction.
Indeed, in the bill it does not appear that thei'e
has ever been an administrator's sale. It is
merely alleged that Spring is in possession
claiming adversely, and that complainants
know of no title which Spring has to any
part of the lots; but that, if he has any, it is
only to one-half. In the answer. Spring sets
up the title claimed by him under the administrator's sale, which is attacked in the
argument, on the ground that there was no
jurisdiction to make the order, for want of
notice.
But the bill was not filed to set this
sale aside, and when set up in the pleadings
and proof of defendant it is insisted that it
was void. The bill was properly dismissed
as a bill of partition, for want of proper parties, and, so far as it sought to evict an adverse claimant without title, there was nothing, either in the bill or proofs, to give the
A court of chancery will
court jurisdiction.
sometimes decree an adverse claimant to deliver possession to the rightful owner, but
only when such relief is incidental to the
main object of the bill, and when the power
of the court has been called into action for
some purpose that belongs to its legitimate
jurisdiction.
Decree affirmed.
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LORING.

Mass.

507.)

Court of Massachusetts.

Sept. 9, 1876.

Bill in equity to establish a trust. The
fendant demurred to the Wll for want of
uity, and on the ground that there was
adequate remedy at law. The case was
served by Wells, J., for the consideration
the full court.
B. F. Thomas, for plaintiff.
for defendant.

deeq-

an
re-

of

0. A. Welch,

COLT, J. The equity jurisdiction of this
court, by the terms of the statute, embraces
suits and proceedings for enforcing and regulating the execution of trusts, whether the
trusts relate to real or personal estate, subject to the general provision which excludes
such jurisdiction where the parties have a
plain, adequate and complete remedy at common law. Gen. St. c. 113, § 2.
The plaintiff seeks to charge the defendant
as trustee for the appropriation to his own
use of certain shares of stociv held in trust.
The bill alleges an agreement between the
parties and certain other persons named for
the purchase of mining lands on Lake Superior and the formation of mining corporations; the subsequent formation of two companies, and the conveyance to them of the
land purchased; the allotment of shares
among the proprietors; and the agreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant that
the plaintiff's shares should be issued to the
defendant as trustee, to be held by him until
the assessments, to become due from the plaintiff thereon, were paid. It then alleges the
plaintiff's payment of more than was due
on his shares, referring to annexed exhibits
for the state of the account; and charges the
defendant with the wrongful sale of the
shares and the appropriation of the proceeds.
It expressly waives the defendant's oath to
his answer, and seeks no discovery as incidental to the relief. The prayer is for an
account,
for payment of the balance due
over the assessments paid, and payment of
the highest value of the stock since the plaintiff became entitled to it with all dividends,
and for general relief.
The question is
whether the bill shows a case in which there
is not an equally effectual remedy at law.
It is plain, from the allegations in the bill,
that the only matter in coutrovei'sy is the
plaintiif's title to the shares of stock in question, and his right to claim that the defendant shall make their value good to him. He
does not seek to obtain the control of trust
property in the possession of the trustee; but
he avers that it has been sold, and we assume that it is now held by the purchaser
by good title, discharged of the trust.
His
claim is reduced to a claim for compensation
in damages for the conversion of property
of
which he claims to have been owner. His

be determined by settling his title
to the property. He seeks no discoveiy, and
there is nothing in the case to show that his
right to compensation may not be the same
in measure, and that his title may not be as
completely and adequately enforced at law
as in equity. The jurisdiction in equity extends, it is said, equally to express and implied trusts (Wright v. Dame, 22 Pick. 55);
and yet it has never been contended that it
embraced all such, cases of implied trust as
arise out of the relations created by a pledge
or mortgage of personal property, or a transfer of choses in action, or shares in a corporation to be held as collateral security for the
payment of money, or which might arise between principal and agent, or between bailor
and bailee, unless there were facts alleged
showing either the need of a discovery in
support of the bill, or relief in some form peculiar to courts of equity. In none of the
cases cited by the plaintiff, in which the objection has been taken by demurrer, will be
found a clear departure from this rule. In
most of them an account of the trust, or a
discovery, or a delivery of trust property, was
prayed for. Hobart v. Andrews, 21 Pick.
526; Raynham Congregational Soc. v. Trustees of Fund in Raynham, 23 Pick. 148; Bm-lingame v. Hobbs, 12 Gray, 367.
The rule of damages in equity cannot be
more favorable than at law to the plaintiff,
when he asks compensation only for the conversion of his property.
Nor can this bill be maintained under the
jurisdiction given to this court in suits upon
accounts, when the nature of the account is
such that it cannot be conveniently and properly adjusted and settled in an action at law.
It is not shown by sufficiently distinct allegations that there is any peculiar difficulty
in ascertaining the true state of the account
between the parties. It is not charged that
there has been any refusal to render an account; the charge is rather that the defendant refused to account for the proceeds of the
stock sold. The elements and means of stating the account appear to be accessible
to
the plaintiff, for he annexes to his bill a full
statement of its items. The real question is
of the ownership of the stock, and that question does not appear by the bill to depend
upon "long complicated and cross
accounts."
It is said that courts of equity will decline to
take jurisdiction under this head where
the
accounts are all on one side; or where there
is a single mattei- on the side of the plaintiff and mere set-offs on the other side, and
no discovery is sought. 1 Story, Eq.
Jur.
§ 459, note, and eases cited; Adams, Eq.
222.
See, also, Locke v. Bennett, 7 Gush
445 449Foley V. Hill, 2 H. L. Cas. 28.
The construction, which we here give to
the
general clause restricting jurisdiction
to cases
where the remedy is imperfect at law, is
that
which has been in many cases recenUy given
under other heads of equity jurisdiction
Thus a bill to redeem a mortgage of
per-
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was dismissed because it did
not show that, from the nature of the property, the peculiar relations of the parties, or
the difficulty of ascertaining the amount to
be paid or tendered, the mode of redemption
pointed out by the statute was not sufficient
to protect the plaintiff's rights (Gordon v.
Clapp, 111 Mass. 22), although a similar bill,
containing such averments, was maintained
in Boston & Fairhaven Iron Works v. Montague, 108 Mass. 248. So In Jones v. New-

sonaX property

hall, 115 Mass. 244, the court refused to entertain a bill in favor of the vendor for the
specific performance of a contract, when all
that remained to be done was the payment of
money by the defendant; and in Suter v.
Matthews, 115 Mass. 253, it was declared that
there was no concurrent jurisdiction in case
of fraud where there is a plaui and adequate remedy at law. See, also. Ward v.
Peck, 114 Mass. 121.
Demun'er sustained.
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SUTHERLAND.

Wall. 74.)

Court of the United

States.

Dec,

1866.

Appeal from circuit court of the United
States for the district of Maryland.
Watson & Co., appellants in the suit, having issued writs of fieri facias on certain
judgments which they had recovered in the
circuit court for the district of Maryland
against Wroth & Fullerton, caused them to
be levied on the entire stock in trade of a
retail dry goods store in Baltimore, in the
possession
of one Sutherland, the appellee.
Sutherland, claiming the exclusive ownership of the property, and insisting that Wroth
& Fullerton had no interest whatever in It,
filed a bill in equity, to enjoin the further
prosecution of these writs of fieri facias, and
so to prevent, as he alleged, iiTeparable injury to himself. The grounds on which the
bill of Sutherland charged that the injury
would be irreparable, and could not be compensated in damages, were these:
that he
was the bona fide owner of the stock of
goods, which were valuable and purchased
for the business of the current season, and
not all paid for; that his only means of payment were through his sales; that he was
a young man, recently engaged on his own
account in merchandising, and had succeeded in establishing a profitable trade, and if
his store was closed, or goods taken from
him, or their sale even long delayed, he
would not only be rendered insolvent, but
his credit destroyed,
his business wholly
broken up, and his prospects in life blasted.
The answer set forth that the goods levied
on were really the property of Wroth & Fullerton, who had been partners in business
in Baltimore, and who, suspending payment
in March, 1861, greatly in debt to the appellants and others, had, on the 27th October,
1862, and under the form of a sale, conveyed
the goods to Sutherland, the appellee;
that
Sutherland was a young man, who came to
this country from Ireland a few years ago;
that when he came he was wholly without
property; that since he came he had been
salesman in a retail dry goods store, at a
small salary, so low as to have rendered it
impossible for him to have saved from his
earnings any sum of money sufficient to have
made any real purchase of this stock of
goods from Wroth & Fullerton,
which the
answer set up was accordingly a fraudulent
transfer made to hinder and defeat creditors.
It further stated that the legislature of
Maryland had passed acts staying executions
from the 10th of May, 1861, until the 1st of
November, 18G2; that previous to the 1st
November, 1862, Wroth & Fullerton had determined to pay no part of the judgments
rendered against them; and that from the
lOtl^ May, 1861, until the 1st November, 1862,
judgments, amounting to between
$30,000
and $40,000 had been rendered against them;

that between
the date of the suspension,
March, 1861, and the 27th October, 1802, they
had sold the greater portion of their goods,
and collectsd a great many of the debts due
them, but had paid only a small portion of
those which they owed; secreting for their
own use the greater portion of the money
collected, and with the residue obtaining the
goods levied upon.
It added that there was no reason to suppose that the levy aforesaid, as made by said
marshal, would work irreparable injury to
the appellee,
even if the goods so levied on
were the property of the complainant, as
property of the same description, quantity,
and quality, could be easily obtained in market, which would suit the appellee's purpose
as well as those levied upon, and that a jury
would have ample power, on a trial at common law, in an action against the respondents, now appellants, or against the marshal
on his official bond, to give a verdict commensurate with any damages the said appellee could sustain by the levy and sale of
the goods aforesaid.
On the filing of the bill a temporary injunction was granted, and when the cause
was finally heard, after a general replication
filed and proof taken, it was made perpetual.
These proofs, as both this court and the
one below considered, hardly established, as
respected Sutherland, the alleged fraud on
creditors.
The appeal was from the decree of perpetual injunction.
Mason, Campbell & McLaughlin, for
fendants. AVallis & Alexander, conti-a.

de-

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion
of the court.
There are, in this record, two questions for
consideration,
'^^'as Sutherland
entitled to
invoke the interposition of a court of equity?
and, if so, did the evidence
warrant the
court below in perpetuating the injunction?
It is contended that the injunction should
have been refused, because there was a complete remedy at law.
If the remedy at law
is sufficient, equity cannot give relief, '-but
It is not enough that there is a remedy at
law; it must be plain and adequate, or in
other words, as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice, and its prompt administration, as the remedy In equity."i How could
Sutherland be compensated at law, for the
injuries he would suffer, should the grievances of which he complains be consummated?
If the appellants made the levy, and prosecuted it in good faith, without circumstances of aggravation, in the honest belief that
Wroth & Fullerton owned the stock of goods
(which they swear to in their answer), and
it should turn out, in an action at law instituted by Sutherland for the trespass, that
the merchandise belonged exclusively to him,
it is well settled that the measure of dam1 Boyce's

Ex'rs

v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210.
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if the property were not sold, could not
extend beyond the Injury done to it, or, if
sold, to the value of it, when taken, with interest from the time of the taking down to
the trial.2
And this is an equal rule, whether the suit
is against the marshal or the attaching creditors, if the proceedings are fairly conducted, and there has been no abuse of authority.
Any hajsher rule would interfere to prevent
the assertion of rights honestly entertained,
and which should be judicially investigated
"Legal compensation refers
and settled.
solely to the injury done to the property taken, and not to any collateral or consequential damages, resulting to the owner, by the
trespass."3
Loss of trade, destruction of
credit, and failure of business prospects, are
collateral or consequential damages, which it
is claimed would result from the trespass,
but for which compensation cannot be awarded in a trial at law.
ruin to Sutherland might,
Commercial
therefore, be the effect of closing his store
and selling his goods, and yet the common
To prevent
law fail to reach the mischief.
a consequence
like this, a court of equity
steps in, arrests the proceedings in limine;
brings the parties before it; hears their allegations and proofs, and decrees, either that
the proceedings shall be unrestrained, or else
enjoined.
The absence of a
perpetually
plain and adequate remedy at law affords
the only test of equity jurisdiction, and the
application of this principle to a particular
case, must depend altogether upon the character of the case, as disclosed in the pleadings. In the case we are considering, it is
very clear that the remedy in equity could
alone furnish relief, and that the ends of
justice required the injimction to be issued.
The remaining question in this case is
one of fact.
The appellants, in their answers, deny that
the property was Sutherland's, but insist
ages,

2
3

Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. 272, 282.
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard, 1 Baldw. 142,
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that it was fraudulently purchased by him^
of Wroth & FuUerton, and is subject to the
payment of their debts.
It seems that
Wroth & Fullerton had been partners in
business in Baltimore, and suspended payment in March, 1861, In debt to the appellants, besides other creditors.
Although theappellants did not recover judgments against
them until after their sale to Sutherland, yet
other creditors did, who were delayed in consequence of the then existing laws of Maryland, which provided that executions should
be stayed until the 1st of November, 1862.
TaJiing advantage of this provision of lawr
the answer charges that Wroth & Fullerton,
after their failure, collected a large portions
of their assets, but appropriated to the payment of their debts only a small portion thusrealized, and used the residue to buy the
very goods in question, which Sutherland
fraudulently
purchased from them on the27th of October, 1862, in execution of a combination and conspiracy with them to hinTheder, delay, and defraud their creditors.
answers also deny that the injury to Sutherland would be irreparable, even if the stock
were his, and insist that he could be amply
compensated by damages at law. After general replication was filed, proofs were taken,
but, as in aU contests of this kind, there was
a great deal of irrelevant testimony, and very
much that had only a remote bearing on the
question at issue between the parties. It isunnecessai"y to discuss the facts of this case,
for it would serve no useful purpose to do so.
We are satisfied, from a consideration of the
whole evidence, that Wroth & Fullerton acted badly, but that Sutherland was not a
party to any fraud which they contemplated
against their creditors, and that he made the
purchase in controversy, in good faith, and
for an honest purpose.
The evidence also shows conclusively, that
had not the levy been arrested by injunction, damages would have resulted to Sutherland, which could not have been repairedat law.
The decree of the circuit court is, therefore, aflarmed.
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et al.
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Ocurt of Appeals

315,

129 N. Y.

of New York.

274.)

Dec. 15, 1891.

Appeal from superior court of New York
cit.y, general term.
Action by Lawrence Lynch against the

Metropolitan Elevated Railway Company
others to restrain the maintenance
roads in
operation of defendants'
front of plaintiff's premises, and for damages. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which
was affirmed by the general term. Deand
and

fendants

appeal.

Affirmed.

Samuel Blythe Rogers and Jullen T. DaYies, for appellants. Charles Gibson Bennett, for respondent.

GRAY. J. This action was brought to
restrain the maintenance and operation of
roads in front of the
the defendants'
plaintiff's premises, and the prayer for
such a judgment included also a demand
for the amount of loss and damage which
might be ascertained to have been already
sustained by the plaintiff. The complaint
sets out the title and ownership of the
plaintiff, and his rights in and to the
street in front of his premises; the construction of the elevated railroad, and the
operation of trains over it, and the annoying results therefrom; the illegal and
unauthorized nature of the trespass upon
the plaintiff's premises and easements,
and the failure of the defendants to acquire or til make (•omr)ensation for them •
the injuries sustained, and that they will
be constant and continuous; and, finally,
that, to prevent a multiplicitj' of suits,
to protect against irreparable damages,
and to afford complete relief, the nlaintitf
is compelled to seek the equitable interference of the court. When the action
came on for trial the defendants' counsel
moved for a trial of the plaintiff's claim
for past damages by jury, and the exception to the denial of that motion raises
the main question presented upon this appeal.

The clause of the constitution upon
which the demand for a jury trial was
based reads:
"The trial by jury, in all
cases in which it has heretofore been used,
shall remain inviolate forever." 'The argument for the appellants is, in substance,
that there were two independent causes
of action stated in thecomplaint,of which
one was for past damages, which, prior
to the constitution of 1846, was cognizable
solely in a court of law, and that, under
the Code, it comes within the equity jurisdiction of the court only by reason of the
permission to join in one complaint legal
and equitable causes of action. By section 970 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which was a now enactment, it is provided that "where a party is entitled hy the
constitution, or by express provision of
law, to a trial by a jury of one or more
issues of fact, * » * hemay apply upon
notice to the court for an order directing
all the questions arising upon that issue
to be distinctly and plainly stated for trial accordingly," whereupon
the court
must so Older, etc. If the defendants believed that they had a constitutional right

to a jury trial of some issue of fact in
this action, it would have been the natural and orderly way for them to make an
a pplication to the court under this section.
The complaint appears to be but one consecutive narrative of the grounds upon
which the equitable interference of the
The precourt is alleged to be necessary.
tense that there is a separate cause of action rests only upon the demand of the
complainant that, if he is entitled to the
equitable relief of an injunction, the court
shall adjudge to him such an amount for
the loss sustained by the defendants' acts
Undoubtedly
as shall be ascertained.
the claim for past damages sustained by
plaintiff in his property rights from the
defendants' acts could have been made the
subject of an action at law, but that
was not the cause of action which the
plaintiff elected to assert in his complaint,
and to bring to trial. What he attempthis action was to reed by instituting
strain the continuance of acts, which were
constantly injuring, and would, to all appearances, constantly in the future continue to injure, him in ways and in a manner which he described in his complaint.
That was a form of relief demandable and
cognizable only on the equity side of the
court. Hence, as upon the face of the
complaint the plaintiff alleged a cause of
action for equitable relief, if the defendants conceived that they were entitled to
a trial by jury of any issue of fact involved in the statements of the complaint,
they might have moved the court under
section 970, and then the question could
have been opportunely and properly met.
Appellants cite upon this point the decision in Colman v. Dixon, 50 N. Y. 572; but
that was made in 187-, and section 970
was a new provision, and was enacted in
1877.

But, whatever the effect of the omission
to take this course of procedure, we need
not determine it now, inasmuch as the
conclusion we have reached holds the
right CO a separate trial by jury, as to the
amount of past damages, in such an action, not to be within the purvievp oE the
constitutional guaranty. The action was
one purely for a court of equity, for thi
main relief sought was an injunctioi
against the defendants, restraining them
from maintaining and operating their elevated railroad.
To the assertion of this
ground forthe equitable interference of the
court the facts in the complaint were
marshaled, and to the necessity for granting that species of relief every allegation
of the complaint was framed and calculated to lead. There was but one cause
of action stated in this complaint, and
that was the claim for relief against the
continued trespass upon the complainant's properties. The demand for past
damages, included in the prayer for judgment, does not have the effect to set up
an independent cause of action. It is
nothing more than a demand that the
court, having adjudged the plaintiff entitled to the equitable relief prayed for, and
having acquired entire jurisdiction of the
action, will assess the damages which appear to have been sustained down to the
Trial.
It has always been a well-settled
and familiar rule that when a court of
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equity gains jurisdiction of a cause before
it Jor one purpose it may retain it generally. To do complete justice between the
parties, a court of equity will lurther retain tbe cause for the purpose of ascertaining and awarding the apparent damages, as sometliing which is incidental to
the main relief sought. While this is done
on the ground that the remedy for the
damage done is deemed to be incidental to
the relief of injunction, the principle is in
perfect harmony with the theory of the
Its
jurisdiction of a court of equity.
power is invoked, and it interferes to restrain a trespass which is continuous in
its nature, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits; and, talving jurisdiction
of the cause for such a purpose, it may
retain it to the end, and close up all matters for legal dispute between the parties
by assessing the loss sustained from the
acts which it has restrained. The power
and practice of courts of equity were, as
it was forcibly remarlied by Judge Earl
in the case of Madison Avenue Baptist
Church, 73 N. Y. 82, 95, "when they have
once obtained jurisdiction of a case, to
administer all the relief which the nature
of the case and the facts demand, and to
bring such relief down to the close of the
litigation between the parties. " The fact
that a money judgment is ordered against
for the plaintiff's loss
the defendant
affords no peculiar ground for attacking
That is frequently
equity's jurisdiction.
the case in actions of an unquestioned
equitable nature. Quite recently. Judge
Finch, in Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer, 113 N. Y. 207, 21 N. E. Rep. 75, observed, with respect to an objection to
the jurisdiction of a court of equity that
the final relief would be a personal judgment, that it would not in that manner
eqlose its jurisdiction of an action of an
"
once
uitable character. The jurisdiction
acquired," he said, "it retains to the end,
even though it may turn out that adequate relief is reached by a merely personal judgment. That is not an uncommon
" Instances are frequent
in
occurrence.
which a court of equity decrees the pay
ment of money as an incident of the grant
of equitable relief, and that fefiruredoes
not suffice to qualify the jurisdiction.
But I think we should consider the question to have been settled, upon the au
thority of several decisions of this court.
In the case of Williams v. Railroad Co.,
by
16 N. y. 97, the opinion was delivered
Judge Samuel Seldkn. That was a suit
in equity, brought to restrain the defendants from using the street with their railway, and to recover damages for past use.
The conclusion arrived at, as expressed in
the opinion, was that "it follows that the
their road,
defendants,
in constructing
* * • were guilty of an unwarrantable
intrusion and trespass upon plaintiff's
property, and that he is entitled to relief.
Although he had a remedy at law for the
trespass, yet, as the trespass was of a
continuous nature, he had a right to
come into a court of equity, and to invoke
its restraining power, to prevent a multiplicltv oi suits, and can, oi course, recover
his damages as incidental to this equitable relief. There may be doubt as to his
right to recover in this suit the damages
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upon the lots which have been sold, because as to those lots there was no occasion to ask any equitable relief, and to
permit the damages to be assessed in this
suit, in effect, deprives the defendants of
the right to have them assessed by a jury.
But, as this question has not been raised,
it is unnecessary to consider it. " There are
two things to be noted in that opinion. In
the first place, the damages already sustained were deemed within the power of
a court of equity to award as an incident
of its jurisdiction over the action. This
idea is, in fact, emphasized by the suggestion as to the lots wliioh had been sold, because it is clear that the court regarded
its right to award the damages as a matter connected with or dependent upon the
ground for granting any equitable relief ;
that is to say, as to the property to be
protected by the decree of the court
against the defendants' acts, the damages
caused to it could be assessed by the
court; but as to that portion withdrawn
by the sale it might be doubtful, because
not the subject of, or entitled to, the equitable relief. It is very obvious that the
court had in mind the question as to the
right of trial by jury. In the second place,
it may be noted that the opinion speaks
'1 his
of the assessment of the damages.
definition of an assessment of the damages seems to me to put the action of the
court in line with just what courts of
equity Iiave always done in cases over
which they have gained jurisdiction ; that
is to say, they proceed to inquire directly,
or by reference, or otherwise, as to the
damages sustained, and assess them accordingly. When, later, the same case,
entitled as Henderson et al., alter a new
trial, came up again, (78 N. Y. 423,) the
opinion of the court was delivered by
Judge Danfoejth, who again upheld the
plaintiff's right to invoke the equitable
power of the court, and held that he
could, "of course, recover his damages as
incidental to this equitable relief;" and he
stated it to be "an elementary principle"
that "when a court assumes jurisdiction
in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits
it will proceed to give full relief both for
tbe tortious act and the resulting dam-

ages."

The opinion was carefully writ-

ten, and based upon the authority of
many cases. Recently, again, in the case
of Shepard v. Railroad Co., 117 N. Y. 442,
23 N. E.Rep.30, it was said of these actions
that they were necessarily "on the equity
side of the court, as the main relief sought
was the injunction against the defendants," and that in them the complainante
could "recover the damages they have sustained as incidental to the granting of the
equitable relief." This view, as stated in
that opinion, was expressly based upon
Cases, and
the Williams and Henderson
upon the supposed equitable principles
governing such actions. The Shepard Case
somewhat conspicuously illustrates the
powers a court of equity may arrogate to
itself with the object of completely determining and quieting the questions before
it when it has once acquired jurisdiction
of the action. It follows, in that reby auspect, a rule long established
thority. It is true that in these cases the
right to demand a jury trial as to past
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cIumaKes was not precisely or In terms
stated as the proposition advanced ; but
that, as it seems to me, would be a very
narrow evasion of thi^ effect of the opinions delivered. They did consider the nature of such actions, and deliberately declared the power of the court in equity, as
an incident of the main relief of injunction,
In Carto assess the damages sustained.
penter V. Osborn, 102 JSi. Y. 552, 7 N. E.
Eep. 82.3, the court, in an action to set
aside certain conveyances as fraudulent,
granted the equitable relief prayed for,
and. in addition, decreed the judgment a
lien upon theland for some unpaid installments of interest,
to the payment of
which the defendant had obligated himself
agreement.
Chief Judge
in a certain
KuGER delivered the opinion of this court
in affirmance of the judgment, and said:
"This principle has been applied in many
eases in awarding judgment for pecuniary
damages, even when the party had an
adequate remedy at law, it the damages
were connected with a transaction over
which the courts had jurisdiction for any
purpose; although for the purpose of collecting damages merely they would not
have had jurisdiction."'
In support of the
principle declared by him, the learned
judge cited Pom. Eq. Jur. § 181, and various cases.
I think some confusion of thonght concerning the constitutional guaranty of a
trial by jury may arise in a misapprehension as to its proper application.
That
Ijrovision relates to the trial of issues of
fact in civil and criminal i)roceedings in
the courts, as it was held by the chancellor in the case of Beekman v. Railroad, 3
Paige, 45. Where the trial of a civil proceeding presents for determination a question of fact the right of trial by jury is
proper, and can be invoked. But an action brought to restrain the commission
of trespasses
which are continuous in
their nature is necessarily in equity, and
the court interferes to prevent multiplicity of suits, and grants equitable relief by
way of an injunction. The question presented for determination in such an action
is one of law, whether, up(m the facts to
be established upon the tripl, the plaintiff
is entitled to such relief. Upon the proofs,
showing the nature of the trespasses, and
the consequent injury to the complainant's property, the court decides the question of plaintiff's right to an injunction.
It does not seem to me that it can be said
that any issue of fact as to damage remains.
That was necessarily decided in
the action, and all that remains is to fix
its amount; and I do not think the constitutional provision was aimed at such a
proceeding.
As defined by the chancellor
in the case above referred to, it seems difficult to rationally give it an application to
what is simply an assessment of the damages. I may extract, and may appositely
quote here, a remark of Judge Andrews
in his opinion in Cogswell v. Railroad
Co., 105 N. Y. 319, 11 N. E. Rep. 518:
"We think," he says, "it is a reasonable rule, and one in consonance
with
the authorities, that where a plaintiff brings an action for both legal and
equitable relief, in respect to the same
cause of action, the case presented is not

one of right triable by jury under the concase was one wherein the
plaintiff's complaint demanded judgment
for damages and an abatement of a nuisance, and also for an injunction against
its continuance. The learned judge's opinion is upon the question of whether such
an action was one for a nuisance, under
section 968 of the Code, which must be
tried by jury, unless waived or referred,
and he held that it differed from Hudson
V. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553, which was a common-law action, in that equitable relief by
way of injunction was asked, and not
simply the relief obtainable by writ of
nuisance for damages and an abatement.
His remark upon the right to a jury trial
inequitable actions is not out of place,
however, here. To carry this discussion
backwards, and to a time anterior to decisions of tliis court, we find warrant in
the opinions then held by our own and
the English chancery courts for holding
that a trial by jury was not usual in cases
where equity had acquired jurisdiction,
and that the court would administer all
the relief which the facts warranted, including the assessment and awarding of

stitution." The

compensation for injury sustained.
In
Watson V. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 169, the
bill was filed to enjoin the cutting of timber and to restrain the removal of that
which had already been cut. Chancellor
Kent confined the relief of injunction to
the timber standing, and refused it as to
the removal of the cut timber, on the
ground that it would be an application to
an "incidental remedy." He said that
"the practice of granting injunctions in
cases of waste is to prevent or stay the
future conimissiou of waste, and the
remedy for waste already committed is
merely incidental to the jurisdiction in the
other case, assumed to prevent multiplicity of suits, and to save the party the necessity of resorting to trover at law."'
The chancellor's exposition of the principle upon which equity acts in cases of
waste obviously is as applicable to cases
of trespass.
If the action at law in trover was deemed unnecessarj' for the personal property already converted in that
case, it seems unnecessary in such an action as this, in order to recover the loss
sustained from the trespass.
The chancellor in the Watson Case relied upon the
practice followed by the English chancellors. LordHAKDwiCKE,in Garth v. Cotton,
1 "Ves. Sr. 528, had held that the decree for
the waste already committed was an incidsnt to the injunction to stay waste.
Before that, in Jesus College v. Bloom, 3
Atk. 262, where the bill was filed for an account and satisfaction for waste in cutting ti-ees, and no injunction was prayed
for, Lord Hardwiokb saidthatthe bill was
improper, and that an action of trover
was the remedy. He asserted the rule,
however, that where the bill was for an
injunction to prevent waste, and for
waste already committed, the court, to
prevent a double suit, would award an
injunction to prevent future waste, and
decree an account and satisfaction for
what was past. He held that to prevent
multiplicity of suits the court will, on bills
for injunction, make a complete decree,
and give the injured party a satisfaction
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for wliat had been done, and not oblise
him to bring another action at law. In

the subsequent case of Smith v. Cooke, Id.
the same lord chancellor declared the
same doctrine, as did also Lord Thurlow
in Lee v. Alston, 1 Ves. Jr. 78. I quote a
remark of Lord Nottingham in Parker v.
Dee, 2Ch. Cas. 201, that -when a court of
chancery has once grained possession of
the cause, if it can determine the whole
matter, it will not be the handmaid of
other courts, "nor beget a suit to be ended
"
elsewhere.
In our former court of errors Chancellor
(then Judge) Kent held, in Armstrong v.
(lilchrist, 2 Johns. Cas. 424, 431, (decided in
1800,) that "the court of chancery, having
acquired cognizance of a suit, for the purpose of discovery or injunction, will, in
most cases of account, whenever it is in
full possession of the merits, and has snffi•cient materials before it, retain the suit in
order to do complete justice between the
parties and to prevent useless litigation
'"
That case was upon a bill
and expense.
for specific relief, and to restrain an action at law brought to i-euover the value
of certain bank-stock, and it set up certain equitable considerations as against
the justice of a recovery in the other acdecided
The chancellor below
tion.
against the whole relief sought by the bill,
and decreed intavorof thedefendants that
the complainants should pay them the
value of the stock, and ordered a reference
to state the account. This procedure the
court of errors upheld as being right, and
the duty of the chancellor to follow.
do
not consider the cases cited by the appellants to be at all controlling upon the
question. In Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch.
59, the bill was filed by two persons, who
were owners of different dwelling-houses
i5!sl.

I

in severalty, having no joint interest in
either of them, to restrain a nuisance
which was a common, but not a joint, injury to both complainants. The objection to the prayer for an account and
compensation for their respective damages
was upon the ground of multifariousness,
Another case, of Hudand so considered.
son v. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553, was an action
to recover damages for the overflowing of
plaintiff's lands, and to c(jmpel the removal of the dam ; and the decision turned
upon the ancient right to a jury trial in
such an action of nuisance, which the
€ode had not affected. It was not an action in equity to restrain a nuisance,
which, according to Judge Andrews' opinion In the Cogswell Case, supra, would not
directed by
be an action for a nuisance
the Code to be tried by jury. But the
judge who delivered the opinion of the majority of the commission of appeals in
Hudson T. Caryl spoke obiter in his remarks upon the general right of trial by
jury, as his opinion indicates, for he says
" But, whatever maybe said
<page555:)
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or decided in regard to the trial of other
actions, in which two causes of action —
one exclusively of legal, and another exclusively of equitable, cognizance, arising
out of the same transaction — are united,
this action should, for an independent reason, have been tried by jury, and that is
that the action, when brought for the
double object of removing the nuisance

and recovering
the damages occasioned
by it, was always tried by jury ; " and he
proceeds to refer to Blackstone and to the
old Revised Statutes. As, therefore, "a
case is presented in which a trial by jury
has been heretofore
used, "the commissioner concluded it was error to refuse it.
It does not seem to me necessary to
pursue further the contiideration of authorities. The respondent's counsel has
cited others in this and the lower courts.
In a note to Armstrong v. Gilchrist,
supra, will be found reference to other
early cases in tuis state and in the United
States supremo court in support of the
"settled rule that when the court of chancery has gained jurisdiction of a cause lor
one purijose, it may retain it generally for
relief." Underlying the system
upon
which courts of eijuity have exercised their
power, as I understand it, is the principle
that when they have gained jurisdiction
of a cause by reason of the infirmity of
the courts of law to entertain it, or to
give full relief, they will retain their control of the cause generally, and settle up
the whole matter between the parties.
have discussed the question here at considerable length, in order that a rule, long
settled by careful judicial utterances, and
in itself reasonable and commendable as
promoting the public convenience in the
disposition of litigated cau-ses, might not,
at this day, be shaken by doubts. The
conclusion which I think we must reach is
that, in this complaint, thecause of action
is single, and constitutes a claim for
equitable relief, and there is not mixed up
with it a cause of action for legal relief.
The facts alleged as a basis for an appeal
to the court to exart its equitable power
may well have constituted a claim for
legal relief, and might have been set up in
an action at law; but that consideration
cannot affect nor change the equitable
nature of the action Itself. It was not
error, therefore, to deny the motion for a
trial by jury as to past damages, and the
court could competently proceed with the
trial of the cause in equity. The only
other point presented to us upon this appeal is that it was error to award damages for portions of the property which
were in the possession of tenants. As to
this question the case is controlled by the
decision of the Kernochan Case, 29 N. E.
Rep. 65, (at this term.) The judgment
should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except EARL and PECKHAM,

I

dissenting.

JJ.,
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Paige, 277.)

Court of Chancery of New York.

Dec. 3, 1844.

This was an appeal from a decree of the
late assistant vice chancellor of the first cirThe bill was filed for the specific percuit.
formance of a contract under the following
circumstances : The defendant, Lucus Blmendorf, and Dutcher & Hogeboom, all supposing that there was a gore of land, containing about 183 acres, between lot No. 11 of
the subdivisions of great lot No. 49, in the
Hardenburgh patent, and the south line of
great lot No. 50, in the same patent, and that
Elmendorf was the owner thereof, an agreement was entered into between them, in the
following words: "I do by these presents,
agree to and with G. Dutcher and C. Hogeboom, to lease to them the gore lot, of about
183 acres, situate in the town of Prattsville,
Greene county, lying between lot No. 11 in
great lot No. 49, and the south line of great
lot No. oO, in the Hardenburgh patent; by
a durable lease to them, either jointly, or to
each a separate lease, which shall contain a
reservation on the whole lot of 32 bushels of
good, merchantable winter wheat, after three
years rent free; the lease or leases to contain the usual reservations and covenants of
my durable leases on my Stratsburgh tract, in
Schoharie county. They have my permission
immediately to move on to the same, provided they shall take and execute leases within
three years, rent free, from this date. March
Shortly afterwards, Dutcher and
1, 1839."
Hogeboom assigned all their interest in the
contract to G. B. Morss, the complainant, upon condition that they should have all the
bark upon the land at the market price, to be
peeled, and drawn and delivered bj"^ them to
Morss, and to be paid for by him in the manThe instruner in the assignment specified.
ment called an assignment then concluded in
these words: "If this memorandum is not
sutficiently strong to hold the bark, we are to
give the said Morss another one as soon as
requested." Soon afterwards, the complainant ascertained that it was doubtful whether
Elmendorf had title to any such land as was
referred to in the agreement; and neither he,
nor Dutcher and Hogeboom, ever went Into
possession of the supposed gore, under the
contract. In 1840, Elmendorf became satisfied that there was no such gore as the parties at the time of entering into the agreement, supposed existed; and he refused to
execute a lease to Morss, who demanded the
execution of the same to him, under such
agreement. The complainant thereupon filed
his bill in this cause, for a specific performance of the contract. The defendant, by his
answer, stated that there was no such gore
of land as, by the contract for a lease, was
supposed
to exist, and that there was no
land between lot No. 11, of the subdivision
of great lot No. 40 and the line of great lot
No. 50. The testimony of a surveyor, who

was well acquainted with the comers and
locations of the several lots, also showed
that there was no such gore; but that great
lot No. 50, and lot No. 11 of the subdivisions
of great lot No. 49, were bounded upon one
and the same line, and upon each other. The
cause was heard upon pleading and proofs,
decreed
and the assistant vice chancellor
that the complainant was entitled to relief
against the defendant, in this court. And he
further decreed that it be referred to a master to ascertain the location and boundaries
of what was designated as the gore lot, and
to make a map thereof if he should be able
to locate the same; and if he could not locate the same, or should find that the supposed gore was within the bounds of great lot
No. 50, or of some other lot than great lot
No. 49, then to ascertain whether the defendant, at the date of the contract, was the owner of lot No. 11 of the subdivision of great lot
No. 49, or of any and what part thereof, and
if so, whether he was still the owner, or
when he ceased to be such owner; and if the
defendant was such owner, the master was
directed to set off a strip of lot No. 11, on
the westerly side thereof, equal in contents
and value to the gore of 183 acres, as it was
at the date of the contract. And the defendant was directed to execute to the complaiiiant a pei-petual lease hereof, according to the
terms of the contract. It was fm-ther decreed, in case the master should find that the
defendant did not then own lot No. 11, or any
part thereof, and was not the owner thereof
at the date of the contract, that such master
proceed to assess the damages which should
be allowed and paid to the complainant by
the defendant, for the non-perfoi-mance of
the contract. Prom this decree the defendant appealed to the chancellor.
M. McDonald,

for respondent.

for appellant.

A.

J.

Parker,

WALWORTH, Ch. There is no principle upon which this decree or any part thereof can
be sustained. The 'question whether there
was in fact any gore, between lot No. 20 of
the subdivisions of great lot No. 49 and the

line of great lot No. 50, was distinctly put
in issue by the defendant's answer, and by
the replication filed to the same; so that
each pai-ty had a full opportunity
to take
testimony to that point. And the evidence
of Keirstead, the surveyor, and the map of
the location of the lots, produced by him,
show conclusively that no such gore ever
existed except in the Imaginations of the inhabitants of the neighborhood, and In that
of the defendant who resided at some considerable distance from the supposed premises intended to be leased. It, therefore, was
useless and improper to direct a reference,
and subject the parties to further expense,
when the complainant had not attempted to
controvert this fact, stated in the defendant's answer, by any testimony whatever in
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opposition to the positive evidence of Keirstead; who established the fact beyond all
doubt. Another surveyor who surveyed the
supposed gore for the complainant, and who
was examined by him as a witness, does not
pretend to dispute the fact sworn to by
lieirstead, that the supposed gore is in fact
within the bounds of great lot No. 50, as
actually run out and located upon the land
by Tappan and Cockburn; the commissioners
who made the partition of the patent more
than -fifty years since. It must, therefore,
be considered as settled, for all the purposes of this suit, that all the parties to the
contract of the first of March, 1839, were
under a mistake in supposing that there was
any such gore as is described in that contract. It is true the letters of the defendant, written
soon after the contract was
made, and when he supposed great lots No.
20 and No. 49 cornered together, state that
there was a gore. But the answer and the
evidence show that the defendant was then
laboring under a mistake. And as the lease,
if executed in conformity with that contract,
and purporting to convey land which has In
fact no existence, would have been a mere
nullity, there was nothing of which a specific
performance could be decreed. I am also satisfied, from the evidence, that the complainant must have been aware of the fact that
there was no such gore of land, at the time
of filing this bill.
The assistant vice chancellor has indeed
attempted to make a new contract for the
parties, and to decree a specific performance
thereof, provided the defendant owns any
land in lot No. 11. That, however, is land
which neither of the parties supposed was
to be included in the lease. For by the
terms of the contract the whole of great lot
No. 50, and the whole of lot No. 11 of the
subdivisions of great lot No. 49, are necessarily excluded from the operation of such
contract. See Jackson v. Woodruff, 1 Cow.
276.
Where the vendor has contracted to
convey a tract of land the title to a part of
which fails, the vendee may claim a specific
performance of the contract as to the residue of the land, with a compensation in
damages in relation to the part as to which
the vendor is unable to give a good title. At
least /urts of equity have in some instances
upon that principle. But I am not
acte
awaio of any case in which the vendor has
been decreed to convey an entirely different piece of land from that which the parties had in contemplation at the time of
making their contract, and which is not in
fact embraced in such contract. Here It is
perfectly evident that neither party, at the
time of making this contract, expected that
Elmendorf was to lease to Butcher and Hogeboom any part of lot No. 11. That part of
the decree which directs the master to set
off to the complainant 183 acres of lot No.
pro11, to be leased to him by Elmendorf,
vided it shall be found by the master that
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the defendant is the owner of lot No. 11,
is therefore clearly erroneous.
Nor do
think this is a proper case for
the court to decree a compensation in damages to the complainant; even if this court
has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages merely, where the defendant never had
the title to land which he has positively
agreed to convey, or where he has parted
with his title before the commencement of
the suit, and that fact is known to the complainant at the time of filing of his bill.
Here the evidence shows that the parties
were acting under a mutual mistake, as to
the actual existence of the gore between lots
No. 20 and 50, at the time the contract was
made.
If the contract has any legal force
or effect whatever, which is at least doubtful, there is no reason why Butcher and
Hogeboom, or the complainant who claims
the benefit of the contract under them,
should not be left to their action at law
to recover damages for the non-performance
of the contract, if any damages have in fact
been sustained. Nothing had been done by
them, or either of them, under the contract,
and nothing had been paid. Nor was there
any mutuality in it. For the defendant could
not have sustained any suit or action, against
Dutcher and Hogeboom, If they had refused
to take a lease of the supposed gore of land;
which, in fact, had no existence. The most
that can be said in this case is, that Dutcher
and Hogeboom have lost the speculation
which they supposed they were making when
they entered into the contract of March,
1839. The means of ascertaining whether
the supposed gore had any existence was
equally accessible to both parties, as the
lines of the lots were run out and marked
upon the land. And the defendant being
mLsled by the reports In the neighborhood of
the existence of a gore, when there was no
such gore, no fault Is attributable to him.
In such a case, the proper course is to leave
the parties to their legal remedies, if they
have any.
It is also perfectly evident in this case,
that the complainant, at the time he filed
his bill, was aware that the supposed gore
had no actual existence, and that no specific
performance of the agreement could be obtained in this court. And, in a case of that
kind, Chancellor Kent correctly decided that
this court ought not to entertain the suit
merely for the assessment of damages.
Hatch V. Cobb, 4 Johns. Ch. 559. Kempshall V. Stone, 5 Johns. Ch. 193. But where
the defendant deprives himself of the power
to perform the contract specifically, during
the pendency of a suit to compel such performance, this court may very properly retain the suit, and award to the complainant
a compensation In damages; to prevent a
multiplicity of suits. And I am not prepared
to say that such a decree might not be
proper, where the defendant had deprived
himself of the power to perform the con-

I
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tract prior to the filing of the bill, but withor
even where he never had the power to perform, if the complainant had filed his bill
in good faith, supposing at the time he iniStituted his suit here that a specific performance of the contract could be obtained under
the decree of this court. But this court does
not entertain jurisdiction where the sole object of the bill is to obtain a compensation in
■damages for the breach of a contract, except where the contract is of equitable cognizance merely. Nor can the complainant entitle himself to the Interference of this court,
to give him a compensation in damages for
the non-performance of a contract, by neglecting to state, in his bill, that the defendant is unable to perform the contract specifi•cally; where that fact is known to him at
the time of filing his bill in this court. For
if the facts which were then known to him
had been fully stated in his bill, the defendant might have demurred, upon the
.ground that the complainant's remedy, if any
Jie had, was at law and not in equity. Or

out the knowledge of the complainant;

might have raised that objection in his
answer. In this case, therefore, the complainant's bill cannot be retained, for the
purpose of obtaining a compensation in damages merely, when he knew that he could
expect nothing more than such a compensation in damages at the time of filing his bill.
And the complainant having made a case, by
his bill, apparently entitling him to a specific
performance, he cannot now insist that the
defendant has waived the objection, that the
remedy of the complainant was at law; because he did not demur to the bill, or state
that objection in his answer.
The decree appealed from is erroneous, and
must be reversed. And the complainant's
bill must be dismissed, with costs in the
court below; but without prejudice to the
complainant's remedy at law, upon the contract, if he has any such remedy there. The
defendant having died since this cause was
submitted upon the appeal, the decree to be
entered upon this decision must be entered
nunc pro tunc, as of the time of such submission.
he
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CITY OF WATERTOWN.

Wall. 107.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
(19

Mr. Justice

HUNT

1873.

delivered the opinion

of the court.
This case is free from the ohjeclions usually made to a recovery upon municipal bonds.
It is beyond doubt that the bonds were
issued by the authority of an act of the legislature of the State of Wisconsin, and in the
It is not
manner prescribed by the statute.
denied that the railroad, in aid of the construction of which they were issued, has
been built, and was put in operation.
Upon a class of the defences interposed in
the answer and in the argument it is not
The theories
necessary to spend much time.
They
upon which they proceei! aie vicious.
are based upon the idea that a refusal to pay
it
because
an honest debt is justifiable
would distress the debtor to pay it. A voluntary refusal to pay an hcmest debt is
a high offence in a commercial community and is just cause of war between nations. So far as the defence rests upon these
principles we And no difliculty in overruling it.
There is, however, a grave question of the
power of the court to grant the relief asked
for.
We are of the opinion that this court has
not the power to direct a tax to be levied
This
for the payment of these judgments.
power to impose burdens and raise money is
the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is
exercised, fiist, to raise money for public
purposes only; and, second, by the power of
It is a power
legislative authority only.
tiiat has not been extended to the judiciary.
Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State
in tlie exercise of this authority at once so
The question is
delicate and so important.
not entirely new in this court.
In the case of Supercisors v. Rogers,* an
order was made by this court appointing the
marshal a commissioner, with power to levy
of the
a tax upon the taxable property
county, to pay the principal and interest of
certain bonds issued by the county, the payment of which had been refused. That case
was like the present, except that it occurred
in tlie State of Iowa, and the proceeding was
taken by the express authority of a statute
of that State. The court say: "The next
question is as to the appointment of the
marshal as a commissioner to levy the tax
This dein satisfaction of the judgment.
pends upon a provision of the code of the
State of Iowa. This proceeding is found in
a chapter regulating proceedings in the writ
of mandamus, and the power is given to the
court to appoint a person to discharge the
duty enjoined by the peremptory writ which
the defendant had refused to perform, and
for which refusal he was liable to an at*7 Wallace,

175.
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taehment, and is express and unqualified.
The duty of levying the tax upon the taxable property of the county to pay the principal and interest of these bonds was specially
enjoined npon the board of supervisors by
the act of the legislature- tliat authorized
their issue, and the appointment of the marshal as a commissioner in pursuance of the
above section is to provide for the performance of this duty where tlie board has disobeyed or evaded the law of the State and
the peremptory mandate of the court."
The State of Wisconsin, of which the city
of Watertown is a municipal corporation, has
The case of Supervisors
passed no such act.
V. Rogers is, therefore, of no authority in
the case before us. The appropriate remedy
of the plaintiff was and is a writ of manThis may be repeated as often as
damus.f
the occasion requires. It is a judicial writ,
a part of a recognized course of legal proIn the present case it has been
ceedings.
thus far unavailing, and the prospect of its
future success is, perhaps, not flattering.
However this may be, we are aware of no
authority in this court to appoint its own
officer to execute the duty thus neglected by
the city in a case like the present.
In WeMi V. St. &eneBieve* at a Circuit Court
for the district of Missouri, a tax was ordered
to be levied by the marshal under similar
We are not able to recognize
circumstances.
No counsel apthe authority of the case.
peared for the city (Mr. Reynolds as amicus
curicB only) ; no authorities are cited which
sustain the position taken by the court;
the power of the court to make the order is
disposed of in a single paragraph, and the
execution of the order suspended for three
months to give the corporation an opportunity to select officers and itself to levy and
collect the tax, with the reservation of a
longer suspension if it should appear advisable. The judge, in delivering the opinion
of the court, states that the case is without
precedent, and cites in support of its decision no other cases than that of Riggs v.
Johnson County,** and Lansing v. Treasurer.X The first case cited does not touch
The question in that
the present point.
case was whether a mandamus having been
issued by a United States court in the regular course of proceedings, its operation could
be stayed by an injunction from the State
court, and it was held that it could not be.
It is jirobable that the case of Supercisors y.
Rogers^ was the one intended to be cited.
This case has already been considered.
. The case of Lansing v. Treasurer
(also
It
cited), arose within the State of Iowa.
fell within the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,
tRiggs
»10 Am.
373.

1). Johnson County,

Law Reg. (N. S.)

**6 Wallace, 166.
t9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
§7 Wallace,

175.

6 Wallace,

193.

.512, Fed. Cas. No. 1',-

415, Fed. Cas. No. 16,538.
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and was rightly decided because authorized is presented in a specific form. It is of a
by the express statute of the State of Iowa. statutory character.
The remedies for the collection of a debt
It offered no precedent for the decision of a
case arising in a State where such a statute are essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and those in existence at the time
does not exist.
preThese are the only authorities upon the it is incurred must be substantially
Thus a statute propower of this court to direct the levy of a tax served to the creditor.
under the circumstances existing in this case hibiting the exercise of its taxing power by
the city to raise money for the payment of
to which our attention has been called.
The plaintiff insists that the court may these bonds would be void.* But it is
accomplish the same result under a differ- otherwise of statutes which are in existence
Of
ent name, that it has jurisdiction of the per- at the time the debt is contracted.
sons and of the property, and may subject these the creditor must take notice, and if
the property of the citizens to the payment all the remedies are preserved to him which
of the plainti ff's debt without the in tervention were in existence when his debt was conof State taxing officers, and without regard tracted he has no cause of complaint.f
His theory is that the court
By section nine of the defendant's charter
to tax laws.
should make a decree subjecting the indi- it is enacted as follows: "Nor shall any
vidual property of the citizens of Watertown real or personal property of any inhabitant
to the payment of the plaintiff's judgment; of said city, or any individualorcorporation,
direct the marshal to make a list thereof be levied upon or sold by virtue of any exefrom the assessment rolls or from such other cution issued to satisfy or collect any debt,
sources of information as be may obtain; re- obligation, or contract of said city."
If the power of taxation is conceded not
port the same to the court, where any objections should be heard; that the amount of to be applicable, and the power of the court
the debt should be apportioned upon the sev- is invoked to collect the money as upon an
eral pieces of property owned by individual execution to satisfy a contract or obligation
citizens; that the marshal should be directed of the city, this section is directly applicable
The process or
to collect such apportioned amount from and forbids the proceeding.
such persons, or in default thereof to sell order asked for is in the nature of an executhe property.
tion ; the property proposed to be sold is that
As a part of this theory, the plaintiff of an inhabitant of the city; the purpose to
argues that the court has authority to direct which it is to be applied is the satisfaction
the amount of the judgment to be wholly I of a debt of the city.
The proposed remedy
made from the property belonging to any in- is in direct violation of a statute in existence
habitant of the city, leaving the citizens to when the debt was incurred, and madeknown
settle the equities between themselves.
to the creditor with the same solemnity as
This theory has many difficulties to en- the statute which gave power to contract
In seeking to obtain for the plain- the debt. All laws in existence when the
counter.
tiff his just rights we must be careful not to contract is made are necessarily referred to
invade the rights of others. If an inhab- in it and form a part of the measure of the
itant of the city of Watertown should own obligation of the one party, and of the right
a block of buildings of the value of $20,- acquired by the
other.J
000, upon no principle
of law could the
But independently of this statute, upon
whole of tlie plaintiff's
debt be collected the general principles of law and of equity
from that property.
Upon the assumption i' jurisprudence, we are of opinion that we canthat individual property Is liable for the pay- not grant the relief asked for. The plaintiff
ment of the corporate debts of the munici- Invokes the aid of the principle that all legal
pality, it is only so liable for its proportion
remedies having failed, the court of chancery
ate amount.
The inhabitants are not joint must give him a remedy; that there is a
and several debtors with the corporation, nor wrong which cannot be righted elsewhere,
does their property stand in that relation to and hence the right must be sustained in
the corporation or to the creditor.
This is chancery. The difficulty arises from too
not the theory of law. even in regard to tax- broad an application of a general principle.
ation.
The block of buildings we have sup- The great advantage possessed by the court
posed is liable to taxation only upon its
of chancery is not so much in its enlarged
value in proportion to the value of the entire jurisdiction as in the extent and adaptabilproperty, to be ascertained by assessment, ity of its remedial powers.
Generally its
and when the proportion is ascertained and jurisdiction is as well defined and limited as
paid, it is no longer or further liable.
It is that of a court of law. It cannot exercise
is discharged. The residue of the tax is to jurisdiction when there is an
adequate and
be obtained from other sources.
There may complete remedy at law. It cannot assume
be repeated taxes and assessments to make
control over that large class of obli<;ations
up delinquencies, but tlie principle and the called imperfect obligations,
resting upon
general rule of law are as we have stated.
•Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 535.
In relation to the corporation before us,
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, 835, 337.
this objection to the liability of individual
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, SS3.
property for the payment of a corporate debt
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of the town, naming it; the individual inhab«
itants,
is said, may and do appear and defend the suit, and hence it
held that the
individual inhabitants have their day in
court, are each bound by the judgment, and
that
may be collected from the property of
any one of them.*
This is local law peculiar to New England.
It is not the law of
this country generally, or of England.
It
has never been held to be the law in New
York, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, nor,
as stated by Mr. Cooley, in any of the Western States.'!
So far as
rests upon the rule
that these municipalities have no common
fund, and that no other mode exists by
which demands against them can be enforced,
he says that it cannot be considered as applicable to those States where prpvision is
to satisfy
made for compulsory taxation
judgments against a town or city.g
The general principle of law to which we
have adverted is not disturbed by these
references. It
applicable to the case before us. Whether, in fact, the individual
has a defence to the debt, or by way of exemption, or is without defence, is not imTo assume that he has none, and
portant.
therefore, that he is entitled to no day in
court, is to assume against him the very
point he may wish to contest.
Again, in the case of Emerie v. Qilman,
is said: "The inhabitants of
before cited,
county are constantly changing; those who
contributed to the debt maybe non-residents
upon the recovery of the judgment or the
Those who opposed
levy of the execution.
the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment, while those, by whose
fault the burden has been imposed, may be
.
.
entirely relieved of responsibility.
To enforce this right a^jainst the inhabitants
of
county would lead to such a multiplicity
of suits as to render the right valueless."
We do not perceive, if the doctrine concorrect, why the money might
tended for
not be entirely made from property owned by
the creditor himself, if be should happen to
own property within the limits of the corporation, of sudicient value for that purpose.

The difficulty and the embarrassment arisor contribution
among those bound to make the payment we
serious objection.
Condo not regard as
tribution and apportionment are recognized
be asheads of equity jurisdiction, and
sumed that process could issue directly
against the citizens to collect the debt of the
court of equity could make the apporcity,
tionment more conveniently than could
court of law.f

a

a

it

if

a

ing from an apportionment

•See the cases coUected in Cooley's Constltn
tional Limitations, 240-315.
Russell V. Men of Devon, Term R. 667.
See Emerio v. Qilman, 10 California, 408, wberi
all the cases are collected.
JCooley's Constitutional Limitations, 246.
470 apd onStory's Equity Jurisprudence,
wards.

[lb.

1

tl

§

§

§

tl K^uity Jurisprudence, 61.
JHeai-d v. Stanford, Cases Tempore Talbot, 174.
00.
*1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
*» We.stervelt v. Gregg, 13 New York, 309.
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Bonscience and moral duty only, unconnected
■with legal obligations.
Judge Story says.f
"There are cases of fraud, of accident, and
of trust which neither courts of law nor of
equity presume to relieve or to mitigate," of
which he cites many instances.
Lord Talbot says:J "There are cases, indeed, in which
a court of equity gives remedy where the
law gives none, but where a particular
remedy is given by law, and that remely
bounded and ciicumscribed
by particular
rules, 'it would be very improper for this
court to take it up where the law leaves it,
and extend it further than the law allows."
Generally its jurisdiction depends upon
legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode
With the subjects of
by law established.
fraud, trust, or accident, when properly before it, it can deal more completely than can
These subjects, however,
a court of law.
may arise in courts of law, and there be well
disposed of.*
A court of equity cannot, by avowing that
there is a right but no remedy known to the
law, create a remedy in violation of law, or
even without the authority of law.
It acts
not only, but
upon established principles
Thus, asestablished channels.
through
sume that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duly in refusing to raise the
amount by taxation, it does not follow that
this court may order the amount to be made
from the private estate of one of its citizens.
This summary proceeding would involve a
He has
violation of the rights of the latter.
He has had no
never been heard in court.
to establish a defence to the
opportunity
debt itself, or if the judgment is valid, to
show that his property is not liable to its
payment. It is well settled that legislative
exemptions from taxation are valid, that
such exemptions may be perpetual in their
duration, and that they are in some cases beThe proceedyond legislative interference.
ing supposed would violate that fundamental principle contained in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in
of the United States, that
the Constitution
no man shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law — that is, he must
be served with notice of the proceeding, and
have a day in court to make his defence.**
"Due process of law (it is said) undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms
which have been established for the protecIn the New Engtion of private lights
judgment obis held that
land States
town may be levied upon
tained against
and made out of the property of any inhabitant of the town. The suit in those ^tate3
brought In form against the inhabitants
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We apprehend, also, that there is some
proposition,
confusion in the plaintifE's
upon which the present jurisdiction is
claimed. It is conceded, and the authorities are too abundant to admit a question,
that there is no chancery jurisdiction where
there is an adequate remedy at law. The
writ ofjnandamus is, no doubt, the regular
remedy in a case like the present, and ordinarily it is adequate and its results are
The plaintiff alleges, however,
satisfactory.
in the present case, tliat he has issued such
a writ on three different occasions; that,
by means of the aid afforded by the legislature and by the devices and contrivances set
forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless; that, in fact, they afford Iiim no remedy.
The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is in its
The want of a remedy and
execution only.
the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy
are quite distinct, and yet they are confounded in the present proceeding. To illustrate: the writ of habere facias possessionem is the established remedy to obtain
the fruits of a judgment for the plaintiff in
ejectment. It is a full, adequate, and complete remedy. Not many years since there
existed in Central New York combinations of

settlers and tenants disguised as Indians,
and calling themselves such, who resisted
the execution of this process in their counties,
and so effectually that for some years no
landlord could gain possession of his land.
There was a perfect remedy at law, but
through fraud, violence, or crime its execution was prevented. It will hardly be argued
that this state of things gave authority to inaid of a court of
voke the extraordinary
of tlie legal
The enforcement
chancery.
remedies was temporarily
suspended by
means of illegal violence, but the remedies
remained as before. It was the case of a
miniature revolution.
The courts of law
lost no power, the court of chancery gained
none. The present case stands upon the
same principle.
The legal remedy is adequate and complete, and time and the law
must perfect its execution.
Entertaining the opinion that the plaintiff
has been unreasonably obstructed in the pursuit of his legal remedies, we should be quite
willing to give him the aid requested if the
We cannot, however, find
j law permitted it.
authority for so doing, and we acquiesce in
; the conclusion of the court below that the
bill must be dismissed.
|
I

Judgment AFriEiiED.
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ties,
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Oh. The equitable rights of the parthis case, must have reference to the

time when the knowledge of their respective
mortgages was communicated to each other,
in the winter of 1814, and prior to the registry
of the elder mortgage. The subsequent registry by the plaintiffs was of no avail. The
rights of the parties had become fixed, by
means of the notice, previously, mutually and
concurrently given, and which notice, as to
them, answered all the purpose and object of
a registry. Priority of registry never prevails
over a previous notice of an unregistered
mortgage. 10 Johns. 461. 462. In considering this case, then, I shall place entirely out
of view the fact of the registry.
The real
point in the case is, which of the unregistered
mortgages had the preference in equity, when
the information of their existence was given
and received.
If there be several equitable interests affecting the same estate, they will, if the equities
are otherwise equal, attach upon it, according
to the periods at which they commenced;
for
it is a maxim of equity, as well as of law,
that qui prior est tempore potior est jure.
This rule has been repeatedly declared;
(Clarke v. Abbott, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 606, pi. 41;
Bristol V. Hungerford, 2 Vern. 525; Symmes
V. Symonds, 1 Brown, Pari. Cas. 66; [4 Brown,
Pari. Cas. (2d Ed.) 328]; Brace v. Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 492, 495,) and we are to see
if there be any thing in this case to prevent
the application of it.
There is no fraud charged or proved upon
the plaintiffs, and if they are to be postponed,
notwithstanding
they have the elder mortgage, it must be on the ground of culpable
negligence, either in leaving the lease with
the mortgagor, when they took the mortgage
of his term, or in not causing their mortgage
to be seasonably registered. I feel strongly
disposed to give to these circumstances all
the weight to which they can be entitled.
1. It is understood to have been the old rule
in the English chancery, that if a person took
left the title
a mortgage, and voluntarily
deeds with the mortgagor, he was to be postponed to a subsequent mortgagee, without notice, and who was in possession of the title
deeds.
The reason of the rule was, that, by
leaving the title deeds, he enabled the mortgagor to impose upon others who have no registry to resort to, except In the counties of
Yorkshire and Middlesex, and who, therefore,
can only look for their security to the title
deeds, and the possession of the mortgagor.
The rule was so understood and declared, by
Mr. Justice Burnet, in Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk.
168, 172; 1 Ves. Sr. 360, and by Mr. Justice
Buller, in Goodtitle v. Morgan, 1 Term B. 762,
and there are decisions which have given
great weight to the cu-cumstance of the title
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deeds being In possession of the junior mortgagee.
Thus, in Head v. Egerton, 3 P. Wms.
279, the lord chancellor said, it was hard
enough upon a subsequent mortgagee, that he
had lent his money upon lands subject to a
prior mortgage,
without notice of it, and,
therefore, he could not add to his hardship,

by taking away from him the title deeds, and
giving them to the elder mortgagee, unless
the first mortgagee paid him his money; especially as the first mortgagee, by leaving the
title deeds with the mortgagor, had been, in
some measure,
accessory in drawing in the
defendant to lend him money.
This case,
however, so far from establishing what was
supposed to be the old rule of equity, evidently contradicts it, and admits the better title
in the first mortgagee.
So, in the case of
Stanhope v. Vemey, 2 Eden, 81, before Lord
Northington, (Butler's note to Co. Litt. 290,
296, § 13,) the second mortgagee, without notice, had possession of the title deeds, but the
chancellor did not give him the preference
on that single circumstance, but because he
also had got possession
of an outstanding
term. There does not seem, therefore, to be
the requisite evidence of the existence of any
such rule in equity, as has been stated by
some of the judges; and if there was, a different rule has been since established. It is
now the settled EngUsh doctrine, that the
mere circumstance of leaving the title deeds
with the mortgagor, is not, of itself, sufflcient
to postpone the first mortgagee, and to give
the preference to a second mortgagee, who
takes the title deeds with his mortgage, and
without notice of the prior encumbrance.
There must be fraud, or gross negligence,
which amounts to it, to defeat the prior mortgage.
There must be something like a voluntary, distinct, and unjustifiable concurrence,
on the part of the first mortgagee, to the
mortgagor's retaining the title deeds, before
he shall be postponed.
Lord Thurlow, in
Tourle v. Rand, 2 Brown, 650, said, he did
not conceive of any other rule by which the
first mortgagee
was to be postponed, but
fraud or gross negligence, and that the mere
fact of not taking the title deeds was not sufficient; and that if there were any cases to
the contrary, he wished they had been named.
So the rule was also understood by Chief Baron Eyre, in Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anst. 432, and
Lord
has since been repeatedly recognized.
Sir William Grant,
Eldon, m 6 Ves. 183, 190.
1 Fonbl. Eq. 153, 155, note.
in 12 Ves. 130.
It is admitted, by these same high authorities,
who leaves
to be just, that the mortgagee,
the title deeds with the mortgagor, so as to
enable him to commit a fraud, by holding
himself out as absolute owner, should be postponed; but the established doctrine is, that
nothing but fraud, express or implied, will
.
postpone him.
2. The hardship and abuse complained of in
the EngUsh cases, arise from the want of a
general registry act, under which a second
I bemortgagee can always secure himself.
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lieve there are no registry acts in England,
except in certain counties, as Yorkshire and
Middlesex; and the provision in such cases,
(see Stat. 3 and 4 Anne c. 4,) is similar to that
In our act concerning mortgages, and gives
the
the subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee,
if the memorial of his deed be
preference,
It has been decided, in Johnfirst registered.
son V. Stagg, 2 Johns. 510, that our act concerning the registry of mortgages extends to
leases for years, assigned by way of mortgage; and that the leaving of the lease with
the mortgagor, was no evidence of fraud, because the registry of the mortgage was a beneficial substitute for the deposit of the deed,
and gave better and more effectual security
The registry of the
to subsequent mortgagees.
mortgage is notice; and if the first mortgagee
neither takes the title deeds, nor registers
his mortgage, he only exposes himself, and
not the subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee.
The statute expressly secures the bona fide
purchaser, and it equally enables the subsequent mortgagee to secure himself, by registering his mortgage.
We have seen that the leaving the title
deeds with the mortgagor is no prejudice to
and there is the less nethe first mortgage;
cessity for it with us than in England, because, with us, the creditor who subsequently,
and without notice of any prior unregistered
mortgage, deals with the mortgagor, can always protect himself in the easiest and most
effectual manner; and, supposing he omits to
do it, by a misplaced confidence in the mortgagor, has he any equitable claim to be preferred to a prior mortgagee, who, under the
same misplaced confidence, has equally omitted to do It?
This is the turning point in the
present case.
The first mortgage was valid without registry. The statute does not render a registry
indispensable.
The omission of the registry
only exposes the mortgagee to the hazard of
a loss of his lien by a subsequent bona fide
purchase, or to the hazard of a postponement
of his lien to a subsequent registered mortgage. A second mortgage will not, per se, and
without registry, gain a preference.
There
is no such principle to be deduced from the
statute, and there is no reason or necessity for
it in the nature of the case. The reason why
a bona fide purchaser is expressly excepted
from the operation of an unregistered mortgage is, that he could not otherwise deal with
safety, and would be exposed, even with the
utmost vigilance, to the frauds of the mortgagor.
The act does not provide for the registry of his deed, but only for the registry of
mortgages,
and gives them a preference according to the priority of the reglsti-y.
The
second mortgagee protects himself by his registry, but the purchaser does not, and cannot;
and, therefore, the statute declares that his
deed shall absolutely prevail over the unregis-

tered mortgage. The statute of 3 and 4 Anne,
relative to the west riding of Yorkshire, provides for the registry of deeds and mortgages
promiscuously, and, therefore, places them
upon an equal footing.
Though, in one sense, every mortgage is a
purchase, yet the mortgage act evidently
speaks of purchasers, in the popular sense, as
those who take an absolute estate in fee.
There is no pretext for considering a mere
mortgagee as a purchaser, within the meaning of the second section of the act concerning mortgages.
I have not been able to discover any principle of law or equity that will enable me to
say, that the first mortgage is to be deprived
of its advantage of priority of time. The
omission to register the mortgage was not
capable of producing any mischief to third
persons, who would use ordinary diligence and
precaution.
The defendants ought not to
charge a negligence upon the plaintiflis of
which they have been equally guilty.
It was
their own fault or folly that they were not
They trusted to the assurances of
protected.
the mortgagor that his land was unencumbered; and the plaintiffs trusted equally in
the mortgagor, that he would not, afterwards,
sell or mortgage the land. It is a common
rule, say the books, that where of two persons, equally innocent, or equally blamable,
one must suffer, the loss shall be left with
him on whom it has fallen; and here comes
in the other rule, that the equities being otherwise equal, the priority of time must determine the right.
It is veiy clear that the firr.t mortgagee was
not bound to register his mortgage, because
the law makes it valid, as between the parties, without registry.
The registry is only a
matter of precaution, and the statute has provided against all the mischief of the omission.
If the party will not avail himself of the
means of safety provided by statute, he cannot expect that this court will grant him further aid, and especially against a party whom
he charges with no fraud.
If relief is ever
given in any case, on the ground of policy, or
constructive fraud, against the sale or mortgage of property, it is because, from the nondelivery of possession, or from other circumstances, imposition had or might have been
practised, which could not be detected or
guarded against by the exercise of ordinary
diligence. No such ground for relief exists in
this case.
I am, accordingly, of opinion, that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, according to the
prayer of their bill, and that the defendants
are either to account to them for the amount
due on their bond and mortgage, or that the
residue of the term be sold for the satisfaction of their debt.
The costs of suit are to be
paid out of the property mortgaged.
Decree accordingly.
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quently the power of attorney may be put
out of tlie case, and the conveyance
could
only operate on his own legal or equitable
interest.
In law, he was seized under the original
deed, and the deed from Robert Jlitchel of
one undivided moiety of the property.
Under the various agreements and entries
on the books of the firms at Charleston and
Savannah which have been stated, his equitable interest was precisely equal to his legal
interest. In law and equity he held one
moiety of the premises in question.
The
other moiety was in John Caig. To one
sixth Caig was legally entitled by the conveyance from Robert Mitchel, and to two
sixths he was equitably entitled by the agreement with Edwin Gairdner and the consequent entries on the books.
Of the equitable interest of John Caig
the mortgagees were bound to take notice,
because the piu:chaser
of an equitable interest, purchases at his peril, and acquires
the property burdened with every prior equity charged upon it, because the deed itself
gives notice of Caig's title, and because Caig
was in possession of the property.
The mortgage
deed of December, 1801,
could not, then, in law or equity, pass more
than one moiety of the property it men-

Shirras and others, the appellants, brought
their bill to foreclose the equity of redemption on two lots lying In the town of Savannah, alleged to have been mortgaged to
them by Edwin Gairdner.
The deed of mortgage is dated the fii-st of December, 1801,
and purports to be a conveyance from Edwin Gairdner and John Caig, by Edwin Gau-dner his attorney in fact. Edwin Gairdner
not appearing to have possessed any power
to act for John Caig, the conveyance as to
him, Is void, and could only pass that interest
which was possessed by Gairdner himself.
The court will proceed to inquire what that
interest was.
It appears that, on the 17th May, 1796, the
premises were conveyed to James Gau-dner,
Edwin Gairdner and Robert Mitchel, merchants and co-partners of the city of Savannah.
In 1799, this partnership was dissolved;
and, in December in the same year, James
tions.
Gairdner made an entry on the books of the
A question arises on the face of the deed
company charging this property to Edwin
respecting the extent of the property comprehended in it. The plaintiffs contend that
Gairdner & Co. of Charleston, at the price
of 20,000 dollars. This firm consisted of Edboth lots are within the description;
the
win Gairdner alone. James Gairdner also exdefendants that only the wharf lot is conveyed.
ecuted a power of attorney authorizing Edwin Gairdner to sell and convey his interest
The property conveyed is thus described:
in this and other real property.
"All that lot of land, houses and wharfs in
In March, 1801, a partnership was formed
the city of Savannah as is particularly debetween Edwin Gairdner and John Caig to
scribed by the annexed plat, and is generally known by the name of Gairdner's wharf."
carry on trade in Savannah, under the firm
The plat was not annexed, nor was it re[name] of Edwin Gairdner & Co.; and in the
same month, Robert Mitchel, conveyed his
corded with the deed. It is, however, filed
one third of the lots in question to Edwin
as an exhibit in the cause, and appears to be
Gairdner and John Caig.
a plat of a part of the town of Savannah,
including the lot on which Gairdner's wharf
About the same time it was agreed between
was, and also one other lot belonging to the
the house at Charleston and that in Savannah to transfer the Savannah property to
same persons, which was designated as No.
the firm trading at that place; and entries
6, and which does not adjoin the property on
to that effect were made in the books of
which the wharves are erected.
both companies; and possession was delivThe words descriptive of the property inered to Edwin Gairdner & Co. of Savannah.
tended to be conveyed do not appear to the
Such was the state of title in December,
court to be applicable to more than the wharf
1801, when the deed of mortgage bears date.
lot. The word "lot" is in the singular number; the term "houses" is satisfied by the
The plaintiffs claim the whole property,
or, if not the whole, five sixths;
because
fact that there are houses on the wharf lot;
they suppose Edwin Gairdner to have been
and there is no evidence in the cause, nor
any reason to believe that lot No. 6 was
equitably entitled to his own third, to that
"generally known by the name of Gairdner's
of James Gairdner, and to half of the third
Wharf." The court, therefore, cannot conof Robert Mitchel. But for this claim the
within the
sider that lot as corapreliended
court is of opinion that there can be no just
conveyance.
pretension, because he did not affect to conThe mortgaged property is in posse.ssinn of
vey by virtue of the power from James
the defendants Caig and Mitchel, who derive
Gairdner— he did not affect to pass the intheir title thereto in the following maniici-.
terest of James Gairdner, but to pass the
ConseOn the 7th of January, 1802, a new part
estate of John Caig and himself.
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nership was formed between Gaiidner, Caig
and Mitchel, and, by the articles of co-partnery, which are under seal, the Savannah
property is declared to be stock in -trade, and
an entry was made on the books of the old
firm transferring this property to the new
On the 12th of the same month,
concern.
the co-partnership of Gairdner and Caig was
dissolved.
On the 27th of July, 1802, by deeds properly executed, one third of the property became vested In John Caig, and one other
•third in Robert Mitchel.
On the 3d of November, 1802, Edwin Gairdand this bill is
ner became a bankrupt;
brought by his mortgagees and assignees.

The claim to foreclose is resisted by Caig
and Mitchel, because they say,
1st. The mortgage was not executed at the
time it bears date, but long afterwards, and
on the eve of bankruptcy.
2d. That the transaction is not bona fide,
there being no real debt, nor any money actually advanced by the mortgagees.
3d. That the mortgage was kept secret, instead of being committed to record.
4th. That the whole transaction is totally
variant from that stated in the deed.
They therefore claim the property for the

creditors of Gairdner, Caig and Mitchel.
1st. From the testimony in the cause it
appears that the deed, if not executed on the
day, was executed about the day of its date;
and that Gairdner, at the time, was believed
to be solvent.
2d. It appears, also, that the mortgage was
executed, in part, to secure the payment of
money actually due at the time, and, in part,
to secure sums to be advanced, and to indemnify sorpe of the mortgagees for liabilities to be incurred.
3d. The mortgage is dated the 1st of December, 1801, and was recorded in September,
1802.

By the laws of Georgia, a deed is valid if
recorded within twelve months; but any deed
recorded within ten days after its execution
takes preference of deeds not recorded within
that time, or previously on the record.
It appears to the court, that neither negligence, nor that fraud which is inferred from
the mere fact of omitting to place a deed on
record, can, with propriety, be imputed to
the person who has used all the despatch
subsequent
pui'which the law requires.
without notice, sustain an injury
chasers
within the time allowed for recording a deed,
the injury is to be ascribed to the law, not
to the individual who has complied with its

If

requisition.
purchasers
In this case the subsequent
might have proceeded to record their deeds
within ten days, and have thereby obtained
they claim, but they have
the preference
failed to do so. They are themselves chargeable with the very negligence which they ascribe to their adversaries; and, were they
to be preferred, the court would invert the

well established rule of law, and postpone,
under similar circumstances, a prior to a subsequent deed.
4th. It is true that the real transaction
does not appear on the face of the mortgage.
The deed purports to secure a debt of £30,It
000 sterling due to all the mortgagees.
was really intended to secure different sums,
due at the time from particular mortgagees,
advances afterwards to be made, and liabilities to be incurred to an uncertain amount.
It is not to be denied, that a deed, which
misrepresents the transaction it recites, and
the consideration on which it is executed,
is liable to suspicion. It must sustain a rigIt is certainly, always
orous examination.
advisable fairly and plainly to state the truth.
But if, upon investigation, the real transaction shall appear to be fair, though somewhat
variant from that which is described, it would
to deseem to be unjust and unprecedented
prive the person claiming under the deed, of
his real equitable rights, unless it be in favor
of a person who has been, in fact, injured
and deceived by the misrepresentation.
That cannot have happened in the present
case.

There is the less reason for imputing blame
to the mortgagees, in this case, because the
deed was prepared by the mortgagor himself,
by
and executed
without being inspected
them, so far as appears in the case.
It is then, the opinion of the court that
the plaintiffs, Shirras and others, have a just
title, under their mortgage deed, to subject
one moiety of the lot, or parcel of ground,
commonly known by the name of Gairdner's
Wharf, to the payment of the debts still remaining due to them, which were either due
at the date of the mortgage, or were afterwards contracted upon its faith, either by advances actually made or incurred prior to the
receipt of actual notice of the subsequent
title of the defendants, Caig and Mitchel;
and that the decree of the circuit court of
Georgia, so far as it is inconsistent with this
opinion, ought to be reversed.
The following is the decree of this court:
This cause came on to be heard on the
transcript of the record, and was ai^ued by
counsel.
On consideration whereof it is the
opinion of this court, that the deed of mortgage in the proceedings mentioned, and dated
on the 1st of December, 1801, is, in law, a
valid conveyance of one moiety of that lot
of land, houses and wharves in the city of
Savannah,
which was generally known by
the name of Gairdner's Wharf, being the parcel of ground lying between the river and the
street, and that the mortgagees
in the said
deed mentioned,
are entitled to foreclose the
equity of redemption in the said mortgaged
property, and to obtain a sale thereof, and to
apply the proceeds of the said sale to the payment of what remains unsatisfied of their respective debts, which were either due at the
date of the mortgage, or have been since contracted, either on account of monies advanced,
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IncuiTed prior to their receiving
actual notice of the title of the defendants,
John Caig, and Robert Mitchel. And the decree of the circuit court for the district of
Georgia, so far as it is Inconsistent with this
or liabilities
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opinion, is reversed and annulled, and in all
other things is aflBrmed; and the cause is remanded to the said circuit court for the district of Georgia, that further proceedings maybe had therein according to equity.
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CITY OF

v. O'NEIL
CO. et al.

ST. LOtnS

LUMBER

(21 S. W. 484, 114 Mo. 74.)
Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 1.
Feb. 6. 1893.

Appeal

from St.

Jacob Klein, Judge.

Liouis circuit court;

Petition hy the city of St. Louis ttiat
certain creditors of James McLane, a contractor, be compelled to interplead for the
purpose of determining tlieir rights in a
fund owing by the city to the contractor.
From a judgment of the circuit court giving preference to the O'Noil Lumber Company, James M. Doyle and others appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment, and the case was then certified
to the supreme court. Reversed.
J. H. Trembly and Eassieur & Schnurmacher, for respondent.

J.

BRACE,
This case is certified here
from the St. Louis court of appeals, under
section 6 of the amendment of the constitution adopted in 1884. The statement of
the case, made by Judge Biggs of that
court, is as follows :
"On the I7th day of July, 1888, the municipal assembly of the city of St, Louis
passed anordinaDceanthorizingthe board
of public improvements
to contract for
certain alterations and repairs at the
House of Refuge. Section 2 of the ordinance is as follows: 'Thecostof the above
worlj shall be paid by the city of St. Louis,
and the sum of forty-five hundred dollars
is hereby appropriated out of funds set
apart for improvements, altei'ations, and
repairsof the Uouseof Refuge.' The work
was let to one James McLane. under three
separate contracts. Contract No. 2,071
provided for the erection of two new privy
buildings at a cost of twenty-eight hundred dollars. By contract numbered 2,0^3
McLane agreed to make certain alterations in the basement and in the dormitory of the ol<l building, for the sum of
eight hundred and fifty dollars. The third
contract, numbered 2,076, provided for
furnishing lumber and laying the floor in
the shoe shop of the House of Refuge. The
foregoing contracts were signed bj' McLane as principal and the interpleaders
Thomas C. Higgins and John M. Sellers as
his sureties. Among other things, the contracts provided that 'in case the con tractor
shall abandon the vs'ork • » * the commissioner of public buildings shall have
power, under the direction of the board of
public improvements, to place such and so
many persons as he may deem advisable,
by contract or otherwise, to work and
complete the work to be done, and to use
such matei'ials as he may find on the line
of said work, or to procure other materials
for the completion of the same, and ti.
charge the expense of said labor nnd materiaistothecontractor;
that thisexpense
shall be deducted and paid out of such
moneys as may then be due, or may at
any time thereafter grow due, to hiui under the contract; and, in case such e.vpense
Is less than the amount still due under the
contract, had it been completed by the
contractor, he shall be entitled to receive

the difference, and, in case such expense is

greater, the party of the first part ( which
includes the contractor and his sureties)
shall pay the amount of such excess.' The
contracts also contained the following
provision: 'And said party of the first
part (which includes the contractor and
his sureties) hereby further agrees that he
Will furnish the said board of public improvements with satisfactory evidence
that all persons who have done or furnished materials under this agreement,
and are entitled to a lien therefor under
any law of the state of Missouri, have
been fully paid, are no longer entitled
to such lien ; and, in case such evidence be
not furnished, such amount as the board
may consider necessary to meet the lawful
claims of the persons aforesaid, provided
said persons shall notify said board before
the final estimates be returned, shall be retained from the moneys due the said party
of the first part under this agreement, until the liabilities aforesaid ma.v be fully discharged.'
Under paragraph S of the contract, an estimate of the amount of the
work done each month is to be made
about the first of each succeeding month,
and a valuation according to the current
market prices put thereon.
From the
amount of such estimate, ten per cent, is
to be deducted, and the balance certified
as due. The obligation of Higgins and
Sellers binds them, with McLane, to the
city of St. Louis, and for the faithful performance of the foregoing contracts in every particular.
The foregoing quotations
from the contracts are believed to be sufiicient for an understanding of the legal
propositions arising upon this record.
McLane entered tfpon the work, and continued it until the 20th day of November,
1888, when he absconded
from the state,
leaving the work in an unfinished condition. It is conceded that up to the 1st day
of November the city had paid to McLane
for work done and materials furnished under contract No. 2,071 the sum of one
thousand and threedollars and fiftycents.
This would leave the sum of one thousand
and seven hundred and ninety-six dollars
and fifty cents due from the city if the
work should be completed. The work under contract No. 2,083 was also left in an
unfinished condition.
Monthly estimates
of the work under this contract had also
been made, and up to the 1st day of November McLane had been paid on account
thereof six hundred and seven dollars and
fifty cents, leaving a balance due from the
city, if the work had been completed, of
two hundred and forty-two dollars and
fifty cents. The work under the third contract had been fully completed and paid
for. It was also admitted that, in addition to the amounts earned bv McLane
under the two contracts betweien the 1st
anil 20th of November, the city owed him
the sum of thirty -seven dollars for work
(lone at the House of Refuge not embraced
in either contract.
When McLane abandoned the contracts, the city made an urrangemeiit with Higuins and Sellers to
complete the work. No new contract was
entered into. The work was to be completed under the old contracts.
Higgins
and Sellers fiuirthed the work to the satisfaction of the city authorities. Afewdays
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after this arrangement with Higgins and
Sellers, the O'Neil TiUmber Company, one
of the interpleaders, filed a suit in equity
against McLane and tlie city, in which it
claimed that McLane was indebted to it
for Ininher furnished on account of said
contracts of the value of seven hundred
and fifty dollars, and it asked that this
amount be charged against the remainder
of the money due from the city under the
contract. Then followed a like suit by
John M. and Edward Doyle, the appellants herein, in which theyclaimed to have
performed w ork and furnished materials
to McLane, under contract No. 2,071, of
the value of thirteen hundred and four dollars. They sought to make their claim u
charge upon the balance due from the city
under said contract No. 2,071. Other
mechanics and material men followed
with like suits, but, under the view we
have taken of the case, it will not be necessary to notice them. When Higglns and
Hcl'ers completed the work they claimed
tliat the work done and the materials furnished by them in the completion of contract N'ti. 2,071 actually cost them the sura
of one thousand and fifty-nine dollars and
eighty-nine cents; that they did work in
completing contract No. 2,083 of the value
of forty dollars; and that they did e.xtra
work under the last-mentioned contract
amounting to twenty-nine dollars and
fifty cents,— making a total of eleven huu•dred and twenty-nine dollars and thirtynine cents. Their contention was, and is
now,that, asthey had earned this amount
in the completion of the work, they were
«ntitled to be first paid out of the balance
of the funds due under the McLane contracts, in preference to the O'Neil Liuiiber
•Company and Doyle Bros. When the city
found itself beset witli these conflicting
claims, it brought into court the amount
due from it under the McLane contracts,
to wit, two thousand one hundred and
five dollars and fifty cents. The foregoing
facts were stated in its petition, and the
court was asked to compel the claimants
to interplead for the fund, and that they
be restrained from the further prosecution
of the suits against the city. The neces«ary orders were made, and thereafter such
proceedings were had in the case as to result in a trial between the several interpleaders of their respectiveclalms to priority. The court held that Higgitis and Sell«rs must be paid tirst. This left a balance
of nine hundred and seventy-six dollars
and eleven cpn<s, which the court found
had been earned by McLane between the

Ist

and 20tb

of November.

As the O'Neil

Lumber Company was the first to institute suit and have the city served with
process, the court gave its claim priority
over those of the other interpleaders, and
ordered it to be paid in full. The suit of
the Doyle Bros, being the next in point of
time, the remainder of the fund, to wit,
the sum of two hundred and twenty-five
<iolIars and sixty cents, was ordered paid
to them. From this ord r of distribution
Doyle Bros. haveprosfculed their appeal."
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of thecircuitcourt.l42 Mo. App.5h6,)
all the judges agreeing that out of thn
funds to be distributed the amount found
to be du« liiggiUB and Ssllers u-ust be first
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paid. But to the conclusion reached by
a majority of the court of appeals and
the circuit court, — that the remainder
should te distributed among the interpleaders according to the priority of their
Kiiits,— Judge Thompson dissented, and
filed a disspiiting opinion, as follows:
"The statute relating to mechanics' liens
eontnina the following section: 'The liens
for work and labor done or things furnished, as specified in this article, shall be
upon an equal footing, without reference
to the date of filing, the account, or lien;
and in all cases where a sale shall be ordered, and the property sold, which may
be described in any account
or lien, the
proceeds arising from such sale, when not
surticientto discharge in full all the liens
against the same without reference to the
date of tiling the account or lien, shall be
fiaid pro rata on the respective liens: provided, such account or liens shall have been
filed and suit brought as provided by this
article.' Re v. St. 1SS9, § 6727 ; Rev. St. 1879,
With this statute in force, the city
§8193.
of St. Louis, in making the contract with
McLane, inserted the following provision :
'
And said party of the first part (which
includes the contractor and his sureties)
hereby further agrees that he will furnish
the said board of public improvements
with satisfactory evidence that all persons
who have done work or furnished materials under this agreement, and are entitled to a lien therefor under any law of the
state of Missouri, have been fully paid, or
no longer entitled to such lien; and, in
case such evidence be not furnished, such
amount as the board may consfHei" necessary to meet the lawful claims of the persons

aforesaid,

provided

said

persons

shall notify said board before the final estimates be returned, shall be retained from
the moneys due the said party of the first
part under this agreement until the liabilities aforesaid ma.v be fully discharged.'
With this provision in force, indicating the
policy of the state to be that all mechanics
and material men entitled to liens shall
share ratably, the city sees fit to insert
this clause in its contract with the mechanic, indicating a clear purpose on its
part to see that the policy of the statute
is carried out, and that it will withhold
enough of what is due to the principal
contractor to nay his subcontractors or
material men. 'It is true that such persons are not, under the law as judicially
construed, entitled to a mechanic's lien
against any property belonging to the
city: but that does not seem to afford a
good reason why no effect whatever
should he given to this clause of the contract. The city had no right, under the
decision of Luthy v. Woods, 6 Nfo. App.
67, and St. Louis v. Keane, 27 Mo. App. 642,
to hold enough of what was due McLane
in the character of trustee for the material
men who had furnished to him materials
which he used in the work. But events
took such a turn that there wasiiotenough
for all, and the city, finding itself thus embarrassed, instead of executing the trust
itself, brought the fund into a court of
equity, and asked that court to administer it; in other words, asked that court to
require the contending jjarties to interplead for it, which was done. It is also
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true that the city has not, under the terms
of the contract, elected to set this fund
apart, and to hold it for any particular
beneficiary; but nevertheless I cannot but
think that it ouj^ht to be distributed, not
according
to the attachment law, but according to the policy of the mechanics'
lien law. This clause of the contract has
no doubt existed in the contract forme on
which the city lets out contracts for city
buildings from a time when it was supposed that the city buildings were liable
Persons supplying
to mechanics' liens.
materials to city contractors may fairly
be presumed to know that such a clause
exists in such contracts. They may, therefore, be fairly presumed to give credit to
the contractor on the faith of being proBut this faitli is
tected by the city.
disapbroken, and this just expectation
pointed, when tlie creditor that makes the
first grab at the fund set apart for all
gets a preference over the other, albeit in
a court called a court of equity.
"The ground on which this result is
reached, if I understand the reasoning, is
that this fund has never been impressed
with the character of a trust, which dis-

tinguishes the case from the previous decisions of this court. To my mind, it is a
conclusive answer to this to say that the
city has done all that it could safely do to
impress the fund with the character of a
trust fund for the equal benefit of tlie material men, and has certainly not indicated a contrary purpose by handing it over
to a court of equity for distribution. But
it is said that the proceedings in equity,
which were taken against the city by tlie
material men before the petition of interpleader was filed, were 'equitable garnishments,' and therefore the provision of the
attachment law is to be imported into a
court of equity, under which, instead of
doing equity by making a ratable distribution among the creditors of equal merit, the rule of distribution is to be, first
come, first served. It is true that in judicial decisions in this state the proceeding
has been denominated an 'equitable garnishment.'
But that expression was used
for the mere convenience of having aname
for an anomalous proceeding.
It was not
used with reference to the question of priorities, which we are here considering.
To
my mind, there is no such thing as an 'equitable garnishment' in the sense in which
it is lierp sought to employ the term, any
more than there is an equitable indictment, or an equitable bill of attainder.
But if we are to disregard the policy of the
statute relating to mechanics' liens, and if
we are also to disregard the contract between the city and McLane, which shows
that botb parties had in mind the idea
that the material men of McLane should
share equally, there is another ground
which is inexorably logical as well as undeniably just, on which the same result
should be worked out. It is the doctrine
of our supreme court in Kieper v. Rieper,
79 Mo. 352, —the same being, so far as 1 can
see, the last controlling decision of that
court upon this question,— in which the
familiar rule of equity is applied that what
are called 'equitable assets' are to be divided pari passu among all creditors l)efore the court. The bauie doctrine was

stated and applied by this court in Ileiraan v. fisher, 11 Mo. App. 275, and in St.

Louis

V.

Keane,
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What,

then, are equitable assets'? Judge Bakewell, in Heiman v. Fisher, 11 Mo. App. at
page 2S0, says that 'equitable assets are
such as can be reached only by the aid of a
court of equity, and the established rule
M that assets which can only be reached in
equity must be distributed pari passu
among all creditors.' I take theruleto be
that, where assets are of such a character
that they are not vendible under an execution at law, and that no lien can be mad»
to attach to them by any proceeding at
law, but that they can only be reached
and subjected to the demand of a creditor
by the aid and the processes of a court of
equity, they are for that reason, and that
reason alone, equitable assets. Nor does
it appear to me to make any difference
why, or on what theory of law or of public policy, they are lield to be available tcv
the creditor through the aia of processesTo bring them within
of equity alone.
the well-known rule in respect of the distribution of equitable assets, it is enoagt*
that they cannot be touched in any waywithout aid of a court of equity, and that
whatever creditor gets satisfaction out of
them must submit himself to the principles of a court whose favorite maxim is
that equity is equality. But to this view
there is opposed the argument that in this
state, in the case of what is called a creditors' bill in aid of an execution at law to
reach assets which have been concealed or
fraudulently conveyed by the debtor, therule is that the creditor first filing such a
bill gets a prioritj- over the others. Such
is, no doubt, the rule in this state, though
the contrary principle is every day administered in the courts of the United States
here in our midst. But the assets thus
pursued and made available by the creditor are not equitable assets within th&
sense of the rule under consideration, for
the reason that they are vendible under
his execution at law. The creditor can
levy upon his debtor's interest in property
which the latter has fraudulently conveyed, have it sold atsherii'f's sale, become
the purchaser, and then bring a suit in equity to clear his title; and I understand
that a third person may become the purchaser at sheriff's sale, and have the like
remedy in equity. Rights may thus attach to such assets in proceedings at law
which in their very nature givea priority,—
not merely a priority of lien, but a priority of title. But there is another reason
which distinguishes those cases from this.
In those cases the moving creditor, even
where he does not first sell the debtor's interest under his execution at law, often
goes to great labor and expense in uncovering assets of his debtor. It is therefore
debatable, to say the least, whether he
ought to be required, after fighting the
battle, to allow the camp followers whohave skulked in the rear to come in and
divide with him the fruits of the victory.
But no such condition of things exists in
respect of the question we are ccjnsidering.
The debtor has made no fraudulent conveyance, has concealed no assets.
He has
simplj' run away, leaving visible certain
assets in the hands of a custodian, who is

li.vxnrs OF equity.
so privilpged, under

the policy of the law,
can only be ron.pelled
to account for them and to distribute
them by a court ot e<iuity. Shall the principle which rewards the dilisem-e and
courage of the judgment creditor who sues
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance be
applied so as to Rive a priority to the
•creditor seekins satisfaction out of such
equitable assets merely because he may
happen to file his bill a day before the others? Tills is not rewarding diligence, courage, labor, and the expenditure of money.
It may result merely in rewarding good
fortune. The creditor first filing his bill
may not even be the most diligent; he
may mercl.v be the most fortunate. A
day's sickness in the case of his rival creditor, the accident of employing one lawyer instead ol another, may, it this is to be
the rule, turn the scale, and give him all,
while the others standing in equal right
get none. I can see no difference in principle between this case and the case of Rieper V. Rieper, 79 Mo. 352, which was, beyond
In both cases
■question, correctly decided.
the assets are well knovvn, uncovered, undenied, unconcealed, but capable of being
subjected only by proceedings in equity.
The moving creditor, who. as in Rieper v.
Kieper, seeks to subject the separate estate oJ a married woman, gets no lien by
the mere filing of his bill, and tor the naked
reason that the assets are equitable assets, and that it is the act of the court,
and not the act ot the creditor, that creates the lien. The lien is created by the
<iecree, and not by the bringing of the suit.
In all such cases the well-known rule of

tliat that custodian

29

chancery procedure is that all creditors
who come in before the final decree of distriouriou share pari iiassn.
In this conclusion reached by the learned
dissenting judge we concur. We think he
might have safely rested it npon the case
of Rieper v. Rieper, 79 Mo. 352, and the last
ground so forcibly put in his opinion, to
which we deem it necessary to add only a
word in explanation of our position.
While a court of equity, underthe admirable doctrine announced in the able opinion
of Judge Bliss in Pendleton v. Perkins, 4'J
Mo. 5t).5, can and will give a remedy to
creditors against assets in its custody, or
which can be reached only by its strong
arm, yet such courts cannot create for
their benefit either the process of garnishment on the one hand, or the remedies to
be acquired under the mechanic's lien law
on the other, and are not constrained to a
distribution of those assets to creditors
according to the principles that would obtain under the law governing either, but
will make such distribution according to
right and justice, which in this case would
be (after paying Higgins and Sellers the
amount found due them for the finishing the work out of the fund) to distribute the remainder among the interpleaders
in proportion to the amounts found to be
severally due them. That this may be
done, the judgment of the St. Louis court
ot appeals affirming the judgment ot the
St. Louis circuit court is reversed, and the
same remanded to said court of appeals,
to be proceeded with accordingly. All
concur, except BARCLAY, J., who dissents.
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CHURCH, 0. J. The principal que.stion
in this ciise, involving the construction of the
grant of water, was correctly decided in the
court below. It is well settled in this State
that the terms used in this grant are to be
taken as a measure of the quantity of water
granted, and not a limitation of the use to
the particular machinery specified.
( Wakely
V. Davidson, 26 N. Y., 387; Cromwell v.
iSelden, 3 id... 253.)
It was found by the court
that, at the time tliedefendantshut the water
off, he asserted that the plaintiff had forfeited
his right to the water, and claimed a right to
shut it off.
In this he was mistaken. In depriving the plaintiff of the use of the water
under an assertion of forfeiture, he rendered
himself amenable to the process of the court
for the protection of the plaintiff's rights.
The judgment enjoining the defendants from
depriving the plaintiff of the quantity of water to which lie was entitled under his deed,
cannot be disturbed.
The only serious question in the case relates to the use of the buzz
saw in front of the mill. Tlie plaintifE did
not, by his deed, acquire the title to the land
in front of the mill, because the description
is limited to the land upon which the mill
stands, but he did acquire an easement in
such land for the puipose of ingress and
egress, and also for the purpose of piling and
sawing wood for the use of the mill, as it had
been used and enjoyed for forty years.
Everything necessary for the full and free enjoyment of the mill passed as an incident, sppurtenant to the land conveyed. (2 Kent's
Com., 467; Blaine's Lessee v. Chambers, 1
Serg. & liawle, 174.)
But this would not authorize the plaintiff to erect and use machinery upon this land not necessary to the
use of the mill, as it had been used, and would
not authorize the use of the buzz saw upon
that land.
The objection is not that the
plaintiff propelled tlie buzz saw with the water from the dam, as he had the right to use
the water for any machinery and in any place
which he was entitled to occupy; but he could
not occupy the space in front of the mill for
that purpose. At the time the water was
shut off by the defendants, it was being used
only to propel this saw ; and it is claimed that
the defendants were justified in shutting off
the water from that machinery; and for that

re.ison the judgment should be reversed, or,
at least, that it should be modified so as to
restrain the plaintiff from using his buzz saw
As we have
on the defendants' premises.
seen, the judgment against the defendants is
fully warranted by the findings; and the question is, whether any modification should bo
It is a rule of
made against the plaintiff.
equity that he who asks equity must do eqThe plaintiff was in fault in using the
uity.
It is
buzz saw on the defendants' premises.
said that this was an independent transaction, for which the defendants might have
an action; and this was the view of the court
below. The rule referred to will be applied
when the adverse equity grows out of the
very controversy before the court, or of such
circumstances as the record shows to be a part
of its history, or is so connected with the
cause in litigation as to be presented in the
pleadings and proofs, with full opportunity
afforded to the party thus recriminated to ex[Tripp v. Cook,
plain or refute the charges.
26 Wend., 143; McDonald v. NeiUon. 2 Cow.,
190; easier v. Shipman, 35 N. Y.. 533.)
All the facts connected with the right of
the plaintiff to use the buzz saw were not
only spread out upon the record, but were in
fact litigated upon the trial, and, as to bis
strict legal rights, are undisputed; and we
cannot say that, but for his use of the saw on
the defendants' premises, the water would
not have been shut off. Whether this was
so or not, the controversy in relation to his
right to use the saw was involved in the litigation, and was intimately connected with
the wrongful act of the defendants; and, being so, it is proper to apply the equitable
rule.
It is not indispensable to the application of this rule that the fault of the plaintiff
should be of such a character as to authorize
an independent action for an injunction
The plaintiff, in strictness,
against him.
was in the wrong in placing his buzz saw in
front of the mill. The defendants were in
the wrong in shutting off the water, and especially in asserting a forfeiture; and. as both
parties are in court to insist upon their strict
legal rights, we think substantial justice will
be done by modifying the judgment so as to
enjoin the plaintiff from using the buzz saw
on the land in front of his mill, and, as modified, judgment afiSrmed, without costs to
either patty against the other in this court.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
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McLaughlin

v.

N.

Mclaughlin

et ai.

J.

Eq. 190.)
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
(20

Oct. Term,

18G9.

Bill in equity for partition and an accounting.
Heard on exceptions to the master's
reports as to the account and as to the value
of a dower interest.
W. A. Lewis, for complainant.
for one of the defendants.

Mr. Dixon,

ZABRISKIE, Ch. John G. AIcLaughlin
died intestate, May 2, 1861, seised of a number of houses and lots in Jersey City, in one
of which he resided at his death.
He left
his widow, Abby Ann McLaughlin, and six
children, his heirs at law. Two of these children were minors at his death.
Some of
these children were children of his widow,
the others were children of his first wife.
The widow remained in possession of the
mansion house until her death, on the 20th
of August, ISliS. Dower was never formally
assigned to her.
The administration of the
personal estate of her husband was granted
By tacit consent of all the heirs who
to her.
were of age, she assumed the management
of the real estate, collected the rents, paid
the taxes and repairs, and rented out such
parts as it was necessary to rent.
The bill in this case was filed In her lifetime for a partition, and for an account by
her of the rents of the estate.
The master reported that a partition could
not be made without great injury, and that
the property should be sold, and that the
dower of the widow should be sold with the
lands.
The lands were all sold in the life of
the widow, and all conveyed except one lot
in Green street, which, upon refusal of the
purchaser to comply with his contract, was
ordered to be re-sold, and was re-sold after
her death.
On the 28th of June, 1868, the
widow filed her petition electing to accept a
gross sum in lieu of her dower, and an order was made on July 7, 1868, to refer it to
the masler to ascertain and compute the
value of her dower. She had, in compliance
with the prayer of the bill, rendered her account of the rents and profits of the estate,
in which she charged five per cent, for collecting them, and claimed one third as due
to her in her right as dowress, but did not
charge herself with the rent of the mansion
house, and the office on the adjoining lot,
which had been occupied as such by her husband, in his lifetime.
It was also referred
to the master to examine and state her account.
The master made a separate report upon
In the reeach order of reference to him.
port upon the order to state the accounts,
he charged her with the value of the mansion
house from the death of her husband, or
rather from May 1st, the day before his
To this the complainant, as executrix
death.
of her mother, the widow, excepts, claiming

ai

that as dower was never assigned, the widow
was entitled by virtue of the statute, to remain in possession of the mansion house and
messuage attached, without rent, until dowciwas assigned.
The master admits the right under the statute, and bases his action on the ground that
dower was virtually and equitably assigned
to the widow in the whole property by her
taking possession of the whole, with the assent of the heirs, and appropriating one third
of the rents of the whole to her own use;
and that the provision of the statute which
was intended to protect the widow in her
estate as dowress, an estate favored at law,
against the injustice or delay of the heirs,
was not intended to secure to her more than
one third of the rents, and more than her due
in a case like this, where the heirs left in
her hands the whole estate to retain, by her
own action, the amount due to her; that assignment of dower requires no particular
form, and may, in some cases, be of one
third of the tolls of a mill or of the produce
of lands, which, if assigned and accepted as
dower, should be equivalent to an assignment at law or in equity. To this conclusion
of the master I assent.
And even without
such equitable assignment, I am of opinion
that a widow who claims one third of the
rents of the lands other than the mansion
house and messuage, must be willing to account for the value of the part occupied by
her.

Damages for the detention of dower were
not recovered at common law, but only by
the statute of Merton; and after that statute the rule was settled by the courts of
common law, that if the widow died before
the damages for detention were assessed,
they could not be recovered.
2 Bac. Abr.
395, tit. "Dower," I; Park, Dower, 309. Nor
could damages be recovered, if the widow
died before dower was assigned; nor if she
accepted the dower assigned by the heir, or
by proceedings in chancery.
Park, Dower,
310; Co. Lift 33a.
But in such cases the
value of the dower for the time it was
wrongfully detained may be recovered in
equity. Curtis v. Curtis, 2 Brown, Ch. 629,
632; Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Atk. 130; Park,
Dower, 332; Johnson v. Thomas, 3 Paige,
377; 2 Bac. Abx-. 396, "Dower," I; Vin. Abr.
"Dower," S, a, § 20; Hamilton v. Ld. Mohun,
1 P. Wms. 118.
The courts of law in assessing damages for
the detention, allow, as reprises, for the occupation by the widow.
In Walker v. Nevil,
Leon. 56, quoted in 2 Bac. Abr., "Dower," I,
p. 394, the court reversed the Judgment, because tlie damages were for eight years, and
the widow had occupied for part of the eight
years. And in Woodruff v. Brown, 17 N. J.
Law, 216, three of the judges In their opinions say that what had been received by the
widow might be deducted from the value.
This was approved in Keeler v. Tatnell, 2:1
N. J. Law, 62. And in the case of Hoppei
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Hopper, 22 N. J. Law, 715, although the
court of errors refused to order the judgment
of a previous term to be altered, so as to
allow a plea to be added that the defendant
had satisfied the demandant for the value of
her dower, yet at the inquisition which was
taken under the direction of Chief Justice
at the Bergen circuit, the defendant
■Green,
was allowed to prove, as part satisfaction of
the value, or in mitigation of the damages,
that the demandant had occupied one half
the mansion bouse from tlie death of her
husband. And it could never be permitted,
where the only land out of which dower is
claimed is the mansion house and messuage,
that a widow, who had occupied the whole
as quarantine from the death of her husband,
should recover in addition one thii'd of the
value as damages;
and yet this would be
the result, if the value assessed miast be one
thii-d of the whole value without regard to
occupation by the widow.
And a court of equity, in such case, will
not give damages beyond the amount established by law, especially when such damages
But, on the other hand,
are inequitable.
where a widow comes into this court to claim
the value of her dower, in a case where such
value could not be recovered at law, she will
be required to do equity, and will be allowed only to recover the value of the dower detained, that is the value of one third of the
whole estate, deducting the value of the part
occupied by her.
This may be done by allowing her to occupy the mansion house free
of rent, and by giving her out of the residue
of the estate so much as will make her pait
■one third of the value of the whole, if anything be requii-ed for that end.
On both
grounds the report of the master must be
sustained, and this exception overruled. The
claim of the widow is unjust and inequitable.
The excess of one day's rent charged by the
jnaster by mere inadvertence, may be corrected without a re-stating of the account.
The next exception to the account is that
of Samuel C. McLaughlin and wife. It is to
the charge of $150, and interest on it for
■one year's rent of No. 147,
and the upper
part of No. 149, Green street. The only evidence as to this is that of Samuel 0. McLaughlin himself. He testifies that he had
rented of his father both premises for the
year ending May 1st, 1801, at the rent of
$300; that he continued to occupy them the
next year without any new bargain. This
usually would be a continuance of the former tenancy at the same rent, and I see
nothing In this case to prevent the application of this rule. I am of opinion that this
exception must be sustained.
The next exception is by the complainant
as executrix and legatee of the widow, to
the master's report on the value of her
dower.
The report finds that she is not entitled
to have a gross sum in lieu of her dower in
V.

the Green street lot, which was not sold unThe report is founded
death.
on the decision of Chancellor Green, in Mulford V. Hiers, 13 N. J. Eq. 13, and is fully
sustained by that decision; and I concur entirely with the late chancellor in the principles upon which that conclusion is based.
Another exception to that report is to the
principle upon which the master estimated
the value of the life of the widow, and the
gross value of her dower. It was held in the
case of Mulford v. Hiers, above referred to,
that when a dowress had, in a partition
case, consented to take a gross sum in lieu
of her dower, the right to have such sum
estimated in proportion to the value of her
life at the time of consent, became a vested
right, and was not lost by her death before
the value was ascertained and settled. That
principle is admitted by the master, and is
not disputed by the counsel for the heirs.
But as she died two months after the election, and before the making of the report,
the master has assumed that the value of
her life is settled by its actual duration.
This assumption is strictly, and in fact, correct.
The actual value of her life was at
that election only two months. But this is
not the manner in which the value of such
a life is, in practice, ascertained in judicial
proceedings.
Where one is in a state of ordinary good health, and has an average expectancy of life, the value of the life is ascertained by calculation from tables prepared for annuities and life insurances, which
give, with great reliability, the gross value
of an annuity for a person in ordinary good
health, at any given age. In such computation, death by accident, or by disease subsequently conti-acted, are, on principle, disregarded. It is a risk that forms part of the
basis of the computation. But these tables
are not a safe guide where a person is not
in ordinary good health, and more especially
when afflicted with a disease incurable in
its nature, and so advanced as to render it
probable that death will soon ensue from
it. In such case the rule here applied by
the master that the actual duration of the
life is the best measure of its probability,
is perhaps the correct rule. But this is not
such a case.
Mrs. McLaughlin had some
time before been afflicted, in a mild form,
with the disease of which she died, but at
the time of her election it had left her, and
she was apparently free from it, and had
the value of her life been ascertained within
a month after her election, with all the evidence that could then have been produced,
it might have been adjudged of an average
value at her age. But although the fact of
her subsequent death, within two months,
ought not, in this case, to be taken as the
test of the value of her life, yet the fact of
a recurrence of the same disease which had
previously attacked her in a milder form,
and that from its virulence and rapid prog-

til after her
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she soon died, is a most important element in judging of the yalue of the life. It
may be with probability inferred, that the
tendency to that disease had not been eradicated from her system, and that its lurking
seeds only awaited development to make it
fatal. Her subsequent fever, and the great
and almost unnatural appetite to -which the
complainant testifies, may have been and
probably were the effect and the indication
of the continuance of the malady. Its development may have been started and continued by accidental causes, and its terby want of
mination caused or hastened
skill in medical or surgical treatment; and
therefore, even assuming that she was not
a healthy person at the time of her election,
it does not follow that her actual life is the
true legal measure of its value. I am satisfied, from the evidence, that her health was
not what may be called ordinary good health,
and that her life was not of the average
But it is
value, at the time of the election.
impossible to lay down, with any accuracy,
or any approach to accuracy, from the testimony, what ratio her life bore to the average value of life at her age; and I do not
think that the opinions or speculations of
physicians in this case, would take away

ress
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much from the uncertainty. In such cases,
the life insurance ofllces generally decline
to insure at all; but this court cannot decline to act, and allow only the annual value.
The statute requires that some estimate
shall be made. I do not feel willing to apply the rule adopted by the master, or to
estimate her life at the average value at
her age.
In this situation,
must adopt
some mean.
The adoption must be arbitrary, and without any reason that can be
assigned with certainty why it should not
be a little greater or a little less. Under
these circumstances I shall adopt the exact
mean between the value of her dower as
calculated by the master, and that calculated upon the value of a life of a person at
her age in ordinary health.
The eri'ors pointed out in the seventh exception of the complainant to the master's
account being mere mistakes In carrying
forward figures in the computation, and being admitted by the defendants, will of

I

course

be corrected.

The matters contained in both reports
must be referred back to the master to be
corrected on the principles above stated.^
1 Decree

reversed, 22 N.

J.

Eq.

505.
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BLBAKLEY'S APPEAL.
(66 Pa. St. 187.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 27, 1870.

AGNEW, J. The facts of this case are
few. Robert Lamberton was the owner of a
judgment for $31,000, entered against Samuel P. Irvln on the 8th day' of June, 1865.
Irvin had purchased of F. D. Kinnear, Esq.,
lot No. 419 in Franklin at $2600, of which
unpaid, and would fall
$820 only remained
due on the Gth of August, 3865, with a provision for forfeiture of the contract in case
of non-payment for thirty days after it fell
due. On the 19th of July, 1865, Irvin asBleakley,
signed his contract to James
binding him to pay the $820 to save the forfeiture, and with the admitted understanding that Irvin should refund the $820 to
Bleakley, settle his indebtedness to the bank,
of which Bleakley was cashier, and that
then Bleakley should reconvey to Irvin's
wife. But the assignment was antedated to
the 1st of May, 1865, thus overreaching Lamjudgment. The master finds that
berton's
this was done to defraud the plaintiff. The
finding is ably vindicated in the opinion of
Judge Trunkey. The absolute character of
the paper, though but a security, the agreement to reconvey to Irvin's wife instead of
himself, and the attempt of Bleakley to use
the paper to defeat the sheriff's sale of the
property by Lamberton on his judgment,
evince the true motive for antedating the
paper.

Bleakley paid the $820 to Kinnear, and
now claims a decree for this sum, before
specific performance shall be decreed to Lamberton, who purchased Irvin's title at the
sheriff's sale. Kinnear does not resist specific performance, but stands ready to convey to Lamberton, whenever the covinous
assignment to Bleakley is put out of his
way. It is Bleakley who resists the decree
until he is refunded the $820, paid upon the
footing of the fraudulent agreement with Irvin, to defeat Lamberton's judgment. Bleakley is made a party to the bill only for the
purpose
of putting aside the covinous assignment to enable Kinnear to convey to
Lamberton. The question then is whether
a chancellor would require Lamberton to refund the $820 to Bleakley, as a condition to
setting aside the assignment and entitling
Lamberton to specific performance of Kinnear.

But clearly Bleakley cannot demand repayment of Lamberton either at law or equity.
And first he is not entitled to subrogation to
Kinnear's rights. Subrogation is not a mat-

ter of contract but of pure equity and benevKyner v. Kyner, 6 Watts, 221; Walolence.
lace's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 103. On what precan a party attence. In foro conscientiae,
tempting to carry out a scheme of fraud
against another, by a payment, claim compensation of the party he has attempted to
defraud? Conscience and benevolence revolt
at such an iniquity. Again Bleakley did not
recognise Kinnear's title by the payment.
He did not profess to bargain for It, and
Kinnear did not profess to sell it to him.
His act was simply a payment and no more,
made by him because of Irvin's duty to pay,
by Kinnear because of his
and accepted
right to receive from Irvin. Besides the payment was accepted by Kinnear in ignorance
of the attempted fraud. There can be no
legal intendment therefore of a bargain on
Kinnear's part to vest his right to receive
the money in Bleakley. As to Lamberton
the payment by Bleakley was not only fraudulent and intended to displace his judgment,
but it was also voluntary. It was not paid
at Lamberton's request nor for his use and
benefit; but on the contrary was intended
to defeat his right, as a creditor by overlapping his judgment, by means of the covBleakley is therefore neiinous transfer.
ther a purchaser, nor a creditor of Lamberton, nor an object of benevolence,
but is
forced upon the record to compel him to put
out of the way the fraudulent barrier to
Kinnear's specific performance to Lamberton. He cannot, thus standing before a chancellor, ask him to make repayment to him
a condition to a decree to remove the fraudulent obstruction he threw in the way. The
payment is one of the very steps he took to
consummate the fraud upon Lamberton. If
he have a legal right of recovery he must
resort to his action at law, and if he can
have none, it is a test of his want of equity.
And in addition to all this, it is a rule that
a chancellor will not assist a party to obtain
any benefit arising from a fraud. He must
come into a court of equity with clean hands.
It would be a singular exercise of equity,
which would assist a party, who had paid
money to enable him to perpetrate a fraud,
to recover his money, just when the chancellor was engaged in thrusting out of the
way of his doing equity to the injured party,
the very instrument of the fraud. Who does
iniquity shall not have equity. Hershey v.
Welting, 50 Pa. St. 2^14, 215.
We are therefore of opinion the court committed no error in refusing compensation,
and the decree of the court below is confirmed.
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
1875.

et al.
Oct. Term,

Bill in equity for specific perfoiinaiice
contract to convey lajids.

of a

P. W. Leonard, for complainant. W. J.
Magie and Robert B. Chetwood, for defendants.
VAN FLEET, V. C. The complainant asks
the specific performance of a contract whereby he agreed to convey to Sir. Keppler a
house and lot on Grier avenue, in Elizabeth
City, at a valuation of $15,750, and the defendant, in payment of that sum, agreed to
pay $750 in money, to assume the payment
of a mortgage for $7,500 on the property to
be conveyed to him, and to convey to the
complainant a house and lot on Anna street,
in the same city, valued at $7,500. The cash
payment was made at the execution of the
contract.
Among the defences set up it is alleged the
complainant procured the contract by fraudulent representations as to the cost of the
house which he had recently built, and as to
the value of the lot whereon it stood. If
these facts are established, the complainant's
prayer must be denied. On a bill for specific
performance the comt will grant or refuse
its aid according to the justice of the case;
it wUl never extend its aid to a suitor who
has practiced a fraud, or procured the contract by a misrepresentation of a material
fact. Miller v. Chetwood, 2 N. J. Eq. 208;
2 Chit. Cont. (11th Am. Ed.) 1473.
An intentional misreioresentation of a fact
materially affecting the value or use of the
property, will deprive the party making it of
all right to a remedy in equity. WuesthofC v.
Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 69.
The remedy by specific performance is discretionary; the question is not, what must
the court do, but what, in view of all the circumstances of the case in judgment, should
it do to further justice. When the contract
has been faii-ly procured and its enforcement
will work no injustice or hardship, it is enforced almost as a matter of course; but, if
it has been procured by any sort of fraud or
falsehood, or its enforcement will be attended with great hardship or manifest injustice,
the court will refuse its aid. Seymour v.
Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 222; King v. Morford,
1 N. J. Eq. 281; Rodman v. Zilley, Id. 324;
Conover v. Wai-dell, 20 N. J. Eq. 273; Story,
Eq. Jur. §§ 750a, 751.
In view of the evidence there can be no
doubt that on the evening the conti-act was
executed, and just before it was signed, the
represented to the defendant
complainant
that his house had cost from $10,000 to $11,000, besides the outlay for gas fixtures, summer pieces, inlaid doors, and the value of his
services as architect, and that land adjacent
to his lot had been sold a few days before
for $100 a foot. Five persons were present,—
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the defendant and his wife; the complainant; George L. Meyer, the broker negotiating the contract, and who has been called as
a witness for the complainant; and Mr. William H. Pooler, who had owned the lot on
which the house was built, having conveyed
it to the complainant with an understanding
he should be paid for it on its sale with the
house, at the rate of $70 a foot, and also that
he should then be entitled to one-half of the
profit made on the house. The defendant
and his wife testify, clearly and positively,
to the foregoing representations. The complainant says, generally, he never represented to the defendant that the house had cost
$11,000, but when required to repeat the conversation at the signing of the contract, says
the defendant and he had the usual conversation occurring between parties dealing,
but declares he cannot give the particulars.
Mr. Meyer makes no allusion to the occurrences preceding or attending the signing of
the conti-act.
While Mr. Pooler denies hearing any representations respecting the value
of the property made by the complainant,
he so far corroborates the defendant and his
wife as to say that just before the execution of
the conti-act Mr. Meyer stated to the defendant, with the complainant's knowledge, and
without eliciting any sign of disapproval, that
the lot was worth $100 a foot, and that the
house must have cost from $10,000 to $12,000,
as it was unusually well built. These representations of cost and value correspond exactly with the sum fixed as the purchase
money to be paid to the complainant, — lot,
fifty feet front, $5,000; house, $10,750; total,
$15,750. They embraced material facts. That
pretending to state the cost of the house
rested exclusively in the knowledge of the
complainant.
It was not open to inspection or examination. If he said anything, he
was bound to speak the truth. It is obvious
they influenced the action of the defendant.
When the contract was produced at his residence on the evening it was signed, the sum
named as the purchase money was $15,500.
Before it was signed, this sum was raised to
$15,750. Something occurred there before the
signing, which induced the defendant to consent to the increase.
Were these representations true ? The complainant has not attempted to show their
truth. No attempt has been made to show
that any lands on Grier avenue were ever
sold for $100 a foot. The complaiuant admits the contract price for building his house
was $6,666. The conviction is irresistible that
these representations were known to be untrue at the time they were uttered, and that
they were made to entrap the defendant into
a conti-act to take complainant's property at
a valuation of one-fourth, or at least one-fifth,
in excess of its fair value. A court whose
delight it is to do justice, will not give Its
aid to a suitor whose title to relief rests upon
an engagement procured by false words.
Let the bill be dismissed, with costs. I will
so advise.
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The parties lived
accounting
for the delay, the plaintiff suffered a period of
26 years to elapse, from the termination of
the American war, to the time of filing his
bill. The offer made by the executors being
for peace, and without any recognition of
the Justness of the demand, and being re-

ill

the same county, and, without

jected by the plaintiff, cannot affect the question.
It would not be sound discretion to' overhaul accounts, in favor of a party who has
slept on his rights for such a length of time;
especially, against the representatives of the
other party, who have no knowledge of the
It is against the prinoriginal transactions.
ciples of public policy, to require an account,
after the plaintiff has been guilty of so great
laches.
The bill must be dismissed on the ground
of the staleness of the demand; but without
costs.
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the surety would likewise be void. But It is
said, that where the contract of the principal
debtor is only voidable on account of incapacity or otherwise, and the person undertaking as surety contracted with a knowledge
of the incapacity or other cause making the
BARTLEY, O. J. The errors assigned in principal obligation voidable, he must be understood as Incurring not merely a collateral,
this case are substantially the following:
but a principal, obligation.
How far this
1st. That the court erred in holding that
may extend, as between suretj' and principal,
the note was void, and that the payment of
it is not necessary here to enquire; but there
the same by the plaintiff gave him no right
seems to be sound reason in the doctrine,
of action against the defendant for contributhat where the surety has knowledge of that
tion.
which
amounts to a vaUd defence for him
2d. That the court erred in overruling the
against the creditor, he is bound either to
motion for a new trial, &c.
Two questions are here presented for de- avail himself of it, or to give notice to the
principal debtor, so as to enable him to set
tei'mination:
up the defence; and in default of doing either,
1st. Was the note void on the ground of
he would be deprived of recourse against the
usury?
principal.
Burge, Sur. 367.
2d. Can a surety on a promissory note
The utmost extent to which a surety, who
which is absolutely void, by the voluntary
has made payment can claim, is a subrogapayment thereof, entitle himself to contribution to the rights of the creditor, so that he
tion against the cosurety?
will rank against the debtor in the same DeThe first question has been determined in
gree as the creditor would have done, if he
the affirmative by adjudications already made
had not been paid. Where, therefore, a surein this state. See the case of Preble Branch
ty could have no remedy against the princiof State Bank of Ohio v. Russell, 1 Ohio St.
pal, he clearly could have none against his
313; also, ChiUicothe Bank v. Swayne, 8 Ohio,
cosurety, against whom he would have less
257; Creed v. Commercial Bank, 11 Ohio, 489;
equity in his favor.
Miami Exporting Co. v. Clark, 13 Ohio, 1;
Such, then, being the nature of the conCommercial Bank v. Reed, 11 Ohio, 498;
tract of suretyship, to what right of contriBank of U. S. v. Owens, 2 Pet. 538.
bution was the plaintiff entitled in this case
The second question is one which does not
against the defendant? The claim set up by
appear to have been very frequently presentthe branch bank was absolutely void; and it
ed for adjudication.
could have acquired no validity from the exThe right of contribution among sureties
ecution of the mortgage by the plaintiff beis founded not in the contract of suretyship,
fore he had notice of the usury, especially as
but is the result of a general principle of eqagainst the defendant. And it appears that
uity which equalizes burdens and benefits.
the plaintiff had knowledge of the usury beThe common law has adopted and given effore he paid the debt. With what pretence
fect to this equitable principle, on which a
of equity can the plaintiff, who was not
surety is entitled to contribution from his cobound himself, by voluntarily paying a void
surety. This equitable obligation to contribnote, claim to impose an obligation upon the
ute, having been established, the law raises
defendant as his cosurety, who was under no
an Implied assumpsit on the part ol the coobligation before, either legal or equitable?
surety to pay his share of the loss, resulting
Had the creditor instituted a suit on the note
from a concurrent liability to pay a common
against the defendant, his remedy was clear
debt.
This jurisdiction, by an action at law,
and complete; and he could not certainly
is, therefore, resorted to, when the case is
have been deprived of his means of defence
not complicated; and the more extensive and
by the voluntary act of the plaintiff. Tliis is
efficient aid of a court of equity is thus renclearly not a case where an implied assumpdered unnecessary. It follows that this action can only be sustained where there exists
sit could have been raised against a cosurety
a just and equitable ground for contribution.
for contribution.
A contract of suretyship is accessory to an
The principle laid down in the case of Skilobligation contracted by another person, eilin V. Merrill, 16 Mass. 40, would seem to be
or previously, or
in point in this case, and fatal to the plainther contemporaneously,
subsequently. It is of the essence of the con- tiff's cause of action. And it is not shaken by
tract, that there be a subsisting valid obligathe case of Ford v. Keith, 1 Mass. 139, and
tion of a principal debtor. Without a printhe case decided upon its authority, of Cave
V. Burns, 6 Ala. 780, to which reference has
cipal, there can be no accessory; and by the
been made.
The two last cases are not strictextinction of the former, the latter becomes
ly analogous to the present one. Upon no
extinct. This results from the natm-e of the
principle of justice or sound reason can a
obligation of suretyship. Burge, Sur. 3, 6;
surety, by voluntarily paying money on a
Theo. Prin. & Sur. 2.
It would seem to follow, from the very na- void note, impose an obligation upon a cosurety for contribution.
ture of the undertaking, that if the principal
Judgment affirmed.
contract is absolutely void, the obligation of
V.

Ohio St. 327.)
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Jan., 1853.
G-. J. & J. M. Smith, for plaintiff.
Mr. Ward,
for defendant.
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Robert Craig's will contained the following clause: "I give and bequeath to my
brother, Thomas Craig, of Baith parish, Ayrshire, Scotland, all the proceeds of my eshave
tate, both real and personal, which
herein directed to be sold, to be remitted to
him, according as the payments are made."
Thomas Craig being an alien, the question
was, could he take the proceeds of this land,
which had been devised to one Leslie, in
trust, the proceeds from the sale of which
were to be paid to him?

I

Atk.

307.

The principle upon which the whole of
this doctrine is founded is, that a court of
equity, regarding the substance, and not the
mere forms and circumstances of agreements
and other instruments, considers things directed or agreed to be done, as having been
actually performed, where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent a performof the more conance. This qualification
cise and general rule, that equity considers
that to be done which is agreed to be done,
will comprehend the cases which come under this head of equity.
2 Thus, where the whole beneficial interest
in the money in the one case, or in the land
in the other, belongs to the person for whose
use it is given, a court of equity will not
the trustee to execute the trust
compel
against the wishes of the cestui que trust,
but will permit him to take the money or
the land, if he elect to do so before the conversion has actually been made; and this
election he may make, as well by acts or
declarations, clearly indicating a determination to that effect, as by application to a
court of equity. It is this election, and not
the mere right to make it, which changes
the character of the estate so as to make it
real or personal, at the will of the party entitled to the beneficial interest.
If this election be riot made in time to
stamp the property with a character different from that which the will or other instrument gives it, the latter accompanies
into the
with all its legal consequences,
hands of those entitled to it in that character.
So that in case of the death of the
cestui que trust, without having determined
his election, the property will pass to his
heirs or personal representatives, in the same
manner as
would have done had the trust
been executed,
and the conversion actually
made in his lifetime.
In the case of Kirkman v. Milles, 13 Ves.
338, which was a devise of real estate to
trustees upon trust to sell, and the moneys
arising as well as the rents and profits till
the sale, to be equally divided between the
testator's three daughters, A. B. and C. The
estate was, upon the death of A. B. and C,
considered and treated as personal property,
notwithstanding the cestui que trusts, after
the death of the testator, had entered upon,

Where the whole beneficial interest in the
land in one case, or in the money in the other,
belongs to the person for whose use
is given,
a court of equity will permit the cestui que
money
or land at his election,
trust to take the
he elect before the conversion is made.
But if the cestui que trust die, without haying determined his election, the property will
in
pass to his heirs or personal representatives,
the
would have done
the same manner as
conversion had been made, and the trust executed in his

lifetime.

if

1 Equity considers land, directed to be sold
and converted into money, as money; and money directed to bo employed in the purchase of
land, as land.

it

'

delivered the
Mr. Justice WASHINGTON
opinion of the court. The incapacity of an
alien to take, and to hold beneficially, a legal or equitable estate in real property, is
not disputed by the counsel for the plaintiff; and it is admitted by the counsel for
the state of Virginia, that this incapacity
The ondoes not extend to personal estate.
ly inquiry, then, which this court has to
make is, whether the above clause in the
will of Robert Craig is to be construed, under all the circumstances of this case, as a
bequest to Thomas Craig of personal property, or as a devise of the land itself.
Were this a new question, it would seem
extremely difficult to raise a doubt respecting it. The common sense of mankind would
determine,
that a devise of money, the proceeds of land directed to be sold, is a devise
of money, notwithstanding it is to arise out
of land; and that a devise of land, which a
testator by his will directs to be purchased,
will pass an interest in the land itself, without regard to the character of the fund out
of which the purchase is to be made.
1 The settled doctrine of the courts of equity corresponds with this obvious construction of wills, as well as of other instruments,
whereby land is directed to be turned into
money, or money into land, for the benefit of
those for whose use the conversion is inIn the case of Fletcher
tended to be made.
V. Ashburuer, 1 Brown, Ch. 497, the master
of the rolls says, that "nothing is better established than this principle, that money
directed to be employed in the purchase of
land, and land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as that
species of property into which they are diand this, in whatrected to be converted,
He
ever manner the direction is given."
adds, "the owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money or
money land.
The cases establish this rule
universally."
This declaration is well warranted by the cases to which the master of

2

it,

1818.

it

Supreme Court of the United States.

it

Wheat. 563-576.)

the rolls refers, as well as by many others.
See Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320; Yates
v. Booth,
v. Compton, Id. 308; Trelawney

3

LESLIE.

2
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and occupied the land for about two years
prior to their deaths; but no steps had been
taken by them, or by the trustees, to sell,
nor had any requisition to that effect been
made by the former to the latter. The master of the rolls was of opinion, th:it the occupation of the land for two years was too
short to presume an election.
He adds:
"The opinion of Lord Eosslyn, that property was to be taken as it happened to be at
the death of the party fi'om whom the representative claims, had been much doubted
by Ijord Eldon, who held that without some
act, it must be considered as being in the
state in which it ought to be; and that Lord
Rosslyn's rule was new, and not according
to the prior cases."
The same doctrine is laid down and maintained in the case of Edwards v. Countess
of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, which was a
covenant on marriage to invest £10,000, part
of the lady's fortune, in the purchase of land
in fee, to be settled on the husband for life,
remainder to his first and every other son
in tail male, remainder to the husband in
fee. The only son of this marriage having
died without issue, and intestate, and the
investment of the money not having been
made during his life, this chancellor decided
that the money passed to the heir at law;
that it was in the election of the son to
have made this money, or to have disposed
of it as such, and that, therefore, even his
parol disposition of it would have been regarded; but that something to determine
the election must be done.
* This doctrine, so well established by the
cases which have been referred to, and by
many others which it is unnecessary to mention, seems to be conclusive upon the question which this court is called upon to decide, and would render any farther investigation of it useless, were it not for the case
of Roper v. RadclifCe, which was cited, and
mainly relied upon, by the counsel for the
state of Virginia.
The short statement of that case is as follows: John Roper conveyed all his lands to
trustees and their heirs, in trust, to sell the
and of the
same, and out of the proceeds,
rents and profits till sale, to pay certain
debts, and the overplus or the money to be
paid as he, the said John Roper, by his will
or otherwise, should appoint, and for want
of such appointment, for the benefit of the
said John Roper, and his heirs. By his will
reciting the said deed, and the power reserved to him in the surplus of the said real
estate, he bequeathed several pecuniary legacies, and then gave the residue of his
real and personal estate to William Constable and Thomas Radcliffe, and two others,
and to their heirs. By a codicil to this will,
he bequeathed other pecuniary legacies; and
the remainder, whether in lands or personal
4 The case of Roper v. RadclifEe,
examined.

9
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he gave to the said W. 0. and T. R.
Upon a bill filed by W. C. and T. R. against
the heir at law of John Roper, and the other trustees, praying to have the trust executed, and the residue of the money arising
from the sale of the lands to be paid over
to them; the heir at law opposed the execution of the trust, and claimed the land as
n resulting trust, upon the ground of the incapacity of Constable and Radcliffe to take,
they being papists. The decree of the court
of chancery, which was in favour of the
papists, was, upon appeal to the house of
lords, reversed, and the title of the heir at
law sustained; six judges against five, being in his favour.
Without stating at large the opinion upon
which the reversal took place, this court will
proceed,
1st. To examine the general principles laid down in that opinion; and then,
2d. The case itself, so far as it has been
pressed upon us as an authority to rule the
question before the court.
In performing the first part of this undertaking, it will not be necessary to question
any one of the premises laid down in that
opinion. They are, 1. That land devised to
trustees, to sell for payment of debts and
This is
legacies, is to be deemed as money.
the general doctrine established by all the
cases referred to in the preceding part of
this opinion, s 2. That the heir at law has
a resulting trust in such land, so far as it is
of value, after the debts and legacies are
paid, and that he may come into equity and
restrain the trustee from selling more than
is necessary to pay the debt and legacies; or
he may offer to pay them himself, and pray
to have a conveyance of the part of the
land not sold in the first case, and the whole
in the latter, which property will, in either
This right
case, be land, and not money.
is very correctly
to call for a conveyance
styled a privilege, and it is one which a
court of equity will never refuse, unless
there are strong reasons for refusing it. The
whole of this doctrine proceeds upon a principle which is incontrovertible, that where
the testator merely directs the real estate to
be converted into money, for the purposes
directed in his will, so much of the estate,
or the money arising from it, as is not effectually disposed of by the will, (whether
it arise from some omission or defect in the
will itself, or from any subsequent accident,
which prevents the devise from taking effect,) results to the heir at law, as the old
estate,

5 Land, devised to trustees, to sell for payment of debts and legacies, is to be deemed as
money.
The heir at law has a resulting trust in such
lands, after the debts and legacies are paid, and
may come into equity and restrain the trustee
from selling more than sufficient to pay them,
or may offer to pay them himself, and pray a
conveyance of the part of the land not sold in
the first case, and the whole in the latter, which
property in either case will be land, and not
money.
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not disposed of. Such was the case of
erase V. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 20, where the
testator having two sons, A. and B., and
three daughters, devised his lands to be sold
to pay his debts, &c., and as to the moneys
arising by the sale, after debts paid, gave
£200 to A. the eldest son, at the age of 21,
and the residue to his four younger children.
A. diea before the age of 21, in consequence
of which the bequest to him failed to take
that the £200
court decided
effect. The
land
to descend to
as
be
considered
should
the heir at law of the testator, because it
was in effect the same as if so much land
as was of the value of £200 was not directed
The
to be sold, but was suffered to descend.
ease of Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Brown, Ch.
is one of the same kind, and estab503,
So, likewise, a
lishes the same principle.
money provision under a marriage contract,
to arise out of land, which did not take effect, on account of the death of the party for
whose benefit it was intended, before the
time prescribed, resulted as money to the
grantor, so as to pass under a residuary
1
clause in his will. Hewitt v. Wright,
Brown, Ch. Cas. 86.
6 But even
in cases of resulting trusts,
for the benefit of the heir at law, it is settled that if the intent of the testator appears to have been to stamp upon the proto be sold, the
ceeds of the lan3 described
quality of personalty, not only to subserve
of the will, but to
the particular purposes
all intents, the claim of the heir at law to
a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate
is considered to be personal. This was decided in the case of Yates v. Compton, 2 P.
AVms. 308, in which the chancellor says, that
the intention of the will was to give away
all from the heir, and to turn the land Into
personal estate, and that that was to be
taken as it was at the testator's death, and
ought not to be altered by any subsequent
accident, and decreed the heir to join in the
sale of the land, and the money arising therefrom to be paid over as personal estate to
the representatives of the annuitant, and to
those of the residuary legatee.
In the case
of Fletcher v. Ashburner, before referred to,
the suit was brought by the heir at law of
the testator, against the personal representatives and the trustees claiming the estate
upon the ground of a resulting trust. But
the court decreed the property, as money, to
the personal representatives of him to whom
the beneficial interest in the money was bequeathed,
and the master of the rolls observes, that the case of Emblyn v. Freeman,
and Cruse v. Barley, are those where real
estate being directed to be sold, some part
use

6 But if the intent of the testator appears to
have been to stamp upon the proceeds of the
land directed to be sold, the quality of personalty, not only for the particular purposes of the
will, but to all intents, the claim of the heir at
law to a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate is considered to be personal.

of the disposition has failed, and the thing
devised has not accrued to the representative, or devisee, by which something has resulted to the heir at law.
It is evident, therefore, from a view of the
above cases, that the title of the heir to a
resulting trust can never arise, except when
something is left undisposed of, either by
some defect in the will, or by some subsequent lapse, which prevents the devise from
taking effect; and not even then, if it appears that the intention of the testator was
to change the nature of the estate from land
to money, absolutely and entirely, and not
merely to serve the purposes of the will.
But the ground upon which the title of the
heir rests is, that whatever is not disposed
remains to him, and partakes of the old use,
as if it had not been directed to be sold.
The third proposition laid down in the
ease of Roper v. Radcliffe, 9 Mod. 167, is,
that equity will extend the same privilege
to the residuary legatee which is allowed
to the heir, to pay the debts and legacies,
and call for a conveyance of the real estate,
or to restrain the trustees from selling more
than is necessary to pay the debts and legacies.

7 This has,
in effect, been admitted in
the preceding part of this opinion; because,
if the cestui que trust of the whole beneficial interest in the money to arise from the
sale of the land, may claim this privilege,
it follows, necessarily, that the residuary
legatee may, because he is, in effect, the
beneficial owner of the whole, charged with
the debts and legacies, from which he will
be permitted to discharge it, by paying the
debts and legacies, or may claim so much of
the real estate as may not be necessary for
that purpose.
s But the court cannot accede to the conclusion, which, in Roper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the establishment of the above
principles. That conclusion is, that in respect to the residuary legatee, such a devise
shall be deemed as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees
it Is deemed as money. It is admitted, with
this qualification, that if the residuary legatee thinks proper to avail himself of the
privilege of taking it as land, by making an
election in his life time, the property will
then assume the character of land. But if
he does not make this election, the property
retains the character of personalty to every
Intent and purpose. The cases before cited
7 Equity
will extend the same privilege to
the residuary legatee which is allowed to the
heir, to pay the debts and legacies, and call for
a conveyance of the real estate, or to restrain
the trustees from selling more than is necessary
to pay the debts and legacies.
8 The conclusion — which, in Roper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the above principles, that
in respect to the residuary legatee such a devise
shall be considered as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees, it
is deemed as money — denied.

MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
seem to the court to be conclusive upon this
and none were referred to, or have
come under the view of the court, which

point;

sanction the conclusion made in the unqualified terms used in the case of Roper v. Radclilfe.
As to the idea that the character of the estate is affected by this right of election,
whether the right be claimed or not, it appears to be as repugnant to reason, as we
think it has been shown to be, to principle
Before any thing can be
and authorities.
made of the proposition. It should be shown
that this right of privilege of election is so
indissolubly united with the devise, as to
constitute a part of it, and that it may be
exercised in all cases, and under all circumstances.
This was, indeed, contended for
with great Ingenuity and abilities by the
counsel for the state of Virginia, but it was
not proved to the satisfaction of the court.
It certainly is not true, that equity will
extend this privilege in all cases to the cestui
It will be refused if he be an in(lue trust.
fant. In the case of Seeley v. Jago, 1 P.
^^'ms. 389, where money was devised to be
laid out in land in fee, to be settled on A.
B. and C, and their heirs, equally to be divided: On the death A., Ms infant heir,
together with B. and C, filed their bill,
claiming to have the money, which was decreed accordingly as to B. and C; but the
share of the infant was ordered to be put
out for his benefit, and the reason assigned
was, that he was incapable of making an
election, and that such election, if pei-mitted,
would, in case of his death, be prejudicial
to his heir.
In the case of Foone v. Blount, Cowp.
who is compelled to
407, Lord Mansfield,
acknowledge the authority of Roper v. RadclifCe in parallel cases, combats the reasoning
of Chief .Tustice Parker upon this doctrine
of election, with irresistible force. He suggests, as the true answer to it, that though
in a variety of cases this rtght exists, yet it
was inapplicable to the case of a person
who was disabled by law from taking land,
and that therefore a court of equity would,
in such a case, decree that he should take
the property as money.
This case of Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. .Tr
this
170, seems to apply with great force to
directed
testator
The
subject.
part of our
money to be laid out in lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, or on long terms, with limitaThe money
tions applicable to real estate.
on failcrown,
the
out,
laid
not having been
ure of heirs, claimed the money as land. It
w:is decided that the crown had no equity
against the next of kin to have the money
laid out In real estate in order to claim it by
It was added that the devisees, on
escheat.
becoming absolutely entitled, have the option given by the will; and a deed of appointment by one of the cestui que trusts,
though a feme covert, was held a sufficient incondication of her intention that it should
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tinue personal against her heir claiming it asineffectually disposed of for want of her examination. This case is peculiarly strong,
from the circumstance, that the election is
embodied in the devise itself; but this was
not enough, because the crown had no equity
to force an election to be made for the purpose of producing an escheat.
Equity would surely proceed contrary toits regular course, and the principles which,
universally govern it, to allow the right of
election wliere it is desired, and can be lawfully made, and yet refuse to decree the
money upon the application of the alien,
upon no other reason, but because, by law,
he is incapable to hold the land: In short, to
consider him in the same situation as if hehad made an election, which would have
been refused had he asked for a conveyance.
The more just and coixect rule would seem
to be, that where the cestui que trust is incapable to take or to hold the land beneficially, the right of election does not exist, and
consequently, that the property is to be considered as being of that species into whicli
it is directed to be converted.
Having made these observations upon the
principles laid down in the case of Roper v.
Radcliffe, and upon the arguments urged at
the bar in support of them, very few words
will suffice to show that, as an authority, it is
inapplicable to this case.
9 The incapacities
of a papist under the
English statute of 11 & 12 Wm. HI., c. 4, and
of an alien at common law, are extremely
The former is incapable to take
dissimilar.
by purchase, any lands, or profits out of
lands; and all estates, terms, and any other
interests or profits whatsoever out of lands,
to be made, suffered, or done, to, or for the
use of such person, or upon any trust for
him, or to, or for the benefit, or relief of any
such person, are declared by the statute to
be utterly void.
Thus, it appeai-s that he cannot even take.
His incapacity is not confined to land, but to
any profit, interest, benefit, or relief, in or
out of it. He is not only disabled from taking or having the benefit of any such interest, but the will or deed itself, which attempts to pass it, is void. In Roper v. Radcliffe, it was strongly insisted, tliat the money
given to the papist, which was to be the proceeds of the laud, was a profit or interest
out of the land. If this be so, (and it is not
material in this case to alfirm or deny that
position,) then the will of John Roper in
relation to the be'quest to the two papists,
was void under the statute; and if so, the
right of the heir at law of the testator, to
the residue, as a resulting trust, was incontestable. The cases above cited have fully
established that principle. In that case, too,
the rents and profits, till the sale, would have
belonged to the papists, if they were capable
» The case of Roper v. Radcliffe distinguished
from the present case.
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of taking, which brought the case still more
strongly within the statute; and this was

much relied on, not only in reasoning upon
the words, but the policy of the statute.
10 Now, what is the situation of an alien?
He cannot only take an interest in land, but
a freehold interest in the land itself, and
may liold it against all the world but the
king, and even against him until office found,
and he is not accountable for the rents and
profits previously received, n In this case
the will being valid, and the alien capable
of taking under it, there can be no resulting
trust to the heir, and the claim of the state
is founded solely upon a supposed equity, to
have the land by escheat as if the alien had,
or could upon the principles of a court of
equity, have elected to take the land instead
of the money. The points of difference between the two cases are so striking that it
would be a waste of time to notice them in
detail.
It may be further observed, that the case
of Roper v. RadclifCe has never, in England,
been applied to the case of aliens; that its
authority has been submitted to with reluctance, and is strictly confined in its application to cases precisely parallel to it.
Lord Mansfield in the case of Foone v.
Blount, speaks of it with marked disapprobation; and we know, that had Lord Trevor
ID

An

alien may take, by purchase, a freehold,

or other interest in land, and may hold it
against all the world except the king; and even
against him until office found; and is not accountable for the rents and profits previously
received.

11 Vide 3 Wheat. 12.
Jackson ex dem. State
of New York v. Clarke, note c.

present, and declared the opinion he
had before entertained, the judges would
have been equally divided.
The case of the Attorney General and Lord
Weymouth, Amb. 20, was also pressed upon
the court, as strongly supporting that of
Koper V. RadclifCe, and as bearing upon the
present case.
might be
7'he firet of these propositions
admitted; although it is certain that the
mortmain act, upon which that case was
decided, is even stronger in its expression
than the statute against papists, and the
chancellor so considers it; for he says,
whether the sui-plus be considered as money
or land, it is just the same thing, the statute
making void all charges and encumbrances
on land, for the benefit of a charity.
But if this case were, in all respects, the
same as Roper v. RadclifCe, the observations
which have been made upon the latter
would all apply to it. It may be remarked,
however, that in this case, the chancellor
avoids expressing any opinion upon the question, wJiether the money to arise from the
sale of the land, was to be taken as personalty or land; and, although he mentions the
case of Roper v. RadclifCe, he adds, that he
does not depend upon it, as it is immaterial
whether the surplus was to be considered as
land or money under the mortmain act.
Upon the whole we are unanimously of
opinion, that the legacy given to Thomas
Craig, in the will of Robert Craig, is to be
considered as a bequest of personal estate,
which he is capable of taking for his own
benefit.
Certificate accordingly.
been
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written parts of the transaction.
Where the
intention is clear thac an absolute convey(71 Me. 567.)
ance is taljen as a security for a debt, it is in
equity a mortgage.
Ko matter how much
Supreme Judicial Court of Maiue. December,
the real transaction may be covered up and
1880.
disguised.
The real intention
governs.
PETERS,
The following facts are de- "If a transaction resolve itself into a securiduciblo frono the evidence in this case: The ty, whatever may be its form, and whatever
complainant purchased of the defendants, name the parties may choose to give it, it is
certain stecim-mill machinery, for removal in equity a mortgage."
Flagg v. Mann, 2
from Hallowell to Danforth, in this State. Sumn. 533, Ped. Cas. No. 4,847.
There was at the time a verbal agreement,
The existence of a debt is well nigh an inthat the complainant should build a mill, and fallible evidence of the intention.
The input the machinery into it, on a lot of land in tention here is transparent.
The defendants
Danforth, bought by him of one lliissell, who have a debt and held the property as a sewas to deed the lot directly to the defendants. curity for its collection.
A legal mortgage
The complainant was also to procure a deed was avoided; an equitable mortgage was
of his home (another) lot to the defendants made.
from the heirs of H. E. Prentiss, who held ! Although difEerent at law, in equity a
an absolute title thereof as security for the mortgage is not prevented because the conindebtedness to tliem, there veyanee does ndt come from the equitable
complainant's
[
being a small balance only unpaid, which the mortgager.
It is sufficient that the debtor
The de- has an interest in the property conveyed,
defendants were to pay for him.
fendants were to give an agreement, to con- either legal or equitable.
Having such an
vey to the complainant if he paid his indebt- [interest, if he procures a conveyance to one
edness to them according to the tenor of cer- ; wlio advances money upon it for him, taking
tain notes to be given.
tlie property as security for the money adOn June 15, 1875, the complainant gave to vanced, he has a riglit to redeem.
The
tlie defend ints a mortgage on the machinery grantee in such case, acquiring the title by
as personal property to secure the notes herehis act, holds it as his mortgagee. Jones on
after named, in order to protect a lien there- Mort. 2d ed. § 331. Stoddard v. Whiting,
on until the machinery should be put into the 46 N. Y. 627; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251.
mill to be built, and become a part of the
It is denied that this court has the power
And there was embodied in this to declare that an absolute deed shall be
real estate.
mortgage, an agreement of the complainant deemed to be a mortgage, allowing an equito build the mill and put the machinery into table mortgager the right to redeem. At law,
Nor, when the court
it. On June 16, 1875, liussell conveyed the it has no such power.
On August 2, had a limited jurisdiction in equity, was the
mill lot to the defendants.
1875, Prentiss conveyed the home lot to them, doctrine admitted.
It was always undertliey paying the balance of the Prentiss claim. stood, however, that, in a case like the presOn August 4, 1875, the defendants gave a ent, if, instead of a demurrer, an answer
writing to the complainant, agreeing to con- was filed admitting the facts alleged, the
vey the property to him upon the condition court had the power to apply the remedy.
that he would pay to them his notes on one, Thomaston Bank v. Stimpson, 21 Maine,
two, three, and five years, respectively, with 195; Whitney v. BacJielder, 32 Maine, 313;
The notes were given for the Howe V. Russell, 36 Maine, 115; Richardson
interest.
amount payable for the machinery, the sum V. Woodbury, 43 Maine, 206. But since the
paid to Prentiss, and for other loans and ad- act of 1874 conferred general chancery powwent on and ers upon the court, it has full and complete
vances. The complainant
erected and completed a mill on the Russell jurisdiction in such cases. Rowellv. Jewett,
lot, and the steam-mill machinery became a 69 Maine, 293-303; Jones, Mort. (2d ed.)
part of it.
§282.
Courts of equity generally exercise such
The complainant seeks to redeem the propWhile the grounds upon which the
erty, claiming the transaction to be a mort- power.
gage. The defendants contend that the doctrine is admitted vary with different
transaction was not a mortgage, that it was courts, there is a great concurrence of opinion as far as the result is concerned. In our
a conditional sale.
It was not a legal mortgage: Because the judgment, it is a sound policy as well as
Warren v. Lovis, principle to declare that, to take an absolute
defeasance has no seal.
And because the papers conveyance as a mortgage without any de53 Maine, 463.
At law, feasance, is in equity a fraud. Experience
were not between the same parties.
the conveyance must be made by the mort- shows tliat endless frauds and oppressions
modes, if
gager and the defeasance by the mortgagee. would be perpetrated under such
It is taking
equity could not grant relief.
Shaw V. Erskine, 43 Maine, 371.
But the transaction was in equity a mort- an agreement, in one sense, exceeding and
The criterion differing from tlie true agreement. Instead
gage — an equitable mortgage.
In equity, of setting it wliolly aside, equity is worked
of
the
parties.
intention
is the
this intention may be ascertained from all out by adapting it to the purpose originally
Eauity allows recaration to be
pertinent facts either within or without the intended.

J.
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made by admitting a verbal defeasance to be
proved. The cases which support this view
are too numerous to cite. The American
cases are collected in Jones, Mort. 2d ed.
§ 241, et seq. See Campbell v. Dearborn,
109 Mass. 130; and Hassam v. Barrett, 115
Mass. 256,

The complainant seeks to separate the artioriginally mortgaged as personal property, and, being allowed the value of them,
redeem the balance of the estate only.
Tliat
would not be equitable. The personal became a part of the real as originally designed
to be. It was affixed and solidly bolted thereto.
The mortgage was evidently only to
serve a temporary purpose.
It was not just
to either party that there should be two mortIt is urged that the
gages instead of one.
defendants foreclosed the personal mortgage.
It could not be done. The personal mortgage was extinguished when attempted to be
done.
That was but a ruse to get the possession which the defendants were entitled
to.
No severance was ever made or attempted to be made.
It is intimated that the mill has burned
down, pendente lite, under an insurance obtained by the defendants, and a question
may arise, before the master, whether the
complainant should have a credit of the net
If the insurance was obtained on
proceeds.
the mortgagees' own account only, they
should not be allowed.
Cushing v. Thompson, 34 Maine, 496; Pierce v. Faunae, 53
Maine, 351. The head note in Larrabee v.
Lumbert, 32 Maine, 97, is erroneous in that
It was allowed in that case by conrespect.
sent. Insurance Co, \. Woodbury, 45iS.-dine,
cles

447.

But where a mortgagee insures the property by the authority of the mortgager, and
charges him with the expense, then any insurance recovered shouki be accounted for.
And if a mortgager covenants to insure, and
fails to do so, the mortgagee can himself insure at the mortgager's expense.
One of the defendants testifies that "Stinch-

fleld agreed to pay all taxes and insurance."'
"We have had the house^
says,
stable and mill insured, and have paid
the insurance, $108."
We think this is evidence of an insurance obtained by the mortgagees at the expense of the mortgager on
account of his failure to keep his verbal covenant to insure, and renders it proper that
the net proceeds of any insurance obtained
should be allowed in the settlement between
them.
But this cannot be, if the insurance wascollected under a policy in which it is agreed
between the insured and insurer that the
company in case of loss should be subrogated
to the right of the mortgagee.
For in such
case the insurance is not in fact on the mortgager's account, nor is it such an insurance
as could be made available to him.
Jones,
Mort. (2d ed.) § 420, and cases in note.
The complainant may redeem the whole
property upon payment of whatever may be
due upon the whole debt. Inasmuch as the
complainant sets up a claim exceeding the
equitable right, neither party to recover costs
up to the entry of this order; and whether
future costs shall be recovered by either side,
to be reserved for decision when the proceedings are to be finally terminated.
Another
reason why complainant should not recover
costs is, that when his bill was commenced
the mortgage debt was not due.
The mortgage could not be redeemed until 1880. The
bill was commenced long before that time.
But as the mortgage is now due, and n»
point is taken that the proceeding was premature, it will probably be for the interest
of all the parties that their matters may be
adjusted under this bill. For which purpose
a master must be appointed, unless the parties can best determine the accounts between
themselves.
Decree accordingly,

He also

APPLETON, C. J., WALTON, DANFORTH, VIUGIN, and LIBBEY, JJ., concurred.
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137, 29

Court of Minnesota.

Minn. 330.)

July

25,

1882.

Plaintiffs brought this action, in the district
couit for Hennepin county, against the West■ern Manufacturers'
Mutual Insurance Com-

pany, to recover the amount due on a policy
of insurance for $2,000, issued to one Robert
Cochran, on a mill and machinery in this
state. The mill was destroyed by fire, and
the loss under this policv was adjusted at
$1,317.70 on July 19, 1880.
On the same
day Cochran assigned all his rights under the
policy to plaintiffs. Ruth C. Richardson,
who had a mortgage upon the mill property,
claiming to be entitled to this sum, was substituted as defendant in place of the insurance company.
The action was submitted to the court,
Toung, J., presiding, upon the complaint and
answer, the allegations of which were admitted to be true, and the material portions
of which are stated in the opinion.
The
court found for the plaintiffs, and ordered
judgment accordingly.
Defendant appeals
from an order refusing anew trial.

BERRY, J. On December 16, 1879, Cochran, being owner of a piece of land in this
state, insured a mill, machinery and fixtures
therein against damage by fire, in the Western Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Company, for $2,000. December 18, 1879, he
borrowed of defendant $5,200, for which he
gave his promissory note on five years, secured by a mortgage of the land mentioned,
which was duly recorded December 22d. By
the terms of the mortgage Cochran covenanted with Richardson that at all times during its continuance he would keep the buildings on the premises "unceasingly insured"
for at least $5,200, payable in case of loss to
Richardson, to the amount then secured by
December 28, 1879, Cochthe mortgage.
ran insured the mill, machinery, and fixtures
for $1,500 in one company, and for $2,000
in another, and, by indorsement upon each
■of the two policies issued to him, the loss
was made payable to Richardson, as her interest might appear. On July 9, 1880, while
the three insurances were in force, the insured property was totally destroyed by fireBefore this Richardson had no knowledge of
The loss was adjusted
the first insurance.
by Cochran and the three insurance companies at $4,298.03, as the true value of the
The result was that the
property destroyed.
losses payable to Richardson were scaled from
f3,500 (the face of the last two policies) to
$2,442.20, and this sum was paid to her and
applied on the note. The loss under the first
insurance was scaled and adjusted at $1,317.70, and that sum agreed to be paid Cochran
This was done July 19, 1880,
accordingly.
and on the same day the certificate which
had been issued to Cochran by the Western
Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Comoanv,
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in lieu of a policy, was for a valuable cnnsideration duly assigned to the plaintiffs.
They brought this action against the insurance company to recover the amount of the
loss as adjusted at $1,317.70. ISlotliing having been paid upon Richardson's note and
mortgage other than the sum of $2,442.20
before mentioned, and the whole debt having been declared due under a provision in
tlie mortgage, there remains due and unpaid thereon something over $3,000.
Richardson laying claim to the money ($1,317.70)
realized from the first insurance, the company paid it into court, and Richardson was
substituted as defendant in the company's
place. The question is, who is entitled to
this money— plaintiffs or Richardson?
It is well settled that, in the absence of
an agreement by a mortgagor to insure for
the benefit of his mortgagee, the latter has no
right to any advantage whatever from an
insurance upon the mortgaged property effected by the former for his own benefit. 1
Jones, Mortg. § 401; Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R.
1.491; Plimpton v. Ins. Co., 43 Vt. 497;
May, Ins. §§ 449, 456; Carter v. Mookett, etc.,
Ins. Co., 8 Paige, 437.
It is equally well settled that an agreempnt
by the mortgagor to insure for the benefit of
his mortgagee gives the latter an equit;»ble
lien upon the proceeds of a policy taken out
by the former and embraced in the agreement.
And when the agreement is that the
mortgagor shall procure insurance upon the
mortgaged property, payable in case of loss
to the mortgagee, and the mortgagor, or some
one for him, procures insurance in themuitgagor's or a third person's name, without
making it payable to the mortgagee, though
this be done without the mortgagee's knowledge, or without any intent to perform the
agreement, equity will treat the insurance
as effected under the agreement, (unless this
has been fulfilled in some other way,) and
will give the mortgagee his equitable lien acThis is upon the principle by
cordingly.
which equity treats that as done which ought
to have been done. That is to say, inasmuch
as the insurance effected ought to have been
made payable to the mortgagee, equity will
give the mortgagee the same benefit from it
In support of these genas if it had been.
eral propositions we refer to Thomas v.
372; Carter v. RockVonkapff, 6 Gill &
ett, etc., Ins. Co., and Nichols v. Baxter, supra; Wheeler v. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 439;
Cromwell v, Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N
Y. 42; Miller v. Aldriah, 31 Mich. 408; 1
Story, Eq. Jur. § 64(/; 2 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th
Ed.) 832-4; In re Sands Ale Brewing Co., 3
Biss. 175, Fed. Cas. xNo. 12,ii07.
Ir the cases cited (with the exception of
Nichols V. Baxter) the insurance was effectIn Nichols
ed after the agreement to insure.
V. Baster it would seem that the court
thought this made no difference, though the
opinion alludes (somewhat as a makeweight,
as it occurs to us) to the fact, which appeared
by inference only, that the insurance in that
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As he
agreement ing it made payable to Bichardson.
parties to did not do the former, he should have done
is in
can see no the latter, and therefore Richardson
not be ap- equity entitled to stand in the same position
to have
plicable to insurance already subsisting when as if he had done what he ouglit
the agreement to insure is made, as to that done.
Stearns v. Quinoy Ins. Co., 124 Mass. 61,
subsequently obtained, unless this result ia
aflirmatively excluded by the facts of the relied upon by the plaintiffs, is not a case
Such subsisting Insurance can be presenting the precise question whether an
case.
before an agreement to
mad'? payable to the mortgagee, or assigned insurance effected
to bim, so as to satisfy the agreement. insure is to be regarded as embraced in such
Where the agreement is, as in the case at agreement, so as to give a mortgagee an
But. the
bar, "to keep" the premises insured, it is en- equitable lien on the proceeds.
tirely consistent with its letter as well as its principle there enunciated, and which apspirit to hold that it embraces prior as well pears to be supported by other decisions of
And where, as in that state, is that the mortgagee cannot have
as subsequent insurance.
the present instance, the value of the insured the lien unless the insurance was obtained
property is such that subsequent insurance, by the mortgagor as his agent, or with intent
If this
sufficient to satisfy the agreement, cannot be to perform an agreement to insure.
obtained so long as the prior insurance was to be regarded as the correct rule, it
stands, this is an (equitable circumstance en- would seem to be decisive in the plainBut it is against the weight
titled to great weight upon the question tiffs' favor.
whether the prior insurance ought to be held and current of authority, and, as it seems to
to be covered by the agreement. This equi- i us, inequitable, and therefore we do not fol'
table circumstance is much enhanced when low it,
the effect of the prior insurance is, as in I Another question was discussed upon the
this case, to scale and reduce the subsequent argument, viz., whether tiie covenant to ininsurance procured and made payable to the sure ran with the land, so that the record of
the mortgage was constructive notice to the
mortgagee under the agreement.
In such a state of facts, to permit the plaintiff and to all others of Riciiardson's
We do not deem
mortgagor to withhold the prior insurance (the mortgagee's) equities.
from the mortgagee is to permit him to profit it at all necessary to consider this question.
by liis own wrong, at the expense of him The mortgagor's assignment of his claim
whom he has wronged, and a violation of under the certificate after the loss was an asone of the first principles of law as well as signment of a debt, — a mere chose in action,
of equity. The question is not what the — wliich the plaintiffs took subject to all demortgagor's intention was with reference to fenses and equities against him. Archer v.
the prior insurance, but whether it was equi- Merchants' <&M. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 434; Wiltable that, in carrying out any intention, he son V. Hill, 3 Met. 66; Brichta v. N. T. Lashould be permitted to withhold the benefits fayette Ins. Co., 2 Hall, (K. Y.) 372; Melfrom the mortgagee, especially in view of len V. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 609;
the maxim that equity regards that as done Greene v. Warnick, 64 N. Y. 220; May, Ins.
which ought to have been done.
From all this it follows that, in our
Cromwell § 386.
V. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., Wheeler v. /n«. opinion, the defendant is entitled to the proCo., Miller v. Aldriah, and In re Sands Ale ceeds of the first insurance paid into the
court, instead of the plaintiffs, as found by
Brewing Co., supra.
Applying these considerations to this case, the court below.
we are of opinion that Richardson is clearly
There being no dispute as to the correctentitled to an equitable lien upon the pro- ness of the findings of fact, the case is receeds of the first insurance, to be applied up- manded, with directions to the district court
on her note and mortgage.
Cochran ought to render judgment for the defendant accordto have kept his covenant.
He could have ingly.
Though there is no formal reversal
done this by procuring a third new policy, oi of the order denying a new trial, the defendby assigning the first insurance, or hav- ant is entitled to costs, as of course.
case, though effected hefore tlie
to insure, wa? understood by the
We, however,
be embiiiced in it.
reason why the same tule should
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and Appeals of New Jersey.
18(1.

Mr. Pitnej' (with nliom was 0. Parker), for
aiipellants.
Mr. Vanatta, for respondent.
L>BPUE, J. The bill of complaint filed in
tills cause, after setting out the proceedings
iu the suit in chancery between Haughwout
and Boisaubln, charges that the deed of conveyance from Boisaubln to Murphj', though
bearing date on the 7th of August, lS(;.j, was
not actuary delivered until the 5th day of
October of that year, and after the filing of
the bill of complaint by Haughwout against
Boisaubln, and after the filing of notice of
the pendency of that suit in the clerk's office
of the county of Morris.
It further charges
that the said Murphy had actual knowledge
of the contract of purchase made by Haughwout with Boisaubln, and of the Intention of
Haughwout
to commence suit for specific
performance, long before the delivery of his
deed and the payment of any part of the consideration money therefor; and that the defendant accepted the said conveyance, and
paid the purchase money therefor, with actual knowledge of the existence of the complainants' contract, and of the pendency of
the suit for the specific performance thereof.
The prayer of the bill is that the title of the
complainants to the said three lots may be
ratified and established, and declared to be
good and valid as against the claim of title
made to the same by said Murphy, and be declared paramount thereto; and that the claim
of title to the said lots by the said Murphy,
under his deed of conveyance from Boisaubln, be declared invalid and of no effect
against the title of the complainants, and
that the defendant may be directed to release
and convey to the complainants; and that
the complainants may have such other and
further relief, &c.
A suit in chancery, duly prosecuted in good
faith, and followed by a decree, is constructive notice to eveiy person who acquires from
a defendant, pendente lite, an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation, of the legal
and equitable rights of the complainant as
charged in the bill and established by the decree.

This effect of a successful litigation in subordinating the title of a purchaser pending a
litigation, to the rights of the complainant
as established in the suit, is not derived fi-om
legislation.
It is a doctrine of courts of equity, of ancient origin, and rests not upon
the principles of the court with regard to
notice, but on the ground that it is necessary
to the administration of justice that the decision of the court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigant parties, but also
upon those who acquire title from them during the pendency of the suit. Bellamy v.
Sabine, 1 De Gex & J. 566; Metcalfe v. Pul-
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vertoft, 2 Ves. & B. 205; Walden v. Bodleys'
Heirs, 9 How. 49; Murray v. Lylburn, 2
Johns. Ch. 441.
Such a purchaser need not
be made a paity, and will be bound by the
decree which shall be made.
1 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 406; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 106, 351; Bishop
of 'Winchester v. Paine, 11 Ves. 196.
Before any statutory provision was made
requiring notice of the pendency of the suit
to be filed in order to charge a subsequent
purchaser from the defendant with notice
of the litigation, it became the established
practice that subpoena served and bill filed
were necessary before the suit was considered as commenced,
so as to make its pendency constructive notice to persons deriving
title from the parties, and to give the decree
a conclusive effect against such persons.
1
Vern. 318; 2 Madd. Ch. Prac. 325; 2 Sugd.
Vend. 280; Hill, Tnistees, *511; Hayden v.
Bucklin, 9 Paige, 512; Dunn v. Games, 1 McLean, 321, Fed. Cas. No. 4,176; Id., 14 Pet.
322, 333.
An assignee who takes an assignment from the defendant after bill filed, but
before subpoena served, is a necessary party.
Powell V. Wright, 7 Beav. 444. By the fiftyseventh section of the chancery practice act,
(the provisions of which are similar to the
New York act of 1834, and to the English
statute of 2 Vict. c. 11, § 7,) another requisite
is superadded in order that the proceedings
in the suit shall aifect a bona fide purchaser
or mortgagee; a written notice of the pendency of the suit must be filed in the clerk's
office of the county in which the lands to be
affected lie. Nix. Dig. p. 102. i This section
is expressed in negative terms, and has not
changed the former practice except in prescribing that notice of the lis pendens shall
be filed before a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee shall be chargeable with notice of the
pendency of the suit, notwithstanding the
bill has been filed and the subpoena served.
But the defendant was not a purchaser
pendente lite. He acquired title by a deed
which bears date on the 7th day of August,
1865, and was acknowledged on the next day.
The defendant testifies that it was delivered
Boisaubin's testimoon the 7th of August.
ny is that it was delivered on the 7th or 8th.
Prom the date of the acknowledgment of
the mortgage, it is probable that it was not
The proof,
finally delivered before the 19th.
however, is full and clear that it was executed and delivered to Murphy before the
bill was filed in the case of Houghwout v.
Boisaubln. 2 The commencement of a suit
in chancery is constructive notice of the pendency of such suit only as against persons
who have acquired some title to or interest
in the property involved in the litigation, under the defendant, after the suit is comStuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch.
menced.
Hopkins v. McLaren, 4 Cow. 667:
151;
Parks V. Jackson, 11 AVeud. 442. A person
1

Revision, p. 114,
N. J. E(i. 3t-j.
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wliose interest existed at the comnienceiiient
is a necessity party, and will not
be bound by the proceediugs unless he be
made a party to the suit. Ensworth v. Lambert, 4 Johns. Ch. 605.
The complainants' right to relief on the
ground that the defendant was a purchaser
from Boisaubin pendente lite having failed,
It must be considered whether, in the other
aspect of the case, he will be entitled to relief. In this aspect the bill is to be taken to
have been tiled for the execution of the trust
arising from the prior contract between
Haughwout and Boisaubin for the purchase
of the lands, by the conveyance to the complainant, by Murphy, of the legal title which
In this aspect of
he acquired by his deed.
the case, the bill is a bill for specific perform-

of the suit

ance.

In equity, upon an agreement for the sale
of lands, the contract is regarded, for most
The
puiposes, as if specifically executed.
purchaser becomes the equitable owner of
Che lands, and the vendor of the purchase
money.
After the contract, the vendor is
the trustee of the legal estate for the vendee.
Crawford v. Bertholf, 1 N. J. Eq. 460; HoagJand V. Latourette, 2 N. J. Eq. 254; Huffman
V. Hummer, 17 N. T. Eq. 264; King v. Kuckman, 21 N. J. Eq. 599.
Before the contract
Is executed by conveyance, the lands are devisable by the vendee, and descendible to his
hell's as real estate; and the personal representatives of the vendor are entitled to the
purchase money.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 789;
2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1213.
If the vendor
should again sell the estate of which, by rear
son of the first contract, he is only seized in
trust, he will be considered as selling it for
the benefit of the person for whom, by the
first contract, he became trustee, and therefore liable to account. 2 Spenee, Eq. Jur.
310.
Or the second purchaser, if he have
notice at the time of the purchase of the previous contract, will be compelled to convey
the property to the first purchaser. Hoagland V. Latourette, 2 N. J. Eq. 254; Downing V. Uisley, 15 N. J. Eq. 94.
A purchaser
from a trustee,
with notice of the trust,
stands in the place of his vendor, and is as
much a trustee as he was. 1 Eq. Gas. Abr.
oS4;
Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 631.
The cestui que trust may follow the trust
property in the hands of the purchaser, or
may resort to the purchase money as a substituted fund. Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns.
<>h. 566, 581.
It is upon the principle of the
transmission by the contract of an actual
equitable estate, and the impressing of a
trust upon the legal estate for the benefit of
the vendee, that the doctrine of the specific
performance of contracts for the sale and
-conveyance of lands mainly depends.
The defendant insists that he holds the
lands discharged of any trust In favor of
Haughwout or the complainants, by reason
of his being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice.

The proof is, that at the time of the delivery of the deed, $400 of the consideration
money was paid, and the balance secured by
mortgage. Conceding that the $400 was actually paid before Murphy had notice of
Haughwout's claim, the defence of a bona
fide purchase is not supported. Before the
mortgage became due. Murphy had actual
notice of the existence and nature of Haughwout's claim.
The defence of a bona fide purchase may
be made by plea, in bar of discovery and relief, or by answer, in bar of relief only. If
made by plea, the payment of the whole of
the consideration money must be averred.
An averment that part was paid and the
balance secured by mortgage, will not be
sufficient. Wood v. Mann, 1 Sumn. 506, Fed.
Cas. No. 17,951.
Proof of the payment of the
whole purchase money is essential to the defence, whether it be made by plea or answer.
Jewett V. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. 65; Molony v.
Kernan, 2 Dru. & War. 31; Losey v. Simpson, 11 N. J. Eq. 246.
Notice before actual
payment of all the purchase money, although
it be secured and the conveyance executed,
or before the execution of the conveyance,
notwithstanding the money is paid, is equivalent to notice before the contract. 2 Sugd.
Vend. 533 (1037); Hill, Trustees, 165.
If the
defendant has paid part only, he will be protected pro tanto only.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
64c; Story, Eq. PI. § 604a.
What the measure of relief shall be in
cases where the deed has been executed and
delivered and part of the purchase money
paid before notice of the previous contract to
sell to another, was elaborately discussed by
the counsel of the appellants.
The chancellor held, upon the authority of Plagg v.
Mann, 2 Sumn. 487, Fed. Cas.- No. 4,847, that
a contract of purchase, executed by delivery
of the deed and payment of part of the purchase money without notice of the previous
contract, gave the purchaser a right to hold
the land, and that the equity of the person
with whom the previous contract was made,
was merely to have the unpaid purchase
money.

The law of the English courts
til the defence of a bona fide

is, that unpurchase is
perfected by the delivery of the deed of conveyance, and the payment of the entire consideration money, such purchaser is without
any protection as against the estate of the
equitable owner under a prior contract, even
though he contracted to purchase, and accepted his deed and paid part of the purchase money in good faith; his only remedy
being against his vendor to recover back
what he has paid on a consideration which
has failed. In some of the American courts
this doctrine has been qualified to the extent of enforcing specific performance of the
prior contract, on condition that the purchaser shall be indemnified for the purchase
money paid, and also for permanent improvements put upon the property before notice,

or EQUITY.

the principle that lie who asks equity
must do equity. The cases are collected in
2 lioad. Gas. Eq. 1; notes to Basset v. Nosworthy.
The doctrine of the English courts is necessary to give effect to the principle that In
equity, immediately on the contract to purchase, an equitable estate arises in the vendee, the legal estate remaining in the vendor
for his benefit. Qualified by the obligation
to make compensation to any subsequent
bona fide purchaser, who has paid part only
of the consideration money, for all disbursements made before notice, the rule is every
way consonant with correct principles. Such
indemnity is protection pro tanto.
But whatever the nature of the relief may
be in cases where the naked question of the
acceptance of a deed and payment of part of
the consideration before notice is presented,
the relief indicated by the chancellor is the
only relief the complainants are entitled to
under the circumstances of this case. The
rule of law which deprives a subsequent purchaser who has contracted for and accepted
a conveyance, and paid part of the purchase
money in good faith, of the fruits of his puris exceedingly
Indemnity,
without
chase
harsh, and often oppressive in its applicatioiL Mitigated by the obligation to make
indemnity for payments and expenditures
before actual notice, its operation is neverA party who
theless frequently inequitable.
asks the enforcement of a rule of this nature
against another who is innocent of actual
fraud, must seek his remedy promptly. He
may lose his right to specific relief against
the lands by laches, and be remitted to the
unpaid purchase money as the only relief
which will be equitable. In cases where the
prayer is for the specific performance of a
contract between the immediate parties to
the suit, delay in filing the bill is often of itself a bar to relief. Merritt v. Brown, 21 N.
J. Eq. 401.
The agreement between Haughwout and
Boisaubin was made on the 24th of Septemher, 1863. In Febniary, 1864, Haughwout
gave Boisaubin notice of his election to take
the property under the agreement. After
this notice was given, Boisaubin laid the
property out in lots and publicly offered them
for sale. Murphy's deed for the three lots
of which he became the purchaser, was expcuted and delivered in August, 186.5. The
v. Boisaubin,
1)111 in the suit of Haughwout
was filed the last day in the same month,
'the solicitor who appeared for Haughwout
in that suit, had notice of the existence of
Murphy's deed within a few days after his
iiill was filed. Boisaubin, in his answer,
on
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which was filed on the 3d of November, 1865,
specifically sets out the fact of the conveyance to Murphy and the circumstances connected therewith.
Murphy was himself examined as a witness on the 5th of April,
1866, and testified in relation to the conveyance to him. Haughwout must be charged
with notice as early as April, 1866, that
Murphy intended to assert his right to the
land. The bill in this case was not filed until the 4th of April, 1868. After this long
delay it would be inequitable to enforce
specific performance against the defendant.
The fact that there were delays in the ijrosecution of that suit to final decree, which
were unavoidable, ought not to prejudice
Murphy. He should have been made a party
to that suit.
Besides that, the bond and mortgage which
were given by Murphy to Boisaubin for the
unpaid purchase money, were assigned by
Boisaubin to one Geoffrey, on the 16th of
April, 1866, and by Geoffrey further assigned to William Davidson, on the 2d of July of
the same year, and notice of such assignment given to Murphy by the solicitor of
Davidson. The money due on the mortgage
was paid at its maturity by Murphy to Davidson's solicitor.
That Davidson, in the
transaction, was acting for Haughwout, and
that the money wherewith this assignment
was procured was paid by Haughwout, and
that the proceeds when collected were realized by him, are indisputable.
That the assignment was made by Geoffrey to Davidson, as collateral security, will
not affect the case. When Murphy received
notice of the prior equitable title of Haughwout, he was entitled to have the seclirity
he had given for the unpaid purchase money surrendered. Tourville v. Naish, 3 P.
Wms. 307. The subsequent assignments
were taken and the money received, with
full notice of all the circumstances. The
Haughmoney
received on the mortgage,
wout still retains. It is no answer to say
that in decreeing specific performance Murphy may have the money refunded to him.
Haughwout might have insisted upon having the land itself, or at his option, pursued
the proceeds of the sale. He cannot have
By accepting a security given for the
both.
purchase money, he is deemed to have affirmed the sale so far as respects the purMurray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch.
chaser.
441; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1262; Scott v. GamEq. 218.
ble, 9 N.
The complainants are not entitled to relief.
The decree of the chancellor is affirmed,
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with

costs.

The whole court concurred.
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Error from superior court, Muscogee county; Smith, Judge.
Suit by Hattie E. Tillman and William L.
Tillman, plaintiffs and defendants in error,
against John W. Clements, defendant and
plaintiff in error, for an account and settlement of a legacy due said Hattie B. Tillman undei' the will of one Jacob A. Clements, John W. Clements being an executor
of the same.
The following is the official report:
Hattie E. Tillman, a legatee under the will
of Jacob A. Clements, deceased, with her
husband and trustee, William L. Tillman,
filed their bill for account and settlement
against John W. Clements, executor, and Sarah B. Clements, executrix, of said will.
The bill contained charges of mismanagement of the estate, violations of the provisions of said bill, and non-payment by the
executors of the interest of complainant as
legatee.
The defendants answered the bill;
but as their answers are not material or necessary to an understanding of the errors complained of, they are not set forth. The jury
returned the following verdict:
"We, the
jury, find that Sarah B. Clements has no
property or effects of the estate of Jacob A.
Clements,
deceased, in her hands, as executrix or otherwise. We, the jury, further find
that John W. Clements, as executor of the
will of Jacob A. Clements, deceased, has now
in his hands the sum of eight hundred and ten
dollars principal and five hundred dollars Interest, belonging to Hattie E. Tillman, as legatee under the will of .Jacob A. Clements."
Upon this verdict the following decree was
by the court: "Whereupon, the
rendered
premises considered, it is ordered, adjudged,
and decreed by the court that the complainant
do recover the same sum of eight hundred and
ten dollars principal and the further sum of
five hundred dollars interest to this date,
and the further sum of
dollars, costs
of suit in this behalf laid out and expended,
for which said several sums let execution issue, to be levied in the first place of the
goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of
said Jacob A. (Elements, deceased, in the
hands of John W. Clements, executor of the
will of said Jacob A. Clements, if to be
found; and if not to be found, then to be
levied of the personal goods and chattels,
lands and tenements, of said John W. Clements.
It is further ordered and decreed by
said court that the said John W. Clements
do satisfy and pay the aforesaid amounts,
principal, interest, and costs, to the said
complainant, on or before the first day of
January next; and, in default thereof, that
he be held and deemed to be in contempt of
the order and decree of this court." Plaintiff
in error excepts to the portion of the decree

embodied by the last sentence, and says the
court erred in rendering a decree to be enforced by attachment for contempt— "First,
because the verdict was a money verdict,
and the same could only be enforced by execution; second, because the verdict of the
jury was a money verdict, and could not be
enforced by an attachment for contempt,
and could only be enforced by execution;
third, because the verdict of the jury was a
money verdict, and was a debt, and to enforce the decree by an attachment for contempt would be to imprison the defendant
for debt, which is prohibited by the constitution of the state; fourth, because the decree
sought and moved for provides both for the
enforcement of it by execution, and an attachment for contempt; and the complainant should be required to elect whether she
would proceed to enforce it by execution or
attachment for contempt if the court determined that it could be enforced by attachment for contempt."
C. J. Thornton, for plaintiff in error.
F. Garrard, for defendants in error.

L.

KIBBEE, J.i Originally, in the absence
of statutes providing otherwise, decrees of
courts of equity, of whatever kind or nature,
operated strictly and exclusively in personam. The only remedy for their enforcement was by what Is termed "process of
contempt," under which the party failing
to obey them was arrested and imprisoned
until he yielded obedience, or purged the
contempt by showing that disobedience was
not wilful, but the result of inability not
produced by his own fault or contumacy.
The writ of assistance to deliver possession,
and even the sequestration to compel the
performance of a decree, are comparatively
of recent origin.
Our statutes expressly provide that "all orders and decrees of the court
may be enforced by attachment against the
person; decrees for money may be enforced
by execution against the property."
Code,
"A decree in favor of any party, for
§ 3099.
a specific sum of money, or for regular installments of money, shall be enforced by
execution against property as at law." Code,
"Every decree or order of a court of
§ 4215.
equity may be enforced by attachment against
the person for contempt;
and if a decree be
partly for money and partly for the performance of a duty, the former may be enforced by execution, and the latter by attachment or other process." Code, § 4216. The
clear legislative Intent is manifest to enlarge and render more eflScacious equitable
remedies, while presenting the remedies the
courts had previously employed in the absence of statutes providing others.
Under
our statutes, when a party is decreed to perform a duty, or to do any act other than the
1

Bland ford. J., being disqualified.

of the Oconee circuit,
preside in his stead.
bee,

was

Judge Kib-

designated

to

MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
mere payment of money, which the court
has jurisdiction to adjudge he shall do, if he
disobeys, the authority of the court Is defied;
he is guilty of contempt, and the arrest and
imprisonment of his person is not imprisonment for debt in any appropriate sense of
the term. But if a court of equity should
render a simple decree for money on a
simple money verdict,— a decree which it
may now enforce by the ordinary commonlaw process against property,— the failure to
pay the decree would not be contempt, nor
could compulsory process against the person of the party in default be resorted to to
enforce payment In Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39
Mo. 285, the court uses the following language: "We do not mean to say that a
party may not be put in contempt for disobeying a decree for the performance of acts
which are within his power, and which the
court may properly order to be done.
If it
were shown, for instance, that the party
had in his possession a certain specific sum
of money or other thing which he refused
to deliver up, under the order of the court,
for any purpose, It may very well be that
his disobedience would be a contempt for
which he might lawfully be imprisoned."
In Carlton v. Carlton, 44 Ga. 220, Judge McCay, delivering the opinion, says: "We do
not intend to say that simply because a debt
is adjudged by a decree in chancery, instead of by a judgment at law, it may thereThe imfore be enforced by imprisonment.
prisonment must be clearly for the contempt
of the process of the court, and be of one
who is able and unwilling to obey the order
of the court. * * * It ought never to be
resorted to except as a penal process, founded on the unwillingness of the party to obey.

5]

The moment it appears that there is Inability, it would clearly be the duty of the judge
to discharge the party," etc. The court further held that, "ordinarily, it would be improper to include in the order the alternative
order for imprisonment on failure, since it is
not to be presumed that a contempt will ensue." The constitutional provision, "there
shall be no imprisonment for debt," was not
intended to interfere with the traditional
power of chancery courts to punish for contempt all refusals to obey their lawful decrees and orders. This proposition may be
conceded to be sound without affecting the
case at bar in any respect.
"The power in
question was never exercised by chancery
courts except in those cases where a trust in
the property or fund arose between the parties litigant, or some specific interest in it
was claimed, or the chattel had some peculiar value and importance that a recovery
of damages at law for its detention or conversion was inadequate. Such interference
was in the nature of a bill quia timet, and
was asserted only on a proper showing that
the fund or property was in danger of loss
or destruction."
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 708710.
"No jurisdiction to compel the payment of an ordinary money demand unconnected with such peculiar equities ever existed in chancery courts, nor had they the
power to compel such payment by punishing
the refusal to pay under the guise of contempt."
In the case at bar the decree was right in
awarding an execution against the executor
as set forth in said decree, but the facts did
not authorize an alternative order imprisoning the defendant on failure to pay. Judgment reversed.
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Mass. 581.)

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
March, 1872.

A. conveyed to B. certain land by an absolute conveyance, B. agreeing orally to hold
in trust for A. after satisfying claims he held
against A. At B.'s death the following writing was found among his papers.
"Boston, July 21, 1865. I, Benjamin Rand,
having purchased the estate of Isaac P.
Rand, of Roxbury, said estate being situated
partly in Roxbury and partly in Dorchester,
in the state of Massachusetts, for his deed delivered to me on July 21, 1865, do hereby
agree and bind myself and my heirs to pay
over to the said Isaac P. Rand whatever balance shall remain over and above the amount
necessary to discharge my original claims
against Isaac P. Rand, and the charges
against the said estate, which by my purchase of the same have become vested In me,
the said payment to be made when all such
claims and charges shall have been fully
liquidated and discharged. * * * And also
in all charges and expenses which have been
or shall be incun-ed by me or my heirs in discharging the above claims and charges and
in carrying on the estate. Benjamin Rand."
This was followed by the memorandum
which is given in the opinion. The plaintiff,
who is the assignee of A., brings this action
against the heir and administrator of B. to
recover the balance remaining after the satisfaction of the claims of B.
H, P. French & J. B. Maynadier, for plaintiff. E. D. Sohier & C. A. Welch, for defendants.

COLT, J. The bill charges that Benjamin
Rand held the land conveyed to him by the
absolute deed of Isaac P. Rand, upon trust to
apply the avails of it to the payment of certain incumbrances and debts due him, and
to account for any surplus to Isaac P. Rand,
the grantor, to whose right the plaintiff, as
assignee,
has
succeeded.
The writings by
which it is claimed that this trust is declared are fully set forth, and it is alleged
that under the trust sales have been made
of more than enough to pay all demands and
charges, leaving a surplus, to which the plaintiff is entitled.
The defendants file a plea denying that
Benjamin in his lifetime held the land upon
any such trust, or that any trust was devolved upon them, as his representatives, by
his death. The purpose, no doubt, is to obtain first the decision of the court upon the
question whether, upon the facts disclosed,
any tmst is raised which can be enforced;
for, if no trust shall be found to exist, then
the investigation of long and detailed accounts will be avoided.
This is the point
which was argued at the bar, and we proceed
to its consideration without regard to supposed irregularities in the pleadings.

The land in question was conveyed by an
absolute quitclaim deed, dated on the 15th,
but delivered on the 21st day of July, 1865,
to Benjamin, who then held large demands
against Isaac P. Rand, secured by mortgage
on the same premises. The evidence sufficiently proves that Benjamin orally agreed,
at and before the time of the delivery of the
deed of the equity, and as part of the transaction, that any surplus over and above his
claim that might remain of the estate or its
proceeds should belong to Isaac P. No written memorandum of the agreement was made
before the delivery of the deed, but it was
suggested at the time that Benjamin should
put it in the shape of a memorandum, safely
deposited, in case anything should happen to
informed
him. And Benjamin afterwards
Isaac P. that soon after the transaction he
made a memorandum of the agreement. No
such paper was ever delivered to, or came
into the possession of, Isaac P., but after the
death of Benjamin a writing of that description was found safely deposited in his bank
trunk. By the terms of this writing, he
agreed to pay over any balance of the estate
remaining, substantially in accordance with
the oral agreement. It was signed by Benjamin, and dated July 21, 1865; and underneath the first signature was an additional
statement, also signed, in these words: "This
memorandum is made by me for the use of
my executor or administrator only. Neither
Isaac P. Rand, nor those claiming under him,
have any legal or equitable claim against me
or my estate; but upon the payment of my
debt, interest, and all charges, as above mentioned, any balance shall enure to the benefit of Isaac P. Rand and those claiming under him."
We are of opinion that this writing is sufficient as a declaration of trust, within the
meaning of our statute. It is much more
formal and particular in its statement than
declarations of this description by letter, by
answer in chancery, affidavit, recital in bond
or deed, or in pamphlet, which have aU been
held suflicient, and with reference to which
it is held to be no objection that they were
drawn up for another purpose and not addressed to, nor intended for the use of, the
cestui que trust. See cases cited in Browne,
St. Frauds, §§ 98, 99.
It is not essential that the memorandum relied on should have been delivered to any
one as a declaration of trust. It is a question
of fact, in all cases, whether the trust had
been perfectly created; and upon that question the delivery or nondellvei-y of the instrument is a significant fact, of greater or less
weight according to the circumstances. If
the alleged trust ai'ises from mere gift, delivery of the writing by which it is declared
Is not always required as proof that the gift
was perfected, for the court will consider all
the facts bearing upon the question of intention, and it has been held that if a party execute a voluntary settlement, and the deed

PKOPBKTY IN EQUITY— TRUSTS.
recites that it is sealed and delivered, it will
be binding on the settlor, even if he never
parts with it and keeps it in his possession
until, his death. Bunn v. Winthiop, 1 Johns.
Oh. 329; Perry, Trusts, § 103, and cases cited.
It must always, however, appear that the
fiduciary relation is completely established,
and not left as a matter of executory agreement only, regard being had to the situation
of the property, the relations of the parties,
and the purposes and objects had in view.
In this case the verbal agreement in which
the trust originated was made in consideration of the conveyance by Isaac P. of his interest in the real estate, and the trust is
founded on a good consideration. The fact is
of weight in aiding the court to carry out the
intentions of the parties; and the want of a
delivery of the memorandum becomes of less
significance.
The law as thus laid down is to be found
mainly in decisions under the words of the
English statute, which requires that all declarations and creations of trust shall be manifested or proved in writing. These were the
words of our earlier law (St. 1783, c. 37, § 3),
and they remained until the first general revision of the statutes; the requirement of the
present statute being that the trust shall be
created or declared in writing. Gen. St c.
The same change has been made
100, § 19.
in other states; and in those in which the
question has been incidentally before the
courts the tendency is to rule that this abbreviation in the words does not change the
law, and that "created or declared" are
equivalent to "manifested or proved." Trusts
may be created in the first instance in writing. They more commonly originate in the
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oral agreements and transactions of the parties, and are subsequently declared in writing. Our statute embraces both descriptions.
It had been settled by repeated decisions under the old statute, when this change was
made, that an express trust was sufficiently
declared if shown by any proper written evidence disclosing facts which created a fiduciai-y relation. Under this construction, the
additional words of the old statute seemed
immaterial, and are omitted. And we are of
opinion that no change in the meaning or effect of it was intended or made.
Perry,
Trusts, § 81, and cases cited.
In view of the law thus stated, the fact
that there was no delivery of the memorandum in this case is not of controlling importance. It is impossible to account for its
existence and safe preservation, unless there
was an intention that it should be used, if
necessai'y, to prove a trust. The statement
that it is made for the use of the executor or
administrator of the trustee implies this. The
cestui que trust was informed of its existence;
and by its terms a perfect trust is declared.
It is, indeed, declared that neither Isaac P.,
nor those claiming under him, have any legal
or equitable claim against the maker or his
But this statement, if such was its
estate.
intention, cannot control the effect of the
memorandum in establishing the trust. That
results, as matter of law, from the proof.
We are taclined to think that its intention
was not to defeat an equitable claim to the
proceeds of the estate conveyed, but only to
protect the maker against personal responsibility beyond the actual receipts in administering the tnists.
Decree for the plaintiff.
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Franklin.

to declare a trust and

for

an

account.

P. H. Stubbs, for plaintiff.
comb,

H. L. Whit-

for defendants.

BARROWS, J. In 1847 one Kennedy gave
to Nicholas Bates and his brother Thomas,
the plaintiff, a bond conditioned for the conveyance of certain parcels of land (estimated
at about tvFo hundred and fifty acresj upon
payment of the obligee's notes. In I8.3I, before the maturity of all the notes, an adjustment was made, by which, in satisfactian of
the bond, he made conveyances of the bonded
land in two separate parcels, — one to Wm. W.
Bates, a third brother, and the other to Nicholas, who (with Wm. W. and the plaintiff)
subscribed and delivered to Kennedy a receipt indorsed upon the bond, setting forth
that he had received the deed of his portion,
"for himself and in trust for his brother
Thomas Bates, according to what the said
Thomas has or may pay towards the same
real estate, which amounts at present to seventy-five dollars."
The price of the parcel
thus conveyed to Nicholas was $450, and
Nicholas seems to have admitted a resulting
trust in favor of the plaintiff to the amount
of one-sixth of the purchase, which was binding upon him and all claiming under him
with notice.
Indeed the writing subscribed by Nicholas
Bates seems to be tantamount to a declaration of an express trust, so as to satisfy Rev.
St.

e. 73.

§ 11.

The words "created and declared" in that
statute seem to be construed by the courts
to be synonymous with "manifested and
proved" as they stood in the original seventh section of the statute of frauds,— 29 Car.
II. c. 3. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 707, 5 Ves.
308; Unitarian Society v. Woodbury, 14 Me.
281; Barren v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Pinnock
V. Clough, 17 Vt. 508.
Prom the cases just cited and numerous
others we see that a letter, memorandum, or
recital subscribed by the trustee, whether addressed to or deposited with the cestui que
trust or not, or whether Intended, when made,
to be evidence of the trust or not, will be sufficient to establish the trust when the subject,
object, and nature of the trust, and the parties and theii- relations to it and each other,
appear with reasonable certainty.
The existence of a trust in favor of the
plaintiff, which he may enforce against Nicholas Bates and his representatives, and all
claiming under him with notice of the trust,
may be regarded as established.
Nicholas Bates mortgaged the property to
Kennedy to secure a balance of the purchase

money, and subsequently made two other
mortgages thereon to Philip M. Stubbs, the
scrivener who drew the conveyances from
Kennedy and wrote the indorsement upon the
bond containing the declaration of the trust.
Both of these last-named mortgages were
assigned to Prince Thompson, who had no
knowledge of the trust, and has given notice
of foreclosure, but has never been in possession of the property.
Nicholas Bates died in January, 1866, leaving a widow, Keziah M. Bates, now Keziah
M. Hurd, who is one of the respondents, and
who took out letters of administration on his
estate, inventoried the land as subject to the
mortgage to Prince Thompson, "and being
also held as a trust estate for Thomas Bates
This sum is
to the amount of about ?140."
apparently the amount of the $75 originally
paid in by the plaintiff towards the purchase
money, with interest up to the time of the
The widow conmaking of the inventory.
tinued In possession of the land, receiving
the rents and profits until November, 1868,
when she made sale thereof by license from
the probate court, without making mention
of the trust, to Daniel Day, who mortgaged
it back to her for part of the purchase money,
and took possession. The widow married
George Hurd, the other respondent, and on
September 9, 1870, took a quitclaim deed
from Day, and since then the two defendants
have occupied or had the exclusive use, income, and profit of the premises.
The plaintiff does not claim any rights as
The heirs of Nichagainst the mortgagees.
olas Bates are no longer interested, as the
sale by the administratrix devested them of
all right and title in the premises.
The administratrix,
in her inventory, admitted the plaintiff's rights, and is fully
chargeable with notice of them.
The other
respondent, -her husband, seems to have occupied only under her. But a joint reception
by them of the rents and profits is admitted
in the agreed statement.
He is therefore responsible to the plaintiff on this score with
The testimony establishes the fact that
her.
the plaintiff made a claim upon the administratrix for his Interest, and that there was
more or less negotiation between them looking to an adjustment. It is unfortunate for
both that an equitable adjustment could not
be reached without litigation.
In the hands of these respondents it is obvious that the property is subject to the
trust which the plaintiff seeks to enforce.
They object that he might have had an adequate remedy at law by a suit for his share
of the income. But cases of trust are, under
our statute, specially made the subject of
remedies in equity, and, moreover, it might
be desirable for him to have the decree to
which he is entitled in equity as against
them, in view of the possibility of a redemption.
Unless the parties can agree as to the
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proper sum to be allowed for the past rents
and profits, a master must be appointed to ascertain them.
Bill sustained. Estate declared subject, in
the hands of these respondents, to the trust
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asserted.
Costs for the complainant.
Master to be appointed at nisi prius, if required.

APPLETON,

C.

J.,

and WALTON, DANJJ., concurred.
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Appeal from Detroit.

Joslyn & Freeman, for complainants.
liinsou & Atliinson, for defendants.

At-

COOLEY, J. We bave not been brought by
the evidence In this case to the conclusion
reached by the judge of the superior court.
We are convinced that the testimony of Francis J. Chamberlain is truthful, and that it defeats the complainants' case. From this evidence it appears that, some twelve years or
more ago Chamberlain's first -wife caused to
be conveyed to him an 80-acre lot of land in
St. Joseph county, which she had purchased
with money received from her father, on a
trust, declared orally, that he would hold the
same for their infant daughter , then six years
of age or thereabouts. This the wife did in
expectation of her speedy decease, and she actually deceased six months thereafter. In
Chamberlain's hands this lot was occupied
and cultivated as part of a farm of 131 acres;
the remaining 51 acres being owned by himself.
It was all mortgaged by him for some
$2,000.
Becoming embarrassed in his circumstances he made an arrangement with his
brother, A. H. Chamberlain, whereby he exchanged the farm for certain property in Detroit, and caused the Detroit property to be
conveyed to the defendant Jane E. Chamberlain, who is cousin to his daughter, on a
verbal understanding that it should be held
In trust for the daughter.

It Is this Detroit property which complainants, as judgment creditors of Francis J.
Chamberlain, seek to reach.
If the farm in
St. Joseph county had been in equity the property of Francis J. Chamberlain, a trust In respect to the Detroit property would have arisen in favor of his creditors when the exchange was made.
Maynard v. Hoskins, 9
Mich. 485. But he had encumbered the farm
to an extent that exhausted his interest, and
In equity the daughter was entitled to the
avails of the encumbered place when it should
be disposed of. So far as concerns the controversy with these complainants, it is immaterial that the trust was a verbal one; it could
not have been enforced against him, but it
was nevertheless his duty to recognize and
execute it; and when he did recognize it, in
the exchange made for other property, his
creditors could not complain. The claim of
his daughter that he should perform the trust
was quite as strong in equity as any claim of
creditors can be.
Jane E. Chamberlain defends this suit in
the interest of the daughter, and avows the
trust in her answer. That is a sufficient declaration of trust in writing to answer the requirements of the statute of frauds.
McLaurie V. Partlow, 53 lU. 340; Whiting v. Gould,
2 Wis. 552; Woods v. Dille, 11 Ohio, 455; Cozine V. Graham, 2 Paige, 177; Chitwood v.
Britain, 2 N. J. Eq. 450; Wynn v. Albert, 2
Md. Ch. 169; Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 111.
310.

The decree must be reversed, and the bill
dismissed, with the costs of both courts.
The other justices concurred.

PHOPERTY
ORISSMAN

V.

CRISSMAN

12Sr

EQUITY— TRUSTS.

et al.

(23 Mich. 217.)
Supreme

Court of Michigan.

July Term,

Appeal from circuit court, Macomb
ty; in chancery.

1871.
coun-

Hubbard and Ashley Pond, for complaiuE. F. Mead and A. B. Maynard, for defendants.
Gr.

ant.

COOLBY, J. This is a bill to establish a
trust in the favor of complainant, in certain
personal property alleged to have been conveyed by her father, Francis Smith, to the
defendant, Frederick S. Crissman, who is
her husband, for her use.
The averments in the bill are that the said
Francis Smith, becoming aged and feeble in
health, was desirous of making a proper disposition of his property, and his wife Dinah
Smith, the mother of complainant, having become much weakened in mind and body, so
as to be unfit to manage or control property
for her own benefit or for the benefit of others, and being so deranged mentally, and
childish, and nervous, that it had become impossible to please or satisfy her, the said
Francis Smith, without consulting with, and
the knowledge of, his said wife as to the disposition of his personal property, concluded
to make the disposition of his whole estate as
follows:
His lands and tenements were in due form
of law deeded to complainant (his sole child),
by deed bearing date December 31, 1863 ; and
his personal property was transferred to said
Frederick S. Crissman, in trust, for complainant, to be by him kept at interest, used and
preserved as such trustee, for the use and
benefit of complainant, and in case any of
such property, or the proceeds thereof, should
remain after the death of complainant and
not disposed of dtiring her life, by her or for
her benefit, then the remainder to go to her
heirs; that such transfer of personal property
was not mentioned or disclosed to said Dinah
Smith, or to complainant, for the reason, as
alleged by said Francis Smith, that It might
create a jealousy on the part of said Dinah
towards complainant; she the said Dinah,
being then in a feeble and childish state of
mind, and then being unfit and incapable of
managing property matters, the said Francis
Smith then and there declaring and stating
that the use and proceeds of said farm during the life of the said Dinah Smith (which
was reserved for her), would be all she would
need and require for her support and maintenance,
and it being his, the said Francis
Smith's, desire that his estate should be secured to complainant, her heirs and assigns
forever.
This is the whole statement of the trust,
but the bill proceeds to aver that said Francis Smith died intestate. May 31, 1866, and
on August 11, 186G, said Frederick S. Criss-
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man was appointed by the probate com-t of
Macomb county, administrator upon his estate, and took upon himself that tnist; that
complainant is informed and believes that
said Frederick S. Crissman, soon after the
transfer of said personal property to him, in
trust, without authority of law, returned and
delivered to said Francis Smith certain portions thereof, amounting in value to about
five thousand dollars; that at or about the
time of the death of said Francis Smith, said
Frederick S. Crissman, without the consent
or knowledge of complainant, and without
authority of law, delivered and entrusted tosaid Dinah Smith a portion of said personal
property, for the sole gratification of the said
Dinah Smith, under the expectation and belief on the part of said Frederick, that she
would preserve and take care of the same
during her life, and at her death the same
would come to complainant and her heirs ,
that the said Frederick, further to gratify
said Dinah, and without the knowledge or
consent of complainant, agreed with said
Dinah to employ no attorney and take no
counsel in the settlement of said estate; and
the said Frederick, being ignorant of his legal responsibility and duty as such trustee,
and further expecting to please and gratify
said Dinah, made an inventory of all the
trust property and proceeds thereof, as the
property and effects of the estate of said
Francis Smith deceased.
The bill further avers that one Elisha S.
Day, a nephew of said Dinah (who is made
a defendant), intermarried with a daughter
of complainant and afterwards, by undue influence, induced said Dinah Smith to make
her will, by which, -after certain other gifts,
said Day and his wife were made residuary
legatees of her property; that this will was
dated May 4, 1867, and that after making
it, said Dinah was and continued to be of
weak and unsound mind and memory, and
was conti'olled by said Day; that she had,
at the time of her death, about four thousand
dollars of said personal property in her
hands, of which said Day took possession under the pretense that it had been given tohim and his wife, or to one of them.
The blE after other averments that need
not be here repeated, prays that the transfer
of such personal property so made by said
Francis Smith to said Frederick S. Crissman, may be declared to be a legal, equitable
and bona fide conveyance to said Freuerick,
in trust for complainant, without power or
authority of revocation, and that a re-delivery of said property, or the proceeds thereof,
to the said Francis Smith, was without authority of law and contrary to equity, and
that a transfer of any of the said trust property to said Dinah Smith and by her to said
Day, or to the executors named in her will,
was a violation of said trust; and that said
Day and such executors may be enjoined
from transferring, expending or disposing of
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any of the money, property or tlie proceeds
thereof so received by them through, and by,
said Dinah Smith, or since her death, except
as they shall return the same to Frederick
S. Crissman, and that said Frederick may be
enjoined from in any way, as such administrator of the estate of said Francis Smith,
representing, inventorying or accounting with
the estate of said Francis for the said property so conveyed to him in trust, as belonging
to the said estate, and that complainant may
have other and further relief.
For the purposes of a preliminary injunction, this bill was verified by the oath of the
who,
S. Crissman,
defendant, Frederick
though one of the parties to be enjoined, appears to have acted in the whole litigation,
in concert with complainant, and to have
been the witness upon whom she principally
relied to establish the trust The case was
heard on pleadings and proofs in the court
below and the bill dismissed.
In reviewing the testimony as it appears in
the record, we are strongly impressed that if
the case were to stand upon the testimony
introduced by complainant, it would not establish such a trust as is alleged. So far
from there being any reasonable pretense
that the arrangement —whatever it was — was
to be kept secret from Dinah Smith, on account of her defective understanding, or for
any other reason, the complainant herself appears to have taken testimony to prove that
Dinah Smith understood and was satisfied
with the arrangement, and there is other very
conclusive evidence to the same effect. Nor
would complainant's testimony convince us
that the trust, if any was created, was to be
irrevocable; but, on the contrary, it is clear
enough that Francis Smith believed he had
a right to withdraw from the hands of Frederick S. Crissman any portion of the property
transferred to him, at any time when he saw
fit, and that when he did withdraw any, it
was not in violation of any trust, but of
right. And perhaps, on the ground that complainant's testimony tends to support a different case from that made by the bill, we
should be justified in afllrming the decree
of the court below without examining the record further.
But we are not disposed to place our decision on any technical ground, inasmuch as
we think there is no sufficient showing that
any trust whatever was ever created.
Where
a party undertakes to establish a trust upon
parol evidence, especially after a considerable
lapse of time, the evidence ought to be veiy
<;lear and satisfactory, and it ought to find
some support in the subsequent conduct of
the parties and in the surrounding circumstances. In the case before us, the parol evidence is not clear or satisfactory, and the
conduct of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances tend to overthrow rather than
to support it. It appears that Crissman, before this alleged transfer in trust, had been
acting as the agent of Francis Smith in the

management of his personal property and the
collection of his dues, and there was nothing
in the externals of the new arrangement
which was inconsistent with a continuance
of the same relation. It appears also that
after the transfer was made to Crissman, he
gave back a receipt in which he undertakes
to account to said Francis Smith for the
mortgages assigned, or to his administrator
or assigns whenever called upon. Crissman
testifies that this receipt was given in consequence of the importunities of Mrs. Smith,
but this is not very material; the important
fact is that it bears strongly against the
complainant's case. The justice who drew the
deed from Francis Smith to complainant, and
also the papers on the transfer of the personal property, was sworn for complainant,
but could give but a very imperfect account
of the transaction. He remembers Smith saying, "He was doing this for the benefit of
Eliza;" and to the question, "Do you or do
you not recollect the fact that there was
something said by Smith in regard to his
personal property being conveyed in trust?"
he replies, "There was a little something
cannot now rememsaid— a very little— but
ber what it was." Now, Smith at this time
was conveying the real property to Eliza,
and it is not clear that what he said about
"doing this for the benefit of Eliza," did not
have exclusive reference to that conveyance;
but, if not, the fact that he regarded the
agency of Crissman in his affau's as beneficial to his own interests, might well have
induced him to speak of the arrangement as
for the benefit of his only child, to whom, as
he was already an old man, he would expect
his property or a portion of it to pass in a
brief period. And the use of the word
"trust" in reference to the personal property,
was not at all unnatural or unlikely if he
understood it to be held for his own use and
subject to his orders.
Crissman testifies more distinctly to a trust
declared in favor of his wife. If he testifies
truly, it seems to us matter of astonishment
that he did not mention it to his wife for
nearly three years; that he should procure
himself to be appointed administrator on the
estate of his father-in-law on the supposition
that all this property belonged to that estate;
and that he should inventory it all as pertaining to the estate. It is incredible that he
could have understood in 1863 that the property was put into his hands to hold for his
wife, and, without consulting with any one
on the subject, could have supposed it his
duty in 1866 to inventory it as the property
of her father's estate. We look in vain for
any satisfactory explanation of this circumstance, though we think we are not without
the means of some insight into the motives
which have impelled Crissman and his wife
to the course they have taken. "I had been
told," Crissman testifies, "that the old lady
could not, in any way, dispose of [the property], and I suppose it was the case." It was
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only after it was ascertained tliat Francis
Smith's widow was entitled of light to a portion of his property, and might dispose of it
by will, that Crissman advanced to his wife
and to the judge of probate this theory of a
conveyance to him in trust; a theory wholly inconsistent with all his actions in respect to the property, both before and since
the death of Francis Smith, and inconsistent
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also with the only writing which evidenced
any part of the ti-ansaction.
This is a most unfortunate family controversy, and we regret the necessity of having
to dispose of it; but we are of opinion that
the circuit court made the only decree warranted by the law and the evidence, and it
must be aflBrmed, with costs.
The other justices concurred.
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STEERS

et al. v.

(5

STEERE

Johns. Ch.

et al.

1.)

Court of Chancery of New York.

Oct. 2, 1820.

The original bill, filed February 21st, 1818,
among other things, that Stephen
Timothy,
father of the plaintifCs,
Smith, and T. Steere, was seized in fee, prior
to the 18th of October, 1802, of various parcels of land in the county of Chenango, and
which were particularly described, amounting
in the whole to 739 acres, and all of which,
except 47 acres, was situate in the town of
Norwich.
That on the 18th of October, 1802, S. Phettlplace obtained a judgment against Stephen
Steere, for 1,258 dollars, on which a fi. fa. was
issued in 1805, and all the lands of Stephen
Steere, in the county of Chenango, advertised
for sale.
That Richard Steere and Mark
Steere, defendants,
sons of Stephen Steere, in
August, 1806, bid off all the real estate of
Stephen Steere, at the sheriff's sale, for 1,600
dollars, and paid 1,400 dollars, the amount of
the judgment, interest, and costs, and took a
deed from the sheriff for "the whole of the
real estate of Stephen Steere, in the county
of Chenango, and his right and title thereto:"
and the levy and advertisement of the lands,
by the sheriff, were in the same general terms
of description.
The bill alleged that the deed
was taken in trust, pursuant to a previous
agreement with Stephen Steere, to loan him
the amount of the judgment, and to hold the
land as security, to be reconveyed, on repayment of the loan, with interest and expenses,
and of such other sums as might thereafter
be loaned to Stephen Steere, by Richard and
Mark Steere. That the Cole lot, containing
120 acres, belonging to Stephen Steere, was
sold by the sheriff, under a judgment and execution in favour of James Glover, in December, 1799, to James Glover, for 140 dollars,
being much less than its value; and that
James Glover agreed to reconvey the land to
Stephen Steere, on the payment of the 140
dollars, and interest. That in August, 1809,
Mark Steere released to Richard Steere, all
his interest in the lands under the sheriff's
deed of August, 1805, and became Insolvent.
That on the 30th of April, 1808, James Glover
conveyed to Asel Steere, defendant, another
son of Stephen Steere, t'jse Cole and Glover
"
farms.
That Asel Steere conveyed the same
farms to Richard and Mark Steere.
That the
purchase was made pursuant to an agreement
with Stephen Steere, and that Asel Steere
acted merely as the agent of Richard and
Mark Steei-e, and the land was to be held in
trust for Stephen Steere.
That on the 14th
of August, 1809, Asel Steere made a new conveyance to Richard Steere, of the Cole and
Glover farms.
The bill then proceeded to
state sales and conveyances of various parcels of the lands by Richard Steere, to different persons, and of the sums of money received by him on such sales, and for rents;
all of which sales and conveyances were alstated,
Steere,

leged to be made by Richard Steere, as trustee, &c.
The bill alleged, that the deed of August,
1805, from the sheriff to Richard and Mark
Steere, was void at law, as the description of
the lands sold was too general and undefined.
That in 1806, Stephen Steere requested Richard and Mark Steere to reconvey to him all
the property, except the Unadilla farm, being
325 acres, which he agreed that they might
retain in satisfaction for their advances, &c.;
and which far exceeded the value of all their
advances, which they neglected to do.
That
Stephen Steere requested Richard and Mark
Steere to account to him for all the moneys
received by them, as trustees, from the sales,
rents, and profits of the lands, after allowing
the money advanced by them on the judgment of Phettiplace, and all their just expense

and demands; but that Richard and Mark
Steere presented unjust and false accounts of
moneys, which they pretended to have advanced, the items of which were particularly
set forth; and insisted on holding the property to cover the same.
That on the 25th of October, 1815, Stephen
Steere made his will, reciting the lands of
which he was seized in Norwich, and particularly describing the same, and declaring, that
"it was his intention to dispose of all his real
and personal estate wheresoever, to his three
sons, plaintiffs, viz: the one moiety thereof to
Timothy, and the other moiety to Smith and
Thomas.
That he appointed James Birdsall
his executor. That the testator died April
22d, 1816, without being in debt, and the
plaintiffs were thus devisees and legatees of
all his real and personal estate.
That Richard and Mark Steere refused to account and
convey to them the property, so held in trust;
that the trusts had been acknowledged by
Richard and Mark, in letters and accounts.
That the plaintiffs were willing to confirm all
the sales made by Richard and Mark, not confirmed by Stephen Steere, in his life time, but
that Richard and Mark ought to account for
the moneys, and assign the securities received
by them.
That Richard Steere had brought
a suit at law against the plaintiff Timothy
Steere, on his bond for 540 dollars, given to
Richard Steere, for a part of the trust property sold and conveyed by him to Timothy
Steere, but that the plaintiff, Timothy, cannot plead at law, the various and complicated
trusts above mentioned.
The bill prayed that
the defendants, Richard and Mark Steere,
may be decreed to account to the plaintiffs
for the rents and profits received by them on
the lands so held in trust, and for the moneys
and securities received on sales, &c., making
to them all just allowances for loans, advances, and expenses;
and to pay over the balance to the plaintiffs, and reconvey to them
the lands so held in trust and undisposed of,
and for general relief, and for an injunction
By an amendment
against the suit at law.
to the original bill, the accounts and letters,
said to contain an acknowledgment of the
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a family patrimony, in which, from the graset forth at large and several special Interrogations added.
tuities of Richard Steere, they expected to
The defendants, Richard and Hark Steere,
share.
That Mark Steere, at that time, proin tlieir answers, the whole of which it is un- posed to release his share, on being paid his
necessary to state, denied the trusts alleged in
advances, &c., and the account was made up
to ascertain the consideration to be paid to
the bill, or any agreement wliatever, to advance money, and to purchase and hold the
Mark Steere, which was found to amount to
3,901 dollars and 80 cents, which Richard
property in trust, or any conversation, before
or after the sale, with Stephen Steere, relative
Steere paid to Mark Steere.
That Richard
to a purchase in trust. Richard Steere admitSteere then made an estimate of what further
ted, that Asel Steere informed him of the exadvances he had made, and in the same form,
using the name of Stephen Steere as a debtor,
ecution, and that it was the wish of all the
brothers that he and Marli Steere should at- and Richard Steere as creditor, for the sake
of convenience.
That the account was made
tend the sale and buy in the property, so as
out for the satisfaction of the plaintiffs and
to deprive S. Steere of all control over it, as
the family, and to show that any further dehe was then much embarrassed. They admitmands on him were unreasonable. That the
ted that Stephen Steere acquiesced in the sale,
account was retained by him as a private
under the idea that it would be better for the
memorandum, untU February, 1814, and to asdefendants, Richard and Mark Steere, to have
sist in the gratuitous disposition of the propthe land than strangers; that it might have
erty among the family.
That in January,
been the hope and expectation of Stephen
1814, an agreement by parol was entered into
Steere, and his children, that Richard and
Mark Steere, would give a share of the prop- between Richard Steere, Mark Steere, and
the plaintiffs, of which a memorandum was
erty to them. That Richard and Jlark Steere
reduced to writing by James Birdsall, and
had often advanced large sums of money to
which was acceded to by Richard Steere, on
Stephen Steere, to save his stock, &c., and
the ground that it would be satisfactory; and
permitted him to reside on part of the estate.
to facilitate it, and not as trustee, he wrote
That the defendant, Richard Steere, may have
the letter mentioned in the amended bill, to
promised the plaintiffs to distribute part of
Mark Steere, dated February 12th, 1814, conthe real estate among them, and may have
taining the account, &c., of January 28th,
said and written things for that purpose; and
1809, but he denied that the letter was writhad made gifts of land and money with that
ten at the request of Stephen Steere, or as
view; but they denied that these acts of kindThat in 1815 Stephen Steere was
That pursuant to trustee.
ness amounted to a trust.
nearly eighty years old, and was induced by
an agreement between Richard and iXark
the plaintiffs, his younger children, to make
Steere, Timothy and Stephen Steere, jun., of
his wiU in their favour, to the exclusion of
January, 1814, by which Richard Steere
his eight other children then living.
agreed to convey to Mark Steere, and TimOne of the accounts of the 28th of January,
othy Steere, each, land to the value of 1,000
1809, referred to in the bill, made Stephen
dollars, he conveyed 43 acres to Stephen
Steere debtor to Mark Steere, for his bond
Steere, jun., 33 acres to Mark Steere, and 38
dated September 3d, 1803, and the interest
acres to Timothy Steere, and that he took the
thereon at 8 per cent, and for various sums
bond of Timothy Steere, for 540 dollars, being
advanced, and for expenses of two journeys
the excess in the value of the land conveyed
to Chenango, the whole amounting to 3,901
dollars.
1,000
the
above
to him, over and
The other account was
and 80 cents.
dollars
That by
That these deeds were gratuitous.
as debtor to Richard
Steere,
Stephen
against
residue
the
convey
to
that agreement he was
Steere, containing different charges for smns
of the land to Timothy Steere and Mark
advanced, among which were the expenses of
Steere, who were to sell the same, and pay
several journeys to Chenango, and at the foot
advances;
but
the defendant his expenses and
were added various charges for advances, unSteere,
the
Mark
of
owing to the failure
der subsequent dates, among which was one
agreement was only in part carried into ef1,000 dollars, towards a mortgage to Glovof
gifts
these
of
any
that
But he denied
fect.
the whole amount being 3,016 dollars and
er,
and conveyances were made with the underIn a letter from Richard to Mark
cents.
26
trusas
bound
was
belief,
he
that
standing or
Smithfield, Februaiy 12th, 1814,
Steere,
dated
defendants,
RichThe
tee to Stephen Steere.
former writes, as follows: "I herewith
the
the
of
account
ilark,
the
admitted
ard and
present you with the amount of my account
2Sth of January, 1809, but denied that it was
against the estate of Stephen Steere, as foltrustees;
as
them
by
made up and presented
Richard and Mark Steere's account
lows:
that the account of the estate was on loose
Stephen Steere, as appears by the
against
was
account
the
1809,
and
papers, prior to
account,
and your casting up to 28th
original
made out from those papers, which are now
1810, amounts to 7,840 dollars and 46
May,
of
plaintiffs.
the
of
mislaid, or in the possession
cents, four years interest, 3,126 dollars 16
That the name of Stephen Steere was used in
cents, the Glover debt when settled, in March,
the
from
estate
the
distinguish
the account to
1813, and costs, 2,600 dollars, and interest
other estate of Richard and Mark, and that
Certain credits were
286 dollars."
thereon,
a
as
used
was
Steere
the name of Stephen
was 500 dollars, on
which
among
stated,
also
debtor, because the estate was looked upon as
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a sale of land to Gunn, and for the Unadilla
farm, 6,000 dollars, leaving a balance of 6,085
A
dollars and 62 cents due Richard Steere.
subwas
sold
for
lands
note of the sums due
joined, amounting to 6,720 dollars. The letter continued as follows: "So that you will
see by this statement, that you will pay me
and retain 110 acres on the south side of the
way, to pay you and Stephen, and the remainI think you may do as well, or
der divide.
I send the
nearly as well, as above stated.
original account, for the satisfaction of Stephen and Timothy, together with a paper, on
which you have heretofore cast It, both of
which papers I wish you to keep, as they may
hereafter be wanted. The old account had
In a letter, datbeen agreed to by father."
ed Smithfleld, October 19th, 1806, Richard
"I
Steere writes to Asel Steere, as follows:
wish you to assist father in every possible
way in acquiring a good title to his land from
Glover, and likewise to get White's lease on
the Unadilla farm settled, as there is a prospect of selling that this fall."— "If in case we
sell it, I don't know but It will be necessary
for father to come down and take a quit claim
from us, and give a warrantee deed, but if we
trade, I will write you further on this subject; at any rate, I wish to have it clear of
"White's lease, but, as it seems some fatality
attends all father's business, I am not in
much expectation of its being soon done."— "It
is particularly necessary for father to attend
to this business, as we are called upon for
the money advanced, and shall be under the
disagreeable necessity of selling other land, in
order to reimburse ourselves, and which father and the family would choose to keep in
preference to the Unadilla farm. I am particularly unfortunate in all my dealings with father; for at the time we were up last year,
a little before which I understood by him,
that his object in redeeming his lana was on
account of Its going to the family, and not
to strangers; I inferred from that, if in case
it came into our hands, he would certainly
have no objections to our deeding a part to
his children; under those circumstances, I assisted in raising the money, with a promise to
many of the family, that it should not go out
of my hands without their having a part,
which I believe you will very well recollect.
Now, it seems, I must either break my promise with my brethren, or incur the heavy displeasure of my father. I must confess that
the situation of the Glover lot, lying so long,
when the probability of its going to strangers was so great, with the averseness to
deeding to his sons, does not, in my opinion,
square with his conversation last year, above
written."— "If there is any compromise that
can take place between father and my brothers, whether in lands or any otherwise, so
that I may escape the heavy sin of a breach
of promise, I shall with all cheerfulness acquiesce in it; but, by the way, Jane would expect to be included." In another letter, dated
Smithfleld, 9th of July, 1807, Richard writes

to his brother Asel, as follows: "Father wishto reconvey
es very much for Mark and
back all the land in your county, in our purchases, except the Unadilla farm, which we
As there
cannot at this time comply with.
seems to be a willingness on Mark's pS.rt to
reconvey, whenever he is paid, it makes it
hard, on my part, to perform my engagements with my brethren, and give father satHe appears to be willing to give
isfaction.
a 1,000 dollars each,
Stephen and Timothy
Jane 500 dollars, and defray Simon's expenses
at Doctor Bellows. Timothy is willing to take
his, and I wish you to use your influence with
Stephen to consent to take his, or agree with
father some other way, for really, I wish the
matter settled."
In a letter, dated Smithfleld, 8th of August,
1809, from Richard Steere, to Stephen, Asel,
and Timothy Steere, after mentioning the loss
of a vessel and cargo belonging to Mark, and
that all his property was attached, and that
he, Richard, was left bound with him for a
large amount, without security, unless he
could be secured in Chenango county, Richard
adds: "I herewith send a deed from Mark to
me, last winter, which I hope you will lose no
time in having acknowledged and recorded.
You will see the necessity of this; for otherwise, Mark holds more than treble the land
which is justly due to him, which is wholly
lost to his family, if his creditors here should
attach it, before my deed should be recorded.
The deed or deeds made to Mark and I of the
Cole and Glover lots from Asel, now in the
hands of Stephen, must be given up or destroyed, and a deed or deeds made to me, at
the same prices, which last must be recorded,"
— "I wish his creditors to have all his property, but to have the other property, which he
holds to a large amount for security, torn
from the family, would be distressing indeed."
Several witnesses were examined on both
sides, the material part of whose testimony is
stated in the opinion of the court.

I

Mr. Henry, for plaintiffs.
contra.

Mr. Van Buren,

KENT, Ch. The bill charges that the purchase by the defendants, Richard and Mark
Steere, at the sheriff's sale, on the 16th of
August, 1805, was In trust for the plaintiffs'
testator, and those defendants are called upon
to account to the plaintiffs, as devisees, for
the rents and profits, and for the proceeds of
that part of the lands which have since been
conveyed to others, and to reconvey to the
plaintiffs that part of the lands which [they]
still retain.

It is intimated in the bill, and it was made
a point at the hearing by the counsel for the
plaintiffs, that the sheriff's sale was void, and
that the deed in pursuance of it was invalid,
for want of designation and description of the
this were so, then the plainlands sold.
tiffs, as devisees of Stephen Steere, the original owner, in August, 1805, would have their

If
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fit and adequate remedy at law, for the lands
now sought by the bill.
In respect to any
claim for the proceeds of the estate, I apprehend the executor of Stephen Steere ought
to have been a party to the bill; for these proceeds in the hands of the defendants were
personal property, and if they were bequeathed at all to the plaintiffs by the will,
(which cannot very readily be admitted,) the
executor is the proper person to call the defendants to account, and to disti-ibute the personal estate under the directions of the will.
But I shall not dwell upon this difficulty in
the case, but proceed at once to the examination of the question on which the whole foundation of the bill rests, viz. is there a trust
sufficiently manifested in writing, to be recognized and enforced in this court?
To take the case out of the statute of frauds,
the trust must appear in writing, under the
hand of the party to be charged, with absolute certainty as to Its nature and terms, before the court can undertake to execute it.
The words of the statute of frauds are, "That
all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences, of any lands, &c. shall be manifested and proved by some writing, signed by
the party who is or shall be by la^ enabled
to declare such trust, or by his last will in
writing, or else they shall be utterly void, &
of none effect." A trust need not be created
by writing, but it must be manifested and
proved by writing; and the doctrine in Forster V. Hale, 3 Ves. 696, is that the nature of
the trust, and the terms and conditions of it,
must sufficiently appear, so that the court
may not be called upon to execute the trust in
a manner different from that intended.
In this case, the testator, Stephen Steere,
at the age of seventy, was much in debt and
embarrassed;
and among other debts there
was a judgment against him, amounting with
interest and costs, to 1,400 dollars. He was
utterly unable to satisfy it, and his lands in
the county of Chenango were advertised for
sale on execution. He had eleven children,
at the time, and the defendants, Richard and
Mark Steere, (who were two of them,) attended the sale and purchased
the property
for 1,600 dollars, and advanced the money
out of their own funds, and took the sheriff's
deeds in their own names.
This was in August, 1805, and it appears to have been a
fair purchase at public auction. The natural
consequence
of such a transaction is, that
these two sons would not be inclined to
speculate
upon their aged father's misfortunes, and make a profitable bargain to themselves, to the injury of him and his other
children.
Considerations arising from the ties
of blood and the dictates of family affection,
would ordinarily lead such a purchaser to
offer to restore the property, on being reimbursed
his advances and indemnified for
iis trouble, or else to engage that all the profits of the purchase should be applied justly,
md equitably, to the common benefit of the
'ainily. But intentions and intimations of that
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kind cannot well be considered as amounting to a clear and absolute trust, which a
court of equity will recognize and enforce,
unless the declaration of it be quite positive
and free from all ambiguity. Parents will
usually make declarations and express intentions of holding their property for their children, but a technical trust would not easily
be deduced from them, unless they were contained In a last will and testament made on
purpose to dispose of the estate. It would
be injurious to that freedom of intercourse,
and to the operation of those kind and generous affections, which ought to be cherished
in the circle of the domestic connexions, to
make such deductions from loose and general
expressions,
in a confidential correspondence
between one member of a family and another, and to give them the force and rigour
of legal obligations. It ought also to be remembered,
in respect to the obligations resulting from family connexion, and the effect
to be given to them in courts of justice, that
the duty of benevolence,
to borrow an expression of Lord Kames, Is much more limited than the virtue. "Sanguinis conjuncti'O'
benevolentia devincit homines et carltate."
The fii-st item of testimony from whence
the plaintiffs undertake to show the trust, ia
a letter from the defendant,
Richard Steere,
to Asel Steere, dated October 19th, 1806, upwards of one year after the purchase under
the sheriff's sale. This letter is not addressed
to the testator, whom the bill alleges to have
been the cestui que trust, and in that respect
it differs essentially from the evidence from
which a trust was deduced, in the cases of
O'Hare v. O'Neil, 2 Brown, Pari. Cas. 39,
and Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696. It is addressed to a stranger to the alleged trust,
through a brother of the defendant, and it
was evidently a letter on private and confidential business.
The letters in the other cases
were addressed to the cestui que trust, and
there was then a reasonable ground of inference, (which is wanted in this case,) that the
writer of the letters [intended] to give a
manifestation or evidence of the trust. This
same Asel Steere declai'es,
in his answer,
that the understanding between him and the
defendants, Richard and Mark Steere, was,,
that the land was not to be reconveyed to the
testator after the repayment of the money
advanced and their expenses and trouble, but
that the surplus should be held for the testator and his wife, and the seven children then
residing In Chenango county.
with the general
This letter corresponds
view of the case, as given by Asel Steere,
In his answer, and shows evidently that Richard Steere considered him^olf as holding the
land In the first place, for his reimbui-sement,
and then, under some general and vague
promise, to distribute the surplus among his
brethren of the family. He says, he inferred that to be his father's wishes, even before he purchased, and that the land should
go "to the family, and not to strangers." He-
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says, therefore, lie made "a promise to many
of the family, that it (the land) should not
go out of his hands without their having a
part," and that he was not willing to "break

his promise with his brethren."
The next letter addressed to Asel Steere,
IS dated July 9th, 1807, in which he says, his
father "wished him and his brother Mark to
reconvey back all the land except the TJhaThis, he said, he could not
■dilla purchase.
then do, because he could not "perform his
engagements
with his brethren and give his
father satisfaction." The third letter of this
defendant is dated August 8th, 1809, and is
■addressed
to three of his brothers,
of whom
the plaintiff Timothy is one, and is material
only for the idea which prevails through all
the letters, that he and his brother JIark held
the property for their security and for "the
family."
There is not, therefore, in either of these
three letters, any sufficient manifestation and
■evidence of the specific trust charged in the
Tsill. The trust charged is in favour of Stephen Steere, the testator, but the trust vaguely intimated in these letters is one in favour
of the family at large of Stephen Steere;
and admitting a trust to have been duly manifested in favour of the children of Stephen
Steere, (and this is an admission which the
evidence
does not demand, for the suggestions and intimations in the letters are too
indefinite and loose to be the foundation of a
Ijill for specific execution,) yet the bill calls
upon the court to support the will of the
testator, and to "execute the trust in a manner very different from that intended." This,
Lord Alvanley admits, cannot be done.
The strongest evidence in favour of the trust
Is contained in the letter from the
■charged.
defendant, Richard Steere, to his brother, the
defendant, Mark Steere, dated February 12th,
1814, inclosing the account of these two defendants against Stephen Steere, of the date

January 28th, 1809.
In that account, Stephen

■of

Steere

Is charged

as a debtor, with payments by R. and M. to
the sheriff, at the time of the purchase by
them in August, 1805, and with some expenses in relation to that business, and he is
likewise credited with the sale part of the
lands held under the sheriff's deed. He says
in the letter that the original account was
sent "for the satisfaction of Stephen
and
Timothy Steere," and that "the old account
had been agreed to by father."
The defendants,
in their answer, admit,
that the account of 1809 was once, and only
once, shown to Stephen Steere, and then casually, and that it was made up with the
intent to show how expensive the estate had
been to them, and what advances had been
made, and that it was made up from loose
papers now mislaid, or in possession of the
plaintiffs, and that the name of Stephen Steere
was used as a debtor for convenience, and
to distinguish the real estate derived from
the sheriff's deed from the other estate of

defendants, and because the estate was
looked upon as a family patrimony, in which
the family expected to share.
They aver in
their answer, that the account was made out
for the satisfaction of the plaintiffs and the
family, and to show that further demands
were unreasonable,
and that the account of
1809 was retained by them, as a private
memorandum, until February, 1814, and that
additions were made to it from time to time,
to assist in the gratuitous dispositions of the
property among the family.
These explanations were given in answer
to interrogatories specially pointed to those
accounts,
and by which they were required
to answer, "whether the said accounts were
not made out in the usual form of accounts."
It appears to me that the explanation is
consistent with the proof applicable to those
accounts,
and with the general complexion
of the entire transactions of the estate.
James Birdsall, a witness, states that in
January, 1814, the defendants, Richard Steere
and Mark Steere, entered into a parol agreement In relation to the lands so purchased
at the sheriff's sale, with their brothers, Stephen Steere, jun., and the plaintiff, Timothy
Steere.
The substance of the agreement was
reduced to writing, at the time, by the witness, at the request of the parties to it, and
was approved of by them. That agreement
was considered as a final settlement of all
questions and claims in respect to that property, and it provided for a distribution of
what remained of the estate, among certain
of the children. The memorandum begins
with these words: "Richard Steere will state
his account to Mark, Stephen, and Timothy
Steere:" and here we have the origin of the
publication of the account produced by the
plaintiffs as evidence of the trust. The account was sent to Mark Steere, in the letter
of Richard Steere, of the 12th of February,
1814, and now we can understand the meaning of that paragraph in the letter, in which
he says, "I send the original account for the
satisfaction of Stephen and Timothy;" and
also the force of another paragraph in which
it is said: "So you will see by my statement
that you will pay me and retain 110 acres
on the south side of the way, to pay you and
Stephen, and the remainder to divide."
This account and letter could not have been
intended as a manifestation or declaration of
a trust in favour of the testator. The manner in which it arose, and was transmitted,
and the contents of the letter, are pretty satisfactory proof, that the explanation given
of the account in the answer is the just and
true explanation, and the only one of which
the whole transaction is susceptible.
The
way in which these accounts came to the
knowledge and possession of the plaintiffs,
was by taking copies of the originals while .
in the hands ot the defendant JIark Steere,
and there v\as never any free and voluntary
delivery for the pm-pose to which they have
been applied.
The only part of the letter
the
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which shows that the defendants considered
themselves as acting In the purchase and
management of the estate, as trustees for tiieir
father, the testator, Is the expression that
"the old account had been agreed to by fatier." This probably referred to the account
of 1809; and though a loose paragraph, it
would be difficult to understand it in any
other sense than as an admission of the trust
sought after, if it was not accompanied with
other paragraphs in the same letter absolutely
inconsistent with that fact. The account was
sent only for the satisfaction of the two sons,
was one,)
(of whom the plaintiff Timothy
and in pursuance of an agreement to distribute the surplus property among the children. The letter says, that after Mark's and
Stephen's debts were satisfied, the remainder
was to be divided. The whole letter must
be taken together, and one expression checked
and balanced by another. And when we take
into consideration the manner in which that
real estate had been dealt with by these two
defendants,
for ten years together, under the
eye, and with the approbation of their father,
the notion of any other trust than that foundspontaneous
ed upon brotherly good will,
promises, and gratuitous acts of benevolence
to the family at large, including their father
and all his other children. Is utterly inadmissible. We have conveyances from the defendants of parts of the estate between 1809 and
1815, to strangers, for a valuable consideration, and to several of the children, as gifts,
and all these acts confirmed by the testator.
The agreement of 1811: was partly executed
by the defendants, and the several voluntary
transfers to the chlldien, to the amount of
5,000 dollars in value, are decisive proofs,
that the defendants have acted according to
their original suggestions and intentions of
applying the surplus property, after their indemnity, to tne benefit of the family. The
idea of a technical trust binding in equity in
favour of the father, was never heard of in
the family, or put forward by any branch of
it, until after the two plaintiffs, Thomas and
Timothy Steere, had obtained from Mark
Steere copies of the accounts above referred
to. I cannot easily reconcile this claim with
good faith, after the agreement of 1814, and
the extent to which it had been carried into
execution by the defendants Richard and
Mark. It also strikes me, considering the
manner in which the purchase had been received and treated by the family of the testator, from the time it was made, down to
the testator's death, and the many gifts and
conveyances which the family have been content to receive at the hands of the defendants,
that to enforce a strict trust with all the
legal responsibilities attached to it, according to the bill, would be extremely unjust
and oppressive.
A question has been raised, whether the
parol evidence given in the case be admissible, to contradict the inference drawn by the
plaintiffs from the accounts and the letters.

If
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the written proof was clear and positive,
be rebutted by parol proof; but
considering the loose and ambiguous nature
of it, I am inclined to think the parol evidence is competent in support of the sheriff's
deed, and to explain the obscurity of the
case, by showing what was the understanding
of all the parties concerned.
In Forster v.
Hale, parol proof was received, and taken
into consideration by the master of the rolls,
in forming his opinion; and in Redington v.
Redington, 3 Ridg. App. 182, parol evidence
was held, by Lord Clare, to be admissible to
support a deed in the name of the son, but
inadmissible to create a trust against it. The
cases of Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms.
and of Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 386,
were referred to by the lord chancellor of
Ireland, in confirmation of this principle. The
parol proof in this case puts an end to all
pretension of a trust in favour of the testator,
and shows that by the acknowledgment of
the testator and of all the family, the purchase at the shej'ifC's sale was absolute, without any trust or qualiflcation whatsoever, and
that none was ever heard of, or suggested
in the family, until about the time that the
testator made the will, giving all the undisposed part of the estate to the plaintiffs.
It
was the uniform and universal understanding in the family, for ten years, that the
property was not to be reconveyed to the
father, but was to be held, in the first place,
for the indemnity of the two purchasers, and
then, it was submitted to their discretion and
justice, in what manner and mode, and to
what extent, the surplus should be appropriated to the wishes and wants of the family. I am aware, however, of the dangerous
nature of such proof, and should not willingly rest upon it, if it did not appear to
corroborate the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the written testimony in the case.
I do not perceive any ground for a distinct
tion between the case of the estate generally,
and the Cole and Glover lots. If any trust
exists as to them, distinct from what is attempted to be established as to the rest of
the estate, it is a trust by implication or operation of law, and such a trust cannot be made
out but by showing the actual payment of the
money by the cestui que trust, or an actual
loan by him for that purpose; and in this
case no such payment or loan is pretended.
The mere charge of the payment to the third
person who sets up the trust will not be
sufficient; and actual payment, or an actual
loan of the money at the time, and not subis indispensable.
sequent to the purchase,
Botsford V. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 409. "If you
merely employ a man by parol," says Jlr.
Sugden, "to buy an estate for you, although
he buy it accordingly, yet if he hold himself
out as the real puichaser, and no part of the
purchase money was paid by you, you cannot compel Mm to convey the estate to you,
because that would be directly in the teeth
of the statute of frauds." And if the entry

it could not
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in the account communicated to Mark Steere,
In 1814, is assented to as evidence in writing
of a trust, it is no longer the case of a resulting trust, but rests precisely upon the same
ground with the general trust set up by the
bill, and must partake of the same fate.
I am, accordingly, of opinion, that the bill
cannot

be sustained,

The plaintiffs,
have a remedy at
by the defendant
as neither the sale
1.

because,

upon their own
law for the land
Richard Steere,
nor the sheriff's

showing,
possessed

inasmuch
deed con-

tained any description or location of the land
sold.

If, however, the plaintiffs,

or the testator
whom they hold, may be considered
(and I think he may justly) as having waived
that objection, and as having affirmed the
sale, by repeated acts, then,
2. The plaintiffs have not made out a trust
sufficiently clear and certain, to enable this
court to act upon it, and to take the case
out of the statute of frauds.
Bill dismissed, without costs.
under
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Court of Appeals of New York.

March, 1865.

Action to recover dower and mesne profDefendant pleaded a provision by will
in lieu of dower, and failure of the widow
to elect. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed.
its.

T. W. Dwight,
for
Tracy, for respondent.

appellant.

Charles

DAVIS, J. The testator not having declared in express terms that the provisions
made by his will for his widow are given in
lieu of dower, she is not put to her election
unless the devises of the will "be so repugnant to the claim of dower, that they cannot
stand together." Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y.
002; Church v. Bull, 2 Denio, 430; Jackson
v. Churchill, 7 Cow. 287; Savage v. Burnliam, 17 N. Y. 562. This rule is a familiar
one, and needs no further citation of authority.
In this case the provisions made by the
will and codicil for the widow are as follows: 1. The will gives her all the household furniture and jewelry of every kind in
use by her and the testator, or either of
them. 2. One-third of the net income of all
belonging to the testator,
the real estate
after payment of all taxes, assessments and
interest due thereon, to commence to be paid
to her six months after the testator's decease, and to be paid to her every six months
thereafter, during her life. The codicil adds,
"a suitable provision in money," "to be paid
to her during the first six months,
till the
payment of her provisions under the will
shall commence,"
and the use during her
natural life of the apartments in the house
No. 615 Fourth street. New York, as occupied by her and her husband, as a residence
at the date of the codicil, with the election
to have such other suitable residence in any
other house belonging to him at the time
of his decease that she might prefer.
After making these provisions the will disposes of all the "rest, residue and remainder
of the estate," by directing in substance that
it be divided equally among his surviving
children and the children of his deceased
children, if any there should be, six months
after the death of his widow.
and
The will then nominates executors,
clothes them "with full power and authority
to carry out all the provisions of the will,"
and if they deem it necessary or proper to a
fair division of the property among the parties entitled thereto, to sell either at public
or private sale the personal and real estate,
or any portion thereof, and execute deeds
thereof, and to divide the proceeds as thereinbefore directed; but no sale to be made
till six months subsequent to the death of
the testator and his wife. It also clothes
the executors, "the survivor or survivors of
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them, with full power and authority to rent,
lease, repair and insure any portion of the
estate during any period of time the same

may remain unsold or undivided."
In Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561, the
testator devised and bequeathed all of his
estate, real and personal,
to trustees; the
real estate upon trust to sell after the death
of his wife. The will provided that during
her life, the widow should "receive and take
to her own use one-third part of the clear
yearly rents and profits of the real estate,
and that the residue of the clear yearly rents
and profits should be deemed a part of the
personal estate, and subject to the dispositions of the will concerning the personal estate."
The entire estate, with all its income, except the one-third of the rents and profits
of the land, was given (through the trusts)
to the testator's children and the children of
his daughters. It was held that a claim of
dower could not stand consistently with
these provisions, and that the widow was
put to her election.
Upon the authority of that case, if the
will in question creates a trust and vests the
entire legal estate in the trustees, the provision made for the widow is inconsistent
with the right of dower, and she was bound
to elect. In that case her claim of dower,
if allowed, would inevitably defeat the
scheme of the will, for it would prevent the
trustees from holding the legal title of the
whole estate, and receiving the entire rents
and profits for the purpose of paying taxes,
assessments,
interest, repairs and insurance,
and ascertaining the net income, of which
one-third is to be paid to the widow, and the
residue ultimately to the other beneficiaries.
The first question then is, are the executors, under this will, made trustees of an express trust? The word "trust" or "trustee"
is not used in the will, but that is only a
circumstance to be noted in considering the
"It is by no means necessary that
question.
the donee should be expressly directed to
hold the property to certain uses or in trust,
* * * It is one of the fixor as a trustee.
ed rules of equitable construction, that there
is no magic in particular words; and any expressions that show unequivocally the intention of the parties to create a trust will have
that effect. It was said by Lord Eldon, that
the word 'trust' not being made use of, Is a
circumstance to be alluded to, but nothing
more; and if the whole frame of the will
creates a trust the law is the same though
the word 'trust' Is not used." Hill, Trustees
(3d Am. Ed.) 99; (Orig. Ed. 05) and cases
there cited.
We are in this case to determine the question by the authority conferred and the duare clothed
ties imposed. The executors
"with full power and authority to rent, lease,
repair and insure" the estate "during any
period of the time it shall remain unsold
That period is, at all
and undivided."
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events, to last until six months after the
They are also in
decease of the widow.

general language clothed "with full power
and authority to carry out all the provisions
of this wiU." It is apparent that the "net
income of all the real estate" Is to be ascertained by some pereon or persons once in six
months dming the life of the widow, "after
all taxes, assessments and interest due thereon are paid." One-third of this net income
is to be paid to the widow. By whom is
this duty to be performed? It is clearly impracticable for the various tenants of the
estate to perform it; neither collectively nor
individually have they the means of determining the facts upon which the net income
is ascertained, and it would be extremely
embarrassing so to frame leases that each
tenant should be subject to pay to the widow
an amount of his rent that should discharge
the proportion his rent bore to the net income of the whole estate, after payment of
all taxes, assessments and interest due on the
whole. Collating the power to rent, lease,
repair, and insm-e, with the duty that rests
somewhere to pay aU taxes, assessments and
interest, and then to pay to the widow onethird of the net income after such payment,
there seems to be no embarrassment in determining where the duty rests.
To my
mind it is apparent that the scheme of this
will requires that the whole income, rents
and profits of the real estate shall be received by the executors
until the sale and
division provided for; and that they are the
persons on whom the duty to pay one-third
of the net income to the widow is imposed.
They are to malie the ultimate division, and
consequently to retain for that purpose the
income not paid semi-annually to the widow.
The rents and profits of all the real estate
are given to them for several purposes:
1.
To keep down taxes, assessments and interest by paying them; 2. To ascertain the "net
income" by deducting from the gross receipts the amount paid for those purposes;
3. To pay one-third of the net income thus
ascertained to the widow every six months;
4. To repair and insure the premises out of
the residue; and 5. To retain the balance
for division, and finally divide it among the
daughters or their children after the decease
of the widow. The imposition of these various duties by the will make the acting executors trustees for their performance to the
same extent as though declared to be so by
the most explicit language. The authority
to sell the real estate and execute deeds
thereof, as given by the will, standing by
itself, would confer nothing but a power;
but coupled as it is with the various provisions for leasing, repairing and insuring,
with the obligation to give to the widow a
residence
as she may elect in any of the
houses of the testator, it goes far to show
that it was the testator's intention to vest
the fee of the estate in the trustees.
But
however that may be, it is well settled that

trustees take the legal estate whenever they
are clothed with the authority which the
foregoing construction of the will gives to
the executors in this case.
"If land be devised to three persons and
their heirs in trust to permit A. to receive
the net profits for her hfe for her own use,
and after her death to permit B. to receive
the net profits for her life, etc., it has been
held that the legal estate is in the trustees,
for that they are to receive the rents and
thereout pay the land tax and other charges
on the estate, and hand over the net rents
only to the tenant for life." Lewin, Trusts,
2i8; Baker v. Greenwood, 4 Mees. & W. 421;
White V. Parker, 1 Bing. N. C. 573.
In White v. Parker, the trustees were to
permit the testator's wife and daughters to
receive the clear rents of three parts and his
son the clear rent of one part — the trustees
to pay all outgoings, to repair and let the
premises.
It was held that the legal estate
vested in the trustees. In the note to 2
Wms. Saund. 11, the rule Is thus laid down:
"Where something is to be done by the trustees which makes it necessary for them to
have the legal estate, such as payment of
the rents and profits to another's separate
use, or of the debts of the testator, or to pay
rates and taxes, and keep the premises ia
repair, the legal estate is vested in them,
and the grantee has only a trust estate."
In Birmingham v. Kerivan, 2 Schoales &
L. 444, Lord Bedesdale said that a direction
to keep a house in repair applied to the
whole house, and could not be considered
an obligation on a person claiming dower.
When therefore the testator authorized his
executors to repair, he did not expect that
they would control two-thirds of the estate
and the widow one-third, but that they would
manage the entire property.
The authority to rent and lease, to repair
and to insure, by necessary implication vests
the trustees with the legal title. They must
not only execute leases, but enforce them,
put in tenants and dispossess them, the proper performance of which requires the title
of the estate. So to repair there must be
such a right of entry and conti'ol in the trustees as gives them complete dominion; and
to insure involves the necessity of ownership,
for the policy must be taken in the name of
the trustees. But to repair and to Insure
necessarily involve expenses chargeable upon the rents and profits; and an executor
who is authorized to lease, repair and insure
by necessary impUcation may so lease that
rents will come to his hands out of whidi
to pay repairs and insurance, and if a net
income Is to be paid out of such rents, the
executor becomes the party whose duty it is
to ascertain and pay it In Leggett v. Perldns,
2 N. Y. 297, the testator constituted his executors trustees of the estate devised to his
daughters for life, and authorized them to
take charge of, manage and improve the
same, and pay over to them from time to
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time the rents, interest and income thereof.
It was held to be "very obvious that the legal estate in the premises was necessary to
enable the trustees to discharge their duties," and that the trust was a valid one
under the third subdivision of section 55 of
the statutes of uses and ti'usts (1 Rev. St.
729), and that by section 60 of the same statute, the whole estate in law and equity vested in the trustees.
In Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19, the testator devised his real estate to his grandchildren, and then provided that the lands
should not be sold or alienated, but that his
executors should lease or rent the same and
pay the rents, issues and profits to his said
grandchildren, etc.; it was held that the
executors were trustees for the purposes of
the wiU, and took, by implication, the legal
estate during the lives of the grandchildren.
are conceived to be
These authorities
abundant to establish the proposition that
the authority to lease, rent, repair, insure,
pay taxes, assessments and interest, and pay
net income to devisees, carried the legal title
to the executors in this case, and created a
trust in them valid under the statute.
It follows therefore from the decision of
this court in Savage v. Burnham, that a
claim of dower Is totally inconsistent with
the provisions of the will, and the plaintifE
was not at liberty to take both the provisions of the will and dower.
In the language of Comstock, J., in the
case cited: "During her life she was to
have one-third of the clear rent and profits,
and the other two-thirds were to go into a
The entire esgeneral fund for distribution.
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tate, with all its income, except the one-third,,
is given in the clearest possible terms, to the

testator's children and the children of his
daughters. It is therefore impossible for her
to receive any part of it, except what is expressly given to her, without subverting the
will to that extent."
The circuit judge erred In directing a verdict for plaintiff.
I have considered the question as to the
effect of the alleged release of dower. In
my opinion, the instrument was not designed
for any such purpose as a release of dower,
and ought not to be so construed. Its objects are apparent on its face; to-wit, to dispose of the vexed question as to her rights
under the provision of the will directing
moneys to be paid to her for her suitable
support the first six months, and protecting
the executors on paying her a sUm which
might prove larger than was designed by the
surrogate's decree, and the Instrument ought
to be construed accordingly.
I am not embarrassed by the question of
parties, nor the form of the judgment. The
Code authorizes all persons having conflicting claims to be made pa '■ties. Code, § 118.
The defendants who appeared and answered,,
admitted the receipt of the rents and profits
as alleged in the complaint, putting nothing
but the amount in issue. They are the heirs
at law, and the statute authorizes the verdict for rents and profits against them.
The judgment below should be reversed,
and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.
All the judges concurring, the judgment
was reversed and a new trial ordered.
Judgment reversed.
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gift in prsesenti of an instrument
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N. Y. 422.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

1880.

Appeal from judgment of tbe general term
of the supreme court, in the Third judicial
department, reversing a decree of the surrogate of the county of Sullivan upon the ac-

counting of plaintiff, as administrator of the
estate of Joseph Young, deceased.
Upon such accounting the administrator
claimed that certain United States and tovi^n
coupon bonds belonged to himself and to his
The surrogate disbrother, John N. Young.
allowed the claim, and charged him with
said bonds.
These bonds, upon the death of the intestate, were found in two pacljages inclosed in
envelopes, upon which were indorsed memoranda signed by him, one dated ilarch 14,
the other March 14, 1874, each of which described the bonds inclosed by numbers, and
stated that certain of them belonged to William H. Young, that the others belonged to
John N. Young. Then followed a statement
of the indorsements, of which the following
is a copy: "But the inst. to become due
thereon Is owned and resei-ved by me for so
long as
shall live; at my death they belong absolutely and entirely to them and
their heirs." The other was similar.
The circumstances under which the memoranda were made, and the further material
facts, are set forth in the opinion.

I

Hezekiah Watson, for appellant.
A. Nelson, for ''espondent.

Homer

RAPALLO, J. The intention of Joseph
Young, deceased, to give the bonds in controversy on this appeal to his son, William
H. Young, reserving to himself only the interest during his life-time, was so clearly
manifested, that we have examined the case
with a strong disposition to effectuate that
intention and sustain the gift, if possible.
The transaction is sought to be sustained
in two aspects: First, as an actual executed
gift, and secondly, as a declaration of trust.
These positions are antagonistic to each other, for if a trust was created, the possession of the bonds, and the legal title thereto,
remained in the trustee. In that case there
was no delivery to the donee, and consequently no valid executed
gift; while if
there was a valid gift, the possession and legal title must have been transferred to the
donee, and no trust was created.
As each
of these theories thus necessarily excludes
the other, they must be separately considered.

To establish a valid gift, a delivery of the
subject of the gift to the donee or to some
person for him, so as to divest the possession and title of the donor, must be shown,
and the first question which arises under
the peculiar circumstances of this case is,
whether it is practicable to make a valid

securing

payment of money, reserving to the
donor the accruing interest, and if so, by
The purpose
what means this can be done.
of such a gift may undoubtedly be accomplished by a proper transfer to a trustee and
perhaps by a written transfer delivered to
the donee, but the question now is, can it
be done in the form of a gift, without any
written transfer delivered to the donee, and
can conceive
without creating any trust?
of but one way in which this is possible, and
that IS by an absolute delivery of the security which is the subject of the gift, to the
donee, vesting the entire legal title and possession in him, on his undertaking to account
to the donor for the interest which he may
collect thereon. But if the donor retains
the instrument under his own control, though
he do so merely for the purpose of collecting the interest, there Is an absence of the
complete delivery which is absolutely essenA gift cannot
tial to the validity of a gift.
be made by creating a joint possession of
donor and donee, even though the intention
be that each shall have an interest in the
chattel, especially where, as in this case, the
line of division between these interests is
The reservation of the
not ascertainable.
interest on the bonds to the donor was for
an uncertain period; that is, during his lifetime, and until his death it was impossible
to determine the precise proportion of the
money secured by the bonds, to which the
donee was entitled.
If therefore the donor retained the custody of the boiids for the purpose of collecting the accruing interest, or even if they
were placed in the joint custody or possession of himself and the donee, there was no
sufficient delivery to constitute a gift. But
if an absolute delivery of the bonds to the
donee, with intent to pass the title, was
made out, the donor reserving only the right
to look to the donee for the interest, the
transaction may be sustained as an executed
gift.
Doty V. Willson, 47 N. Y. 580.
This brings us to an examination of the
evidence.
The written memoranda attached
by the donor to the envelopes containing the
bonds, evinced his intention to make a present gift to the respondent of an interest in
the bonds, and shows that the disposition
was not intended to be of a testamentary
character.
He declares that the bonds are
owned by William H. Young, but the interest to become due on the same is owned and
reserved by the donor for so long as he shall
live, and that at his death the bonds are
owned by the donee ''absolutely and entirely" in one case, and "wholly and entirely" in the other. There are some verbal differences in the two memoranda, but the purport of both is the same.
They both express in the same words that the interest to
become due on the bonds is "owned and
reserved" by the donor for so long as he
shall live, and that the bonds are not to hethe
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long "wholly" or "absolutely" to the donees
till after his death.
The exhibition of these memoranda to the
wife of the donee, and the declarations of
the donor, show that what he had thus done
was m pui-suance of a settled purpose, and
that he believed that he had made a valid
disposition of the bonds according to the
memoranda, but they do not satisfy the requirement of an actual delivery.
The evidence touching the point of delivery is that the deceased for several years
before his death resided at the house of his
son, William H. Young, where there was a
safe which had formerly belonged to the deceased, but which he is said to have presented to his grandson, James C. Young, a son
of William H.. reserving to himself the right
to use the safe, and in fact using it as a
place of deposit for his valuable papers.
That William H. Young also kept papers in
the same safe, but rarely went to it himself,
the deceased being in the habit of depositing
therein for him such things as he desired,
and removing them for him at his request.
The upper part of this safe was divided
into pigeon-holes, where the deceased usually kept his papers and was in the habit, up
to the time of the transaction now in question, of keeping the bonds in controversy.
The lower part of the safe was divided into
larger open compartments, one of which had
been appropriated as the receptacle of the
papers of William H. Young.
After affixing to the two envelopes in
which the bonds were contained, the memoranda showing the dispositions in favor of
his sons William H. Young and John N.
Young, and after exhibiting these memoranda to the respective wives of the donees,
the deceased replaced the two packages of
bonds in this safe, and after his death they
were found, not in the pigeon-hole where
they had formerly been kept, but in the
compartment where William H. Young's paAfter the memoranda had
pers were kept.
been made, the bonds were generally keist in
that compartment, but the deceased had been
seen by William H. to put them in the
pigeon-holes and take them out with the indorsements on.
On the occasion of exhibiting the packages
of bonds and the indorsements to Mrs. William H. Young, the deceased asked her to
take them in her hands and see what he
But this was not inhad written on them.
tended as a delivery to her, for she asked
him whether he wanted her to take them
After
and put them up, and he said, "No."
having thus exhibited them he took them
back and placed them in the safe. The memoranda were made on the 14th March, 1874.
The testator died November 12, 1875. In
the meantime installments of interest on the
The deceased cut ofC
bonds became due.
the coupons, and on some occasions William
H. Young assisted him in so doing, but William H. testified that he never asserted any
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ownership over the bonds as against his
father. And the testimony shows that they
were at all times under the control of the
deceased,
altliousli William H. Young and
his son, James V. YduuK. also had access to
the safe.
Those three however were the
only persons having access to the safe, and
It does not appear that John N. Young, the
other donee named in the memoranda,
ever
had any control over the bonds or access
thereto.
It was also shown that after the
alleged gift, when solicited for a loan, the
deceased
said that he supposed he might
with the boys' consent take some of their
bonds.
Also that he called the attention of
his grandson, James C. Young, to the memoranda and said, "you see what
have done
with them." That he declared to a witness,
Benjamin Grant, that what he had left he
had given to William and Newton.
That in
1875, he took from one of the
September,
envelopes
a bond of $1,000, being one of
those stated in the memorandum
indorsed
to belong to John N. Young, and gave it
to a third party, but it also appeared that
he had, before making the memorandum,
presented John N. Young with $1,000.
This is the substance of all the testimony
by which a delivery to the donee is sought
to be established. It shows that the deceased at no time parted with the possession or control of the bonds, but merely
confirms the intention expressed in the memoranda. The change of the position of the
bonds in the safe where they were kept,
from the pigeon-hole to the compartment,
might have been significant had William H.
been the only donee, and had the intended
gift been unaccompanied by any reservation. But under the existing circumstances
it cannot be construed into a delivery of the
bonds.
In the first place, part of the bonds
were stated in the memoranda to be given
to William H., and part to John N. Young.
The intention of the donor toward each of
Yet no attempt aphis sons was the same.
pears to have been made to effect any sort
Moreover, the form
of delivery to John N.
of the intended gift shows that no immediate delivery could have been contemplated
The memorandum on each
by the deceased.
envelope says that the interest to become
due on the bonds is "owned and reserved"
This interest, up to the dates
by the donor.
of the maturity of the bonds respectivelj',
was represented by coupons attached to the
It clearly could not have been inbonds.
tended to deliver them, for so many of them
as might become due during the life of the
donor were reserved from the gift, as the
declared to be
interest was expressly
"owned" by the donor, and not parted with.
The possession of these coupons was necessary to enable him to collect the interest,
and he availed himself of it for that purNo intention was
pose from time to time.
manifested to deliver up these vouchers and
look to the donees for the interest. No divi-
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sion of the coupons could be made, for the
period of the donor's life was uncertain;
and further, If all the coupons were retained
by the donor, they might not represent the
entire interest reserved by him. The bonds
matured In 1887 and 1888, and some were
earlier; and if he had lived unredeemable
til the maturity of the bonds, or until the
United States bonds were called in by the
as they were liable to be, the
government,
donees would not then have been entitled
to the possession of the bonds or their proThe reservation accompanying the
ceeds.
gift would entitle the donor to possession of
The intention of the donor, as
the fund.
deducible from the memoranda and the evidence, was, not to part with his title to the
accruing interest, but to keep the bonds and
collect the interest for his own use till he
should die; and that then, and not before,
his sons should have possession of them and
That although he
own them absolutely.
meant that their right to this interest In
remainder should be vested and irrevocable
from the time of the supposed gift, yet that
at no time during his life did the donees have
exclusive possession i of the bonds or the legal right to such possession.
The declarations of the donor that he had
given the bonds to his sons must be understood as referring to the qualified gift which
There is nothing to
he intended to malie.
indicate that he ever relinquished his right
to the interest, and all the circumstances of
the case show that he could not have intended to admit that he had made an absolute gift, free from the qualification exThe cases of
pressed in the memoranda.
Grangiac v. Arden, 10 Johns. 295; Davis v.
Davis, 8 Nott & McC. 226, and kindred cases,
consequently have no application. The principle of those cases was applied in the late
case of Trow v. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446, but
in that case the gift was Intended to be absolute.
No qualification was attached to it,
and the bonds were placed where they were
accessible to the donee, and he had himself
collected the interest for his own use. There
was nothing inconsistent with a full delivery,
but there was no direct evidence of such de^
livery, and the admissions of the donor that
she had given the bonds and they belonged
to the donee, were received, and weight given
to them,- as some evidence from which the
jury might infer that the gift had been completed by an absolute delivery.
It is impossible to sustain this as an executed gift, without abrogating the rule that
delivery is essential to gifts of chattels inter
vivos. It is an elementary rule that such a
gift cannot be made to take effect in possession in futuro. Such a transaction amounts
only to a promise to make a gift, which is
nudum pactum. Pitts v. Mangum, 2 Bailey,
588.
There must be a delivery of possession
with a view to pass a present right of property. "Any gift of chattels which expressly
reserves the use of the property to the donor

for a certain period, or (as commonly appears
in the cases which the courts have had occasion to pass upon) as long as the donor
shall live, is ineffectual." 2 Schouler, Pers.
Prop. p. 118, and cases cited; Vass v. Hicks,
This rule has been ap3 Murph. (N. C.) 494.
plied even where the gift was made by a
written instrument or deed purporting to
transfer the title, but containing the reservation. Sutton's Bx'r v. Hallowell, 2 Dev. 186;
Lance v. Lance, 5 Jones Law, 413.
The only question remaining therefore is
whether a valid declaration of trust is made
out.

The trust contended for, if put into words,
would be that the donor should hold the
bonds and their proceeds for his own benefit during his life and to the use of the donees
from the time of his own death.
Of course no trust was created of the interest for the donor's own life, for he was the
legal owner of the income of the bonds, and
never parted with this right—nor could he be
at the same time trustee and cestui que trust
The trust then would be to hold to the use of
the donees an estate in remainder in the
bonds, which should vest in possession in the
donees, at the time of his death.
The difliculty in establishing such a trust
is that the donor did not undertake or attempt to create it, but to vest the remainder
directly In the donees. Assuming, for the
purposes of the argument, that he might have
created such a trust in himself, for the benefit of his sons, and, further, that he might
have done so by simply signing a paper to
that effect and retaining it In his own possession, without ever having delivered it to the
donees, or any one for them, yet he did not do
so. He simply signed a paper certifying that
the bonds belonged to his sons. He did not
declare that he held them in trust for the
donees, but that they owned them subject to
the reservation, and were at his death to
have them absolutely. If this instrument had
been founded upon a valuable consideration,
equity might have interfered and effectuated
its intent by compelling the execution of a
declaration
of trust, or by chai-ging the
bonds, while in his hands, with a trust in
favor of the equitable owner. Day v. Roth,
18 N. Y. 448.
But it is well settled that equity will not interpose to perfect a defective
gift or voluntary settlement made without
consideration. If legally made, it will be upheld, but it must stand as made or not at
all. When therefore it is found that the gift
which the deceased attempted to make failed to take effect for want of delivery, or a
sufficient transfer, and it Is sought to supply
this defect and carry out the intent of the
donor by declaring a trust which he did not
himself declare, we are encountered by the
rule above referred to. Story, Eq. Jur. 706,
787, 793b-793d;
Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Yes.
39, 43; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226;
7 Sim. 325; Price v. Price, 8 Eng. Law &
Eq. 281; Hughes v. Stubbs, 1 Hare, 476. It
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established as unquestionable law that a
ui-t of equity cannot by its authority
uder that gift perfect which the donor has
ft imperfect, and cannot convert an imperct gift into a declaration of trust, merely
1 account

of that imperfection. Heartley v.
icholson, 44 L. J. Ch. 279.
It has in some
ses been attempted to establish an excep)u in favor of a wife and children on the

ound that the moral obligation of the donor
provide for them constituted what was
.lied a meritorious
consideration for the '
ft, but Judge Story (2 Eq. Jur. § 987, and 1
q. Jur. § 433) says that that doctinne seems
)w to be overthrown, and that the general
■inciple Is established that in no case what-er will courts of equity interfere in favor
'
mere volunteers, whether it be upon a
)luntary contract, or a covenant, or a setement, however meritorious may be the conderation, and although the beneficiaries
and in the relation of a wife or child. Holway V. Headington, 8 Sim. 32.5; Jeffreys v.
;ffreys, 1 Craig & P. 138, 141.
These positions are sustained by many aulorities. To create a trust, the acts or words
!lied upon must be unequivocal, implying
lat the person holds the property as trustee
)r another. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134,
Though It is not necessary
3r Church, C. J.
lat the declaration of trust be in terms exlicit, the donor must have evinced by acts
hich admit of no other interpretation, that
ich legal right as he retains is held by him
Heartley v. Xich5 trustee for the donee.
son, 44 L. J. Cb. 277, per Bacon, '\'. C.
he settler must transfer the property to a
ustee, or declare that he holds it himself in
Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264,
■ust
In cases of volun3r Lord Knight Bruce.
iry settlements or gifts, the court will not
apute a trust where a trust was not in fact
The distinction bele thing contemplated.
veen words importing a gift and words cre;ing a trust is pointed out by Sir Geo. Jessel
I Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas.
"The making a man trustee
L, as follows:
ivolves an intention to become a trustee,
hereas words of gift show an intention to
ve over property to another, and not to rein it in the donor's hands for any purpose,
luciary or otherwise."
The words of the donor in the present case
•e that the bonds are owned by the donees.
It that the interest to accrue thereon is
vned and reserved by the donor for so long
1 he shall live, and at his death they belong
jsolutely to the donees. No intention Is here
:pressed to hold any legal title to the bonds
Whatever interest
trust for the donees.
as intended to be vested in them was transrred to them directly, subject to the reserition in favor of the donor during his life,
id free from that reservation at his death.
Dthing was reserved to the donor, to be held
trust or otherwise, except his right to the
cruing Interest which should become payIt could only be by retie during his life.
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forming or supplementing the language used,
that a ti-ust could be created, and this, as
has been shown, will not be done in case of
a voluntary settlement without consideration.
There are two English cases where indeed
the circumstances were much stronger in
favor of the donees than in the present case,
which tend to sustain the position that a settlement of this description may be enforced
in equity by constituting the donor trustee for
the donee. They are Morgan v. JIalleson,
L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 475, and Richardson v.
Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 686. In the firat
of these cases, Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10
Eq. Cas. 475, the intestate signed and delivered to Dr. Morris a memorandum in writing:
"I hereby give and make over to Dr. Morris
one India bond," but did not deliver th&
bond.
Sir John Romilly sustained this gift
as a declaration of trust. The case is referred to by Church, C. J., in Martin v. Funk as
an extreme case. In Richardson v. Richardson, an instniment purporting to be an assignment, unsupported by a valuable consideration, was upheld as a declaration of trust.
In speaking of these cases in Richards v.
Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 11, Sir Geo. Jessel, M. R., says:
"If the decisions of Lord
Romilly (in Morgan v. Malleson), and of
Wood, V. C. (in Richardson v. Richardson)
were right, there never could be a case wherethe expression of a present gift would not
amount to an effectual declaration of trust."
And it may be added that there never could
be a case where an intended gift, defective
for want of delivery, could not, if expressed
in writing, be sustained as a declaiation of
trust. Both of the cases cited are now placed
among overruled cases. Fisher, Ann. Dig.
(1873 and 1874) 24, 23. In Moore v. Moore,
43 L. J. Ch. 623, Hall, V. C, says: "I think
it very important indeed to keep a clear and
definite distinction between these cases of
imperfect gifts and cases of declarations of
trust; and that we should not extend beyond
what the authorities have already established, the doctrine of declarations of trust, so as
to supplement what would otherwise be mereimperfect gifts." If the settlement is intended to be effectuated by gift, the court will
not give effect to it by construing it as a
trust. If it is intended to take effect by
transfer the court will not hold the intended
transfer to operate as a declaration of trust,
for then every imperfect instrument would
be made effectual by being converted into a
perfect ti-ust. Milroy v, Lord, 4 De Gex, P. Si

J.

204.

The case of JIartin v. Funk and kindred
cases cannot aid the respondent. In all those
cases there was an express declaration of
trust. In the one named the donor delivered
the money to the bank, taking back its obligation to herself in the character of trustee
for the donee; thus parting with all beneficial interest in the fund, and having the legal title vested in her in the character of trustee only. No interposition on the part of the
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court was necessary to confer that character
upon her; nor was it necessary, by construction or otherwise, to change or supplement
the actual transaction. None of the difficulties encountered in the present case stood
in the way of carrying out her intention.
It was capable of being executed in the form
in which it was expressed.
The question whether a remainder in a
chattel may be created and given by a donor
by carving out a life estate for himself and
transferring the remainder, without the intervention of a trustee, is learnedly discussed in
the appellant's brief; but the views we have

expressed render it unnecessary to pursue
that inquiry. We are satisfied that it is impossible to hold that the facts as they appear
establish a valid transfer of any interest iu
the bonds in question to the donee, and that
the attempted gift cannot be sustained as a
declaration of trust. It follows that the judgment of the general term must be reversed
and the decree of the surrogate affirmed.
Costs of all the parties in this court and in
the supreme court to be paid out of the estate.

All concur.
Judgment reversed.
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ELLISON

r.

(G Ves.

ELLISON.
656.)

High Court ot Chancery.
1802.
By indentures, dated the 1st of July, 1791,
reciting a lease, dated the 6th of Juue preceding, of collieries at Hehburn and .Tarrowood in the county of Durham, for thirtyone years to Charles Wren, and others; and
that the name of Wren was used in trust for
Nathaniel Ellison and Wren in equal shares,
it was declared, that Wren, his executors and
administrators would stand possessed of the
lease in trust as to one moiety for Ellison,
his executors, &c.
By another indenture, dated the 18th of
June, 1796, reciting, that Ellison was interested in and entitled to one undivided eighth part
of certain collieries at Hebburn and Jarrowood, held by two several leases for terms of
thirty -one years; and that he was desirous of
settling his interest, he assigned and transferred all his interest in the said collieries
and all the stock, &c. to Wren, his executors,
administrators, and assigns, in tnist for Nathaniel EUison and his assigns during his
life; and after his decease in trust to manage and carry on the same in like manner as
Wren should carry on his own share; and
upon further trust out of the profits to pay
to Margaret Clavering during the remainder
of the term, in case she should so long live,
the yearly sum of £103. 2s. 8d.; which sum Is
thereby mentioned to be secured to her by
an indenture, dated the 14th of Jlay last; and
subject thereto in trust to pay thereout to
Jane Ellison, in case she should survive Nathaniel Ellison, during the remainder of the
term, during the joint lives of Jane Ellison
and Anne FuiTe, the clear yearly sum of
£180; and after the decease of Anne Fuiye
then the yearly sum of £90 during the remainder of the term, in case Jane Ellison
should so long live; and subject, as aforesaid, upon trust to pay thereout to each of
the children of Nathaniel Ellison, that should
be living at his decease, during the remainder
of the term, during the joint lives of Jane Ellison, and Anne Furye, and the life of the
survivor, the yearly sum of £30 a-piece, and
after the decease of the survivor the yearly
sum of £15;
and upon further trust to
pay the residue of the profits arising from
the collieries to the eldest son of Nathaniel
Ellison, who should attain the age of twenty-one; and upon the death of Margaret
Clavering then upon trust to pay to each
of the children of Nathaniel Ellison the
further yearly sum of £10; with survivorship, in case any of the children should die
before twenty-one, or marriage of daughters,
provided none except the eldest should be entitled to a greater annuity than $50; and
upon further trust to pay the residue to the
eldest son; provided further, in case all the
children die before twenty-one or the marriage of daughters, upon trust to pay the
whole to such only child at twenty one, or
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marriage of a daughter: provided further, in
case the profits to arise from the colliery
should not be sufficient to pay all the annuities, the annuitants except Margaret Clavering should abate; to be made up, whenever
the profits should be sufficient; and upon further trust, in case Wren, his executors, or
administrators, should think it more beneficial for the family to sell and dispose of
the collieries, upon trust to sell and dispose
of the same for the most money, that could
reasonably be got, and to apply the money
in the first place in payment of all debts due
from the colliery in respect of the share of
Ellison; and subject thereto to place out the
residue on real securities and apply the interest in the first place in payment of the annuity of £103. 2s. 8d. to Margaret Clavering,
then to the annuities of £180 or £90; then to
pay all the children of Ellison during the life
of Margaret Clavering the yearly sum of £22.
10s. and to pay the residue of the dividends,
and Interest to the eldest son of Ellison in
manner aforesaid; and if the dividends, &c.
should not be sufficient for the annuities, the
two annuitants except Margaret Clavering to
abate; and after her death to pay to each
of the children of Nathaniel Ellison the further yearly sum of £2. 10s. for their lives;
and after the decease of Margaret Clavering
and Jane Ellison upon ti'ust to pay to each
of the children of Nathaniel Ellison the sum
of £500 in case the money arising from the
sale should be sufficient; then upon trust to
divide the same equally among all the children, share and share alike; and subject, as
aforesaid, to pay over the residue to the eldest son on his attaining twenty-one; and it
was declared, that the portions of the children should be paid to the sons at twentyone, to the daughters at twenty-one or marriage; and in case of the death of any before
such period to pay that share to the eldest
and if only one child
son at twenty-one;
should survive, to pay the whole to such one
at twenty-one, or marriage, if a daughter;
and in case all die before twenty-one, &c.
then the said Charles Wren, his executors and
administrators, shall stand possessed of the
said collieries and the money to arise by sale
thereof, subject as aforesaid, in trust for Nathaniel Ellison, his executors, administrators,
It was further declared, that
and assigns.
the annuities should be paid half-yearly; and
that upon any such sale the receipt of Wren,
his executors or administrators should be a
sufficient discharge to the purchasers. Then
followed this proviso:
"Provided always and it is hereby further
declared that it shall and may be lawful for
the said Nathaniel Ellison by any deed or
deeds writing or writings to be by him signed sealed and delivered in the presence of and
attested by two or more credible witnesses,
to revoke determine and make void all and
every the uses trusts limitations and powers
hereinbefore limited and created of and concerning the said collieries and coal mines,
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and by the same deed or deeds or by any
other deed to be by him executed in like
manner to limit any new or other uses of
the said collieries and coal mines as he the
said Nathaniel Ellison shall think fit."
By another indenture dated the 3d of July,
1797, but not attested by two witnesses, reciting the leases of the collieries, and that
the name of Charles Wren was used in trust
for Nathaniel Ellison and himself in equal
shares; and that Ellison had advanced an
equal share of the monies supplied for carrying on the collieries, amounting to £9037. 10s.
it was witnessed, that in consideration of
£4518.
15s. Wren assigned to Nathaniel Ellison one undivided moiety or half part of all
the said collieries demised to him by the said
several leases, with a like share of the stock;
to have and to hold the said collieries to Ellison, his executors, administrators, and assigns, for the residue of the said terms, subject to the rents, covenants, and agreements,
in the said leases; and to have and to hold
the stock unto Ellison, his executors, administrators, and assigns, to and for his and
their own proper use for ever; with the
usual covenants from Wren as to his title
to assign, &c. and from Ellison to indemnify
Wren, his executors, &c.
Nathaniel Ellison, by his will, dated the
22d of June, 1796, after several specific and
pecuniary legacies, gave all the rest and residue of his personal estate and effects of what
nature or kind soever not before disposed
of, to his wife and Wren and the survivor
and the executors and administrators of such
survivor; upon trust to call in and place the
same out in the funds or on real securities;
and he directed, that all sums of money,
which should come to the hands of his wife
and Wren or of the executors, &c. of either
of them under the said trusts, should be
equally divided between all his children, sons
and daughters, born and to be born, share
and share alike: the shares to become vested and be payable upon marriage with consent of their guardians, and not otherwise
until the age of twenty-one: such part of the
interest in the mean time as the guardians
shall think proper to be applied for maintenance: the residue to accumulate; with
a direction for payment of part of the principal for advancement; and survivorship upon the death of any, before the respective
shares should be payable; and in case of the
death of all under age and unmarried he gave
the dividends and interest to his wife for
life; and upon her death he gave the principal and a sum of £3000 charged upon her
estates, to his sister Margaret Claverlng and
his nephew. Then after some further dispositions of stock in favour of his children, he
gave a legacy of twenty guineas to Wren;
and appointed his wife and Wren executors
and guardians.
The testator died in 1708; leaving his widow and ten children sui-viving; one of whom,
Cliarles Ellison, died in 1799, an Infant, Wren

also died in that year. The bill was filed by
testator's widow and Margaret Claverlng; praying that the trusts of the deed of
June, 1796, may be established; and that
new trustees may be appointed.
The younger children by their answer submitted, whether the trusts of that deed were
not varied or revoked by the deed of July,
the

1797.

Mr. Romilly and Mr. Bell, for plaintiffs.
Mr. Richards, Mr. Steele, and Mr. W. Agar,
for defendants.

LOltD CHANCELLOR. I had no doubt,
that from the moment of executing the first
deed, supposing it not to have been for a wife
and children, but for pure volunteers, those
volunteers might have filed a bill in equity
on the ground of their interests in that instrument; making the trustees and the author of the deed parties. I take the distlnc-i
tion to be, that if you want the assistance of
the court to constitute you cestuy que trust,
and the instrument is voluntary, you shall
not have that assistance for the purpose of
constituting you cestuy que trusty as upon
a covenant to transfer stock, &c. if it rests
In covenant, and Is purely voluntary, this
court will not execute that voluntary covenant; but If the party has completely transferred stock, &c. though It Is voluntary, yet
the legal conveyance being effectually made,
the equitable interest will be enforced by
this court. That distinction was clearly taken In Coleman v. Sarrel, independent of the
vicious consideration. I stated the objection
that the deed was voluntary;
and the lord
chancellor went with me so far as to consider It a good objection to executing what
remained in covenant.
But if the actual
transfer is made, that constitutes the relation
between trustee and cestuy que trust, though
voluntary, and without good or meritorious
consideration; and it is clear in that case,
that If the stock had been actually transferred, unless the transaction was affected
by the turpitude of the consideration, the
court would have executed it against the
trustee and the author of the trust.
In this case, therefore, the person claiming under the settlement might maintain a
suit, notwithstanding any objection made to
It as being voluntary; If that could apply to
the case of a wife and children: considering
also, that Mrs. Claverlng was an annuitant,
and not a mere volunteer.
But It was put
for the defendants thus; that though tlie instrument would have been executed originally. If the subject got back by accident Into
the author of the trust, and was vested in
him, then the objection will lie in the same
manner, as If the instrument was voluntary.
I doubt that for many reasons; the trust being once well created; and whether it would
apply at all, where the trust was originally
well created; and did not rest merely in engagement to create It.
Suppose Wren had
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and had made Ellison his executor, it
would be extraordinary to hold, that though
an execution would be decreed against him
as executor, yet, happening to be also author
of the trust, therefore an end was to be put
to the interest of the cestuy que trust. But
it does not rest there; for Ellison clothes the
legal estate remaining in Wren with the equitable interests declared by the first deed;
making him therefore a trustee for Ellison
himself first, and after his death for several
■other persons; and he has said, he puts that
restraint upon his own power; not only, that
Tub shall not have a power of revocation,
whenever he changes his intention, but, that
he shall not execute that power, nor be supposed to have that change of intention, unless manifested by an instrument executed
My opinion
with certain given ceremonies.
is, that, if there is nothing more in this transaction than taking out of Wren the estate'
clothed with a trust for others, with present
though future in enjoyment, and
interests,
that was done by an instrument with no witness, or only one witness, it is hardly possible
to contend, that such an instrument would be
a revocation according to the Intention of
the party, the evidence of whose intention is
that are not
made subject to restrictions
complied with. The only difliculty is, that
the declaration of the trusts in the first instrument could not be executed, the second
It
instrument being allowed to have effect.
is said, a power was placed in Wren, his ex€cutors and administrators, not his assigns,
if in sound discretion thought fit, to sell, and
to give a larger Interest to the younger chilIf
dren than they otherwise would take.
Wren had not after the reassignment that
discretion still vested in him, I think, it
would not be in the executors of Ellison, and
it could not be exercised by the court;
though in general cases trusts will not fail
But though the
■by the failure of the trustee.
effect would be to destroy the power of

■died,
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Wren, which I strongly doubt, attending to
the requisition of two witnesses, I do not
know that it would destroy the other interests.
I think therefore, up"on the whole, this
trust does remain notwithstanding this reassignment of the legal estate to Ellison.
I do
not think, consistently with the intention expressed in the first instrument, and the necessity imposed upon himself of declaring a
different intention under certain restrictions,
that if a different intention appeared clearly
upon the face of the instrument, the latter
would have controlled the former. But I do
not think his acts do manifest a different intention.
Supposing one witness sufficient, I
the second deed does not sufficiently mani- I!
fest an intention to revoke all the benefits l(
given by the first deed to the children; and/)
it is not Inconsistent that he might intend to^i
revoke some and not all.
I
As to the will, it is impossible to maintain, that the will is a writing within the
meaning of the power: considering how the
subject is described.
The word "residue"
there means that estate, of which he had the
power of disposing, not engaged by contracts,
declarations of tmsts, &c. It was necessary
for him to describe the subject in such a way,
that there could be no doubt he meant to embrace that property.
Upon the whole, therefore, this relief must
be granted; though I agree, that, if it rested
in covenant, the personal representative
might have put them to their legal remedies,
he cannot where the character of trust attached upon the estate, while in Wren ; \feich
character of trust therefore should adhere to
the estate in Ellison, unless a contrary intention was declared; and the circumstance
of one witness only, when the power reserved
required two witnesses, is also a circumstance of evidence, that he had not the intention of destroying those trusts which had
attached, and wMe then vested in the person
of Wren.
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RICHARDSON

v.

RICHARDSON.

(L. R. 3 Bq. 686.)
February 26, 1876.
Mr. G. M. Giffard and ilr. Kay, Q. C, for
plaintiff. Jlr. Willeocli, Q. C, and Mr. Faber,
for defendants.
C. The sole question in this
a legatee, under the will of
whether
is
case
the testator, Richard Richardson, of a sum of
£1250, ought or ought not to submit to a

WOOD, V.

deduction of £450, in respect of two promissory notes given by him to his sister, which
Involves the further question whether the
testator was or was not the absolute owner
of the notes. If he was the owner, though
he demanded no interest upon the notes,
and made no application for payment of
them, yet, as is conceded, the statute of
limitations cannot be set up, and the plaintiff must be considered as having received
on account of his legacy so much of the assets of'the testator as his debt amounted to.
Whether or not the notes were the property
of the testator depends upon a certain voluntary assignment, whereby the sister, shortly before her death, assigned the whole of
her personal estate to her brother, the testator, and in the same Instrument she gave
him a power of attorney to ask, sue for,
and recover the thereby assigned moneys
and premises, and to do and execute such
further acts and deeds as should be deemed
necessary for deriving the full benefit of the
assignment.
Now, there is no specific description in the
deed of the promissory notes, and, if they
passed at all, they passed under the description of "all other the personal estate and
effects,
whatsoever and wheresoever," of
She did not Indorse
Elizabeth Richardson.
the notes, and the defendants, the executors,
by their answer, say they believe that if
she had not died so soon the testator would
have applied to her to indorse the notes, but
she did not do so. The questions are: First,
whether they passed by the deed at all; and,
secondly, if they passed, whether they passed
to the testator as trustee or in his own
right.
After the decision In Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. &: G. 176, I think it is
impossible to contend that these notes did
not pass by this instrument, because the
rule laid down in that case, the decision in
which was supported by reference to Ex
parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140, was not confined
merely to this: that a person who, being entitled to a reversionary interest, or to stock
standing in another's name, assigns it by a
voluntary deed, thereby passes it, notwithstanding that he does not in formal terms
declare himself to be trustee of the property;
but it amounts to this: that an Instrument
executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere covenant to assign

on a future day) is equivalent to a declaration of trust.
It is impossible to read the argument in
that case, and the judgment of Lord Justice
Knight Bruce, without seeing that his mind
was directed to Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare,
464; on appeal, 1 Phil. Ch. 342, and that class
of cases, where it had been held (such was
the nicety upon which the decisions turned)
that an actual assignment is nothing more
than an agreement to assign in equity, because it merely passes such equitable interest as the assignor may have, and some
further step must be taken by the assignee
That further
to acquire the legal interest.
being necessary, the assignment was
step
held to be. In truth, nothing but an agreement to assign; and, being so, was not enforceable in this court, the court having often
decided that it will not enforce a mere voluntary agreement.
The distinction, undoubtedly, was very fine
between that and a declaration of trust; and
the good sense of the decision in Kekewich
V. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 176, I think,
lies in this: that the real distinction should
be made between an agreement to do something when called upon, something distinctly
expressed to be future in the instrument,
and an instrument which effects to pass everything independently of the legal estate.
It was held In Kekewich v. Manning that
such an instrument operates as an out and
out assignment, disposing of the whole of tlie
assignor's equitable Interest, and that such
a declaration of trust Is as good a form as
any that can be devised. The expression
used by the lords justices is this: "A declaration of trust is not confined to any express,
form of words, but may be indicated by the
character of the instrument."
In that case reference was made in the
argument principally to the case of Ex parte
Pye, 18 Ves. 140, which was a decision of
Lord Eldon to the same effect. Reliance is
often placed on the circumstance that the
assignor has done all he can; that there is
nothing remaining for him to do; and it is
contended that he must, in that case only,
be taken to have made a complete and effectual assignment.
But that is not the sound
doctrine on which the case rests; for if
there be an actual declaration of trust, although the assignor has not done all that
he could do,— for example, although he has
not given notice to the assignee, — yet the interest is held to have effectually passed as
between the donor and donee. The difference
must be rested simply on this: Aye or no,
has he constituted himself a trustee?
In Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140, the testator
had written to one Dubost, authorizing him
to purchase in France an annuity for the
benefit of a lady named Garos, for her life,
with power to draw on him for £1,500 for
The agent, finding the lady
such pui-chase.
was a married woman, exercised his own dls-
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cretlon, and bought the annuity in the name
of the testator. Then, shortly before his
death, the testator sent to Dubost, by his
desire, a power of attorney, authorizing him
to transfer the annuity to the lady.
The
testator died before anything more was
done, and after his death the annuity was
transfen'ed.
There was a question whether, by the law of France, the exercise of
a power of attorney by the person to whom
it is given, without knowledge of the death
of his principal, is good.
think the master found that it was so; but Lord Eldon expressly declined to rely upon that, as
he says in Ms judgment (Id. 150): "These
petitions" (the question came on upon petition) "call for the decision of points of more
importance and difficulty than I should wish
to decide in this way, if the case was not
pressed upon the court. With regard to the
French annuity, the master has stated his
opinion as to the French law, perliaps without sufficient authority, or sufficient inquiry
into the effect of it, as applicable to the precise circumstances of this case;
but it is
not necessary to pursue that, as upon the
documents
before me it does appear that,
though in one sense this may be represented
as the testator's pereonal estate, yet he has
committed to writing what seems to me a
sufficient declaration that he held this part
of the estate in trust for the annuitant."
Now, the testator had done nothing more
than execute the power of attorney. It is
true, he had written a letter directing the
stock to be purchased in the lady's name;
but that was not done; it was purchased in
his name.
The decision, therefore, could
only be rested upon this: that this was not
an agreement to assign, not an agreement to
become a trustee at some future pei-iod, but
an actual constitution
by the testator of
himself as trustee.
Following, therefore, Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 176,
must regard
this instrument as having effectually assigned the promissory notes, although they were
is an actual
not indorsed. The instrument
assignment with a power immediately vested in the assignee to make himself master of
the property;
and I do not know in what
way the assignor could have more efCectually declared that she was a trustee of that
property for Richard Richardson.
The next question is whether the testator
took these notes upon trust, for, if he did,
there can be no set-off of the debt due to
him qua trustee, against the legacy given by
his will. It appears to me there is nothing
whatever on the face of the instrument to
create a trust. The property is given out
Nor do I find anything
and out, absolutely.
like evidence to authorize me to say that it
is fixed with a trust.
[His honor reviewed

I

I
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the evidence, and came to the conclusion that
a will had been executed in 1855, although
the Instrument itself had not been produced,
nor its absence accounted for. His honour
tliought it very possible that the assignment
was executed for the purpose of avoiding
the duty, and disposing of the property
through the medium of a trust; but he did
not think the evidence sufficient to fasten
that trust upon the property, no right having been asserted, during the period from
1858 to 186-1, as against the testator. His
honour continued:]
It was said by Mr. Giffard, in another part
of his argument, relying on the case of Freeman v. Lomas, 9 Hare, 109, that if the testator could not take this property, except
through the executoi-s of Elizabeth Richardsou, if he could not take the notes specifically, but could only take their value as an ordinary legacy after a settlement of accounts
with the executoi-s of Elizabeth Richardson,
the testator's executors are not in a position to assert a right of set-off as regards
these
specific notes. But I have already
stated my reasons for considering that there
Is no evidence to show that the testator did
not take these notes absolutely by the
deed; and, as regards the application of the
moneys secured on the notes to the payment of debts, that would only arise in consequence of the possibility of the statute of
Elizabeth intervening, which might take out
for the benefit of the creditors as much of
the property as might be wanted for tlie
payment of debts; but, as regards the donee
and donor, the deed would remain absolute,
no debt ever having been asserted, and the
property having been completely and effectually assigned.
As regards some faint evidence of the testator's wish that this debt might not be enforced, no doubt the testa^tor never received
interest, and he was in a vacillating frame of
mind about it; but unfortunately that vacillation never amounted to anything definite
or precise, amounting to a gift of the property.
[His honour went through the evidence on
this head, and continued:]
Although I am vei-y reluctant to come to
this conclusion, I must say the testator does
not appear to me to have made up his mind;
and, as he did not do so, I cannot do anything for the plaintiff. Therefore the legacy
must be paid, deducting the value of the
notes; but of course there will be no interThe order will be to pay the
est on them.
plaintiff his legacy of £1,250, less £450, with
interest at £4 per cent, on the difference, from
There
one year after the testator's death.
will be no costs on either side, except that
the defendants will have their costs out of
the estate.
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MALLESON.

(L. R. 10 Eq. 475.)

July

28,

1870.

The following memorandum was given by
John Saunders, the testator in the cause, to
his medical attendant. Dr. Morris: "I hereby
give and make over to Dr. Morris an India
bond, No. D., 506, value £1000, as some token
for all his very kind attention to me during
illness.
"Witness my hand, this 1st day of August,
1868.

"(Signed)
John Saunders."
The signature was attested by two witnesses, and the memorandum was handed over to
Dr. Morris, but the bond, which was transferable by delivery, remained in the possession of Saunders. There was no consideration for it.
Saunders died more than a year afterwards,
having, by his will, bequeathed the residue
of his personal estate to charities. A suit

was instituted for the administration of his
and a summons was taken out by the
attorney general on behalf of absent charities for the direction of the court on the question whether this memorandum was or was
not a valid declaration of trust In favor of
Dr. Morris.
estate,

Mr. Jessel, Q. C, Mr. Speed, and Tucker &
Lake, for Dr. Morris.
Raven & Bradley and
Mr. Wickens, for the attorney general.

I

Lord EOMILLY. M. R.
am of opinion
that the paper writing signed by Saunders
is equivalent to a declaration of trust in fahe had said, "I undervor of Dr. Morris.
take to hold the bond for you," or if he had
said, "I hereby give and make over the bond
in the hands of A.," that would have been a
declaration of trust, though there had been
no delivery.
This amciants to the same
thing; and Dr. Morris is entitled to the bond,
and to all interest accrued due thereon.

If

U'

;

.^y

.RICHARDS
(L. E.
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DELBRIDGE.

18

Bq. 11.)

Chancery Division.

April

16,

1874.

Demurrer. Tlie bill filed by Edward Bennetto Richards, an infant, by his next friend,
That John Delbridge, deceased, was
stated:
possessed of a mill, with the plant, machinery, and stock-in-trade thereto belonging, in
which he carried on the business of a bone
manure merchant, and which was held under a lease dated the 21;th of .Tune, 1863.
That on the 7th of March, 1873, John Delbridge indorsed upon the lease and signed
memorandum:
"7th March,
the following
This deed and all thereto belonging
1873.
I give to Edward Bennetto Richards from
this time forth with all the stock-in-trade.
John Delbridge." That the plaintiff was the
person named in the memorandum, and the
grandson of John Delbridge, and had then
for some time assisted him in the business.
That John Delbridge, shortly after signing
delivered the lease on his
the memorandum^
behalf to Elizabeth Ann Richards, the plaintiff's mother, who -n-as still in possession
That John Delbridge died in April,
thereof.
having executed several testamentary
1873,
instruments which did not refer specifically to
the said mill and premises, but he gave his
furniture and effects, after his wife's death,
to be divided among his family. That the
testator's widow, Elizabeth Richards, took
"
to his estate, with the
out administration
testamentary papers annexed. The bill, which
was filed against the defendants Elizabeth
Delbridge, Elizabeth Ann Richards, and the
testator's two sons, who claimed under the
said testamentary instruments, prayed a declaration that the indorsement upon the lease
by John Delbridge and the delivery of the
lease to Elizabeth Ann Richards created a
valid trust in favor of the plaintiff of the
lease and of the estate and interest of John
Delbridge in the property therein comprised,
and in the good will of the business carried
on there, and in the implements and stockin-trade belonging to the business. The defendants demurred to the bill for want of
equity.

Fry, Q. C, and Mr. Phear, in support of
the demurrer. W. R. Fisher (Mr. Southgate,
Q. C, with him), and T. D. Bolton, for plainGregory, Rowcliffes •& Rawle, for detifC.
fendants.

JESSEL, M. R. This bill is wan'anted by
the decisions in Richardson v. Richardson,
L. R. 3 Eq. 686, and Morgan v. Malleson,
L. R. 10 Bq. 475, but, on the other hand,
we have the case of MUroy v. Lord, 4 De
Gex, F. & J. 264, before the court of appeals,
and the more recent case of Waniner v.
Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340, 348, in which Vice
Chancellor Bacon said: "The rule of law
HUTCH.EQ.JUR.
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upon this subject I take to be very clear,
and, with the exception of two cases which
have been referred to (Richardson v. Richardson and Morgan v. Malleson), the decisions are all perfectly consistent with that
rule. The one thing necessary to give validity to a declaration of trust— the indispensable thing— I take to be, that the donor, or
grantor, or whatever he may be called,
should have absolutely parted with that interest wliich had been his up to the time
of the declaration, should have effectvially
changed his right in that respect, and put
the property out of his power, at least in
the way of interest."
The two first mentioned cases are wholly
opposed to the two last. That being soi, I
am not at liberty to decide the case otherwise than in accordance with the decision
It is true the judges
of the court of appeal.
appear to have taken different views of the
constmction of certain expressions, but I
am not bound by another judge's view of
the construction of particular words; and
there is no case in which a different principle is stated from that laid down by the
court of appeal. Moreover, if it were my
duty to decide the matter for the first time,
I should lay down the law in the same way.
The principle is a very simple one. A man
may transfer his property, without valuable
consideration, in one of two ways: he may
either do such acts as amount in law to a
conveyance or assignment of the property,
and thus completely divest himself of the
legal ownership, in which case the person
who by those acts acquires the property
takes it beneficially, or on trust, as the case
may be; or the legal owner of the property
may, by one or other of the modes recognized as amounting to a valid declaration
of trust, constitute himself a trustee, and,
without an actual transfer of the legal title,
may so deal with the property as to deprive
himself of its beneficial ownership, and declare that he will hold it from that time
forward on trust for the other person. It
is true he need not use the words, "I declare
myself a trustee," but he must do something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions which have that meaning; for,
however anxious the court may be to carry
out a man's intention, it is not at liberty
to constiiie words otherwise than according
to their proper meaning.
The cases in which the question has arisen
are nearly all cases in which a man, by documents insufiicient to pass a legal interest,
has said: "I give or grant certain property
Malleson, L.
to A. B." Thus, in Morgan v.
R. 10 Eq. 47.5, the words were: "I hereby
give and make over to Dr. Morris an India
bond"; and in Richardson v. Richardson,
L. R. 3 Eq. 686, the words were, "grant
In both cases the
and assign."
convey,
were effectual
words
the
that
judges held
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declarations of trust. In the former case, made effectual by being converted
Lord Romilly considered that tlie words were perfect trust."

"I undertake to hold the
bond for you," which would undoubtedly
have amounted to a declaration of trust.
The true distinction appears to me to be
plain, and beyond dispute; for man to make
himself a trustee there must be an expression of intention to become a tnistee, whereas words of present gift shew an intention to
give over property to another, and not retain it in the donor's own bauds for any
purpose, fiduciary or otherwise.
In Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264,
274, Lord Justice Turner, after referring to
the two modes of making a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, adds these words:
"The cases, I think, go further, to this extent: That if the settlement is intended to
be effectuated by one of the modes to which
I have referred, the court will not give effect
to it by applying another of those modes.
If it is intended to take effect by transfer,
the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for
then every imperfect instrument would be
the same as these:

into

a

It appears to me that that sentence contains the whole law on the subject. If the
decisions of Lord Romilly and of Vice-Chancellor Wood were right, there never could
be a case where an expres.sion of a present
gift would not amount to an effectual declaration of trusi, which would be candying
the doctrine on that subject too far. It appears to me that these cases of voluntary
gifts should not be confounded with another
class of cases in which words of present
transfer for valuable consideration are held
to be evidence of a contract which the court
will enforce. Applying that reasoning to
cases of this kind, you only make the imperfect instrument evidence of a contract of a
\oluntary nature which this court will not
enforce; so that, following out the principle
even of those cases, you come to the same
conclusion.
I must, therefore, allow the demurrer; and,
though
feel some hesitation, owing to the
conflict of the authorities,
think the cost*
must follow the result

I
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MARTIN

V.

FUNK.

(75 N. ¥. 134.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

Nor.

Nehemiah Jlillard, for appellants.
Divine, for respondent.

12, 1878.

M. W.

CHURCH, C. J. The facts in this case
undisputed, as found by
are substantially
the judge before whom the case was tried.
The intestate Mrs. Boone, in 1866, deposited
in the Citizens' Savings Bank $500, declaring at the time that she wanted the account
to be in trust for Lillie Willard, who is the
plaintiff. The account was so entered, and
a pass-book delivered to the intestate, which
contained these entries: "The Citizens' Savings Bank in account with Susan Boone, in
trust for Lillie Willard. 1866, March 23,
$500."

A deposit of the

same amount and in the
manner was made in trust for Kate
Willard, now Mrs. Brown. This money belonged to the intestate at the time of the deposits.
The plaintiff and Mrs. Brown are
sisters, and were at the time of the age respectively of eighteen and twenty, and were
distant relatives of the intestate, their mothThe Intestate reer being a second cousin.
tained possession of the pass-books until her
and her
death in 1875, and the plaintiff
sister were ignorant of the deposits until
after that event. The money remained in
the bank with its accumulated interest until
the death of the intestate, except that she
drew out one year's interest. Mrs. Brown
assigned to the plaintiff her interest in the
deposit purporting to have been made for
her benefit, and the action is brought against
the administrator of the intestate and the
bank for the delivery of the pass-books and
The question
the recovery of the money.
involved has been very much litigated, and
many refinements may be found in the
Many cases have
books in respect to it.
been found diflacult of solution, not so much
on account of the general principles which
should govern, as in applying those principles to a particular state of facts. It is
clear that a person sui juris, acting freely
and with full knowledge, has the power to
make a voluntary gift of the whole or any
part of his property, while it is well settled
that a mere intention, whether expressed or
not, is not sufficient, and a voluntary promise to make a gift is nudum pactum, and of
binding force. Kekewich v. Manning, 50
Eug. Ch. 175, and cases cited. The act constituting the transfer must be consummated,
and not remain incomplete, or rest in mere
intention, and this is the rule whether the
gift is by delivery only, or by the creation
of a trust in a third person, or in creating
the donor himself a trustee. Enough must
be done to pass the title, although when a
trust is declared, whether in a third person
or the donor, it is not essential that the property should be actually possessed by the cessame
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tui que trust, nor is it even essential that the
latter should be informed of the trust. In
Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 204, Lord
Chief Justice Turner, who adopted the most
rigid construction of trusts, in delivering an
opinion against the validity of the trust in
that case, laid down the general principles
as accurately perhaps as is practicable. He
said: "I take the law of this court to be
well settled, that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual the settler must have done every thing which according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement was necessary to be
done in order to transfer the property, and
render the settlement binding upon him. He
may of course do this by actually transfen-ing the property to the persons for whom
he intended to provide, and the provision will
then be effectual, and it will be equally effectual if he transfer the property to a trustee for the purpose of the settlement,
or declare that he himself holds it in trust for
those purposes, and if the property be personal, the trust may I apprehend be declared
either in writing or by parol."
The contention of the defendant is that
the transaction did not transfer the property, and that there was no sufficient declaration of trust and that by retaining the
pass-books
the intestate never pai-ted with
the control of the property.
If what she
did was sufficient to constitute herself a
trustee, it must follow that whatever control she retained would be exercised as trustee, and the right to exercise it would not
be necessarily inconsistent with the completeness of the trust. The question involving substantially the same facts has been
several times before different courts of the
state, and in every instance the transaction
has been sustained as a good gift.
The Case of Wetzel before Surrogate Bradford, and Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb.
Prac. 380, were deposits in the same form,
and in the former the cestui que trust
had no notice of the deposit, and in both
cases the gift was held effectual. In Smith
V. Lee, 2 Thomp. & C. 591, money was deposited with the defendant, and a note taken
payable to the depositor for another person,
and it was held that the depositor constituted himself a trustee. The case of Kelly
Inst, for Savings (not reportV. Manhattan
ed) was a special term decision of the New
York common pleas before Robinson, J.,
where precisely such a deposit was made as
in this, and it was upheld as an absolute
gift.
These decisions although not controlling upon this court are entitled to respect,
and they show the tendency of the judicial
mind to give these transactions the effect
which on their face they import. So in
Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, a similar deposit was upheld as a declaration of trust.
Park, J., noticed the point urged there as
and
here of the retention of the pass-book,
said: "She retained possession therefore be-
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cause the deposit was made in her uame as
trustee, and not because she had not given
the heneficial interest of the deposit to the
plaintiff," and in that case the depositor had
drawn out the deposit, and the action was
So in
sustained against her administrator.
Ray V. Simmons, 11 E. I. 266; the facts
were precisely like the case at bar, except
that the cestui que trust was informed of

the gift, and the court held the trust valid.
But the supreme court of Massachusetts
In two cases (Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent
and Clark v.
Sav. Bank, 104 Mass. 228,
Clark, 108 Mass. 522) seem to hold a different doctrine. In the first case the circumstances were deemed controlling, adverse to
an intent to create a trust, and in the last,
which was similar in its facts to this, the
court express the opinion that the trust was
not complete, but without giving any reaalsons for the opinion. The last decision,
though entitled to great respect, is exceptional to the general current of authority in
this country.
In the English courts I do not find any
case where these precise facts appeared, but
the cases are numerous where the general
principles have been elaborately discussed
and applied to particular facts. It is only
deemed necessary to refer to a few of them.
In Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq.
Cas. 684, it was held that an instrument
executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere contract to assign
at a future day) is equivalent to a declaration of trust. Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10
Eq. Cas. 475, was decided upon this principle, and is an extreme case in support of
It appeared that the
a declaration trust.
testator gave to his medical attendant the
following
memorandum:
"I hereby give
and make over to Dr. Morris, an Indian
bond No. D 506, value £1,000, as some token
for all his very kind attention to me during
my illness." This was held to constitute the
testator a trustee for Dr. Morris of the bond
which was retained by him. These cases
upon, and the latter someare commented
what criticised in Warriner v. Rogers, L. R.
16 Eq. 340, but Sir James Bacon, in delivering the opinion, substantially adheres to the
general rule before stated. He requires only "that the donor or grantor, or whatever
he may be called, should have absolutely
parted with that interest which had been
his up to the time of the declaration— should
liave effectually changed his right in that
respect, and put the property out of his power, at least in the way of interest." This
case was decided against the validity of the
trust, mainly upon the ground that the
produced were upon their face
memoi'anda
testamentary in character. In Pye's Case,
18 Ves. 140, money
was transmitted to an
agent in France to purchase an annuity for
a lady. Owing to circumstances which the
agent supposed prevented its purchase in
her name, he purchased it in the name of

the principal. When the latter learned this
fact, he executed and transmitted to the
agent a power of attorney to transfer the
annuity, but before its arrival the principal
Lord Eldon held that a declaration of
died.
trust was established.
Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551, is quite
analogous to the case at bar. A testatrix
directed her brokers to place £2,000, in the
joint name of the plaintiffs, and herself as a
trustee for the plaintiffs. The sum was
placed to the account of the testatrix aloue,
as trustee of the plaintiffs, and a promissory note was given by them to her as such
trustee. The note remained In her possession until her death, when her executor received the money. It was held that the
transaction amounted to a complete declaration of trust.
Mr. Hill, in his work on Trustees, after
saying "that it is extremely difficult, in the
present state of authorities, to define with
accuracy the law affecting this very intricate subject," lays down the following as
the result: "When the author of the voluntary trust is possessed of the legal interest in the property, a clear declaration
of
trust contained in or accompanying a deed
or act which passes the legal estate wiU create a perfect executed trust, and so a declaration or direction by a party that the
property shall be held in trust for the object
of his bounty, though unaccompanied
by a
deed or other act divesting himself of the
legal estate, is an executed
trust." Hill,
Trustees, 130.
If there is a valid declaration of trust,
that is sufficient of itself, I apprehend, to
transfer the title, but the difficulty is in determining what constitutes such a declaration, and whether a mere formal transfer of
the property, as in the case of the medical
attendant, is sufficient, is a question upon
which there is some difference of opinion.
No particular form of words is necessary to
constitute a trust, while the act or words
relied upon must be unequivocal, implying
that the person holds the property as trustee
for another.
Let us now consider the case in hand. In
form at least the title to the money was
changed
from the intestate individually to
her as trustee. She stated to the bank that
she desired the money to be thus deposited.
It was so done by her direction, and she took
a voucher to herself in trust for the plaintiff. Upon these facts what other intent can
be imputed to the intestate than such as
her acts and declarations imported, and did
they not import a trust'.' There was no contingency or uncertainty iu the circumstances, and I am unable to see wherein it was
incomplete. The money was deposited unqualifiedly and absolutely In trust, and the
intestate was the trustee. It would scarcely have been stronger if she had written in
the pass-book: "I hereby declare that I have
this money for the benefit of the
deposited
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plaintiff
her."

and

I

liold the same as trustee for

This would have been a plain declaration
of trust, and accompanied as it was with a
formal transfer to herself in the capacity of
trustee, would have been deemed sufficient
under the most rigid rules to he found in
any of the authorities. It seems to me that
this was the necessary legal intendment of
the transaction, and that it was sufficient to
pass the title. The retention of the passhook was not necessarily inconsistent with
this construction. She must be deemed to
have retained it as trustee. The book was
not the property, but only the voucher for
the property, which after the deposit consisted of the debt against the bank.
There are many cases where the instrument creating the trust has been retained
by the author of it until his death, especially
when he made himself the trustee, and yet
the trust sustained. Exton v. Scott, 6 Sim.
31; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Souverbye V. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Bunn v.
Id.,
329.
This circumstance,
Winthrop,
among others, has been considered upon the
question of intent, but is never deemed decisive against the validity of the trust. Id.
Hill, Trustees, supra. Some confusion
See,
has been created by judicial expression, that
the author of such a trust must do all in
his power to carry out his intention, that the
nature of the property will admit of. This
general proposition requires some qualification.
In this case the intestate might have
notified the objects of her bounty, but this
is not regarded as indispensable by any of
the authorities, and she might have made
the deposits in their name, and delivered to
or delivered to them the
them the books,
money.
The rule does not require that the
gift shall be made in any particular way, it
only requires that enough shall be done to
transfer the title to the property, and one of
the modes of doing this is by an unequivocal
declaration of trust. In Richardson v. Richardson,
supra, the court, in noticing this
point, said: "Reliance is often placed on the
circumstance that the assignor has done all
he can, and that there is nothing remaining
for him to do, and it is contended that he
must in that case only be taken to have made
a complete
and effectual assignment. But
that is not the sound doctrine on which the
case rests; for if there be an actual declara-
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tion of trust, although the assignor has not
done all that he could do, for example,
although he has ' not given notice to the assignee, yet the interest is held to have effectually passed as between the donor and
donee.
The difference must be rested simply on this: aye or no, has he constituted
himself a trustee."
As notice to the cestui que trust was not
necessary, and as the retention of the passbooks was not inconsistent with the completeness of the act, the case is peculiarly
one to be determined by this test: did the
intestate constitute herself a trustee? After
a careful consideration of the case in connection with the established i-ules applicable
to the subject, and the authorities, I think
this question must be answered in the affirmative. It was not done in express formal terms, but such is the fair legal import
of the transaction. I have considered
the
case thus far upon what appears from the
face of the transaction, without evidence aliunde, bearing upon the intent. It is not
necessary
to decide that surrounding circumstances may not be shown to vary or explain the apparent character of the acts, and
the intent with which they were done. The
facts developed may not be so unequivocal
as to be regarded as conclusive. It is sufficient to say that there is no finding of an
intent contrary to the creation of a trust,
and the facts found do not establish such an
adverse intent. But looking at the evidence
it is fairly inferable that the intestate designed that the plaintiff and her sister should
have the benefit of these deposits, and there
are some circumstances from which an inference may be drawn that she regarded the
The circumgifts as fixed and complete.
stance that she did not intend that the objects of her bounty should know of her gift
until after her death is not inconsistent with
It, and the most that can be said is that she
may have believed that the deposits might
be withdrawn during her life, and the money converted to her own use. It is not clear
that she entertained such a belief, but if she
did, it would not change the legal effect of
her acts.
The judgment must be affirmed.
concur except JIILLER
absent at argument.
Judgment affirmed.

All

JJ.,

and

EARL,
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Court of Appeals

McCORMACK

lawful

et al.

N. Y. 174.)

of New York.

Feb.

28,

1882.

Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court, in the Second judicial
department, entered upon an order made the
second Monday of December, 1881, which
atflrmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the court on trial at
special term. Reported below, 25 Hun, 574.
This action was brought to obtain a construction of the will of .John Walsh, late of
The clauses
the city of New York, deceased.
of the will as to which there was any controversy are as follows:
"Thirdly.
give, devise, and bequeath unto
my said son James, during his natural life,
all the rents, issues, and profits of my real
estate, and in case he marries and has lawful
issue, then and in the last-mentioned event
and thereupon I give, devise, and bequeath
to my said son James all and singular my
i-eal estate, whatsoever and wheresoever, to
have and to hold, the same to my said son,
liis heirs and assigns forever.
"Fourthly.
desire my executors to keep
insured
on my real estate
the buildings
;i gainst loss or damage by fire, and in repair,
and to pay all taxes, assessments, and other
charges thereon, and also the interest on inby mortgage thereon; and, if
(•umbrances
necessary, they are authorized to receive sufficient of the rents to enable them so to do;
and in case of damage or loss by fire they
are to receive the avails of the insurance,
and to repair or rebuild; but this clause of
my will is only to have effect until my said
son James shall have lawful issue; and 1
also authorize my said executors, until that
event, to raise, by mortgage of my real estate, or any part thereof, whenever and as
often as shall be necessary, a similar amount
as is now on mortgage of my said estate,
wherewith to discharge the present mortgage

I

I

if

necessary.

"Fifthly. In

of my son
James without ever having had any lawful
issue,
desire my executors who shall then
be surviving, or the last survivor, to sell all
my real estate, and to distribute the proceeds
thereof amongst my next of kin as personal
estate, according to the laws of the state of
New York for the distribution of intestate
personal estate; and for that purpose I authorize my said surviving executors or the
last survivor to execute good, valid, and sufficient conveyances in the law to transfer
said estate, and vest the same In the purchaser and purchasers in fee simple.
"Liastly. I appoint my beloved wife, and
my beloved son James, and my friend Tighe
Davey to be the executors of this my last
will and testament."
The testator died in 1830, leaving, surviving him, his son James, one nephew, the
plaintiff
herein, and four nieces.
James
died in 1880, unmarried, and having had no

I

case of the death

issue.
The two other executors died
before him, as did also the four nieces of
The defendants are the chilthe testator.
dren of said nieces.

John W. Goff, for appellant McCormack.
Luke F. Cozans and J. Woolsey Shephard, for
John R. Kuhn, for
appellants Walker et al.
respondent.

FINCH, J. The testator gave to his son
James the whole of his real estate for life,
and absolutely and in fee, in case the son
married and had issue; but if he died without having had lawful issue, the testator directed his executors who should then be survlvingj or the last survivor of them, to sell
his real estate and distribute the proceeds
among the testator's "next of kin, as personal estate, according to the laws of the
state of New York, for the distribution of
intestate personal estate." The executors
named were the testator's wife, his son
James, and his friend Tighe Davey; all of
whom are dead.
James died without having had lawful issue.
At testator's death his
next of kin were his son James, four nieces,
and a nephew, who is the present plaintiff.
The four nieces died during the lifetime of
James, but leaving children who are defendants here, and claim an interest in the proceeds of the real estate, or in the real estate
At the date of the death of James
itself.
the plaintiff" was the sole next of kin of the
testator, and claiming the entire proceeds ot
the real estate, brought an action for a construction of the will and the appointment
of a trustee to carry out its unexecuted proThe trial court determined that it
visions.
had jurisdiction
to appoint a trustee, and
made such appointment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the entire proceeds of the
real estate after payment of the liens thereon.
That judgment was affirmed, and the
children of two of the nieces bruag this appeal.

It is contended in their behalf that the devise to James, before marriage and the birth
of issue, was but a life estate; that the remainder in fee vested at the death of testator in his heirs at law; that the four nieces
and plaintiff took such remainder in fee as
tenants in common, subject to be divested
by the marriage of James and birth of lawful issue; that this contingency not having
occurred the fee was not divested; and that
it cannot be divested by a sale of the real
estate and disposition of the proceeds as personalty because the power of sale given to
the executors was a mere naked power, not
coupled with any interest; died with the donees to whom it was given; and cannot he
executed by a court of e<iuity.
It might prove to be the better opinion
that James took a base, or determinable fee,
subject to be divested upon his death without having had lawful issue, so that during
his life there was no fragment of the estate
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to descend upon his heirs at law, but the
character of his interest need not be particularly discussed if the power of sale survived
the death of the executors, and the real estate is to be distributed as personalty.
That
is the vital point in the case, and the appellant's view of it is sought to be sustained by
a reference to the rule at common law,
which, it is said, the Revised Statutes have
not seriously changed, but have omitted any
provision, express or implied, which gives
the court authority to appoint a trustee to
execute a naked power. The argument turns
in the end upon the single inquiry whether
the authority given to the executors to sell
is a mere naked power, or a power in trust
The statutory
and its execution imperative.
provisions must control and determine the
result, and render unnecessary any discussion or examination of the cases previously
decided, which were not always harmonious
and in some instances not easily reconciled.
They were very ably and patiently examined
in Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. 555, resulting
in a general conclusion that the statutoi-y revision substantially followed and adopted the
rules of the common law, departing from
them only to remove doubts and secure greatBut in any event
er accuracy and precision.
the statutes must furnish the rule by which
we are to be guided to a conclusion, for they
begin with a comprehensive provision abolishing all powers as then existing by law,
and making their creation, construction and
execution to be governed by the succeeding
enactments. 1 Rev. St. pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, art.
A power is there defined to be "an
S, § 73.
authority to do some act in relation to lands,
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the owner granting or reserving such power might himself lawfully
The authority here
perform."
Section 74.
given to the executors of John Walsh to sell
the lands and distribute the proceeds in the
event of the death of James without having
had issue was clearly a power within the
It was also a general
statutory definition.
and not a special power, for the former exists where the authority permits the alienation in fee by means of a conveyance, will
or charge of the lands embraced in the power
to any alienee whatever (section 77), and the
latter when the alienation must be to designated persons, or of a less estate or interest
A distinction is
Section 78.
than a fee.
then drawn between cases in which no person other than the grantee of the power has
any interest in its execution, in which case
the power, whether general or special, is denominated beneficial (section 79), and cases
in which the grantee has no interest in Its
execution, but holds it for the benefit of others.
A general power is in trust "when any
person or class of persons, other ixian the
srantee of such power, is designated as entitled to the proceeds, or any portion of the
proceeds, or other benefits to result from the
alienation of the lands according to the pow-
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er." Within this definition the general power conferred upon the executors to sell the
lands and distribute the proceeds to testator's next of kin was a power in trust, iu the
execution of which the grantees had no interest, for, although James was one of them,
the power, by its terms, was to be exercised
upon his death, and in an event which left
him without any interest in its execution.
These statutory definitions seem to us entirely accurate and clear and scarcely need, at
least for present purposes, the "authoritative
exposition" invoked. A power to be exercised by the grantee, not at all for his own
benefit but wholly and entirely for the benefit of some other person or class of persons,
is necessarily exercised by such grantee in a
trust capacity.
The element of trust inheres
in its substance and is its essential and vital
characteristic.
The statutes then provide
that every trust power shall be imperative,
and impose a duty upon the grantee, the
performance of which may be compelled in
equity, unless in a case where its execution
or non-execution is made expressly to depend
upon the will of the grantee, and does not
cease to be such even though he may have
the right to select some and exclude others
from among the objects of the trust.
Sections 96, 97.
So far, it is determined for us,
that the authority granted to the executors
of John Walsh is a general power in trust,
Being such, a further proand imperative.
vision, reaching the emergency of the death
of the grantees, becomes applicable. It is
enacted (section 102) that the provisions of
sections 66 to 71 of article 2, relating to express trusts, shall apply to powers in trust,
and section 68 of that article confers upon
the court, upon the death of the surviving
trustee, his powers and duties, and permits
them to be exercised by some person appointed for that purpose under the direction
of the coui-t. The statutes therefore answer
the whole argument of the appellants. The
power in trust conferred upon the executors
did not die with them, but survived and
vested in the courts of equity having full
power to compel the execution of the trust.
If in Oatton v. Taylor, 42 Barb. 578, there
is any thing to the contrary, which seems to
be the fact, it was decided without reference
to the statutes and does not alter or modify
our conclusion. The power in this case was
It was not
general, in trust and imperative.
of a character personal to the trustees as involving the exercise of theh' individual choice
and discretion, and might as well be executed
by persons other than themselves. Probably
it would have survived before the Revised
Statutes, but certainly remains and is enforceable since.
Assuming then the validity of the trust
power and the jurisdiction of equity to provide for its exercise, the appellants still contend that the "next of kin," to whom the
proceeds of the real estate were to be distributed, are the persons or their representa-
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lives who were such at the date of the
death of the testator, and not those who
were such at the date of the death of James.
There is no question here of the suspension
of the power of alienation, for the sale and
distribution awaited only the termination of
a single life; but nevertheless the argument
of the appellants proceeds, and must necessarily proceed, upon the idea that the next
of kin of the testator at his death took vested interests in a legacy, payable in the future,
since otherwise the right of each would lapse
and nothing would pass to their representatives. But there is no gift to the next of
kin, and no language importing such gift, except in the direction to convert the real estate into money and then make distribution;
and in such case the rule is settled that time
is annexed to the substance of the gift and
Much more is that
the vesting is postponed.
true where the gift is only to vest upon the
happening of a future contingency, until the
occurrence of which it is uncertain whether a
gift will be made at all. Warner v. Durant,
70 N. Y. 136; Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer.
387; Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92.
Here
a future condition or contingency attached
to the substance of the gift.
It was conditioned upon the death of James without hav-

ing had lawful Issue, so that the vesting was
jilainly postponed and the gift was future.

There is the further and important fact that
at the death of James the land was to be converted into personalty and be "ilstributed as
such, and the very subject of the gift was
not to come into existence until the preVincent v. Newhouse,scribed contingency.
83 N. Y. 511; Hoghton v. Whltgreave, 1 Jac.
& W. 145.
The case therefore falls within
the rule that where the gift is money, and the
.direction for the conversion absolute, the legacy given to a class of persons vests in those
who answer the description and are capable
of taking at the time of distribution. Teed
Adding to these
V. Morton, 60 N. Y. 506.
considerations the incongruitj' of a construction which would Include James himself,
among the next of kin in the testator's mind
and intention, we are entirely clear that the
courts below correctly decided that the next
of kin entitled were those who answered
that description at the date of the . distribution.
We discover therefore no error in the
disposition of the case.
The judgment should be affirmed, with
costs.

All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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Allen, 539.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suffolk. Jan, Term, 1867.
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Bill in equity by the executor of the will
of Francis Jackson, of Boston, for instructions as to the validity and effect of the following bequests and devises:
'Article 4th. I give and bequeath to William Lloyd Garrison, "Wendell Phillips, Edmund Quincy, Maria W. Chapman, L. Maria
Child, Edmund
Jackson, William I. Bowditch, Samuel May, Jr., and Charles K. Whipple, their successors and assigns, ten thousand dollars; not for their own use, but in
trust, nevertheless, for them to use and expend at their discretion, without any responsibility to any one, in such sums, at such times
and such places, as they deem best, for the
preparation and circulation of books, newspapers, the delivery of speeches, lectures, and
such other means, as, in their judgment, will
create a public sentiment that will put an
end to negro slavery in this country; and I
hereby constitute them a boaid of trustees
for that purpose, with power to fill all vacancies that may occur from time to time by
death or resignation of any member or of
any oflicer of said board. And I hereby appoint Wendell Phillips president, Edmund
Jackson treasurer, and Charles K. Whipple
secretary,
of said board of trustees. Other
hereinafter made, will sooner or
bequests,
later revfert to this board of trustees. My
desire is that they may become a permanent
hope and trust that they
organization ; and
will receive the services and sympathy, the
donations and bequests, of the friends of the

I

slave.

I

give and bequeath to the
"Article 5th.
board of trustees named in the fourth article
of this will, their successors and assigns, two
thousand dollars, not for their own use, but
in trust, nevertheless', to be expended by them
at their discretion, without any responsibility
to any one, for the benefit of fugitive slaves
who may escape from the slaveholding states
of this infamous Union from time to time.
"Disregarding the self-evident declaration
of 1776, repeated in her own constitution of
1780, that 'all men are born free and equal,'
Massachusetts has since, in the face of those
solemn declarations, deliberately entered into
a conspiracy with other states to aid them
in enslaving millions of innocent persons.
have long labored to help my native state out
of her deep iniquity and her barefaced hypocrisy in this matter. I now enter my last
protest against her inconsistency, her injustice, and her cruelty, towards an unoffending people. God save the fugitive slaves that
escape to her borders, whatever may become
of the commonwealth of Massachusetts!
give and bequeath to Wen"Article 6th.
dell Phillips of said Boston, Lucy Stone,
formefly of Brookfleld, Mass., now the wife

I

I

S9

of Henry Blackwell of New York, and Susan
B. Anthony of Rochester, N. Y., their successors and assiKus, five thousand dollars,
not for their own use, but in trust, nevertheless, to be expended by them, without any
responsibility to any one. at their discretion,
in such sums, at such times, and in such
places, as they may deem fit, to secure the
passage of laws granting women, whether
married or unmanled, the right to vote; to
hold office; to hold, manage, and devise property; and all other civil rights enjoyed by
men; and for the preparation and circulation of books, the delivery of lectures, and
such other means as they may judge best;
and I hereby constitute them a board of trustees for that intent and purpose, with power
to add two other persons to said board if they
deem it expedient. And I hereby appoint
Wendell Phillips president and treasurer, and
Susan B. Anthony secretary, of said board.
I direct the treasurer of said board not to
loan any part of said bequest, but to invest,
and, if need be, sell and re-invest, the same
in bank or railroad shares, at his discretion.
I further authorize and request said board
of trustees, the survivors and survivor of
them, to fill any and all vacancies that may
occur from time to time by death or resignation of any member or of any ofBcer of said
board.
One other bequest, hereinafter made,
will, sooner or later, revert to this board of
trustees. My desire is that they may become'
a permanent organization, until the rights
of women shall be established equal with
those of men; and I hope and trust that said
board will receive the sei-vices and sympathy,
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
human rights. And being desirous that said
board should have the immediate benefit of
said bequest, without waiting for my exit,
have ah-eady paid it in advance and in full
to said Phillips, the treasurer of said board,
whose receipt therefor is on my files.
"Article 8th. I now give to my three children equally the net income of the residue of"
my estate, during the term of their natural
lives, in the following manner, namely: After
the payment of my debts and the foregoinggifts and bequests, I give, bequeath and devise one undivided third part of the residue
of my estate, real, personal and mixed, to
my brother Edmund Jackson of said Boston,,
and assigns, not for his or
his successors
their own use, but in trust, nevertheless,
with full power to manage, sell and convey,
invest and re-invest, the same at his discretion, with a view to safety and profit;" and
"the whole net income thereof shall be paid
semi-annually to my daughter Eliza E. Eddy,
during her natural life;" and at her decease,,
one-half of such income to be paid semi-annually "to the board of trustees constituted
in the sixth article of this will, to be expended by them to promote the intent and purpose therein directed," and the other half to
Lizzie F. Bacon, her daughter, during her
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S. E. Sewall, for one of the trustees.

G.

Phillips, for others of the trustees. S.
Bartlett and J. G. King, for certain heirs at

"W.

law.

GRAY, J. This case presents for decision
many important and interesting questions,
which have been the subject of repeated discussion at the bar and of much deliberation
and reflection by the court. The able and
elaborate arguments of counsel have necessarily involved the consideration of the fundamental principles of the law of charities,
and of a great number of the precedents from
which they are to be derived; and have disclosed such diversity of opinion upon the extent and application of those principles, and
the just interpretation and effect of the adjudged cases, as to require the principles iu
question to be fuUy stated, and supported by
a careful examination of authorities, in delivering judgment.
I. By the law of this commonwealth, as by
the law of England, gifts to charitable uses
are highly favored, and will be most liberally construed in order to accomplish the intent and purpose of the donor; and trusts
which cannot be upheld in ordinary cases, for
various reasons, will be established and carried into effect when created to support a gift
The most important disto a charitable use.
tinction between charities and other trusts is
in the time of duration allowed and the deThe law does
gree of definiteness required.
not allow property to be made inalienable, by
means of a private trust, beyond the period
prescribed by the rule against perpetuities,
being a life or lives in being and twenty-one
years afterwards;
and if the persons to be
benefited are uncertain and cannot be ascertained within that period, the gift will be adjudged void, and a resulting trust declared for
But a public
the heirs at law or distributees.
or charitable trust may be perpetual in its duration, and may leave the mode of application
and the selection of particular objects to the
v.
Sanderson
discretion of the trustees.
White, 18 Pick. 333; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen,
and authorities cited; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, -146; Lewin, Trusts, c. 2.
Each of the bequests in the will of Francis
Jackson, which the court is asked iu this case
to sustain as charitable, is to a permanent
board of trustees, for a purpose stated in general terms only. The question of the validit.y of these trusts is not to be determined by
the opinions of individual judges or of the
whole court as to their wisdom or policy, but
by the established principles of law; and does
not depend merely upon their being permitted
by law, but upon their being of that pecuUar
nature which the law deems entitled to extraordinary favor because it regards them as
charitable.
It has been strenuously contended for the
heirs at law that neither of the purposes declared by the testator is charitable within the
which
Intent and purview of St. 43 Eliz. c.
all admit to be the principal test and evidence
of what are in law charitable uses. It becomes necessary therefore to consider the
spirit in which that statute has been construed and applied by the courts.
4,

6,

natural life; and at the decease of both
mother and daughter, "to pay and convey the
whole of said trust fund to said board of
trustees constituted in the sixth article of this
will, to be expended by them in the manner,
and for the intent and purpose, therein directed."
By article 9th, the testator gave another undivided third part of the said residue to his
brother Edmund, his successors and assigns,
in trust, with like powers of management and
investment, "and the whole net income thereof shall be paid semi-annually to my son
James Jackson, during the term of his natural life; at his decease, I direct said trustee,
or whoever may then be duly qualified to execute this trust, to pay semi-annually onehalf part of the net income thereof to the
board of trustees constituted in the fourth
article of this will, and the other half-part
of said net income shall be paid semi-annually to his children equally, during their
natural lives; at the decease of all his children, if they survive him, I direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized
to execute this trust, to pay and convey the
whole of said trust fund to said board of
trustees constituted in said fourth article in
this will, to be expended by them for the intent and purpose directed in said fourth article; but, in case my said son James should
leave no child living at the time of his decease, then, at his decease, I direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized to execute this trust, to pay and convey
the whole of said trust fund to said board
of trustees constituted in the fourth article
of this will, to be expended by them for the
intent and purpose therein directed."
By article 10th, the testator made a similar
bequest and devise of the remaining undivided third part of said residue to his brother
George Jackson, his successors and assigns,
and in trust to pay the whole net income
thereof semi-annually to the testator's daughter Harriette 51. Palmer, during her natural
life, and at her decease, one half of such income "to the board of trustees constituted in
the fourth article of this will, to be expended
by them in the manner and for the intent
and purpose therein directed;" and the other
half, in equal proportions, to all her children
that may survive her, during the term of their
natural lives; and, at their decease, to pay
and convey the whole of said trust fund to
said board of trustees; "but, in case my said
daughter Harriette M. Palmer should outlive
all her children, then, at her decease, I direct
said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly
authorized to execute this trust, to pay and
convey the whole of said trust fund to the
board of trustees constituted In said fourth
article in this will, to be expended by them
as aforesaid."

.5,
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The preamble of the statute mentions three

^J<;lasses of charitable gifts, namely, First: For
J the relief and assistance of the poor ami
/ needy, specifying only "sick and maimed sol/ diers and mariners," "educiition and prefer1

'

ment of orphans," "marriages of poor maids,"
"supportation, aid and help of yomig tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed,"
^'relief or redemption of prisoners and captives," and assistance of poor inhabitants in
paying taxes, either for civil or military obSecond: For the promoting of educajects.
tion, of which the only kinds specified in the
(beyond
the "education and preferstatute
ment of orphans." which seems more appi'opriately to fall within the first class) are those
"for maintenance of schools of learning, free
schools, and scholars of universities." Third:
For the repair and maintenance of public
buildings and works, under which are enumerated "repair of ports, havens," and "seabanks," for promoting commerce and navigation and protecting the land against the encroachments of the sea; of "bridges," "causeways" and "highways," by which the people
may pass from one part of the country to another; of "churches," in which religion may
be publicly taught; and of "houses of correction "
It is well settled that any purpose is charitable in the legal sense of the word, which is
within the principle and reason of this statute, although not expressly named in it; and
many objects have been upheld as charities,
which the statute neither mentions nor distinctly refers to. Thus a gift "to the poor"
generally, or to the poor of a particular town,
parish, age, sex, race, or condition, or to poor
emigrants, though not falling within any of
the descriptions of poor in the statute, is a
Saltonstall v. Sanders,
good charitable gift.
11 Allen, 455-461, and cases cited; Magill v.
Brown, Brightly, N. P. 405, 4(»i;; Barclay v.
Maskelyne, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 12!)4; Chambers v.
St. Louis, 29 llo. 543. So gifts for the promotion of science, learning and useful knowledge, though by different means and in different ways from those enumerated under the
second class; and gifts for bringing water into a town, for building a town-house, or otherwise improving a town or city, though not alluded to in the third class; have been held
to be charitable. American Academy v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 594; Drury v. Natick,
By
10 Allen, 177-182, and authorities cited.
towards
I modem decisions in England, gifts
payment of the national debt, or "to the
queen's chancellor of the exchequer for the
time being, to be applied for the benefit and
advantage of Great Britain," are legal charities. Tudor, Char. Trusts (2d Ed.) 14, 15, and
Sergeant Maynard, long before,
cases cited.
gave an opinion that a bequest "to the public
use of the country of New England" was a
good disposition to a charitable use. 1 Hutch.
Hist. Mass. (2d Ed.) 101, note. And it may
be mentioned as evidence of the use of the
word "charitable" by the founders of Massa-
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that It was applied by the Massachusetts Company in 1628, before they crossed
the ocean, to "the common stock" to be
"raised from such as bear good affection to
the plantation and tlie propagation thereof,
and the same to be employed only in defrayment of public charges, as maintenance of
ministers, transportation of poor families,
building of churches and fortifications, and all
other public and necessary occasions of the
plautatiou."
1 Mass. Col. Rec, 68,
No kind of charitable trusts finds less support in the words of St. 43 Eliz. than the large 'fU
class of pious and religious uses, to which the
statute contains no more distinct reference)
than in the words "repair of churches." Sue!
uses had indeed been previously recognize^
as charitable, and entitled to peculiar favor,
by many acts of parliament, as well as in the!
courts of justice.
St. 13 Bdw. I. c. 41; 17
Edw. II. c. 2; 23 Hen. VIII. c. 10; 1 Edw,
VI. c. 14; Anon., And, 43, pi. 108; Pitts v,
James, Hob, 123; Cheney's Case, Co. Litt.
342; Gibbons v. Maltyard, Poph. 6, Moore, j
594; Coke's note to Porter's Case, 1 Coke, 26a;
Bruerton's Case, 6 Coke, lb, 2a; Barry v. Ley,
In the latest of those
Dwight, Char. Cas, 92.
acts, the "erecting of grammar schools for the
education of youth in virtue and godliness, the
further augmenting of the universities, and
better provision for the poor and needy,"
were classed with charities for the maintenance of preachers, and called "good and godly uses;" and grammar schools were considered in those times an effectual means of forwarding the progress of the Reformation. St,
1 Edw. "VI. c. 14, §§ 1, 8, 9; Attorney General
Wilm. 15; Boyle, Char. 7, 8.
V. Do\\Tiing,
Sir Francis Moore, who drew St. 43 Eliz,, indeed says that a gift to maintain a chaplain
or minister to celebrate divine service could
not be the subject of a commission under the
statute; but "was of purpose omitted in the
penning of the act," lest, in the changes of
opinion in matters of religion, such gifts
might be confiscated in a succeeding reign as
Yet he also says that such a
superstitious.
gift might be enforced by "the chancellor by
his chancery authority;" and cites a case in
Duke, Char. Uses
which it was so decreed.
And from very
(Bridgman's Ed.) 125, 154.
soon after the passage of the statute, gifts for
the support of a minister, the preaching of
an annual sermon, or other uses connected
with public worship and the advancement of
religion, have been constantly upheld and carried out as charities in the English courts of
Anon., Gary, 39; Nash, Char.;
chancery.
Dwight, Char. Cas. 114; Pember v. Inhabitants of Knighton, Heme, Char. Uses, 101,
Toth. (2d Ed.) 34; Duke, Char. Uses, 354,
Tu356, 381, 570, 614; Boyle, Char. 39-41;
So in this commondor, Char. Trasts, 10, 11.
wealth, trusts for the support of public worship and religious instruction, or the spread
ing of religion at home or abroad, have al.->
4 Dane,
ways been deemed charitable uses.
Abr. 237; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536; Go-,- )
chusetts,
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ing V. Emery, 16 Pick. 107; Sohier v. St.
Paul's Church, 12 Jletc. (JIass.) 250; Brown
T. Kelsey, 2 Gush. 243; Barle v. Wood, 8
I
It is not necessary in this connecCush. 445.
' tion to speculate
whether the admission of
V pious uses into the rank of legal charities in
/ modern times is to be attributed to the influ'
ence of the civil law; to their having been
J mentioned in the earlier English statutes; to
a more liberal interpretation, after religion
had become settled in England, of the words
of churches," or, possibly, of the
} "repair
I clauses relating to gifts for the benefit of ed\ ucation, in St. 43 Eliz. ; or to the support giv/ en by the court of chancery to public charita( ble trusts, independently of any statute.
It
f is sufficient for our present purpose to observe
I that pious and religious uses are clearly not
\ within the strict words of the statute, and can
only be brought within its purview by the
f
largest extension of its spirit.
The civil law, from which the English law
of charities was manifestly derived, considered wills made for good and pious uses as
privileged testaments, which were not, like
other wills, void for uncertainty in the objects, and which must be carried into effect
even if their conditions could not be exactly
observed;
and included among such uses
(which it declared to be in their nature perpetual) bequests for the poor, orphans, widows, strangers, prisoners, the redemption of
captives, the maintenance of clergymen,
the
benefit of churches, hospitals, schools and colleges, the repairing of city walls and bridges,
the erection of public buildings, or other ornament or improvement of a city. Poth.
Pand. lib. 30-32, Nos. 57-62; Code, lib. 1, tit.
2, cc. 15, 19; Id., tit. 3, cc. 24, 28, 42, 46, 49,
57; Godol. Leg. pt. 1, c. 5, § 4; 2 Kent, Comm.
(6th Ed.) 257; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1137-1141;
McDonough v. Murdoch, 15 How. 405, 410,
{

/,

414.

Charities are not confined at the present day
to those which were permitted by law in England in the reign of Elizabeth.
A gift for the
advancement of religion or other charitable
purpose in a manner permitted by existing
laws is not the less valid by reason of having
such an object as would not have been legal
at the time of the passage Of the statute of
charitable uses.
For example,
charitable
trusts for dissenters from the established
church have been uniformly upheld in England since the toleration act of 1 Wm. & M.
e. 18, removed
the legal disabilities under
which such sects previously labored. Attorney General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193,
W. Kel. 34; Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P. Wms. 344,
2 Atk. 148; Attorney General v. Cock, 2 Ves.
Sr. 273.
And in this country since the Revolution no distinction has been made between
charitable gifts for the benefit of different religious sects.
Gifts for purposes prohibited by or opposed
to the existing laws cannot be upheld as charitable, even if for objects which wouM otherwise be deemed such. The bounty must, in

the words of Sir Francis Moore, be "according to the laws, not against the law," and
"not given to do some act against the law." /
Duke, Char. Uses, 126, 169. So Mr. Danedefines, as undoubted charities, "such as are
calculated to relieve the poor, and to promote'
such education and employment as the laws
of the land recognize as useful." 4 Dane,
Abr. 237. Upon this principle, the English
courts have refused to sustain gifts for printing and publishing a book inculcating the j
absolute and inalienable supremacy of the )
pope in ecclesiastical matters; or for the sup- j
'
port of the Roman Catholic or the Jewisbi
religion, before such gifts were countenanced! )
by act of parliament. De Themmines v. De 1
Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288; Tudor, Char. Trusts,
21-25, and cases cited.
And a bequest "to- )
wards the .political restoration of the Jews I
to Jerusalem and to their own land," has )
been held void, as tending to create a politi- I
eal revolution in a friendly country. Habershon V. Vardon, 4 De Gex & S. 467.
In a free I
republic. It is the right of every citizen to"
\
strive in a peaceable manner by vote, speech
or writing, to cause the laws, or even the '
constitution, under which he lives, to be re- I
formed or altered by the legislatm-e or the |
people.
But it is the duty of the judicial de- I
partment to expound and administer thfe laws i
as they exist. And trusts whose expressed
)
purpose is to bring about changes in the laws
or the political institutions
of the country '
are not charitable in such a sense as to be
entitled to peculiar favor, protection and per- '
petuation from the ministers of those laws
which they are designed to modify or sub- ;
vert.
A precise and complete definition of a legal^Mu,
charity is hardly to be found in the
books!^'^|^
ITie one most commonly used in modern >fM^
cases, originating
in the judgment of Sir
William Grant, confirmed by that of Lord
Eldon, in Morice v. Bishop of Durham. 9*
Ves. 405, 10 Ves. 541— that those purposes
are considered
charitable which are enumerated in St. 43 Eliz. or which by analogies
are deemed within its spirit and intendment
—leaves something to be desired in point of
certainty, and suggests no principle. Mr. Binney, in his great argument in the Girard Will
)
Case, 41, defined a charitable or pious gift!
to be "whatever is given for the love of God, \
or for the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense — given from these!
motives,
and to these ends— free from the
stain or taint of every consideration that is'
personal,
private or selfish."
And this definition has been approved by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania. Price v. Maxwell, 28;
Pa. St. 35. A more concise and practical
rule is that of Lord Camden, adopted by
Chancellor Kent, by Lord Lyudhurst, and by
the supreme court of the United States— "A
gift to a general public use, which extends; j
to the poor as well as the rich." Jones v. i
Williams, Amb. 652; Coggeshall v. Pelton, T i
'
Johns. Ch. 204; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phil-
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Perin v. Carey, 2i How. 506. A
charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully
defined as a gift, to be applied consistently
with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their
bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
S Ijy assisting them to establish themselves
in
! life, or by erecting or maintaining
public
S T)uildings or works or otherwise lessening the
Vbm-dens
of government. It is immaterial
the purpose is called charitable in
} -whether
i the gift itself, if it is so described as to show
that it is charitable in its natm'e.
If the words of a charitable bequest are
ambiguous or contradictory, they are to be
so construed as to support the charity, if
possible. It is an established maxim of interpretation, that the court is bound t(i carry
the will into efCect, if it can see a general
intention consistent with the rules of law,
•even if the particular mode or manner pointed
out by the testator is illegal.
Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 543; Inglis v. Sailor's Snug
Harbor, 3 Pet. 117, 118. If the testator uses
a word which has two meanings, one of which
will effect and the other defeat his object,
the first is to be adopted. Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 455. When a charitable intent
appears on the face of the will, but the terms
used are broad enough to allow of the fund
Ijelng applied either in a lawful or an unlawful manner, the gift will be supported, and
its application restrained within the bounds
of the law. The most frequent illustrations
of this in the English courts have arisen
Tinder St. 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (commonly called
the "Statute of Mortmain"), prohibiting devises of land, or bequests of money to be
laid out in land, to charitable uses. In the
leading case. Lord Hardwicke held that a
direction to executors to "settle and secure,
lay purchase of lands of inheritance, or other"wise, as they shall be advised, out of my pergonal estate," two annuities to be paid yearly
forever for charitable objects, was valid, because It left the option to the executor to
make the investment in personal property,
which was not prohibited by the statute;
and said, "This bequest is not void, and there
IS no authority to construe it to be void, if
l)y law it can possibly be made good," or
<according to another and perhaps more ac•curate report) "no authority to construe it
to be void by law, if it can possibly be made
good." Sorresby v. Hollins, 9 Mod. 221, 1
CoU. Jurid. 439. The doctrine of that case has
■ever since
been recognized as sound law.
Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Yes. 144;
■Curtis V. Hutton, 14 Ves. 530;
Dent v. AllMayor, etc., of Faver■croft, 30 Beav. 340;
sham V. Ryder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 353; Edwards V. Hall, 11 Hare. 12, 6 De Gex, M. &
G. 89. In a like spirit the house of lords
xecently decided that a bequest to erect buildings for charitable purposes if other lands
should be given was valid, and could not be
191, 192;

/
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held to be Impliedly prohibited by St. 9 Geo.
II. Philpott V. St. George's Hospital, 6 H.
L. Cas. 338. The rule stated in Attorney General V. AVilliams, 2 Cox, Ch. 388, and Tatham

V. Drummond,
11 L. T. (N. S.) 325,
upon
which the heirs at law rely, that "the court
will not alter its conception of the purposes
of a testator, merely because those intentions
happen to fall within the prohibition of the
statute of mortmain," shows that no forced
construction of the testator's language is to
be adopted to avoid illegality, but does not
afCect the principle that a bequest which according to the fair meaning of the words may
include a legal as well as an illegal application is to be held valid.
In the light of these general principles, we
come to the consideration of the language of
the different bequests in this will.
II. The first bequest which is drawn In ques
tion is that contained in the fourth article
of the will, by which the sum of ten thousand
dollars is given in trust to be used and expended at the discretion of the trustees, "in
such sums, at such times and such places as
they deem best, for the preparation and circulation of books, newspapers,
the delivery
of speeches, lectures and such other means
as in their judgment will create a public sentiment that will put an end to the negro
slavery in this country;" and the testator
expresses a desire that they may become a
permanent organization, and a hope "that
they wUl receive the services and sympathy,
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
the slave."
Among the charitable objects specially designated in St. 43 Eliz. is the "relief or redemption
of prisoners and captives." And
this was not a peculiarity of the law of
England or of that age. The civil law regarded the redemption of captives as the highest of all pious uses — in the words of Justinian, causa piissima — and not only declaretl
that no heir, trustee or legatee should infringe or unjustly defeat the pious intentions of the testator by asserting that a legacy or trust for the redemption of captives
was uncertain, and provided for the appointment of a trustee when none was named in
the will, and for informing him of the bequest, but even authorized churches to alienate their sacred vessel and vestments for this
one pjirpose, upon the ground that it was
reasonable that the souls or lives of men
should be preferred to any vessels or vestments whatsoever— "Quoniam non absurdum
est animas hominum quibuscuuque vasis vel
vestimentis preferri." Code, lib. 1, tit. 2, c.
22; Id., tit. 3, cc. 28, 49; Id., lib. 8, tit. 54,
c. 36; Nov. 7. e. 8; Id., p. ll."i, c. 3; Id., p.
120, c. 10; Id., p. 131, c. 11; Godol.
Leg. pt.
1, c. 5, § 4.

The captives principally contemplated in St.
Eliz. were doubtless Englishmen taken
held as slaves in Turkey and Barbary,
And the relief of our own citizens from such
captivity was always deemed charitable in
43
and

i
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illustration of which is
of the governor and
council in 1693, by whom a petition of the
relations of two inhabitants of the province,
"some time since taken by a Salley man of
war, and now under Turkish captivity and
slavery," for permission "to ask and receive
the charity and public contribution of well
disposed persons for redeeming them out of
their miserable sulfering and slavery," was
gi'anted;
"the money so collected to be employed for the end aforesaid, unless the said
persons happen to die before, make their esthen
cape, or be in any other way redeemed;
the money so gathered to be improved for
the redemption of some others of this province, that are or may be in like circumstances,
as the governor and council shall direct."
Council Rec. 1693, fol. 323. But there is no
more reason for confining the words of the
than
statute of Elizabeth to such captives,
for excluding from the class of religious charities gifts for preaching the gospel to the
heathen, which have uniformly been sustained
Boyle,
as charitable, here and in England.
Char. 41; Bartlet v. King, 12 ilass. 536.
Indeed it appears by Sir Francis Moore's
reading upon the statute, that even in his
time the word "captives" ipight include captive enemies. Duke, Char. Uses, 1.58.
It was argued that the slave trade was fostered and rewarded by the English government in the reign of Elizabeth, and therefore gifts for the relief of negro slaves could
not be deemed within the purview of the
statute of charitable uses. The fact is undoubted; but the conclusion does not follow.
The permission of slavery by law does not
prevent emancipation from being charitable.
A commission of manumission, granted by
Queen Elizabeth, twenty-seven years before
the statute, recites that in the beginning God
created all men free by nature, and afterwards the law of nations placed some under
the yoke of slavery, and that the (queen believed it would be pious and acceptable to
God and according to Christian
charity—
"plum fore credimus et Deo acceptabile
Christianseque charitati consentaneum"— to
wholly enfranchise the villeins of the crown
on certain royal manors. 20 Howell, St. Tr.
1372. See, also. Bar. Ob. (5th Ed.) 305, 308.
The spirit of the Roman law upon this point
is manifested by an edict of Constantine,
which speaks of those who with a religious
sentiment in the bosom of the church grant
their slaves that liberty which Is their due
— Qui religiosa mente in ecclesioe gremio servis suis meritam concesserint libertatem."
Code, lib. 1, tit. 13, c. 2. That the words of
the statute of charitable uses may be extended to negro slaves of English masters is
clearly shown by the decision of Lord Cottenham, when mastei- of the rolls, applying for
the benefit of negroes in the British colonies
in the West Indies the accumulations of a
bequest made in 1670 "to redeem
poor
slaves." Attorney General v. Gibson, 2 Beav.
Massachusetts,
found in the

an
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note; Id., cited Craig & P. 226. In dealing with such a question, great regard is to
be had to the favor which the law gives to
liberty, so eloquently expressed by Chief Justice Fortescue:
"Crudelis enim necessario
judicabitur lex, qure servltutem augmentat et
minuit libertatem. Nam pro eS. natura semper Implorat humana. Quia ab homine et
pro vitio introducta est servitus. Sed libertas a Deo homlnis est indita naturae. Quare
ipsa ab homine sublata semper redire gliscit,
ut facit omne quod libertati natural! privatur. Quo ipse et crudelis judicandus est,
qui libertati non favet. Haec considerantia
Anglise jui-a in omnl casu libertati dant favorem."
Fortes. De Laud. c. 42.
But the question of the lawfulness of this
gift, if falling within the class of charitable
uses, depends not upon the laws and the public policy of England at the time of the passage of the statute, but ujyon our own at the
time of the death of the testator. It was seriously argued that, before the recent amendment of the constitution of the United States,
"a trust to create a sentiment to put an end
to negro slavery, would, having regard to the
constitution and laws under which we live,
be against public policy and thus be void;"
but the court is unable to see any foundation
for this position in the constitution and laws,
either of the United States or of this commonwealth.
The law of Massachusetts has always been
peculiarly favorable to freedom, as may be
shown by a brief outline of its history. The
"rights, liberties and privileges," established
by the general court of tho colony in 1641, to
be "impartially
and inviolably enjoyed and
observed throughout our jurisdiction forever," declared: "There shall never be any
bond slavery, villenage or captivity amongst
us, unless it be lawful captives taken in just
wars, and such strangers as willingly sell
themselves or are sold to us. And these
shall have all the liberties and Christian
usages which the law of God established in
Israel concerning such persons doth morally
require. This exempts none from servitude
who shall be judged thereto by authority."
The last proviso evidently referred to punishment for crime. Body of Liberties, art 91.
This articlo, leaving out the word "strangers"
in the clause as to slaves acquired by sale,
was included in each revision of the laws of
the colony. Mass. Col. Laws (Ed. 1C60) 5; Id.
(Ed. 1672) 10; 4 Mass. Col. Rec. pt. 2, p. 467.
It is worthy of observation, that the tenure
upon which the Massachusetts Company held
their charter, as declared in the charter itself,
was as of the manor of East Greenwich in
the county of Kent; that no one was ever born
a villein in Kent (Y. B. 30 Edw. I, p. 168; Pitzh.
Abr. "Villenage," 46; 3 Seld. Works, 1876);
and that the Body of Lllierties contained articles upon each of the principal points distinctive of the Kentish tenure of gavelkind
—freedom from escheats on attainder and execution for felony, the power to devise, the
317,
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age of alienation,

and descent to all the sons
together— adopting some and modifying others. Body of Liberties, aits. 10, 11, 53, 81; 2
Bl. Comm. 84.
In the laws of Europe, at the time of the
foundation of tlie colony, descent was named first among the sources of slavery. The
common law, following the civil law, repeated "Servi aut nascuntur aut fiunt," and differed only in tracing it through the father,
instead of the mother; and each system recognized that a man might become a slave by
capture in war, or by his own consent or confession in some form.
Just. Inst. lib. 1, tit.
3; Bi-act. 4b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 3; Bedes v. Holbadge. Act. Can. 393; Swinb. Wills, pt. 2, §
And such was then the es7; Co. Litt 117b.
tablished law of nations. Gro. De Jure B. lib.
In parts of
2, c. 5, §§ 27, 29; Id. lib. 3, c. T.
England, hereditary villenage would seem to
have still existed in fact; and it was allowed
by law until since the American Revolution.
Pigg V. Caley, Noy, 27; Co. Litt. 116-140; 2
Inst. 28, 45; 2 Rolle, Abr. 732; Smith v.
Brown, 2 Salk. 606, Holt, 495;
Smith v.
Gould, 2 Salk. 667, 2 Ld. Raym. 1275; Ti-eblecock's Case, 1 Atk. 633; The King v. Ditton,
4 Doug. 302.
Lord Bacon, in explaining the
maxim, "Jura sanguinis nulla jm-e civili dirimi possunt," with a coolness which shows
that in his day and country the illustration
was neither unfamiliar nor shocking, says,
"If a villein be attainted, yet the lord shall
have the issue of his villein born before or
after his attainder; for the lord hath them
jure naturae but as the increase of a flock."
Bac. Max. reg. 11.
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, as
Govei-nor Winthrop tells us, was composed
by Nathaniel Ward, who had been "formerly
a student and practiser in the course of the
common law." 2 Winthrop's Hist. New England, 55. In view of the other laws of the
time, the omission, in enumerating the legal
sources of slavery, of birth, the fii"st mentioned in those laws, is significant. No instance is known in which the lawfulness of
hereditary slavery in Massachusetts under
the charter of the colony or the province was
affirmed by legislative or judicial authority;
and it has been denied in a series of judgments of this court, beginning in the last
century, in each of which it was essential to
the determination of the rights of the parties.
Littleton v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. 128, note; Lanesborough V. Westfield, 10 JIass. 74; Edgartown V. Tlsbury, 10 Cush. 408. The case of
Perkins v. Emerson, 2 Dane, Abr. 412, did
not touch this question; but simply determined that a person received into a house as
a slave of the owner was not received "as an
inmate, boarder or tenant," so that notice
of the place whence such person last came
must be given to the selectmen under Prov.
No doubt
St. 10 Geo. II.; Anc. Chart. 508.
many children of slaves were in fact held as
slaves here, especially after the Province
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Charter, during the period of which all acts
of the general court were required to be
transmitted to England for approval. Earlier
ordinances which had not been so approved
were hardly recognized by the English government as of any force.
The policy of England restrained the colonists from abolishing
the African slave trade, and the number of
slaves (which had been very small under the
comparatively
independent government of
the colony) was much increased. The practice of a whole people does not always conform to its laws. Thousands of negroes were
held as slaves in England and commonly sold
in public at the very time when Lord Mansfield and other judges decided such holding
to be unlawful.
Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell, St. Tr. 72, 79, Lofft, 17; Quincy, 97, noter
The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 106.
While negro slavery existed in Massachusetts, it was in a comparatively mild form.
The marriages of slaves were protected by
the legislature and the courts; according to
the opinion of Hutchinson and of Dane,
slaves might hold property; they were admitted as witnesses, even on capital trialsof white persons, and on suits of other slaves
for freedom; they might sue their masters
for wounding or immoderately beating them;
and indeed hardly differed from apprentices
or other servants except in being bound for
life.
See authorities and records cited in
Quincy, 30, 31. note; 2 Dane, Abr. 313. The
annual tax acts show that before the Declaration of Independence they were usually
taxed as property, always afterwards as perThe general court in September 1776
sons.
forbade the sale of two negroes taken as
prize of war on the high seas and brought
into this state, and resolved that any negroes
so taken and brought in should not be allowed to be sold, but should be treated like othRes. Sept. 1776, c. 83.
er prisoners.
It was in Massachusetts, by the first article
of the declaration of rights prefixed to the
constitution adopted in 1780, as immediately
afterwards interpreted by this court, that
the fundamental axioms of the Declaration of
Independence— "that all men are created
equal; that' they are endowed by their Creathat
tor with certain inalienable rights;
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"— first took at once the form
and the force of express law; slavery was
thus wholly abolished in Massachusetts; and
it has never existed here since, except so far
as the constitution and laws of the state were
held to be prevented by the constitution and
laws of the United States from operating upCaldwell v. Jennison,
slaves.
on fugitive
Rec. 1781, fol. 79, 80; Jennison's Petition,.
Jour. H. R. June 18, 1782, fol. 89; Com. v.
Jennison, Rec. 1783, fol. 85; Parsons, C. J.,
in Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 128; 4
Mass. Hist. Coll. 203, 204; Com. v. Aves, 18
Pick. 208, 210, 215, 217; 2 Kent, Comm. (6th
Ed.) 252; Betty v. Horton, 5 Leigh, 628.
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entitled, the just inference is that lawful
means only are to be selected, and that they
are to be used in a lawful manner.
It was further objected that "to create
public sentiment" was too vague and indefinite an object to be sustained as
charitable use. But "a public sentiment" on
moral question is but another name for publie opinion, or a harmony of thought— idem
sentire. The only case cited for the heirs at
law in support of this objection was Browne
V. Yeall,
Ves. .50, note, in which Lord Thurlow held void a perpetual trust for the pur-(
chase and distribution in Great Britain and
its dominions of such books as might have
tendency to promote the interests of virtue
and religion and the happiness of mankind.
But the correctness of that decision was
doubted by Sir William (jlrant and Lord
Eldon in Morice v. Bishop of Durham,
is inconVes. 406, 10 Ves. 534, .530; and
authorities,
sistent with the more recent
The bequest now behere and in England.
fore us is quite as definite as one "for the
of Christian
increase and improvement
liuowledge and promoting religion," and tlie
purchase from time to time of such bibles
and
and other religious books, pamphlets
tracts as the trustees should think fit for
which was upheld by Lord
that purpose,
Eldon in Attorney General v. Stepney, 10
Ves. 22; or "to the cause of Christ, for the
benefit and promotion of true evangelical
piety and religion," through the agency of
trustees, to be by them "appropriated to the
cause of religion as above stated, to be distributed in such divisions and to such societies and religious charitable purposes as
they may think fit and proper," which was
sustained by this court in Going v. Emery,
16 Pick. 107; or "for the promotion of such
religious and charitable enterprises as shall
be designated by a majority of the pastors
composing the Jliddlesex Union Association,"
as in Brown v. Kelsey,
Cush. 243; or to be
distributed, at the discretion of trustees, "in
aid of objects and purposes of benevolence
or charity, public or private," as in Saltonstall V. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; or "for the
cause of peace," to be expended by an unincorporated society, whose object, as defined
in its constitution, was "to illustrate the inconsistency of war with Christianity, to
show its baleful influence on all the great
Interests of mankind, and to devise means
for insuring universal and permanent peace,"
as in Taijpan v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122; or to
found "an establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men;" or "for
the benefit and advancement and propagation of education and learning in every part
of the world, as far as circumstances will
permit;" as in Whicker v. Hume,
H. L.
v.
Cas. 124, 155. and President of U.
Drununoud, there cited. See, also, McDonough v. ilurdoch.
15 How. 405. 414.
The beques:! itself manifests its immediate
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The doctrine of our law, upon this subject,
-as stated by Chief Justice Shaw in delivering the judgment of the court in Com. v.
Aves, just cited, is that slavery is a relation
founded in force, contrary to natural right
and the principles of justice, humanity and
sound policy; and could exist only by the
-effect of positive law, as manifested either
The
by direct legislation or settled usage.
-same principle has been recognized by Chief
and
Mr. .Justice Story,
Justice Jlarshp
speaking for the supreme court of the United
The Antelope, 10 AA'heat. 120, 121;
States.
Prigg V. Pennsylvania, 10 Pet. 611.
The constitution of the United States unifoi-mly speaks of those held in slavery, not
as property, but as persons; and never contained anything inconsistent with their peaceAs beable and voluntary emancipation.
would require the
tween master and slave,
most explicit prohibition by law to restrain
M'Cutchen v.
the right of manumission.
Pet. 238.
We cannot take judiMarshall,
cial notice of the local laws of other states of
the Union except so far as they are in proof.
appears
Knapp V. Abell, 10 Allen, 488. But
by cases cited at the bar that bequests of
manumission were formerly favored in Virginia; and that
was more recently decided
in Mississippi that trust created by will for
paying the expenses of transporting the testator's slaves to Africa and maintaining them
Charles v.
In freedom there was lawful.
Hunnicutt,
Call, 311; Wade v. American
Smedes & M. <>'i3. A
Colonization Soc,
state of slavery, in which manumission was
wholly prohibited, has never been known
.among civilized nations. Even when slavery
prevailed throughout the world, the same
-common law of nations, jus gentium, which
justified its existence, recognized the right
-of manumission as a necessary consequence.
-Just. Inst. lib.
tit. .5.
We fully concur with the learned counsel
for the heirs at law that if this trust could
not be executed according to the intention
of the testator without tending to excite servin
ile insurrections
other
states
of the
Union, it would have been unlawful; and
that a trust which looked solely to political
agitation and to attempts to alter existing
laws could not be recognized by this coMrt
as charitable. P.ut such does not appear to
us to be the necessary
or tlie reasonable interpretation of this bequest.
The manner
stated of putting an end to slavery is not
by legislation or political action, but by creating a public sentiment, which rather points
to moral influence and voluntary manumisThe means
specified
sion.
are the usual
means of public instruction, by books aud
newspapers, speeches and lectures.
Other
means are left to the discretion of the trustees, but there is nothing to indicate that
they are not designed to be of a kindred
nature. Giving to the bequest that favorable
-construction to which all charitable gifts are
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purpose to be to educate the -whole people
upon the sin of a man's holding his fellowman in bondage; and Its ultimate object, to
put an end to negro slavery in the United
States; in either aspect, a lawful charity.
It is universally admitted that trusts for
the promotion of religion and education are
charities. Gifts for the instruction of the
public in the cure of the diseases of quadrupeds or birds useful to man, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals (either by publishing newspapers on the subject, or by
killing
establishments
where
providing
might be attended
them for the market
with as little suffering as possible), have
London
in England.
been held charitable
University v. Yarrow, 23 Beav. 159, 1 De
Gex & J. 72; Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.)
790; Tatham v. Drummond, 11 L. T. (N. S.)
325. To deliver men from a bondage which
the law regards as contrary to natural right,
humanity, justice and sound policy, is surely
not less charitable than to lessen the sufferings of animals. The constitution of Massachusetts,
which declares that all men are
born free and equal, and have the natural,
essential and unalienable rights of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness; also declares that a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of
the constitution, and a constant adherence
to those of piety and justice, are absolutely
necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government; that
arts and sciences,
'•the encouragement of
to the honor of
literature,
tends
and all good
God, the advantage of the Christian religion,
and the great benefit of this and the other
United States of America;" and that "wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of
their rights and liberties, and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts
of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth," besides cherand the
ishing the interests of literature
"to countenance and inculcate the
sciences,
principles of humanity and general benevo"and all
lence, public and private charity,"
sentiments
generous
and
social affections
among the people." Declaration of Rights,
arts. 1, 18; Const. Mass. c. 5. This bequest
directly tends to carry out the principles
thus declared in the fundamental law of the
commonwealth. And certainly no kind of
education could better accord with the religion of Him who came to preach deliverance to the captives, and taught that you
should love your neighbor as yourself and
do unto others as you would that they should
do unto you.
The authorities already cited show that the
HUTCH. BQ.JUB. — 7
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redemption or manumission of
slaves in any manner not prohibited by law
is a charitable object. It falls indeed within
the spirit, and almost within the letter, of
many clauses In the statute of Elizabeth.
It would be an anomaly in a system of law,
which recognized as charitable uses the relief of the poor, the education and preferment of orphans, marriages of poor maids,
the assistance of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, the relief of
prisoners and the redemption of captives, to
exclude the deliverance of an indefinite number of human beings from a condition in
which they were so poor as not even to own
themselves, in which their children could not
be educated, in which marriages had no sanction of law or security of duration, in which
all their earnings belonged to another, and
they were subject, against the law of nature,
and without any crime of their own, to such
an arbitrary dominion as the modern usages
over capof nations wiU not countenance
tives taken from the most barbarous enemy.
III. The next question arises upon the beof fugitive
quest in trust for the benefit
slaves who might from time to time escape
from the slaveholding states of the Union.
The validity of this bequest must be determined according to the law as it stood at
the time when the testator died and from
which his will took effect. It is no part of
the duty of this court to maintain the constitutionality, the justice, or the policy of
the fugitive slave acts, now happily repealof the United
ed. But the constitution
States, at the time of the testator's death, declared that no person held to service or labor
in one state should be discharged therefrom
It may safely be
by escaping into another.
assumed that, under such a constitution, a
bequest to assist fugitive slaves to escape
from those to whom their service was thus
recognized to be due could not have been
upheld and enforced as a lawful charity.
The epithets with which the testator accompanied this bequest show that he set his
own ideas of moral duty above his allegiance
to his state or his country; and warrant the
conjecture that he would have been well
pleased to have the fund applied in a manner inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States. But he has used
methods,
no words to limit its use to illegal
as to
untrammelled
trustees
his
left
has
and
the mode of its application.
Whether this bequest is or is not valid, is
to be ascertained from a fair construction of
its language, in the light of the maxims of
interpretation stated in the earlier part of this
opinion, by which the court is bound to cany
into effect any charitable bequest in which
can be seen a general intention consistent
with the law, even if the particular mode
pointed out is illegal; and there is no authority to construe it to be void if it can be applied in a lawful manner consistently with
the intention of the testator as manifested in
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A bequest for the benefit of fugitive slaves
The words "reis not necessarily unlawful.
lief or redemption of prisoners and captives"
have always been held in England to include
those in prison under condemnation for crime,
as well as persons confined
for debt; and
to support gifts for distributing bread and
meat among them annually, or for enabling
poor imprisoned debtors to compound with
their creditors. Duke, Char. Uses, 131, 156;
Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Coop.
Prac. Oas. 285, 290; Attorney General v.
Painterstainers' Co., 2 Cox, Ch. 51; Attorney
General v. Drapers' Co., Tudor, Char. Trusts,
591, 592, 4 Beav. 67; 36th Report of Charity
Commissioners to Parliament, pt. 6, pp. 856868.
It would be hardly consistent with charity or justice to favor the relief of those undergoing punishmept for crimes of their own
committing, or imprisonment for not paying
debts of their own contracting; and yet prohibit a like relief to those who were in equal
need, because they had withdrawn
themselves from a service imposed upon them by
local laws without their fault or consent.
It was indeed held in Thrupp v. Collett, 26
Beav. 125, that a bequest to be applied to purchasing and procuring the discharge of persons committed to prison for non-payment
of fines under the game laws was not a lawful charity. But such persons were convicted offenders against the law of England, who
would by such discharge be wholly released
from punishment. A fugitive slave was not
a criminal by the laws of this commonwealth
or of the United States.
To supply sick or destitute fugitive slaves
with food and clothing, medicine or shelter,
or to extinguish by purchase the claims of
those asserting a right to their service and
labor, would in no wise have tended to impair the claim of the latter or the operation

M
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this connection.
In Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb. (2d Ed.) 228,
note, the will contained one bequest for the
support and maintenance of a Jews' synagogue;
and another bequest of an annuity
"to the gabas of the said synagogue," who
were found, upon inquiiy by a master, to be
treasurers of the synagogue, whose office it
was to collect and receive the annual subscriptions for the support of poor Jews belonging to the synagogue, and to apply the
same to the expenses of supporting the synagogue and to the maintenance of such poor
Jews. This last bequest was upheld, and referred to a master to report a scheme, although the support of the synagogue was adjudged to be an unlawful use; and thus a
bequest manifestly intended for the benefit
of persons professing a religion not tolerated
by law, and which might, according to its
terms, be applied either in an unlawful or
a lawful manner, was sustained as charitable, and its application confined to the lawful

of the constitution and laws of the United
States; and would clearly have been withia
If, for example,
the terms of this bequest.
the trustees named in the will had received
this fund from the executor without question,
and had seen fit to apply it for the benefit of
fugitive slaves in such a manner, they could
not have been held liable as for a breach of
trust.
This bequest therefore, as well as the previous one, being capable of being applied according to its terms in a lawful manner at the
time of the testator's death, must, upon the
settled principles of construction, be held a
valid charity.
—w
It is hardly necessary to remark that thp Irii
direction of the testator that his trustees I'm*
shall not be accountable to any one is simply
void. No testator can obtain for his bequests V^'i
that support and permanence which the law
gives to public charities only, and at the same
time deprive the beneficiaries and the public
of the safeguards which the law provides for
their due and lawful administration.
As the trustees named in the will are not
corporation established by law, and these two
bequests are unlimited in duration, and by
their terms might cover an illegal as well as
a legal appropriation, it is the duty of the
court, before ordering the funds to be paid
to the trustees, to refer the case to
master
to settle a scheme for their application in
lawful manner. Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb.
228, note; Attorney
General v. Stepney, 10
Ves. 22; Boyle, Char. 100, 217.
IV. It is quite clear that the bequest in
trust to be expended "to secure the parage
of laws granting women, whether maiWed or
unmanned, the right to vote, to hold office, to,
hold, manage and devise property, and all
other civil rights enjoyed by men," cannot
be sustained as a charity.
No precedent has been cited in its support.
This bequest differs from the others in aiming directly and exclusively to change the
laws; and its object cannot be accomplished
without
changing
the constitution
also.
Whether such an alteration of the existing
laws and frame of government would be wise
and desirable is a question upon which we
cannot, sitting In a judicial capacity, properly express any opinion. Our duty is limited
to expounding the laws as they stand. And
those laws do not recognize the purpose of
overthrowing or changing them, in whole or
in part, as a charitable use. This bequest
therefore, not being for a charitable purpose,
nor for the benefit of any particular persons,
and being unrestricted in point of time, is
inoperative and void.
For the same reason, the gift to the same
object, of one third of the residue of the testator's estate after the death of his daughter
Mrs. Eddy and her daughter Mrs. Bacon,
is also invalid, and will go to his heirs at law
as a resulting trust.
It is proper to add that the conclusion of
the court upon this point, as well as upon the
a
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the words by which it is expressed.
lustration of these maxims may be added
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to create a public sentiment whlcli would
put an end to negro slavery In the United
States, had the concurrence of the late Mr.
Justice Dewey, whose judicial experience and
large acquaintance with the law of charitable
uses give great weight to his opinion, and
whose lamented death, while this ease has
been under advisement, has deprived us of
his assistance In determining the other questions in controversy.
i V. The validity of the other residuary be' quests and devises depends upon the law of
perpetuities as applied to private trusts. The
principles of this branch of the law have
been so fully considered by the court in recent
cases as to require no extended statement.
The general rule is that if any estate, legal
or equitable, Is given by deed or will to any
person in the first instance, and then over to
another person, or even to a public charity,
upon the happening of a contingency which
may by possibility not take place within a
life or lives in being (treating a child in its
mother's womb as in being) and twenty-one
years afterwards, the gift over is void, as
tending to create a perpetuity by making the
for the title of those takestate inalienable;
ing the previous interests would not be perfect, and until the happening of the contingency it could not be ascertained who were
entitled. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3
Gray, 142; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 5, 7. If
therefore the gift over Is limited upon a single
event which may or may not happen within
the prescribed period, it is void, and cannot be
made good by the actual happening of the
event within that period.
But if the testator distinctly makes his gift
over to depend upon what is sometimes called an alternative contingency, or upon either
of two contingencies, one of which may be
too remote and the other cannot be, its validity depends upon the event; or, in other
words, if he gives the estate over on one
contingency which must happen, if at all,
withm the limit of the rule, and that contingency does happen, the validity of the distinct gift over in that event will not be affected by the consideration that upon a different contingency, which might or might
not happen within the lawful limit, he makes
a disposition of his estate, which would be
void for remoteness. The authorities upon
v.
Longhead
this point are conclusive.
Phelps, 2 W. Bl. 704; Sugden and Preston,
arguendo,
in Beard v. Westcott, 5 Barn. &
814; Minter v. Wraith, 13 Sim.
813,
Aid. 809,
52; Evers v. Challis, 7 H. L. Gas. 531; Armstrong V. Armstrong, 14 B. Mon. 333; 1 Jarm.
Wills, 244; Lewis, Perp. c. 21; 2 Spence,
Eq. Jur. 125, 126.
By the ninth and tenth articles of the will,
the Income of one third of the residue of the
testator's estate, real and personal, is to be
paid to his son James and to his daughter
Mrs. Palmer, respectively, during life. Each
of these articles contains a distinct direction
that, in case such son or daughter shall die
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leaving no child surviving, the principal of
his or her share shall be paid and conveyed
to the board of trustees named in the fourth
article, to be expended for the intent and purpose therein directed. As the first tenant for
life in each bequest is living at the death of
the testator, the event of such tenant's dying,
leaving no child then living, must happen
within the period of a life in being, if at all;
and, if it does happen, the gift over to the
charity will be valid.
Neither James Jackson nor Mrs. Palmer therefore is entitled to
a present equitable estate in fee.
But as
James, though now unmarried, may marry
and have children who survive him, and as
Mrs. Palmer's children may sui-vive her, in
either of which cases half of the income of
the share would by the will go to such children during their lives and the bequest over
to the charity be too remote, the validity and
efCect of that bequest over cannot be now determined. If the contingency upon which it
is valid should hereafter occur, namely, the
death of the testator's son or daughter, respectively, leaving no children surviving, the
whole remainder of the share will then go
to the charity established by the fourth article, and be paid, after the settlement of a
scheme for its lawful application, to the trustees therein named.
VI. By the thirteenth amendment of the\
constitution of the United States, adopted
since the earlier arguments of this case, it is
declared that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United
States or any place subject to their jurisdicThe effect of this amendment upon
tion."
the charitable bequests of Francis Jackson is
the remaining question to be determined;
and this requires a consideration of the nature and proper limits of the doctrine of cyf
pres.

is contended for the heirs at law, that
the power of the English chancellor, when a
charitable trust cannot be administered according to its terms, to execute it so as to
carry out the donor's intention as nearly as
possible— cy pres—is derived from the royal
prerogative or St. 43 Eliz. and is not an exthat, whether
ercise of judicial authority;
this power is prerogative or judicial, it cannot, or, if it can, should not, be exercised by
this court; and that the doctrine of cy pres,
even as administered in the English chancery, would not sustain these charitable bequests since slavery has been abolished.
Much confusion of ideas has arisen from
the use of the term "cy pres" in the books to
by
describe two distinct powers exercised
cases,
the
charity
in
chancellor
the English
crown, the
one under the sign manual of the
in equity;
jurisdiction
general
other under the
as well as to designate the rule of construction which has sometimes been applied to
executory devises or powers of appointment
individuals, in order to avoid the objec-
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use or submitted to the disposition of the government, because superstitious or illegal.
Dane, Abr. 239; Gass v. Wilhite,
Dana,
176;
Methodist Church v. Remington,
Watts, 226.
The second class of bequests which are dis- Ik.
posed of by the king's sign manual is of gifts
to charity generally, with no uses specified,
no trust interposed, and either no provision
made for an appointment, or the power of
appointment delegated to particular persons
who die without exercising it. Boyle, Char.
238, 239; Attorney General v. Syderfen,
Vern. 224,
Eq. Cas. Abr. 96; Attorney General v. Fletcher,
Law J. Ch. (N. S.) 75.
This too is not a judicial power of expounding and carrying out the testator's Intention,
but a prerogative power of ordaining what
the testator has failed to express.
No instance is reported, or has been discovered in
the thorough investigations of the subject,
of an exercise of this power in England before the reign of Charles II. Moggridge v.
Thaekwell,
Ves. 69-^1; Dwight's Argument
in the Rose Will Case, 272. It has never, so
far as we know, been introduced into the
practice of any court in this country; and,
exists anywhere here,
is in the legislature of the commonwealth as succeeding to
the powers of the king as parens patriae.
Kent, pomm. 508, note; Fontain v. Ravenel,
17 How. 369, 384; Moore v. Moore,
Dana,
365, 366; Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 93;
Attorney General v. Jolly,
Rich. Eq. 108;
Dickson v. Montgomery,
Swan, 348; Lepage V. Macnamara,
Iowa, 146; Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 545; Sohier v. Massachusetts
General Hospital,
Cush. 496, 497.
It certainly cannot be exercised by the judiciary of
state whose constitution declares that "the
judicial department shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men." Declaration of Rights,
art. 30.
The jurisdiction of the court of chancery to
superintend the administration and decree
the performance of gifts to trustees for charitable uses of a kind stated in the gift stands
upon different grounds; and is part of its
equity jurisdiction
over trusts, which
shown by abundant evidence to have existed
before the passage of the statute of charitable uses.
Sir Francis Moore records
case/
in which a man sold land to another upon]
confidence to perform
charitable use, which
the grantor declared by his last will that the
grantee should perform;
"the bargain was
never enrolled, and yet the lord chancellor
decreed that the heir should sell the land to
be disposed according to the limitation of the
use; and this decree was made the 24th of
Queen Elizabeth, before the statute of charitable uses, and this decree was made upon
ordinary and judicial equity in chancery."
Symon's Case, Duke, Char. Uses, 163.
About
the same time the court of chancery entertained a suit between two parties, each claim-

it

\l,

I

•'

1

t

,•
';■ ;

It was of this last, and
tion of remoteness.
not of any doctrine peculiar to charities, that
Lord Kenyon said, "The doctrine of cy pres
goes to the utmost verge of the law, and we
must take care that it does not run wild;"
and Lord Bldon, "It is not proper to go one
Brudenell v. Elwes, 1 East,
step farther."
1 Jarm. Wills, 261-263;
451, 7 Ves. 390;
Sugd. Powers, c. 9, § 9; Coster v. Lorillard,
::~-...^14 Wend. 309, 348.
^~'"
The principal, if not the only, cases in
J-Jif which the disposition of a charity is held to
he in the crown by sign manual, are of two
classes; the first, of bequests to particular
,1 ,
uses charitable in their nature, but Illegal, as
for a form of religion not tolerated by law;
- -^
and the second, of gifts of property to charity generally, without any trust interposed,
and in which either no appointment is provided for, or the power of appointment is
delegated to persons who die without exercising it.
It is by the sign manual and in cases of
the first class, that the arbitrary dispositions
have been made, which were so justly condemned by Lord Thurlow in Moggridge v.
Thaekwell,
Ves. Jr. 469, and Sir William
Grant in Gary v. Abbot,
"Ves. 494, 495; and
which, through want of due discrimination,
have brought so much discredit upon the
whole doctrine of cy pres.
Such was the
case of Attorney General v. Baxter, in which
a bequest to Mr. Baxter to be distributed by
him among sixty pious ejected ministers, (not,
as the testator declared, for the sake of their
nonconformity, but because he knew many of
them to be pious and good men and in great
want,) was held to be void, and given under
the sign manual to Chelsea College; but the
reversed,
decree was afterwards
upon the
ground that this was really
legacy to sixty
individuals to be named.
Vern. 248;
Vern. 105;
Eq. Gas. Abr. 96;
Ves. 76.
Such also was the case of Da Costa v. I>e
gift for establishing
Pas, in which
jesuba
or assembly for reading the Jewish law was
applied to the support of a Christian chapel
at a foundhng hospital. Amb. 228;
Swanst.
489, note;
Uickens, 258;
Ves. 76, 81.
This power of disposal by the sign manual
of the crown in direct opposition to the declared intention of the testator, whether
is
to be deemed to have belonged to the king as
head of the church as well as of the state,
"intrusted and empowered to see that nothing be done to the disherison of the crown or
the propagation of a false religion" (Rex v.
Portington,
Salk. 162,
Eq. Cas. Abr. 96);
or to have been derived from the power exercised by the Roman emperor, who was sovereign legislator as well as supreme Interpreter of the laws (Dig. 33,
17; 50,
Code,
lib.
tit.
a 19; Id., tit. 14, c. 12); Is clearly a prerogative and not judicial power, and
could not be exercised by this court; and
is difficult to see how
could be held to exist at all in
republic, in which charitable
bequests have never been forfeited to the
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ing to be trustee, to determine how bequests
for the weekly relief of the poor of certain
towns, for the yearly preferment of poor children to be apprentices, and for the curing of
divers diseased people lying by the highway's side, should be "employed and bestowReade v.
ed according to the said will."
Silles (27 BUz.) Act. Can. 559. A decree in 16
Eliz., confirming a report of the master of
the rolls and others to whom a suit for enforcing a charitable trust founded by will
had been referred, is cited in 1 Spence, Eq.
Jur. 588, note. For years before St. 43 Eliz.,
or the similar act of 39 Eliz., suits in equity
by some in behalf of all of the inhabitants of
a parish were maintained to establish and
enforce bequests for schools, alms or other
charitable purposes for the benefit of the parish, which would have been too indefinite to
Parker v.
be enforced as private trusts.
Browne (12 Eliz.) 1 Gal. Pro. Ch. 81, 1 Mylne
& K. 389, 390; Dwight, Char. Cas. 33, 34; in
which the devise was in trust to a corporaParrot v.
tion incapable at law of taking.
I'awlet (21 Eliz.) Gary, 47; Elmer v. Scot (24
Eliz.) Cho. Cas. Ch. 155; Matthew v. Marow
(32-34 Eliz.); and Hensman v. Hackney (38
Eliz.) Dwight, Char. Cas. 65, 77; in which the
decrees approved schemes settled by masters
in chancery. Many other examples are collected in the able and learned arguments, as
separately printed in full," of Mr. Binney in
the Case of Girard's Will, and of Mr. Dwight
in the Kose Will Case.
And the existence of
such a jurisdiction anterior to and independent of the statute is now generally admitted.
Vidal V. Girard, 2 How. 194-196, and cases
cited; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 501; Magill
V. Brown, Brightly, N. P. 346; 2 Kent, Comm.
286-288, and note; Burbank v. Whitney, 24
Pick. 152, 153; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich,
Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 436;
45 Me. 559;
Urmey v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160; Chambers
V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur.
588; Tudor, Char. Trusts, 102, 103.
The theory that St. 43 Eliz. enlarged the
discretion of the chancellor to depart from
the expressed intention of the founder of a
charity is refuted by the words of the statute itself.
After reciting that many gifts
and appointments for the charitable purposes
therein named "have not been employed according to the charitable intent of the givers
and founders thereof, by reason of frauds,
breaches
of trust, and negligence in those
that should pay, deliver and employ the
same;" it then, for redress and remedy thereof, authorizes the lord chancellor or lord
keeper to make such decrees that the property "may be duly and faithfully employed
to and for such of the charitable uses and intents before rehearsed respectively for which
they were given, limited, assigned or appointed by the donors and founders thereof;"
which decrees, "not being contrary or repugnant to the orders, statutes or decrees of the
donors or founders," shall "stand firm and
good, according to the tenor and purpose
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thereof, and shall be executed accordingly,"
until altered by the lord chancellor or lord
keeper upon complaint by any party aggrieved; and upon such complaint the chancellor
or keeper may "by such course as to their
wisdoms shall seem meetest, the circumstances of the case considered, proceed to the examination, hearing and determining thereof;
and upon hearing thereof shall and may annul, diminish, alter or enlarge" the decrees
of the commissioners as "shall be thought to
stand with equity and good conscience, according to the true intent and meaning of
the donors and founders thereof."
These
last qualifications are Specially marked by
Lord Coke, who was attorney general at the
passage of the statute and for some time before and after, and who adds, by way of
note to the final clause, "This Is the lapis
ductitius, whereby the commissioners and
chancellors must institute their course." 2
Inst. 712. See, also, Duke, Char. Uses, 11,
156,

In

169,

372, 619.

cases of bequests to trustees for charitable uses, the nature of which is described

in the will, the chancellor acts in his equity
jurisdiction over trusts; and the prerogative
of the king finds its appropriate exercise
through his attorney general in bringing the
case before the court of chancery for a judiThis has been well excial determination.
"It is the duty of
plained by Lord Eldon.
a court of equity, a main part, originally
almost the whole, of its jurisdiction, to administer trusts; to protect not the visible
owner, who alone can proceed at law, but the
individual equitably, though not legally, enProm this principle has arisen the
titled.
practice of administering the trust of a pubpersons possessed of funds aplic charity:
propriated to such purposes are within the
general rule; but, no one being entitled to
an immediate and peculiar interest to prefer
a complaint, who is to compel the performance of these obligations, and to enforce
It is the duty of the
their responsibility?
king, as parens patriae, to protect property
to charitable uses; and that duty
devoted
is executed by the officer who represents
On this
the crown for all forensic purposes.
foundation rests the right of the attorney
general in such cases to obtain by information the interposition of a court of equity."
Attorney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 291,
To the like effect are the opin1 Wils. 354.
ions of Lord Redesdale in Attorney General
V. Mayor, etc., of Dublin, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 347,
348, and Corporation of Ludlow v. Greenhouse, Id. 48, 62; of Lord Keeper Bridgman
in Attorney General v. Newman, 1 Ch. Cas.
158; of Sir Joseph Jekyll in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 119; and of Lord Hardwicke in Attorney General v. Middleton, 2
Ves. Sr. 328; which also state that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery over charities was exercised on such informations before St. 43 Eliz. See, also. Attorney General V. Carroll, Act Can. 729; Dwight's Ar-
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gument in the Rose Will Case, 259-268. This
duty of maintaining the rights of the public,
and of a number of persons too indefinite
to vindicate their own, has vested in the
commonwealth, and is exercised here, as in
England, through the attorney general. Going V. Emery, 16 Pick. 119; County Attorney V. May, 5 Gush. 338-340; Gen. St. c. 14,
It is upon this ground that, in a suit
§ 20.
instituted by the trustees of a charity to obtain the instructions of the court, the attorney general should be made a party defendant, as he has been by order of the court in
this case. Harvard College v. Society for
Promoting Theological Education, 3 Gray,
280; Tudor,
The
Char. Trusts, 161, 162.
power of the king or commonwealth, thus
exercised,
is simply to present the question
to a court of justice, not to control or direct
its judicial action.
A charity, being a trust in the support and
execution of which the whole public is concerned, and which is therefore allowed by
the law to be perpetual, deserves and often
requires the exercise of a larger discretion
by the court of chancery than a mere private trust; for without a large discretionary
power, in carrying out the general intent of
the donor, to vary the details of administration, and even the mode of application, many
charities would fail by change of circumstances and tlie happening of contingencies
which no human foresight could provide
against; and the probabilities of such failure would increase with the lapse of time
and the remoteness of the heirs from the
original donor who had in a clear and lawful
manner manifested his will to divert his estate from his heirs for the benefit of public
charities.
It is accordingly well settled by decisions
of the highest authority, that when a gift is
made to trustees for a charitable purpose,
the general nature of which is pointed out,
and vs'hich is lawful and valid at the time of
the death of the testator, and no intention
is expressed to limit it to a particular institution or mode of application, and afterwards, either by change of circumstances
the scheme of the testator becomes impracticable, or by change of law becomes illegal,
the fund, having once vested in the charity,
does not go to the heirs at law as a resulting
trust, but is to be applied by the court of
chancery, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in equity, as near the testator's particular
directions as possible, to carry out his general charitable intent. In all the cases of
charities which have been administered in
the English courts of chancei-y without the
aid of the sign manual, the prerogative of
the king acting through the chancellor has
uot been alluded to, except for the purpose
of distinguishing it from the power exercised by the court in its inherent equitable
jurisdiction with the assistance of its masters in chancery.
At the time of the settlement of the Mass-

achusetts Colony, this power was most freely exercised by the court of chancery, either
on information
by the attorney general, or
on proceedings by commission under the
Attorney Genstatute of charitable uses.
eral V. Warwick (1615, 1638) Dwight, Char.
Cas. 140, 141, West, Ch. 60, 62; Bloomfield
V. Stowemarket (1619) Duke, Char. Uses,
In the last case, lands had been given
644.
before the Reformation to be sold, and the
proceeds applied, one half to the making of
a highway from the town in which the lands
were, one fourth to the repair of a church
in that town, and the other fourth to the
priest of the church to say prayers for the
souls of the donor and others; and Lord
Bacon decreed the establishment of the uses
for making the highway and repairing the
church, and directed the remaining fourth
(which could not, by reason of the change in
religion, be applied as directed by the donor)
to be divided between the poor of the same
town, and the poor of the town where the
donor inhabited.
In the Case of Baliol College, this doctrine
was enforced by successive decrees of the
greatest English chancellors between the
English Revolution and our own, which have
been recently confirmed by the unanimous
decision of the house of lords. Attorney General V. Guise, 2 Vern. 166; Attorney General V. Baliol College, 9 Mod. 407; Attorney
General v. Glasgow College, 2 Colly. 665, 1
H. L. Cas. 800. The case is of such importance and reported at different stages in
so many books and at such length, that it
may be well to state it. John Snell, an
Episcopalian, who made his last will and
died in 1679, while the form of religion established by law in Scotland as well as in
England was Episcopal, gave lands in trust
to apply the income for the maintenance and
education at the university of Oxford of
Scotchmen to be designated by the vice chancellor of that university and the heads of
certain colleges therein, and who should, upon their admission, give security to enter
into holy orders and to be sent into Scotland
and there remain. After the Revolution of
1688, Presbyterianism
in
was reestablished
Scotland by act of parliament; and in 1690
an information was filed by the attorney general, at the relation of the vice chancellor
and heads of colleges named in the will,
against the testator's heiress at law, suggesting a pretence by her that as Episcopacy and
Prelacy had been abolished In Scotland, and
the Presbyterian form of worship established
instead, the testator's intentions could not he
carried into effect, the devise became void,
and the property reverted to her. But the
lords commissioners of the great seal, by a
decree passed in 1692, established the devise
against her, ordered an account, and reserved all directions for the establishment of the
charity.
2 Vern. 267, note; 2 Colly. 665-670,
1

Cas. 802-804, 820, 822. In 1693 the
came on for further directions before

H. L.

cause
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Lord

Keeper Somers, who, acting upon the
that it was within the province of
a court of equity to administer the trust upon the principle of cy pres, ordered the estate to be conveyed to the sis senior fellows
of. Baliol College, one of the colleges named
in the will, to maintain a certain number of
Scotch scholars at that college, and, in consideration of the privileges enjoyed by such
scholars, to apply the surplus income to its
library; and this decree was made subject to
such alteration and disposition as the court
should from time to time make, upon the application of any person concerned,
for the
better and more effectual execution of the
trust, as near as could be to the testator's
will and intentions.
2 Vem. 267, note;
2
Uocti-ine

CoUy. G70, 671, 1 H. L. Cas. 804, 805, 824.
In 1744 Lord Htirdwicke, in the execution of
the directions in the decree of Lord Somers,
referred the cause to a master to approve of
a scheme "for the better establishment and

regulation of the charity, and carrying the
same into effect for the future as near to the
will and intention of the testator as the alteration of circumstances since the making
of the will would admit;" and upon his report, and against the exceptions of the heads
of colleges in Oxford, confirmed a scheme
which did not impose any condition of the
scholars taking holy orders — thus carrying
out the general intention of the trust so far
as to educate Scotch scholars at Oxford, although the testator's ultimate object that
they should be educated in the Episcopal form
of church government to take part in the
established religion in Scotland could not, by
reason of the change of law since his death,
be effected.
1 H. L. Cas. 805,
9 Mod. 407;
806, 825-827.
In 1759 Lord Keeper Henley
Lord Northington) varied the
(afterward
scheme in other particulars, but declined to
vary it in this; and further orders were afterwards made in chancery as. the revenues
2 CoUy. 672-674,
1 H. L. Cas.
increased.
Upon a
806, 807, 825, 826; 3 Yes. 650, note.
new information filed at the relation of some
Scotch Episcopalians, the house of lords in
1848, reversing an order of Vice Chancellor
Knight Bruce, held that the charity must
continue to be administered according to the
1 H. L. Cas. 800.
earlier decrees.
In another case. Queen Elizabeth, by letters patent, established a hospital for forty
lepers, and made the inmates a corporation.
After leprosy had become almost extinct in
jEngland, and the members of the corporation
reduced to three, an information was filed,
alleging that the corporation was dissolved,
and praying for a new application of the
revenues agreeably to the letters patent and
the donor's intention, or as near thereto as
circumstances would permit and the court
should direct. Lord Eldon held that neither
the donor's heirs at law nor the crown took
referred
the land discharged of the charity;
and
the case to a master to report a scheme;
■confirmed the report of the master, approv-
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ing a scheme for the application of the revenues to a general infirmary,
reserving a
preference to all lepers who might offer
themselves.
Attorney
General v. Hicks,
Higlmi. Mortm. 336-354, 3 Brown, Ch. 166,
uote.

Sir John Romilly, JI. R., afterwards made
a like decision, holding that a gift made in
1687 of land (for which in 1774 other land
had been substituted by leave of parliament)
in trust out of the income to keep it ready
for a hospital and burial place for patients

sick of the plague, was a present gift for
charitable purposes, and valid, although the
plague had not reappeared in England for
more than one hundred and eighty years;
and, after alluding to a class of cases, cited
for the heirs at law in that case, as they
have been in this, in which the charitable bequest could never have taken effect, added,
"But who can say, when this deed was executed or the act passed, that this was not a
charitable trust, capable of being performed;" "and if it were ever wholly devoted to
charity, those cases do not apply." Attorney
General v. Craven, 21 Beav. 392, 408.
The principle that a bequest to trustees for
charitable purposes indicated in the will,
which are lawful and capable of being carried out at the time of the testator's death,
will not be allowed to fail and result to the
heirs at law upon a change of circumstances,
but will be applied by the court according t«
a scheme approved by a master to carry out
the intent of the testator as nearly as possible, has been affirmed and acted on In
many other English cases.
Attorney General V. Pyle, 1 Atk. 435; Attorney General v.
Green, 2 Brown, Ch. 492; Attorney General
V. Bishop of London, 3 Brown, Ch. 171; Moggridge v. Thackwell, Id. 517, 1 Ves. Jr. 464;
Attorney General v. Glyn, 12 Sim. 84; Attorney General v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32; Attorney General v. Vint, 3 De Gex & S. 705.
The dicta of Lord Alvanley, upon which the
heirs at law much rely, do not, in the connection in which they were uttered, substantially differ from the general current of authority. Attorney General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves.
Jr. 387, 388; Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 143, 144; Attorney General v.
Minshull, 4 Ves. 14.
By the opinion of Lord Eldon, formed after
great doubt and hesitation, the principle has
been held to extend to the case of a bequest
of property to a person named, in trust for
not otherwise desuch charitable purposes,
scribed, as he should appoint.
Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 7 Ves. 96, 13 Ves. 416; Paice v.
Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364; Mills
Such a
19 Ves. 483, 1 Mer. 55.
V. Farmer,
trust has been held valid in this commonwealth, so far as to vest a title in the trustee
as against the next of kin. Wells v. Doane,
3 Gray, 201. Whether, in case of his death,
it could properly be administered by a court
of chancery, without the aid of the prerogative power, need not be considered in this
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case. See Fontain t. Ravenel, 17 How. 387,
388; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana, 366. i
In most of the cases cited at the argument,
in -which the heirs at law were held to be entitled to the property, the charitable gift never took effect at all; either because it could
not be carried out as directed, without violating the mortmain act of 9 Geo. II., as in
Jones V. Williams, Amb. 651; Attorney General V. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 141, and Smith v.

Beav. 481; or because the testator
to a special object
which could not be accomplished at the time
of his death; as in the case of a bequest to
build a church in Wheatley, which could not
be done without the consent of the bishop,
and he refused (Attorney General v. Bishop
of Oxford, 1 Brown, Oh. 444, note; Id., cited
2 Cox, Ch. 365; 2 Ves. Jr. 388; and 4 Ves.
431, 432); or of a direction to contract with
the governors of a hospital for the purchase
of a presentation of a boy to that charity, if
the residuary assets should prove sufficient
for that purpose, and they proved to be Insufficient (Cherry v. Mott, 1 Mylne & 0.
Oliver,
had

11

in terms limited it

123).

In Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 790, the
testator gave a legacy, after the death of his
wife, "for continuing the periodical published under the title of 'The Voice of Humanity,' according to the objects and principles
which are set forth in the prospectus contained in the third number of that publication."
"The Voice of Humanity" had been
published quarterly by an association for the
protection of animals, but no number had
appeared for nearly a year before the date
of the will. Upon the death of the widow
twenty years later. Vice Chancellor Wood
held that the gift was not to support the
principles of the publication, but only the
publication itself, and, the publication having ceased and the association perished, that
the legacy lapsed. But he added, "It would,
I think, have fallen within the description of
charity, if this periodical had been subsisting
at the date of the will, and afterwards ceased. That would be simply a ease where, the
particular intention having failed, the general
intention must be carried out."
Two striking cases upon this subject have
arisen in England under charities for the redemption of captives.
In the Case of Betton's Charity, Thomas
Betton in 1723 bequeathed the residue of his
estate
to the Ironmongers'
Company, in
trust, "positively forbidr'ing them to diminish
the capital sum by giving away any part, or
that the interest and profit arising be applied
to any other use or uses than hereinafter
mentioned
and directed," namely, one half
of the income yearly unto the redemption of
British slaves in Turkey or Barbary, one
fourth unto charity schools in the city and
suburbs of London where the education is
according to the church of England, and one
1 See, also,

Lorings v. Marsh,

6

Wall. 337.

fourth "unto necessitated decayed freemen
of the company, their widows and children."
The first half of the income of the fund
greatly accumulated, few such slaves having
Lord Brougham,
been found for a century.
reversing the decree of Sir John Leach, M.
R., held that the court had jurisdiction to
apply the surplus income of this moiety and
its accumulations as near as might be to the
laving regard to
intentions of the testator;
the bequest touching British captives, and
also to the other charitable bequests in the
will; and that the case should be referred
back to the master to approve a proper
Attorney Genscheme for such application.
eral V. Ironmongers' Co., 2 Mylne & K. 576.
Sir Christopher Pepys, M. R. (afterwards
Lord Cottenham,) accordingly ordered it to
be so referred. On the return of the master's
report, Lord Langdalt, M. E., approved a
scheme to apply the whole fund to the second and third purposes declared in the will.
Lord Chancellor Cottenham on
2 Beav. 313.
and upon the
appeal reversed this decree;
ground that the testator had not limited the
first charity, like the others, to persons in
London, ordered the first moiety to be applied to supporting and assisting charity
schools in England and Wales, and referred
it back to the master to settle a scheme for
that purpose. Craig & P. 208. And this decree was affirmed in the house of lords with
the concurrence of Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, and Lords Brougham, Cottenham and
Campbell. 10 Clark & F. 908. In that case,
though there were differences of opinion as
to the details of the scheme, the jurisdiction
of the court of chancery to frame one in such
a case was thus affirmed by the deliberate
judgments of five law lords; and all agreed
that, for the purpose of ascertaining what
was cy pres to the particular object which
had failed, the court might look at all the
charitable bequests in the will; applying in
this respect the principle upon which Lord
Bacon had acted more than two centuries
before in the case of Bloomfield v. Stowemarket, above cited.
But the case most like that now before us
is that of Lady Mice's Charity, Lady Mico,
by her will made in 1670, gave a thousand
pounds "to redeem poor slaves in what manner the executors should think most conThis charity was established by
venient."
Upon an indecree in chancery in 1686.
formation filed in 1827, after the fund had
accumulated a hundred fold, it was referred
to a master to approve of a scheme for the
application of the income according to the
will of the testatrix, or, if he should find that
it could not be executed according to her will,
then as near the intent of the will as could
be, regard being had to the existing circumstances and to the amount of the fund. The
master, by his general report in 1835, stated
that the relators had laid before him a
scheme for applying the fund to the enfranchisement of slaves in the British Colonies
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who were too poor to purchase their own
freedom; which application, in consequence
of St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 73, abolishing slavery
(which took effect in 1834), had become impracticable; that he was of opinion that the
testatrix by her will contemplated the redemption of poor slaves in the Barbary
States, but that intention could not be carried into effect; and he approved a scheme
to apply the capital and income in purchasing
and building schcol-houses for the education
of the emancipated apprentices and their Issue, qualifying teachers, paying the salaries
of masters and other expenses, and to apply
the surplus rents to the support of any other
schools, and generally in promoting education in the British Colonies. Sir Christopher
Pepys, M. R., confirmed this scheme by a decree; and, after he had become lord chancellor, stated the reasons to have been that
"in this there was no restriction as to the
description of slaves, or the countries in
which the slaves were to be looked for;" that
upon the reference to the master "it appeared
that there were not within any part of the
British dominions any poor slaves to be redeemed, but that there were in the colonies
many thousands of human beings from
whom the odious appellation of slaves had
been removed, but whose state was very far
short of that of freemen, from whose bodies
the chains of slavery had been struck, but
whose minds and morals were still in that
state of degradation which is inseparable
from the unfortunate situation from wMch
they had recently been in part rescued; it
was proposed to the master to apply, and he
approved of a scheme for the completion of
that holy work, by assisting in the education
of those poor beings. If, before the slavery
abolition act, these funds could properly have
been applied to procuring the redemption of
slaves in the colonies, the proposed application for the benefit of the apprentices was
doubtless cy pres to the intention of the
donor."
And his reason for not applying
Betton's Charity in the same manner was
that it was in terms limited to slaves in Turkey or Barbary.
Attorney General v. Gibson,
2 Beav. 317, note; Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Craig & P. 226, 227.
There is no adjudication of this question
by the supreme court of the United States.
The dicta of Chief Justice Marshall in Baptist Ass'n V. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat 1, were
based upon an imperfect survey of the authorities, were not required by the decision,
and are hardly reconcilable with the more
recent judgments of the same court; and that
case, as well as Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 79,
arose under the law of Virginia.
Vidal v.
Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 192; Perin v. Carey,
24 How. 501; Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
380; American Academy of Arts & Sciences
V. President,
etc., of Harvard College, 12
Gray, 593; 2 Kent, Comm. 287. In Fontain
V. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, the testator authorized his executors or the survivor of them
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to dispose of the residue of his estate "for
the use of such charitable institutions in
Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they or
he may deem most beneficial to mankind,"
and they died without appointing; and it was
held that the title did not vest in the executors as trustees, and that according to the
English law the disposition would have been
in the crown by sign manual. As Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can reach this
case.
There is not only uncertainty in the
beneficiaries of this charity, but behind that
is a more formidable objection. There is noexpressed will of the testator. He intended
to speak through his executors or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence
this has become impossible.
It is then as
though he had not spoken.
Can any power
now speak for him, except the parens patrise?" The further remarks about the power
of cy pres, if intended to cover a case In
which the charitable purposes were described
or indicated in the will, were upon a question
not before the court. The separate opinion
of Chief Justice Taney In Fontain v. Ravenel
was but his own, based mainly upon that of
Chief Justice Marshall In Baptist Ass'n v.
Hart's Ex'rs.
And it is impossible to avoid
the inference that the impressions of both of
those eminent magistrates were derived from
the laws of Maryland and Virginia in which
they had been educated, and by which St. 43
Ellz. has been expressly repealed, and charities are not recognized as entitled to any
favor, either in duration or construction, beyond other trusts. Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 Har. & J. 392; Gallego v. Attorney
General, 3 Leigh, 450.
In North Carolina^
the supreme court once declared that it had
all the powers exercised by the English chancellor, either in the equity jurisdiction or under the sign manual; and since, reboundingfrom that extreme opinion, seems to have
adopted the view of Maryland and Virginia.
Grilfln v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96; McAuley v.
Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276; Holland v. Peck, 2
Ired. Eq. 255. There is a dictum to a like
So
effect in Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 830.
in New York, the court of appeals, after
some division and vacillation of opinion in
in the
the course of the frequent changes
composition of the court, has recently adjudged that in that state the English law of
charitable uses has been wholly abrogated
by statute, and that charities are within the
rule against perpetuities, and have no priviBascom v. AIleges about private trusts.
bertson, 34 N. Y. 584.
On the other hand, the court of appeals of
Kentucky, in an able judgment delivered by
Chief Justice Robertson, marked the distinction between the power exercised under the
sign manual, and that inherent in the equity
jurisdiction; and, after speaking of the former as not judicial, added: "The cy pres doctrine of England is not, or should not be, a
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judicial doctrine, except in

one liind of case;
and that is, where there is an available charity to an identified or ascertainable object,
and a particular mode, inadequate, illegal or
inappropriate, or which happens to fail, has
been prescribed. In such case, a court of equity may substitute or sanction any other
mode that may be lawful and suitable and
will effectuate the declared intention of the
donor, and not arbitrarily and in the dark,
presuming on his weakness or wishes, declare an object for him. A court may act judicially as long as It effectuates the lawful
intention of the donor." Moore v. Moore, 4
Dana, 366. See, also, Gass t. Wilhite, 2 Dana,
177; Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana, 38. The
power of cy pres, which was declared by
the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Methodist Church V. Remington, 1 Watts, 226, and
Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 93, not to exist in that state, was the power exercised under the sign manual in case of a gift to superstitious uses, or of an expression of general
intention to devote a sum to charitable purposes not designated. In a very receut case,
the same court said: "The rule of equity on
this subject seems to be clear, that when a
definite charity is created, the failure of the
pai-ticular mode in which it is to be effectuated does not destroy the charity; for equity
■s\'ill substitute another mode, so that the substantial intention shall not depend
ion the
formal intention." "And this is the doctrine
of cy pres, so far as it has been expressly
adopted by us" — "a reasonable doctrine, by
which a well defined charity, or one where
ihe means of definition are given, may be
enforced in favor of the general intent, even
where the mode or means provided for by
the donor fail by reason of their inadequacy
or unlawfulness."
Philadelphia v. Girard, 45
Pa. St. 27, 28. Like principles have been
maintained in South Carolina and Illinois.
Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99, 2
Strob. E'q. 395; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111.
231.
The existence of a judicial power to administer a charity cy pres where the expressed intention of the founder cannot be
exactly carried out has been either countenajQced or left an open question in all the
England
New
states except Connecticut,
BiuT V. Smith, 7 Vt. 287, 288; Second Congregational Soc. V. First Congregational Soc,
14 N. H. 330; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H.
296; Derby v. Derby, 4 li. I. 439; Tappan v.
Deblois, 45 Me. 131; Howard v. American
Peace Soc, 49 Me. 302. 303; Treat's Appeal,
See, also, 2 Redf. Wills, 815,
30 Conn. 113.
note; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15;
Beall V. Fox, 4 Ga. 427; Chambers v. St.
Louis, 29 Mo. 590, 592; Lepage v. Macnamara,
5 Iowa, 146; Mclntyre v. ZanesviUe, 17 Ohio
St. 352.

The narrow doctrines which have prevailed
in some states upon this subject are inconsistent with the established law of this commonwealth.
Our ancestors brought with
them from England the elements of the law

of charitable uses, and, although the form of
proceeding by commission under St. 43 Eliz.
has never prevailed In Massachusetts, that
statute, in substance and principle, has always been considered as part of our common
law. 4 Dane, Abr. 6, 239; Earle v. Wood, 8
Cush. 445. Under the Colony charter, charities wei'e regulated and administered, according to the intent of the donors, under the direction of the general court, the court of assistants, and the county courts; and under
the Province charter, although no court was
vested with equity jurisdiction,
charitable
bequests were not the less valid. Anc. Chart.
52; Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 180, 181, and
authorities cited; Winslow v. Trowbridge,
The English
stated in 11 Allen, 459, 460.
mortmain act of 9 Geo. II. c. 36, did not extend to Massachusetts; and the similar provision in Prov. St. 28 Geo. II. c. 9, was repealed immediately after our Revolution by
St. 1785, c. 51. Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 6.
Charities are held not to be within the common rule limiting perpetuities and accumulations. Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243; Odell
V. Odell, 10 Allen, 1.
Charitable bequests to
an unincoi-porated society here, to a foreign
corporation or society, or to a particular religious denomination in a certain contty,
have been carried into effect, even where uo
trustees iiave been named in the will. Burbank V. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Bartlett v.
Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 378; Washburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 280; Universalist Sec. v.
Fitch, 8 Gray, 421. See, also. Wells v. Doaue,
3 Gray, 201; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen,
446.

The intention of the testator is the guide,
Lord Coke, the lodestone,
of the court; and therefore, whenever a chai'itable gift can be administered according to
his express directions, this court, like the
court of chancery in England, is not at liberty to modify it upon considerations of policy or convenience. Harvard College v. Society for Promoting Theological Education,
3 Gray, 280; Baker v. Smith, 13 Mete. (Mass.)
34; Trustees of Smith Charities v. Inhabitants
of Northampton, 10 Allen, 498. But there are
several cases, where the charitable trust
could not be executed as directed in the will,
in which the testator's scheme has been vai'ied by this court in such a way and to such
an extent as could not be done in the case
of a private trust Thus bequests to a particular bible society by name, whether a corporation established by law or a voluntary
association, which had ceased to exist before
the death of the testator, have been sustained, and applied to the distribution of bibles
through a trustee appointed by tie court for
the purpose. Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush.
358; Bliss v. American Bible Soc, 2 Allen,
334.
At a time when the general chancery
jurisdiction of this court over trusts was
limited to those arising under deeds and wills,
the legislature by a special statute authorized it to hear and determine in equity any
or, in the phrase of
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and all matters relating to a certain gift to a
scientific corporation, to be Invested in a certain manner, and paid in premiums for discoveries or improvements on heat or light
published in America within two years before each award. Upon a biU being filed, and
it appearing that it had become impriicticablo
to carry out the intent of the donor in the
mode prescribed, Chief Justice Shaw authorized a different investment of the fund ; and,
in accordance with a scheme reported by a
master, authorized the corpora lion to apply
the sui-plus income, after paying such premiums, to purchasing books, papers and pliilosophical apparatus, and making such publications or 1 'curing such lectures, experiments or Investigations
as should facilitate
and encourage the making of such discoveries
and improvements; and said: "Whenever it
appears that a general object of charity is
intended, and the purpose is not unlawful
and void, the right of the heir at law is divested." "It is now a settled rule in equity
that a liberal construction is to be given to
charitable donations, with a view to promote
and accomplish the general charitable intent
of the donor, and tliat such intent ought to be
observed, and when this cannot be strictly
and literally done, this court will cause it to
be fulfilled as nearly in conformity with the
intent of the donor as practicable. Where
the property thus given is given to trustees
capable of taking, but the property cannot
be applied precisely in the mode directed,
the court of chancery interferes, and regulates the disposition of such property under
its general jurisdiction on the subject of
trusts, and not as administering a branch of
the prerogative of the king as pai-ens patri£e." "What is the nearest method of carrying into effect the general intent of the
donor must of course depend upon the subject matter, the expressed intent, and the
other circumstances of each particular case,
upon all of which the court is to exercise its
discretion."
American Academy v. Harvard
College, 12 Gray, 582. The same principle
was also recognized or assumed in 4 Dane,
Abr. 242, 243, in Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick.
Baker v.
333, and other cases already cited.
Smith, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 41; Harvard College
EducaV. Society for Promoting Theological
tion, 3 Gray, 282, 298; Trustees of Smith
Charities v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 10
Allen, 501, 502.
By Gen. St. c. 113, § 2, this court may
hear and determine in equity all suits and
proceedings for enforcing and regulating the
execution of trusts, whether the trusts relate
to real or personal estate, "and shall have
full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity, in all
other cases, where there is not a plain, adremedy at law." The
equate and complete
powers usually exercised by the court of chancery in the course of its jurisdiction in equity
have thus been expressly conferred upon this
court by the legislature. The authority of ad-
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ministering a charitable trust according to
the expressed intention of the donor, and,
when that cannot be exactly followed, then
as nearly as possible, is a part of this jurisdiction, which the court is not at liberty to
decline.
The only question is, whether the
facts of the case show a proper occasion for
its exercise according to the settled practice
in chancery.
In all the cases cited at the argument, in
which a charitable bequest, which might have
been lawfully carried out under the circumstances existing at the death of the testator,
has been held, upon a change of circumstances, to result to the heirs at law or residuary
legatees, the gift was distinctly limited to
particular persons or establishments.
Such
was Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 204,
in which the gift was of five pounds outright to each poor person of a particular description in certain parishes, and Vice Chancellor Stuart held that the shares of those
who died before receiving them went to the
residuary legatees. Such, also, was Clark v.
Taylor, 1 Drew. 642, in which it was held
that a legacy to a certain orphan school by
name, which ceased to exist after the death
of the testator, failed and fell into the residue of the estate; and which can hardly be
reconciled with the decisions in Incorporated
Soc. V. Price, 1 Jones & L. 498, 7 Ir. Eq.
260; In re Clergy Society, 2 Kay & J. 615;
Marsh v. Attorney General, 2 Johns. & H.
61; Winslow v. Cunimings, 3 Cush. 358, and
Bliss V. American Bible Soc, 2 Allen, 334.
5 Gray,
So in Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast,
17, the trust was expressly limited, not only
in object, but in duration, to the maintenance
of the pastor of a certain church of a specified faith and practice in a particular town,
"so long as they or their successors shall
maintain the visibility of a church in said
faith and order;" and could not have been
held to have terminated, had it not been so
Attorney General v. Columbine,
limited.
Boyle, Char. 204, 205; Potter v. Thurston,
7 R. I. 25; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243.
The charitable bequests of Francis Jackson
cannot, in the oijinion of the court, be regarded as so restricted in their objects, or
so limited in point of time, as to have been
terminated and destroyed by the abolition of
slavery in the United States. They are to a
board of trustees for whose continuance careful provision is made in the will, and which
the testator expresses a wish may become a
permanent organization and may receive the
services and sympathy, the donations and beTlieir
quests, of the friends of the slave.
duration is not in terms limited, like that
of the trust sought to be established in the
sixth article of the will, by the accomplishment of the end specified. They take effect
from the time of the testator's death, and
might then have been lawfully applied in
exact conformity with his expressed intentions. The retaining of the funds in the custody of the court while this case has been
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advisement cannot affect the question.
Tlie gifts being lawful and charitable, and
having once vested, the subsequent change
of circumstances before the funds have been
actually paid over is of no more weight than
if they had been paid to the trustees and
been administered by them for a century before slavery was extinguished.
Neither the immediate purpose of the testator—the moral education of the people; nor
his ultimate object—to better the condition of
the African race in this country; has been
by the abolition of slavfully accomplished
under

ery.

Negro slavery was recognized by our law as
of the rights inseparable from
human nature; and tended to promote idleness, selfishness and tyranny in one part of
the community, a destruction of the domestic
relations and utter debasement in the other
part. The sentiment which would put an end
to it is the sentiment of justice, humanity
and charity, based upon moral duty, inspired
by the most familiar precepts of the Christian religion, and approved by the constitution of the commonwealth. The teaching and
diffusion of such a sentiment are not of temporary benefit or necessity, but of perpetual
obligation. Slavery may be abolished; but
to strengthen
and confirm the sentiment
which opposed it will continue to be useful
and desirable so long as selfishness, cruelty,
the lust of dominion, and indifference to the
rights of the weak, the poor and the ignorant,
have a place in the hearts of men. Looking
at the trust established by the fourth article
of this will as one for the moral education
of the people only, the case is within the
principle of those, already cited, in which
charities for the relief of leprosy and the
plague were held not to end with the disappearance of those diseases;
and is not essentially different from that of Attorney General V. Baliol College, in which a trust for the
education at Oxford of Scotch youths, to be
sent into Scotland to preach Episcopalianism
in the established church there, was applied
by Lords Somers and Hardwicke and their
successors to educate such youths, although,
by the change of faith and practice of the
Church of Scotland, the donor's ultimate object could no longer be accomplished.
The intention of Francis Jackson to benefit
the negro race appears not only in the leading clause of the fourth article, and in his
expression of a hope that his trustees might
receive the aid and the gifts of the friends
of the slave, but in the trust for the benefit
of fugitive slaves in the fifth article of the
will, to which, according to the principle established by the house of lords in the Case of
Betton's Charity, resort may be had to ascer^
tain his intent and tne fittest mode of carrying it out. The negroes, although emancipated, still stand in great need of assistance and
education.
Charities for the relief of the poor
have been often held to be well applied to
educate them and their children. Bishop of
an infraction

Hereford v. Adams, 7 Ves. 324; Wilkinsott
Malin, 2 Cromp. & J. 636, 2 Tyrw. 544;
Anderson v. Wrights of Glasgow, 12 L. T.
(N. S.) 807. The Case of Mico Charity is
directly to the point that a gift for the redemption of poor slaves may be appropriated,
after they have been emancipated by law, t*
educate them; and the reasons given by Lord
Cottenham for that decision apply with no
less force to those set free by the recent
amendment of the constitution in the United
States, than to those who were emancipated
by act of parliament in the West Indies.
The mode in which the funds bequeathed
by the fourth and fifth articles of the will
may be best applied to carry out in a lawful
manner the charitable intents and purposes
of the testator as nearly as possible must
be settled by a scheme to be framed by a
master and confirmed by the court before
the funds are paid over to the trustees. In
doing this, the court does not take the charity
out of the hands of the trustees, but only
declares the law which must be their guide
in its administi-ation. Shelf. Mortm. 651-654;
Boyle, Char. 214-218. The case is therefore
to be referred to a master, with liberty to
the attorney general and the trustees to submit schemes for his approval; and all further
directions are reserved until the coming in
of his report.
Case referred to a master.
V.

The case was then referred to John Codman, Esquire, a master in chancery for this
county, who, after notice to the trustees and
the attorney general, and hearing the parties,
made his report, the results of which were
approved by the attorney general; and upon
exceptions to which the case was argued by
W. Phillips for himself and other excepting
trustees, and by J. A. Andrew in support
of the master's report, before Gray, J., with
the agreement that he should consult the
whole court before entering a final decree.
No account was asked by any party of sums
already expended by the trustees.
As to the bequest in the fifth article, the
master reported that the unexpended balance
(amounting to $1049.90) was so small that it
was reasonable that it should be confined to a
limited territory;
and that it should therefore be applied by the trustees, in accordance
with their unanimous recommendation,
to the
use of necessitous persons of African descent
in the city of Boston and its vicinity.
This
scheme was approved and confirmed by the
court, with this addition: "Preference being
given to such as have escaped from slavery."
As to the sum bequeathed in the fourth article of the will, the master reported that a
portion had been expended by the trustees
before any question arose as to its validity;
and that but two schemes had been suggested to him for the appropriation of the residue,
namely, first, (which was approved by four
of the seven trustees who had accepted the
trust,) In part to the support of the Anti-
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Slavery Standard, and In part to the New
England Branch of the American Freedmen's
Union Commission; or, second, (which was
approved by the remaining trustees,) that the
whole should he applied to the last named object.
The master disapproved of the first of these
schemes;
and reported that the Anti-Slavery
Standard was a weekly newspaper published
in the city of Kew York with a circulation of
not more than three thousand copies, which
was established nearly thirty years ago for
the purpose of acting upon public opinion in
favor of the abolition of slavery; that in his
•opinion, since the abolition of slavery, and
the passage of the reconstruction acts of congress, "the support of a paper of such limit«d circulation as hardly to be self-sustaining
would do very little for the benefit of the colored people in their present status, and its
direct influence would be almost imperceptible on the welfare of that class most nearly
■corresponding to those whom the testator had
in view in making this bequest;" and that the
argument, that it was evidently the intention
of the testator to accomplish the object indicated in the fourth article of his will by
means of which a newspaper like this might
be considered an example, was answered by
the fact that the object for which these means
already accom•were to be used had been
The master returned
plished without them.
with his report a few numbers of the AntiSlavery Standard, (taken without selection as
they were given to him by the chairman of
the trustees,) by which it appeared that it was
In large part devoted to m-ging the passage of
laws securing to the freedmen equal political
rights with the whites, the keeping of the
southern states under military government,
the impeachment of the president, and other
political measures.
The master reported that he was unable to
devise any better plan than the second
that this mode of approscheme suggested;
priation was in his opinion most in accordance with the intention of the testator as ex-
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pressed in the fourth article of the will, because the intention nearest to that of emancipating the slaves was by educating the
emancipated slaves to render them capable of
self-government; and this could best be done
by an organized society, expressly intended
and exactly fitted for this function, and which,
if the whole or any part of this fund was to
be applied to the direct education and support of the freedmen, was admitted at the
hearing before him to be the fittest channel
for the appropriation.
The master returned
with his report printed documents by which
it appeared that the object of the American
Freedmen's Union Commission, as stated in
its constitution, was "the relief, education and
elevation of the freedmen of the United
States, and to aid and cooperate with the people of the South, without distinction of race
or color, in the improvement of their condition, upon the basis of industry, education,
freedom and Christian morality;" and that
the New England and other branches of the
commission were now maintaining large numbers of teachers and schools for this purpose
throughout the southern states.
The master accordingly reported that what
remained of the fund bequeathed by the
fourth article of the will should be "ordered
to he paid over to the New England Branch
of the Freedmen's Union Commission, to be
employed and expended by them in promoting
the education, support and interests generally
of the freedmen (late siaves) in the states of
And this
this Union recently in rebellion."
scheme was by the opinion of the whole court
accepted and confirmed, modified only by directing the executor to pay the fund to the
trustees,
to be by them paid over at such
times and in such sums as they in their discretion might think fit to the treasurer ot the
branch commission; and by substituting for
the words "recently in rebelUon" the words
"in which slavery has been abolished, either
by the proclamation of the late President Lincoln or the amendment of the constitution."
Final decree accordingly.
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of New York.

February

7,

1888.

Appeal from general term, supreme court,
department.
Action by Mary Holland, Ellen Bagley,
Catherine Alcock, Ann Bagley, Thomas Bagley, and Mary Hanley, heirs at law and next
of kin of Thomas Gunning, deceased, against
Henry Alcock, impleaded with Frederick
Smyth, as executors and trustees under the
will of Thomas Gunning, to declare void the
residuary clause in such will because of the
Indefinite designation of the beneficiaries
therein. Judgment at special term for plaintiffs, and at general term for defendants.
Plaintiffs appeal.
Second

E. H. Benn, for appellants. I. Newton
Williams and David McClure, for respondents.

RAPALLO, J. The third clause of the testator's will is in the following words: "All
the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate I give and bequeath to my said executors, to be applied by them for the purpose
of having prayers offered in a Roman Catholic Church, to be by them selected, for the
repose of my soul, and the souls of my family, and also the souls of all others who
The validity of this
may be in purgatory."
clause is the question now presented for adjudication.
The action is brought by five
nieces and a nephew of the testator, who
claim to be his next of kin and heirs at law,
and, as such, entitled to his residuary estate
in case the disposition thereof attempted to
be made by the third clause of the will is
adjudged to be invalid.
The estate consists
wholly of personal property, and amounted
at the time of the testator's death, in 1882,
By the second
to about the sum of $28,000.
clause of his will the testator devised and
bequeathed all his estate, real and personal,
to his executors, in trust for the uses and
purposes set forth in the will, which were to
pay certain legacies, amounting in the aggregate to about $10,500, and to apply the residue as directed in the third clause, before
recited. That clause must therefore be regarded as creating, or attempting to create,
a trust of personal property for the purpose
The plaintiffs claim that the trust
specified.
thus attempted to be created is void; that as
to the residuary estate the testator died intestate; and that distribution thereof should
be made among the next of kin, etc.
The
defendant Alcock, one of the executors, demurred to the complaint.
At special term
the demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiffs had judgment.
On appeal to the general term the judgment was reversed, and
judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant Alcock, thus affirming the validity

of the third clause of the will. The plaintiffs now appeal.
Some of the points involved in the case
now before us were passed upon in the late
case of Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2
N. B. 464. In that case the deceased had
in her life-time placed in the hands of the
defendant a sum of money, on his promise
to apply it to certain purposes during the
life-time of the deceased and of her husband, and after the death of both of them
to pay their funeral expenses, etc., and to
expend what should remain in proturing Roman Catholic masses to be said for the reThis court declined to
pose of their souls.
decide whether a valid trust had been created in respect to the surplus, there being
no ascertained or ascertainable beneficiary
who could enforce it; and the majority of
the court expressly reserved its opinion upon that question, disposing of the case upon the ground that a valid contract inter
vivos, to be performed after the death of
the promisee, had been established, that
there was nothing illegal in the purpose for
which the expenditure was contracted to be
made, and that there was no want of deflniteness in the duty assumed by the promisor; and we held that as there had been
no breach of the contract, but the promisor
was ready and willing to perform, he was
entitled, as against the legal representatives
of the promisee, to retain the consideration.
The point upon which the majority of the
court in the case last cited reserved its decision is now again presented. There is no
contract inter vivos, but the will expressly
bequeaths the fund in question to the executors, in trust for the purposes therein specified ; one of which is to apply the residuary
estate to the purpose of having prayers offered in a Roman Catholic Church for the
repose of the souls of the testator, of his
family, and of all others who may be in
purgatory.
It is claimed that this disposition contains all the elements of a valid
trust of personal property, that there are
definite and competent trustees, that the
purpose of the trust is lawful, and that it
is sufficiently definite to be capable of being
enforced by a court of equity, as the court
could decree the payment of the fund to a
Roman Catholic Church or Churches for the
purpose directed by the will. But, if all
this should be conceded, there is still one
important element lacking.
There is no
beneficiary in existence, or to come into existence, who is interested in, or can demand
the execution of, the trust.
No defined or
ascertainable living person has, or ever can
have, any temporal interest in its performance; nor Is any incorporate church designated so as to entitle it to claim any portion
The absence of a defined benof the fund.
eficiary is, as a general rule, a fatal objection to any attempt to create a valid trust.
It Is said by Wright, J., in Levy v. Levy, 33
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N. Y. 107, that, "if there is a single postulate of the common law established by an
unbroken line of decision, it is that a trust
without a certain beneficiary, who can claim
its enforcement, is void, whether good or
bad, wise or unwise."
It is only in regard
to the class of trusts known as "charitable"
that a different rule has ever prevailed in
equity in England, and still prevails in
some of our sister states.
Whether the
English doctrine of charitable uses and
trusts prevails in this state will be considIn all otlier cases the rule
ered hereafter.
as stated by Judge Wright is universally
recognized, both in law and in equity.
It is claimed that the trust now under review is not void according to the general rules
of law for want of a defined beneficiary, because the trust is for the pui-pose of having
prayers offered in a Roman Catholic Church
to be selected by the executors. It is contended that this is in effect a gift to such
Roman Catholic Church as the executors shall
select, inasmuch as tlie money to be expended
for the masses would, according to the usage,
be payable to the church or cliurches where
they were to be solemnized, and therefore,
as soon as the selection is made, the designated church or churches will be the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and entitled to the
payment; that the trust is therefore, in substance, to pay the fund to such Roman Catholic Church or Churches as the executors may
select; and that a duly-incorporated church,
capable of receiving the bequest,
must be
deemed to have been intended. Passing the
criticisms to which the assumptions contained
in this proposition are subject, and considering the trust as if it had been in form to pay
over the fund to such Roman Catholic Church
as the executors might select, to defray the
expense of offering prayers for the dead, the objection of indefiniteness in the beneficiary
would not be removed.
The case of Power v.
Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, is relied upon by the respondents as supporting their claim. In that
case the bequest was of a fund to the executors in trust, to be divided by them among
such Roman Catholic charities, institutions,
schools, or charities in the city of New York
as a majority of the executors should decide,
and in such proportions as they might think
proper.
The opinion of the court by Miller,
J., holds that giving full force and effect to
the rule that the object of the trust must be
certain and well defined; that the beneficiaries must be either named, or capable of being ascertained, within the rules of law applicable to such cases; and that the trusts
must be of such a nature that a court of
equity can direct their execution, and making
no exception in favor of charitable uses, —the
bequest should be upheld, as coming within
the general rule; that the clause designates
a certain class of objects of the testator's
bounty, to which he might have made a valid
direct bequest, and that by conferring power
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upon his executors to designate the organizations which should be entitled to participate,
and the proportion which each should take,
he did not impair the legality of the provision, so long as the organizations referred to
had an existence recognized by law, and were
capable of taking and could be ascertained;
that the evidence showed that at the time of
the execution of the will, and of the testator's
death, there were in the city of New York
incorporated institutions of the class referred
to in the will, and that a portion of these had
been designated
by a majority of the executors; that none but incorporated institutions
could lawfully have been selected, and that,
even if the executors had failed to make a
selection or apportionment, the court would
have had power to decree the execution
or
the trust, there being no difficulty in determining what institutions came within the
class described by the testator. It must be
observed that in the case cited the beneficiaries were confined to Roman Catholic institutions of a certain class in the city of New
York. These were necessarily limited in number. By 1 Rev. St. p. 734, § 97, it is provided
that a trust power does not cease to be imperative when the grantee has the right to
select any, and exclude others, of the persons
by
I designated as the objects of the trust;
section 99, that, when the terms of the power import that the estate or fund is to be
distributed between the persons designated
in such manner or proportions as the trustee of the power may think proper,
the
trustee may allot the whole to any one or
more of such persons, in exclusion of the
others; by section 100, that if the trustee of
a power, with the right of selection, shall die
leaving the power unexecuted, its execution
shall be decreed in equity for the benefit
equally of all the persons designated as objects of the trust; and by section 101, that
where a power in trust is created by will, and
the testator has omitted to designate
by
whom the power is to be exercised, its execution shall devolve on the court of chancery.
Regarding these provisions as declarations of
general rules applicable to all trast powers,
and governing trusts of personal as well as
real property, the decision in Power v. Cassidy in no manner infringes upon the rule
that the designation of a beneficiary, entitled
to enforce its execution, is essential to the
validity of a trust; and the only point as to
which the correctness of that decision is open
to any doubt is whether, in fact, the beneficiaries in that case were sufBciently defined
and capable of ascertainment to enable a
court of equity to enforce the trust in their
The view taken in respect to that
behalf.
point was certainly very liberal; but the
court has in subsequent cases repeatedly announced that the decision was not to be extended, and it is evident that, without a material extension, it cannot be made to cover
Here, if the church or
the present case.
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churches from among which the selection is
made are to be regarded as the beneficiaries, they are not limited, as in Power v.
Cassidy, to a Roman Catholic Church or
Churches in the city of New York, but include all the Roman Catholic Churches in the
No one church, or the churches of
world.
.any particular locality, can claim the benefit
of the bequest.
In this respect the case at
bar is analogous to that of Prichard v.
Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76, where the bequest
was of a sum of money to the executors, to
be distributed by them "among such incorporated societies organized under the laws of
the state of New York or the state of Maryland, having lawful authority to receive and
hold funds upon permanent trusts for charitable or educational uses," as the executors,
or the survivors of them, might select, and in
Th's
such sums as they might deto'mine.
bequest was held void because of the indefijiiteness of the designation of the beneficiaries.
The opinion was written by the
same learned judge who delivered the opinion in Power v. Cassidy, and by him distinguished from that case on the ground that in
Power V. Cassidy the class of beneficiaries
was specially designated and confined to the
limits of a single city, and to a single religious denomination, so that each one could
readily be ascertained, and each had an inherent right to apply to the court to sustain
And enforce the trust; while in the case at
bar every charitable and educational institution within two states was included.
This
case (Prichard v. Thompson) also establishes
that the power to the executors to select the
beneficiary or beneficiaries does not obviate
the objection of the omission of the testator
to designate them in the will, unless the per-sons or corporations from among whom the
selection is to be made are so defined and limited that a court of equity would have power
to enforce the execution of the trust, or, in
default of a selection by the trustee, to decree
jin equal distribution among all the beneficiaries.
This discussion has proceeded in
answer to the claim that the church or
churches where the masses were to be sol^■mnized were the intended objects of the testator's bounty, and the beneficiaries of the
trust; but the correctness of that position is
by no means conceded.
It is, however, not
necessary to discuss it. If the bequest had
tieen of a sum of money to an incorporated
Roman Catholic Church or Churches, duly
designated by the testator, and authorized by
law to receive such bequests, for the purpose
of the solemnization of masses, a different
-question would arise.
But such is not this
case.
The bequest is to the executors in
trust, to be by them applied for the purpose
-of having prayers offered in any Roman Cath•olic Church they may select.
It has been argued that the absence of a
beneficiary entitled to enforce the trust is
not fatal to its existence where the trustee is
competent and willing to execute it, and the
.to be

purpose is lawful and definite; that It is only
where the trustee resists the enforcement of
the trust that the question of the existence
of a beneficiary entitled to enforce it ariyes.
I have not found any case in which this question has been adjudicated, or the point has
been made, and it does not seem to be presented on this appeal.
The case now before
us arises on a demurrer by the defendant Alcock, one of the executors, to the complaint,
on the ground that it shows no right in the
The complamt alleges that the
plaintiffs.
defendant Alcock, together with Frederick
Smyth, were named as executors in the will;
that the defendant Alcock did not qualify,
and has never acted, as executor or as trustee of the alleged trust sought to be created
by the third clause, nor participated in any
form in carrying out the same; but that his
co-executor, Frederick Smyth, has taken possession of the whole estate, as such executor
and trustee. Smyth is not a party to this
appeal.
It comes up on the demurrer of Alcock alone, and there is nothing in the complaint to show that he is willing to execute
the trust; but, on the contrary, it shows that
he has in no manner acted, or qualified himBut, aside from these
self to act, therein.
considerations, I do not think that the validity or invalidity of the trust can depend upon
the will of the trustee. If the trust is valid,
he can be compelled to execute it; if invalid,
he stands, as to personal property undisposed
of by the will, as trustee for the next of kin,
and the equitable interest is vested in them
immediately on the death of the testator, subject only to the payment of his debts and the
expenses of administration.
When a trust is
attempted to be created without any beneficiary entitled to demand its enforcement, the
trustee would, if the trust property were in
his possession, have the power to hold it to
his own use without accountability to any
one, and contrary to the intention of the
donor, but for the principle that in such a
case a resulting trust attaches in favor of
whoever would, but for the alleged trust, be
equitably entitled to the property. This equitable title cannot on any sound principle be
made to depend upon the exercise by the trustee of an election whether he will or will not
execute the alleged trust.
In such a case
there is no trust, in the sense in which the
term is used in jurisprudence.
There is simply an honorary and imperfect obligation to
carry out the wishes of the donor, which the
alleged trustee cannot be compelled to perform, and which he has no right to perform
contrary to the wishes of those legally or equitably entitled to the property, or who have
succeeded to the title of the original donor.
The existence of a valid trust capable of enforcement is consequently essential to enable
one claiming to hold as trustee to withhold
the property from the legal representatives
of the alleged donor.
A merely nominal
trust, in the performance of which no ascertainable person has any interest, and which
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is to be performed or not as the person to
whom the money Is given thinks fit, has never been held to be sufficient for that purpose.
It Is contended, however, that charitable
uses and trusts are not subject to the genei'al rules of law upon this subject, and that
the bequest now under consideration is of
features of
that class. The distinguishing
this class of trusts, as administered in England from an early period, were that they
might be established through trustees, who
might consist either of individuals or a corporation; and, in the case of individual
trustees, they might hold in indefinite succession, and be self-perpetuating,
and the
funds might be devoted in perpetuity to the
charitable purposes indicated by the donor;
while private trusts were not permitted to
continue longer than a life or lives in being
and 21 years and a fraction
afterwards.
The persons to be benefited might consist of
a class, though the individual
members of
the class might be uncertain. The scheme
of the charity might be wanting in sufficient
deflniteness or details to admit of its practical
administration, and, in such cases, a court
of equity would order a reference to a master
in chancery to devise a scheme for its administration, which should as nearly as possible conform to the intentions of the founder of the charity; and thus was called into
operation what was known as the "cy-prgs
doctrine." These charitable trusts were regarded as matters of public concern, and
were enforceable by the attorney general,
although, In many cases, the court would
compel their performance without his intervention, at the instance of a town or parish,
or of Its inhabitants, or of an individual
of the class Intended to be benefited, such
as one of the poor or maimed, etc. In a comparatively recent case argued in this court,
many instances of ancient charities were cited which had been enforced by the court of
chancery in England, such as Cooke's Charity, decided A. D. 1552, whereby the testator
ordered the purchase of lands, and the erection of a free grammar school; Bond's Charity, decided A. D. 1553, in which the testator's will, dated in 1506, directed that there
should be established a Bede house at Bablock, and there should be built a chapel, and
therein one mass to be said on Sunday, and
therein to be ten poor men, and a woman to
dress their meat and drink,— the priest to be
a brother of Trinity guild and Corpus Christ!
guild, etc.; Howell's Charity, decided In
1557, whereby the testator directed his executors to provide a rent of 400 ducats yearly forever, to be appropriated each year to
promote the marriage of four orphan maidens, honest, and of good fame. This trust
appears to have been enforced In chancery
upon a bill filed by certain orphan maidens
In behalf of themselves and others. We
were also referi'ed to numerous other charities for the support of the poor, for erection of almshouses, hospitals, maintaining
HUTCH. BQ. JOB. — 8
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school-masters, keeping churches in repair,
and other similar purposes. In the case of
Bond's Charity, cited above, a license was
granted by King Henry VII., in 150S, to the
testator's son and others to grant lands to
support a priest to sing mass, and twelve
poor men and one woman to say prayers and
obsequies for the king, the brothers and sisters of the guild, and for their souls, and
especially for the soul of the testator, Thomas Bond, in the then newly-erected chapel
at Bablock. It appears that religious or
pious uses were, when the Roman Catholic
rehgion prevailed in England, recognized as
charities. In 1434, Henry Barton devised to
the rector of St. Mary's, and the church'-wardens, and their successors, certain lands, at
a perpetual rent, payable to the guild of
Corpus Christi, etc., so that said rector of
St. Mary's and his successors, or their parish priests, when they should say prayers in
the pulpit of the church, should pray for the
souls of Richard Barton, the testator's father,
of Dionesia, his mother, and for the souls
of their children, and all the faithful deceased, and, in case they should neglect to
do so for two days after the proper time,
tliat the master and wardens of said guilds,
etc., should levy a distress upon said lands for
12 pence by way of penalty, and retain such
distress until such prayers should be said.
This property appears to have been afterwards seized by the crown, under the statutes of chauntries (1 Edw. VI.), and granted
by Edward VI. to one Stapleton; but the
rector, etc., of St. Mary's having re-entered,
it was made to appear in a litigation between
them and the successors in interest of Stapleton that no prayer for souls had been made,
nor had the rents of the premises been devoted to any manner of superstitious use
within the space of six years and more next
before the first year of the reign of King
Edward VI., since which time the rents and
profits had been employed by the parson and
church-wardens of the parish in good uses
and purposes. The case was tried in the
22d and 23d Eliz., and the parish was allowed to retain the land for general charitable
purposes.
The purposes for which charities were established in England were so numerous and
varied, and the learning contained in the
books on that subject is so vast, that It
would be futile to attempt to go into it In
detail, or to do more than briefly refer to
their history, so far as Is necessary to determine whether the English doctrine of
charitable uses and trusts, as distinguished
from private trusts governed by the general
rules of law, still has any place in the jurisThe statute of 1
prudence of this state.
Edw. VI., A. D. 1547, known as the "Statute
of Chauntries," recited that a great part
of superstition and errors In Christian religion had been brought Into the minds of
men by reason of their ignorance of their
true and perfect salvation through the death
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of Jesns Christ, and by devising vain opinions of purgatory, and masses to be done
for tliose who are departed, which doctrine
is maintained by nothing more than by the
abuse of trentalles, chauntries, and other
provisions for the continuance of such blindness and ignorance; that the amendment
of the same, and converting them to good
and godly uses, such as the erection of grammar schools, the education of youth, and better provision for the poor, cannot in the present parliament conveniently be done, nor be
committed to any person than to the king,
who by the advice of his most prudent council can and will most wisely alter and dispose of the same.
It then recites the act of
37 Hen. VIII. for the dissolution of colleges,
chauntries, etc.. and enacts that all colleges,
free cliapels, and chauntries not in the actual
possession of the late or present king, (with
certain specified exceptions,)
and all their
lands and revenues, are declared to be in the
actual seizure and possession of the present
king, without oflSce found; and that all sums
of money, etc., which by any conveyance, wiU,
devise, etc., have been given or apijointed in
perpetuity towards the maintenance of priests,
anniversaries, or obits, be vested in the king.
Certain colleges, free chapels, and chauntries,
such as those within the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and others specified in
the statute,
were exempted from its provisions; but the king ivas empowered to alter
the chauntries in the universities. In this manner property which had been devoted by the
donor to uses which had come to be regarded
as superstitions were, through the king, put
to charitable uses which were deemed lawful;
and this policy was carried out by many decrees of the court of chancery.
The statute
of 39 Eliz., A. D. 1597, authorized persons
owning estates in fee-simple dm'iug 20 years
next ensuing the passage of the act, by deed
enrolled
in the high court of chancery, to
found hospitals, houses of correction,
almshouses, etc., to have continuance for ever, and
place therein a head and members, and such
number of poor as they pleased;
and such
institutions were declared to be corporations,
with perpetual succession.
It will be observed that this was but a temporary act, which
gave power only for 20 years next ensuing its
passage, to found the chauntries mentioned.
This statute also contained a provision entitled "An act to reform deceits and breaches of
trust touching lands given to charitable uses,"
which recited that divers institutions had been
founded, some by the queen and her progenitors, and some by other godly and well-disposed people, for the charitable relief of poor,
aged, and impotent people, maimed soldiers,
schools of learning, orphans,
and for other
good, charitable, and lawful purposes and intents, and that lands and goods given for such
purposes
had been unlawfully converted
to
the lucre and gain of some few greedy and
covetous persons;
and then proceeds to provide for the issue of commissions out of chan-

cery to inquire into those wrongs, and decree
the observance of the trusts according to the
intent of the founders thereof. This statute
was followed by that of 43 Eliz. c. 4, "To redress the misemployment of lands, goods, and
stocks of money heretofore given to charitable
This act is known as the "Statute of
uses."
Charitable Uses," and was at one time, together with that of 39 Eliz., regarded as the
foundation of the law of charitable uses, and
of the jiu-isdiction of chancery in cases of
charities. But the reports of the record commission established in 1819 have disclosed that
the jurisdiction had been exercised, and charity laws administered, by the courts of chancery from a much earlier period.
The act,
however, throws light upon what were at the
time considered and recognized as charitable
uses, for they are enumerated
in the preamble as follows, viz.: The relief of the poor,
the maintenance of the sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free
schools, and schools in universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks, and highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the maintenance of houses of correction; the marriage of
poor maidens; the aid of young tradesmen,
handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives;
the aid of poor persons in the payment of
taxes.
The act then provides for the issuing
of commissions by the lord chancellor of England or the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, and the redress of breaches of trust,
as in the statute 39 Eliz.
In this enumeration of charitable uses there is none which
would cover the present case; and indeed,
under the statute of chauntries and other statutes prohibiting superstitious uses, it would
not have been recognized m England as vaUd
as a charity or otherwise.
But assuming, as
perhaps we ought to assume, that before gifts
for the support of priests, chauntries, etc., came
to be regarded as superstitious uses, they were
within the principles of charity, and that they
became illegal only by virtue of the statutes
against superstitious uses; in this state,
where all religious beliefs, doctrines, and
forms of worship are free, so long as the public peace Is not disturbed, the ti-ust in question cannot be impeached on the ground that
the use to which the fund was attempted to
be devoted was a superstitious use. The efficacy of prayers for the dead is one of the
doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, of
which the testator was a member; and those
professing that belief are entitled in law to
the same respect and protection in their religious observances thereof as those of aay
other denomination. These observances cannot be condemned by any court, as matter of
law, as superstitious, and the English statutes
against superstitious uses can have no effect
here.
Amend. Const. U. S. art. 1; Const. N.
Y. art. 1, § 3. If, in other respects, the hequest was by the law of England valid as a
"charitable" use, and the English doctrine of
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charitable uses prevails In this state, the objections to its validity on the ground of indefiniteness of the trust, perpetuity, and the
absence of an ascertainable beneficiary can be
otherwise, they must prevail, at
overcome;
least so far as relates to the absence of a beneficiary, which is sufficient to dispose of the
case without refennce to the other points.
We will therefore treat the bequest as a charitable use.
The principal cases in this state in which
the doctrine of charitable uses has been discussed are Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y.
527; Owens v. Missionary Soc, 14 N. Y.
380; Beeliman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298;
Downing v. Marshall, Id. 366; Levy v. Levy,
33 N. Y. 97; Rose v. Rose (1863) 4 Abb. Dec.
108; Bascom v. Albertson,
34 N. Y. 584;
Burrlll V. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254. These
cases were argued by counsel of eminent
ability, and in the arguments and opinions
display a depth of learning and thoroughness of research which render it useless to
attempt a discussion of the question here as
an original question, or to do more than
summarize the main points upon which the
arguments turned, and ascertain how the
case stands upon those authorities.
So lately as the case of Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.
T. 254, the question was argued as still an
open one; and that case was decided on the
ground that the trust was valid without resorting to the doctrine of charitable uses.
Comstock, J., in a note to the eleventh edition of Kent's Commentaries (volume 4, p.
305, note 2), states that the essential requisites of a valid trust are (1) a sufficient expression of an intention to create a trust;
(2) a beneficiary who is ascertained, or capable of being ascertained; that the appointment or non-appointment of a trustee of the
legal estate is not material;
that if the
trust or beneficial purpose be well declared,
and if the beneficiary is a definite person or
corporation capable of taking, the law Itself
will fasten the trust upon him who has the
legal estate, whether the grantor, testator,
heir, or next of kin, as the case may be;
and that, outside of the domain of charitable uses, no definiteness of purpose will
sustain a trust if there be no ascertained
beneficiary who has a right to enforce it.
And in delivering the opinion of this court
in Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 310, the
same learned judge says that the joint authority of the cases of Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 527, and Owens v. Missionary
Soc, 14 N. Y. 308, establishes the propositions (1) that a gift to charity is maintainable in this state if made to a competent
trustee, and If so defined that it can be executed, as made by the donor, by a judicial
decree, although it may be void, according
to general rules of law, for want of an ascertained beneficiary;
(2) that in other respects the rules of law applicable to charitable uses are within those which appertain to trusts in general; (3) that the cy-pr6s
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power which constitutes the peculiar feature
of the English system, and Is exercised In
determining gifts to charity where the donor has failed to define them, and In framing schemes of approximation near to or
from the donor's true design, Is unsuited to
our institutions, and has no existence in the
jurisprudence of this state on this subject.
But he declined to re-examine these cases,
as he concludes that the law of charities
could not be invoked in the case then under
consideration.
The same learned judge,
however. In the subsequent case of Bascom
V. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, in which he acted as counsel, reviewed at length the question whether the English law of charitable
uses prevailed to any extent whatever in
this state.
His argument was preserved in
print, and was used in Burrill v. Boardman,
43 N. Y. 254, and In that argument, referring to what he had said In his opinion in
Beekman v. Bonsor as to the proposition
that a gift to charities, if well defined, and
made to a competent trustee, was maintainable In this state, although it might be
void, according to general rules of law, for
want of an ascertained beneficiary, and to
the similar remark in his opinion in Downing V. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 382, characterizes
his own remarks in those two cases as a
most inconsiderate repetition, as a dictum,
of a proposition laid down by another judge;
calling attention to the fact that the repetition was a mere dictum, because In the
two cases in which it was made the trusts
were held void.
The case of Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y.
524, Is the leading case In the court of last
resort of this state in support of the doctrine that the English law of charitable
uses Is In force in this state, and it fully
supports the proposition that it is. In that
case the testator after making a bequest to
an Incorporated church, bequeathed the sum
of $6,000 to Zophar B. Oakley and other Individual trustees, with power to perpetuate
their successors, as a perpetual fund for the
education of the children of the poor who
should be educated in the academy of the
village of Huntington, with directions to accumulate the fund up to a certain point,
and apply the income in perpetuity to the
education of the children whose parents'
The
names were not upon the tax-lists.
opinion was delivered by Denio, J., and concurred In by four of the other judges, three
The opinion held that
judges dissenting.
this bequest, by the general rules of law,
would be defective and void, as a conveyance in trust for the want of a cestui que
trust in whom the equitable title could vest,
and could be sustained only by force of that
peculiar system of law known in England
under the name of the "Law of Charitable
Uses;" that the objection that the bequest
assumed to create a perpetuity would also be
fatal If the Revised Statutes applied to gifts
for charitable purposes. But the learned
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judge held that according to the laws of
England as understood at the time of the
American Revolution, and as it still existed,
devises and bequests for the support of
charity or religion, though defective for
want of such a grantee or donee as the rules
of law required in other cases, would, when
not within the purview of the mortmain act,
be supported in the court of chancery; that
the law of charitable uses did not originate
in, and was not created by, the statute 43
Bliz. c. 4, but had been known and recognized and enforced before that statute, and
was ingrafted upon the common law, and
consequently was not abrogated by the repeal in this state of the statute 43 Eliz. in
1788 (Laws 1788, c. 46, § 37) ; that the provisions of the Revised Statutes did not affect
property given in perpetuity for religious or
charitable purposes; and that consequently
the bequest to Zophar B. Oakley and others,
in trust for the children of the poor, was
valid.
In Owens v. Missionary Soc, 14 N. T. 380,
the testator bequeathed the residue of his
estate to the "Methodist General Missionary
Society," an unincorporated association existing when the will was made, and when it
took effect, in 1834, but which, subsequent
to the testator's death, became incorporated.
In a suit between the incorporated society
and the next of kin of the testator, the bequest was held void, and that the next of
kin were entitled to the residue. Opinions
were delivered by Selden, 0., and Denio, J.
Judges A. S. Johnson, T. A. Johnson, Hubbard, and Wright concurred in the opinion
of Selden, J., which held that the bequest
was not valid as one made to the association for its own benefit, because of its incapacity to take; nor could it be sustained as
a charitable or religious use, as it was not
accompanied by any trust as to the applicaAlso that, where there
tion of the fund.
was no trustee competent to take, our court
of chancery had no jurisdiction to uphold a
trust for a charitable or religious purpose;
and it distinguished the case from Williams
V. Williams on the ground that there the bequest was to trustees competent to take. Although the tenor of the opinion is against
following the example of the English chancellors in applying a peculiar and partial
system of rules to the support of charitable
gifts. Judge Selden disavows the intention
of denying the power of courts of equity in
this state to enforce the execution of trusts
created for public and charitable purposes in
cases where the fund is given to a trustee
competent to take, and where the charitable
use is so far defined as to be capable of being specifically executed by the authority of
the court, even although no certain beneficiary other than the public at large may be
Denio, J., while reaffirming the
designated.
decision in Williams v. Williams, placed his
vote upon the ground that the trust was not
one which could be executed by the court

as a charitable use, the purposes of the society being "to diffuse more generally the
civilization,
blessings
of education,
and
Christianity throughout the United States
and elsewhere;" that although trusts in favor of education and religion had always
been considered charitable uges, and were
recognized as such in the statute of Elizabeth, the advancement of civilization generally was not classed among charities, and
the whole fund might be disposed of for purpromotive of universal civilization,
poses
which still would not be charitable objects
Six of the
in the understanding of the law.
judges were of opinion that the charity was
not suflBciently defined by the terms of the
will, and that the judgment in favor of the
next of kin should be affirmed on that
ground.
The next case in order Is Beekman v. BonIn that case the^mount
sor, 23 N. Y. 298.
to be given to the charitable purpose, as
well as the manner in which the fund was
to be applied, was left to the discretion of
They renounced, and it was
the executors.
held that the trust was incapable of execution, that the cy-prSs power, as exercised in
England In cases of charity, had no existence in this state, and that the next of kin
Numerous points
were entitled to the fund.
were discussed in the opinion, which was by
Comstock, J., and he there made the dictum,
which he afterwards recalled, that a gift of
charity which would be void, by the general
rules of law, for the want of an ascertained
beneficiary, will be upheld by the courts of
this state if the thing given was certain, if
there was a competent trustee to administer
the fund as directed, and if the charity itself
was precise and definite.
Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, held
that a devise and bequest to an unincorporated missionary society was void, on the
same grounds as In the case of Owens v.
Missionary Soc, supra.
Up to this time the doctrine of the case of
Williams v. Williams as to the validity of
trusts for charities, even in the absence of a
definite beneficiary, had been acquiesced in.
But in Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, it was
vigorously assailed by Wright, J., who discussed the question anew whether the English doctrines of trust for charitable uses
That learned judge
were law in this state.
expressed a decided opinion that they were
not (page 105 et seq.); that that peculiar
system of jurisprudence proceeded in disregard of rules deemed elementary and fundamental in other limitations of property, in
upholding indefinite charitable gifts, by the
exercise of chancery powers and the royal
prerogative; that it was not the exercise of
the ordinary jurisdiction of chancery over
and
trusts, but a jurisdiction extended
by the prerogative of the
strengthened
crown and the statute of 43 Eliz. over public and indefinite uses defined In that statute
that even In England It liad
as "charities;"
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been deemed necessary to restrain and regu-

late by act of parliament the creation of
these Indefinite charitable trusts, by the statutes of mortmain and other restrictions, and
it cannot be supposed that the system was
deliberately retained in this state freed from
all legislative restriction.
He calls attention
to the fact that in 1788 the legislature of
this state repealed the statute of 43 Eliz.,
the statute against superstitious uses, and
the mortmain acts. That at that time it
that the law for the enforce■was supposed
ment of charitable trusts had its origin only
in the statute of Elizabeth; and argues that
the legislature of 1788, in thus sweeping
away all the great and distinctive landmarks of the English system, must have intended that the effect of the repeal should
be to abrogate the entire system of indetinite trusts, which were understood to be
supported by that statute alone; and that
the whole course of legislation in this state
indicates a policy not to introduce any system of public charities except through the
medium of corporate bodies. That in 1784
the general law for the incorporation of religious societies had been enacted, and that
before, and contemporaneously with, the repeal of the statute of Elizabeth and the statutes of mortmain, special acts incorporating
such societies were passed, and other acts
have been passed creating or authorizing
corporations for various religious and charitable purposes, in all of which are to be
found limitations upon the amount of property to be held by such societies; thus indicating a policy to confine within certain
limits the accumulation of property perpetually appropriated, even to charitable and religious objects. That the absolute repeal of
and of the mortthe statute of Elizabeth
main acts was wholly inconsistent with the
policy thus indicated, unless it was intended
to abrogate the whole law of charitable
uses as understood and enforced in England.
The opinion then refers to the course of legislation in this state following the repeal of
the English statutes authorizing corporations
for charitable, religious, literary, scientific,
and benevolent purposes, and in all cases
limiting the amount of property to be enjoyed by them. This legislation is claimed
to disclose a policy differing from the British system, and absolutely inconsistent with
the supposition that uses for public or indefinite objects, and of unlimited duration,
can be created and sustained without legislative sanction. Since the case of Williams
V. Williams, decided 35 years ago, there has
been no adjudged case in this court which
supports a charitable gift on the principles
enunciated by Judge Denio in pronouncing
that decision. Of course, this observation
applies only to the indefinite charity which
the case included, and not to the gift in
favor of a religious corporation.
After the decision of that case the struggle
in this court for the overthrow of charitable
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uses began in the case of Owens v. Missionary Soc, 14 N. Y. 380.
The opponents of
such trusts had for their justification the
repeal in 1788 in this state of all the BrAtish
statutes which upheld such trusts in England, and the substitution of a charity system maintained by our statute laws in the
form of corporate charters containing, by
legislative enactment, power to receive, hold,
and administer charitable gifts of every variety known in the practice of civilized communities and our statute of uses and trusts,
defining the trusts which may lawfully be
created. This statute has been held binding
on the courts, although, of course, it ceases
to operate when the legislature charters a
corporation for a charitable purpose, with
power to take and hold property in perpetuity for such purpose. From the case of
Owens V. Jlissionary Soc, 14 N. Y. 380,
through the cases of Downing v. Marshall,
23 N. Y. 366;
Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97;
Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584; Burrill
V. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254; and Holmes v.
Mead, 52 N. Y. 332 (decided in 1873),— the
struggle was continued, and the announcement definitely made, in the latest of those
cases, that the controversy was closed by
the adoption of the principles enunciated in
the said last-mentioned case. In Williams
V. Williams, Judge Denio, whose great learning and ability are universally
acknowledged, maintained, as the basis of his conclusion in favor of charitable trusts as the
law of this state, that they came to us by
inheritance from our British ancestors, and
as part of our common law.
That iparticular
postulate being finally overthrown, and the
British statutes having been repealed at the
very origin of our state government, we
should be a civilized state without provision
for charity if we had not enacted other laws
for ourselves. But charity, as a great interest of civilization and Christianity, has
suffered no loss or diminution in the change
which has been made.
The law has been
simplified, and that is all. Instead of the
huge and complex system of England, for
many generations the fruitful source of litigation, we have substituted a policy which
offers the widest field for enlightened benevolence.
The proof of this is in the great
number of charitable institutions scattered
throughout the state.
It is not certain that
any political state or society in the world offers a better system of law for the encouragement of property limitations in favor of
religion and learning, for the relief of the
poor, the care of the insane, of the sick and
the maimed, and the relief of the destitute,
than our system of creating organized bodies
by the legislative power, and endowing them
with the legal capacity to hold property
which a private person or a private corporation has to receive and hold transfers of
Under this system, many doubtproperty.
ful and obscure questions disappear, and
give place to the more simple inquiry wheth-
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er the grantor or devisor of a fund designed

for charity Is competent to give; and wheth-

er the organized body is endowed by law
with capacity to receive, and to hold and
administer, the gift. In Williams v. Williams, supra, in maintaining a gift for pious
uses to an incorporated religious society,
Judge Denio assigned the reasons which
have been universally approved since that
tiLdie; and they are summed up by saying
that charitable limitations of property in
favor of corporations competent, by statute
law, to hold them, are valid or invalid on
the same grounds as other limitations of
property between natural persons, and are
referable to the general system of law which
governs in the ordinary transactions of man-

kind. From his reasoning in the other
branch of the case before him, it appears
that he had not reached the conclusion established in the later cases, namely, that
with us charity is found in our corporation
laws, general and special, which have been
extended so as to embrace the purposes heretofore known and recognized as charitable,
and which are continually
extending and
improving, so as to meet the new wants
which society in its progress may develop.
As the result of the foregoing views, the
judgment of the supreme court at general
term should be reversed, and that of the
special term affirmed.
All concur, except EARL, J., not voting.
Judgment accordingly.
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T.

FOBES.

(22 Mich. 454.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.

April Term,

1871.

Bill in equity to establish

a resulting trust.
There was a decree for complainant, from
which defendant appealed.

A. C. Baldwin, for complainant.
& Brewer, for defendant.

Crofoot

COOLEY, J. The facts in this case are
few and simple, and in regard to most of
them there is no dispute.
In the fall of
complainant resided in Bennington,
1854,
New York, upon a parcel of land which he
had purchased of the Holland
Land Company, and upon which he was then owing
about thirteen hundred dollars, which he
was unable to pay.
The company were demanding payment, and had sent an officer,
whether with legal process or simply as their
agent, we are not informed, to remove him
from the premises, when one Stillman Goodenough, complainant's brother-in-law,
intervened, and succeeded in obtaining two weeks'
time, in which to make some arrangement
if possible. Complainant seems to have been
quite discouraged, and put himself entirely
into the hands of Goodenough, telling him to
go on and make a saving for the family if
he could do so. Goodenough did go on as
agent
for complainant, and succeeded
in
making an arrangement with one Patchin,
then residing in Steuben county. New York,
to exchange the interest of complainant in
the Bennington land for an eighty-acre lot
owned by Patchin in Milford, Oakland counsigned some
Michigan.
Complainant
ty,
writing expressing his satisfaction with this
arrangement, and it would seem to have been
closed up at once, so far as complainant was
concerned, but the deed from Patchin was
executed at his home, and was not sent on
It does not
until some weeks afterwards.
distinctly appear that there was any understanding between complainant and Goodenough, as to who should be named as grantee in the deed from Patchin, but the deed,
when received, named Goodenough as grantee, and complainant does not appear to have
with it. He,
expressed
any dissatisfaction
however, took possession of the Milford land,
claiming it as his own, and has ever since
been in possession under the like claim, and
made valuable Improvements.
Stillman Goodenough, it appears, conveyed
the Milford land to his brother, John R.
Goodenough,
in 1855, on an understanding,
as he claims, that the title should still be
held for complainant, and there have been
several subsequent conveyances, until the legal title has become vested in the defendant,
who claims to be a grantee In good faith,
and for value. It is not claimed, however,
that defendant or any of the intermediate
grantees has or had any greater equities than
were possessed by Stillman Goodenough, and

119

as the complainant's continuous possession
must be regarded as notice of his actual
rights (McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358), we
need not consider the merits of any of the
alleged subsequent purchases.
The bill in this case avers that Stillman
Goodenough took the title to the Milford
land in his own name without the consent of
complainant, and in fraud of his rights; and
its purpose is to compel the defendant to release to the complainant the title which, it
is claimed, is held for him under an implied
or constructive trust. The defendant insists
that the conveyance to Stillman Goodenough
was made with the full approval of complainant, and that consequently under our
statute he is entitled to no relief.
As the consideration for the conveyance
to Stillman Goodenough was furnished by
complainant, there can be no doubt that at
the common law there would have been a resulting trust in complainant's favor. But
our statute provides that, "when a grant for
a valuable consideration shall be made to one
person, and the consideration therefor shall
be paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such
payment shall be made; but the title shall
vest in the person named as the alienee in
such conveyance, subject only" to a trust in
favor of creditors, when the effect would
otherwise be to defraud them: Comp. Laws,
§§ 2637, 2638.

This provision, however, must be understood as applicable only to those cases in
which the deed has assumed the form it has
by consent of the party furnishing the consideration. It has no application to a case
where one has taken a deed in his own name
in fraud of the rights of another, nor to a
case where, though no fraud was designed,
the conveyance has been made to some person other than the purchaser without his
consent.
The purpose is to preclude parties
from asserting equitable interests in land
where they must rest upon parol evidence,
in opposition to the written instruments of
title, which have been made with their consent and approval. If, therefore, it shall appear that complainant assented to the conveyance to Stillman Goodenough, without demanding or receiving any written declaration
or other evidence of a trust in his own favor,
no such trust can be declared, however clearly It may appear from the parol evidence
that the transaction was entered into for
his benefit, and that, between the parties,
it was understood that the title was to be
held in trust for him. If he has trusted
himself entirely to the good faith of Goodenough, and suffered an arrangement to rest
in parol which the statute declares shall be
evidenced by writing only, it will not be in
our power to relieve him even if we were
disposed so to do.
It has already been seen that there is no
of any understanding bedirect evidence
tween complainant and Goodenough as to
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was to be made the grantee in Patchin's
we must therefore see wbat legal
luferences are deducible from the situation of
the parties, or may fairly be drawn from the
facts whicli appear. The following facts, as
we have before said, are unquestioned: 1,
That in the arrangement Goodenough acted
as agent for complainant; 2, that he was intrusted with the whole management of the
negotiation with Patchin; and, 3, that it was
distinctly understood between him and complainant that the conveyance made by Patchin was to be for the benefit of complainant.
Supposing this to be the whole of their understanding, the duty of Goodenough was
plain. It was to have the conveyance made
directly to complainant, or, if made to himself for any other person, then to have a
trust in favor of complainant distinctly declared in the conveyance, so that it might be
legally enforced; and if he failed to have
made in proper form for the proconveyance
tection of complainant's interests, he would
have been chargeable with constructive
fraud, and a court of equity would have
given complainant the proper relief.
We cannot infer, in the absence of evidence to that effect, that complainant unGoodenough was to take the deed
derstood
to himself and without expressing therein
any trust in favor of complainant. The contrary is the only reasonable inference. When
it distinctly appeare that the conveyance was
to be for his benefit, we must suppose that
he expected it to be in such form that the
law would protect his enjoyment of the
premises under it. We cannot assume that
his agent, into whose hands he placed himself, was understood to be empowered to take
in a form which would defeat
conveyance
the very purpose of the arrangement, or that
complainant, without any occasion whatever,
so far as the evidence shows, was to trust
his interests for an indefinite period solely
to the continued good will, good faith, and
sense of honor and justice of the agent who
was negotiating for him.
Goodenough testifies that after the arrangement with Patchin was agreed upon, complainant was informed of it, and expressed
his satisfaction. But he does not state that
■n-lio

deed, and

complainant was then told to whom the deed
was to be made, and we have no reason to
infer that the information went any further
than that an even exchange was to be made
of the Bennington interest for the MUford
land; but after the deed was made by Patchin, it was shown to complainant, and he
read it and made no objection, and this is
claimed to be very conclusive evidence that it
was in accordance with his expectation and
Of this evidence it is to be observed,
desire.
that if complainant had not previously assented, this failure to object to the deed
after it had been made, could not operate as
If a constructive
a waiver of his rights.
trust existed in his favor when the deed was
first taken, by reason of its being taken in
Goodenough's name, without his consent, he
was under no such obligation to assert his
rights immediately on learning the facts, as
to be baiTed of his equities by failure to do
so.
An inference of assent may be drawn
from his silence, but there is nothing in the
case in the nature of an estoppel.
And we think any such inference of assent
Goodenough had
is not very conclusive.
been giving his services to complainant, and
though he had taken the deed in his own
name, he had evinced no disposition to appropriate the property. He allowed complainant to take possession and appropriate the
account. His possession
profits
without
would preclude any bona fide purchase by
strangers, and if we suppose complainant to
be fully aware of his legal rights, we must
assume that he Icnew he had nothing to
gain or lose by demanding or failing to demand an immediate conveyance. His silence,
consequently, after the transaction
was completed does not seem to us such evidence of previous assent as to warrant our
finding that an understanding Is proved that
the arrangement Goodenough was engaged
to make for the benefit of complainant,
might be put in such form as to Inure exclusively to the benefit of Goodenough himself.
After careful consideration of this record,
we are of opinion that the decree was correct, and that it should be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.
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DYER
2 Oox,

V.

Court of Chancery.

In

DYER.

Ch. 92.

Nov. 27, 1788.

certain copylaold premises Lolden
of the manor of Heytesbury, in the county
of Wilts, were granted by the lord, according to the custom of that manor, to Simon
Dyer (the plaintiff's father), and Mary, his
wife, and the defendant William (his other
son), to take in succession for their lives,
and to the longest liver of them. The purchase money was paid by Simon Dyer, the
father. He survived his wife, and lived until 1785, and then died, having made his
will, and thereby devised all his interest in
these copyhold premises (amongst others) to
the plaintiff, his younger son. The present
bill stated tliese circumstances, and insisted
that the whole purchase money being paid
by the father, although, by the form of the
grant, the wife and the defendant had the
legal interest in the premises for their lives
in succession, yet in a court of equity they'
were but trestees for the father, and the bill
therefore prayed that the plaintiff, as devisee
of tbe father, might be quieted in the possession of the premises during the life of the
defendant.
The defendant insisted that the insertion
of bis name in the grant operated as an advancement to him from his father to the extent of the legal interest thereby given to
him. And this was the whole question in
the cause.
This case was very fully argued
by Mr. Solicitor General and Ainge for plaintiff, and by Burton & Morris, for defendant The following cases were cited, and
very particularly commented on: Smith v.
Baker, 1 Atk. 385; Taylor v. Taylor, Id. 386;
Jlumma v. JIunlma, 2 Vern. 19; Howe v.
Howe, 1 Vern. 415; Anon., 1 Freem. Ch. 123;
Benger v. Drew, 1 P. Wms. 781; Dickinson
V. Shaw, before the lords commissioners in
before Sir T.
1770; Bedwell
v. Froome,
Sewell, on the 10th May, 1T7S; Bow v. Bowden before Sir L. Kenyon, siting for the lord
chancellor; Crisp v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549;
Scroope v. Scroope, 1 Ch. Cas. 27; Elliot v.
Elliot, 2 Ch. Cas. 231; Ebrand v. Dancer, Id.
2G; Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67; Back
V. Andrew, Id. 120; liundle v. Bundle, Id.
264; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms.
Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480; Pole v.
Pole, 1 Ves. Sr. 76.
1737

Ill;

LOBD CHIEF BABON, after directing the
cause to stand over for a few days, delivered
the judgment

of the court.

Tlie question between the parties in this
cause is whether the defendant is to be
considered as a trustee for his father in re-

of his succession to the legal interest
of the copyhold premises in question, and
whether the plaintiff, as representative of
the father, is now entitled to the benefit of
intimated my opinion of the
that trust.
question on the hearing of the cause, and 1
spect

I
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then Indeed entertained very little doubt
upon the rule of a court of equity, as applied to this subject; but as so many cases
have been cited, some of which are not in.
print, we thought it convenient to take an
opportunity of looking more fully into them,,
in order that the ground of our decision may
be put in as clear a light as possible, especially in a case in which so great a difference of opinion seems to have prevailed at
the bar. And I have met with a case in addition to those cited, which is that of Rumboll V. BumboU, 2 Eden, 15, on the 20th,
April, 1761. The clear result of all the cases,
without a single exception, is that the trust
of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold,,
or leasehold; whether taken in the namesof the purchasers and others jointly, or in
the name of others without that of the purchaser; whether in one name or several;,
whether jointly or successive,—results to the
man who advances the purchase money.
Tills is a general proposition, supported byall the cases, and there is nothing to contradict it; and it goes on a strict analogy
to the rule of the common law that, where a
feoffment is made without consideration, the
use results to the feoft'er. It is the established doctrine of a court of equity that thisresulting trust may be rebutted by circumThe cases go one step
stances in evidence.
further, and prove the circumstance of one ormore of the nominees, being a child or children of the purchaser, is to operate by rebutting the resulting trust; and it has been
determined in so many cases that the nominee, being a child, shall have such operation
as a circumstance of evidence, that we
should be disturbing landmarks if we suffered either of these propositions to be called
in question, namely, that such circumstance
shall rebut the resulting trust, and that it
shall do so as a circumstance of evidence.
I think it would have been a more simple
doctrine if the children had been considered
as purchasers for a valuable consideration.
Natural love and affection raised a use at
common law. Surely, then, it will rebut a
trust resulting to the father. This way of
considering it would have shut out all thecircumstances of evidence which have found
their way into many of the cases, and would
have prevented some very nice distinctions,.
and not very easy to be understood. Considering it as a circumstance of evidence,
there must be, of course, evidence admitted
on the other side. Thus it was resolved into
a question of intent, which was getting int»
a very wide sea, without very certain guides.
In the most simple case of all, which is that
of a father purchasing in the name of his
son, it is said that this shews the father intended an advancement, and therefore the
resulting trust is rebutted; but then a circumstance is added to this, namely, that
the son happened to be provided for. Then
the question is, did the father intend to advance a son already provided for? Lord Not-
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tingham could not get over this, and he
ruled that in such a case the resulting trust
was not rebutted; and in Pole v. Pole, 1
Ves. Sr. 76, Lord Hardwicke thought so too;
and yet the rule in a court of equity as recognized in other cases is that the father is
the only judge as to the question of a son's
therefore, of
provision. That distinction,
the son being provided fpr or not, is not
very solidly taken or uniformly adhered to.
It is then said that a purchase in the name
of a son is a prima facie advancement, and,
indeed, it seems difficult to put it in any
way. In some of the cases some circumstances have appeared which go pretty much
against that presumption, as where the father
has entered and kept possession, and taken
the rents; or where he has surrendered or
ilevised the estate; or where the son has
given receipts in the name of the father.
The answer given is that the father took the
rents as guardian of his son. Now, would
the court sustain a bill by the son against
should think it
the father for these rents?
pretty difficult to succeed in such a bill. As
to the surrender and devise, it is answered
that these are subsequent acts; whereas the
intention of the father in taking the purchase in the son's name must be proved by
acts; yet these are pretty
•concomitant
strong acts of ownership, and assert the
right, and coincide with the possession and
enjoyment. As to the son's giving receipts
In the name of the father, it is said that, the
son being under age, he could not give receipts in any other manner; but I own this
reasoning does not satisfy me. In the more
complicated cases, where the life of the son
is one of the lives to take in succession, other
■distinctions are taken. If the custom of the
manor be that the first taker might surren•der the whole lease, that shall make the
other lessees trustees for him; but this custom operates on the legal estate, not on
the equitable interest; and therefore this is
not a very solid argument. When the leasees are to take successive, it is said that,
as the father cannot take the whole in his
own name, but must insert other names in
the lease, then the children shall be trustees
for the father; and to be sure, if the circumstance of a child being the nominee is
not decisive the other way, there is a great
deal of weight in this observation. There
may be many prudential reasons for putting
in the life of a child in preference to that
of any other person; and if in that case it
is to be collected from circumstances whether an advancement was meant, it will be
•difficult to find such as will support that
idea. To be sure, taking the estate In the
name of the child, which the father might
have taken in his own, affords a strong argument of such an intent; but where the
estate must necessarily be taken to him in
succession, the inference is very different.
These are the difficulties which occur from
considering the purchase in the son's name

I

as a circumstance of evidence only. Now,
were once laid down that the son was
to be taken as a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, all these matter of presumption would be avoided.
It must be admitted that the case of Dickinson V. Shaw is a case very strong to support the present plaintiff's claim. That came
on in chancery, on 22d May, 1770. "A copyhold was granted to three lives to take in
succession,
the father, son, and daughter.
The father paid the fine.
There was no
custom stated. The question was whether
the daughter and her husband were trustees
during the life of the son, who survived
the father. At the time of the purchase the
son was nine and the daughter seven years
old. It appeared that the father had leased
the premises from three years to three years
to the extent of nine years. On this case
Lords Commissioners
Smythe and Aston
were of opinion that, as the father had paid
the purchase money, the children were trustees for him." To the note I have of this
case it is added that this determination was
contrary to the general opinion of the bar,
and also to a case of Taylor v. Alston, in
this court. In Dickinson v. Shaw there was
some little evidence to assist the idea of its
being a trust, namely, that of the leases
made by the father. If that made an ingredient in the determination, then that case
is not quite in point to the present; but I
rather think that the meaning of the court
was that the burthen of proof laid on the
child; and that the cases which went the
other way were only those in which the
estate was entirely purchased in the name
of the children. If so, they certainly were
not quite correct in that idea, for there had
been cases in which the estates had been
taken in the names of the father and son.
I have been favoured with a note of Rumboll V. Rumboll, before Lord Keeper Henley
on the 20th April, 1761, where a copyhold
was taken for three lives in succession, the
father and two sons. The father paid the
fine, and the custom was that the first taker
might dispose of the whole estate (and his
lordship then stated that case fully). Now,
this case does not amount to more than an
opinion of Lord Keeper Henley, but he
agreed with me in considering a child as
a purchaser for good consideration of an
estate bought by the father in his name,
though a trust would result as against a
stranger. It has been supposed that the
case of Taylor v. Alston in this court denied
the authority of Dickinson v. Shaw. That
cause was heard before Lord Chief Baron
Smythei myself, and Mr. Baron Burland,
and was the case of an uncle purchasing
in the names of himself and a nephew and
niece.
It was decided in favour of the nephew and niece, not on any general idea of
their taking as relations, but on the result
of much parol evidence, which was admitted on both sides, and the equity on the
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side of the nominees was thought to preLord Kenyon was in that cause,
ponderate.
and his argument went solely on the weight
Indeed, as far as the
of the parol evidence.

circumstance of the custom of the first takit was a strong case
However, the court
determined the other way on the parol evidence. That case, therefore, is not material.
Another case has been mentioned, which is
not in print, and which was thought to be
materially applicable to this (Bedwell v.
Froome, before Sir T. Sewell) ; but that was
materially distinguishable from the present.
As far as the general doctrine went, it went
against the opinion of the lords commisHis honour there held that the copysioners.
holds were part of the testator's personal
estate, for that was not a purchase in the
name of the daughter. She was not to have
It was only a contract to
the legal estate.
add the daughter's life in a new lease to
be granted to the father himself. There could
be no question about her being a trustee,
for it was as a freehold in him lor his
daughter's life. But in the course of the
argument his honour stated the common
principles as applied to the present case,
and ended by saying that, as between father
and chUd, the natural presumption was that
The anonymous
a provision was meant.
case in 1 Freem. Ch. 123, corresponds very
much with the doctrine laid down by Sir
T. Sewell, and it observes that an advancement to a chUd is considered as done for
valuable consideration, not only against the
Kingdon v.
father,
but against creditors.
Bridges, 2 Vem. 67, is a strong case to this
point,— that is, the valuable nature of the
consideration arising on a provision made
for a wife or for a child; for there the question arose as against creditors.
I do not find that there are in print more
than three cases which respect copyholds
where the grant is to take successive,— Rundie V. Rundle, 2 Vern. 264s which was a case
perfectly clear; Benger v. Drew, 1 P. Wms.
781, where the purchase was made partly
with the wife's money; and Smith v. Baker,
1 Atk. 385, where the general doctrine as
applied to strangers was recognized; but the
er's right to suiTender,
In favom* of a trust.
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case turned on the question whether the interest was well devised.
Therefore, as far
as respects this particular case, Dickinson
V. Shaw is the only case quite in point; and
then the question is whether that case is
to be abided by. With great reverence to

the memory of those two judges who decided
it, we think that case cannot be followed;
that it has not stood the test of time, or the
opinion of learned men; and Lord Kenyon
has certainly intimated his opinion agamst
it. On examination of its principles, they
seem to rest on too narrow a foundation,
namely, that the inference of a provision
b'iiug Intended did not arise, because the
purchase could not have been taken wholly
in the name of the purchaser. This, we
think, is not sufficient to turn the presumption against the child. If it is meant to
be a trust, the purchaser must shew that
intention by a declaration of trust; and we
do not think it right to doubt whether an
estate in succession is to be considered as
an advancement, when a moiety of an estate in possession certainly would be so.
If we were to enter into all the reasons that
might possibly influence the mind of the
purchaser, many might perhaps occur in
every case upon which it might be argued
that an advancement was not intended. And
I own it is not a very prudent conduct of
a man just married to tie up his property
for one child, and preclude himself from
providing for the rest of his family. But
this applies equally in case of a purchase
in the name of the child only, yet that case
is admitted to be an advancement; indeed,
if anything, the latter case is rather the
strongest, for there it must be confided to
one child only. We think, therefore, that
these reasons partake of too great a degree
of refinement, and should not prevail against
a rule of property which is so weU established as to become a landmark, and which,
whether right or wrong, should be carried
throughout
This bill must therefore be dismissed; but,
after stating that the only case in point on
the subject is against om- present opinion,
it certainly will be proper to dismiss it without costs.
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OCEAN BANK OF NEW YORK
COTT.
(46 N. Y. 12.)

v.

OL-

Court of Appeals of New York. Sept. 2, 1871.
Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the First department, reversing an order
of the special term overruling demurrer to
plaintiff's reply and sustaining demurrer to
the fourth and fifth counts of defendant's answer.
This action is in the nature of a creditors'
bill on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff
against the defendant, Cornelius Olcott, on
the 15th of April, 1861. And the allegations
in the complaint are that since the judgment
said defendant has paid, of his own moneys,
for certain real estate, the conveyance of
which was taken by and in the name of the
defendant, Kate G. Olcott, the wife of the
other defendant, in fraud of his creditors.
The answer denies all these allegations of
fraud, and sets up the defence that since the
judgment, and before this action was commenced, the defendant, Cornelius Olcott, obtained a discharge in bankruptcy, under the
act of congress of 1867, and was thereby fully
discharged from all his debts, the aforesaid
judgment included.
The plaintiff replied to the defence of the
discharge in bankruptcy, alleging that said
discharge was fraudulently obtained, and setting forth the frauds complained of.
The defendant demurred to the reply that
it does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a reply.

P. J. Gage, for appellant.
ley, for respondent.

Richard H. Hunt-

CHURCH, C. J. The two principal questions in this case are: 1. Whether a certificate of discharge in bankruptcy, issued
under the bankrupt act of 1867, can be impeached in a state court, on the ground that
it was improperly granted? and, 2. Whether
the plaintiff can enforce the judgment, against
the property conveyed to the defendant, Kate
G. Olcott, wife of the other defendant, Cornelius Olcott, notwithstanding his discharge
in bankruptcy?
The constitution of the United States confers upon congress power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States.
This, like all
other powers, is exclusive when exercised by
By the thirty-fourth section of the
congress.
bankrupt act of 1867, a mode of attacking
the discharge is prescribed in the court wiiich
issued it, on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained. A creditor therefore seeking to invalidate the discharge for that reason, must pursue the remedy prescribed in
the act. Otherwise the certificate is declared
to be "conclusive evidence" in favor of such
bankrupt of the fact, and the regularity of
the discharge. It follows that neither in any
other mode, nor in any other court can the

discharge be questioned, on the ground that
it was improperly granted. Besides the plaintiffs have alleged in the reply, that they have
made application to the United States court
to set aside the discharge for the frauds alleged to invalldiate it in this case, and if the
state court should entertain concurrent jurisdiction to try the' same questions, a conflict
of judgment and authority might result in a
case clearly vyithin the cognizance of the federal courts. In this respect the act of 1867
is unlike the act of 1841, which contained no
provision for setting aside the discharge, but
permitted its impeachment whenever it was
We must therefore
interposed as a defense.
regard the discharge as valid for the purposes
of this action.
The second point represents the important
question in the case. It comes up on demurrer to the reply, and the plaintiff seeks
to attack the answer, setting up the discharge,
on the ground that it constitutes no defense
to the action. In determining this question,
we must take the allegations in the compa nt
as true. It is alleged in substance that after
the plaintiff's debt was contracted, the defendant, Cornelius Olcott, purchased and paid
the consideration for a large quantity of real
estate, which was conveyed to his wife, and
which by this action, the plaintiffs seek to
reach, for the purpose of satisfying their demand. Judgment was obtained against Olcott before the bankrupt discharge was obtained, but this action was not commenced
until after that time. A discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes the debt against the
bankrupt. The judgment becomes extinguished, and the demands upon which it was rendered.
Ruckman v. Cowell, 1 N. Y. 505; Depuy V. Swart, 3 Wend. l.>j; Baker v. Wheaton, 5 Mass. 509. In the language of the act,
the discharge releases "the bankrupt from
all debts, claims, liabilities and demands
which were or might have been proved against
his estate in bankruptcy, and may be pleaded
■* * *
as a full and complete bar to all suits
brought on any such debts, claims, liabilities
or demands."
It is claimed by the plaintiffs, that as creditors they had, by virtue of the fifty-first and
fifty-second sections of the statute of uses
and trusts, a lien upon the property held by
the wife, the consideration for which was
paid by the debtor, and that such lien existed at the time the discharge was granted and
was not affected by it.
Prior to the Revised Statutes, where the
consideration for land was paid by one person, and the land was conveyed to another,
a trust resulted to the person paying the consideration, and the interest of such person
might be taken and sold on execution, and
the legal title thereby transferred to the pur1 Rev. St 74; Guthrie v. Gardner,
chaser.
19 Wend. 414; Jackson v. Walker, 4 Wend.
462.
The Revised Statutes changed this rule,
by providing in the fifty-first section that no
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use or trust shall result in favor of the person
by whom the payment is made, but that the

title shall vest in the person named as alienee
in such conveyance, subject only to the provisions of section 52, which declares that
every such conveyance "shall be presumed
fraudulent as against the creditors, at the
time, of the person paying the consideration,
and that when a fraudulent intent is not disproved, a trust shall result in favor of such
creditors to the extent that may be necessary
to satisfy their just demands." This change
was probably made to prevent an evasion of
the general policy of the statute prohibiting
trusts, except for a few specified purposes.
It is obvious that the interest or right, or
whatever it may be termed, secured to creditors by this statute, is an equitable interest,
enforceable only in equity. A trust results,
not of the whole property, but suflBcient only
to satisfy the just claims of creditors; not of
one creditor only, but of all creditors. Except as against creditors, the title is perfect
in the grantee, and as against them it is perfect, if the grantee can disprove a fraudulent
intent. The rights of both creditors and grantee can only be properly adjusted and enforced, in a proceeding in equity, where all
interested persons can be made parties, and
a sale and proper distribution of the proceeds
can be made. That this is an equitable and
not a legal interest, to be enforced in a court
of equity, was decided in this court in Garfield V. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475.
The bankrupt act preserves the rights of
creditors by mortgage, pledge or other lien
upon the property of the bankrupt, and the
assignee takes the property subject to it (sections 14, 20), and of course a valid lien against
the property of a third person would not be
affected by the discharge.
Although there may be some apparent confusion from the use of terms, I do not think
the interest of the creditors constitutes a
lien, within the meaning of the bankrupt
act; nor in any such legal sense as to give
creditors a priority, except by means of the
usual equitable remedies. A lien is not a
property in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a mere right of action for the thing.
It more properly constitutes a charge upon
the thing. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 506; 1 Burrill,
Law Diet. tit. "Lien." In some general sense
creditors have an equitable lien upon the
property thus situated. So they would have,
if a general liability instead of a resulting
trust had been declared. So debts are an equitable lien upon property fraudulently transferred by a debtor; and it may be said that
every debtor is a trustee for his creditors and
bound to use his property for their benefit,
and that creditors have an equitable lien upon
the property of the debtor. But in all these
cases the usual remedies are to be pursued
to create and enforce the lien before a specific charge constituting an incumbrance is created. There is no mystery in the term "re-
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sulting trust." After adopting the fifty-first
It was indispensable to make some
provision to preserve the rights of creditors,
otherwise the grantee w6uld have held the
title absolutely against creditors and all others. Hence the fifty-second section was adopted, which placed the property in the same
relation to creditors as it would have been
if the debtor himself had fraudulently ti'ansferred it, and the words used were appropriate for that purpose. The object of the
statute was to cut off all interest in the pei-son paying the consideration, and then to declare property liable for his debts; but this
liability can only be enforced in the usual
mode. A creditor at large cannot enforce the
liability without a preliminary judgment and
execution. When the legislature transformed
this from a legal into an equitable interest,
we must presume that they intended to apply
equitable rules and principles existing at the
time for its enforcement. One of them is
that before the equitable interests of a debtor
can be reached in equity all available legal
remedies must be exhausted. It is not necessary to hold that such an action is in
strictness a creditor's bill, and that jurisdiction depends upon a technical compliance
with the statute. The general powers of a
court of equity over trusts and frauds may
be conceded as sufficient to confer jurisdiction, but this concession does not dispense
with the rule of equity which existed prior
to and independently of the statute, that
creditors must exhaust available, legal remedies before resorting to courts of e(juity to
reach equitable interests. In Beck v. Burdett, 1 Paige, 305, the chancellor laid down
the rule of equity established before the Revised Statutes, as follows: "There are two
classes
of cases where a plaintiff is permitted to come into this court for relief after
he has proceeded to judgment and execution
at law, without obtaining satisfaction of his
In one case the issuing of an execudebt.
tion gives to the plaintife a lien upon the
property; but he is compelled to come here
for the purpose of removing some obstruction, fraudulently or inequitably interposed,
In the
to prevent a sale on the execution.
other, .the plaintiff comes here to obtain, satisfaction of his debt, out of property which
cannot be reached by execution at law. In the
latter case, his right to relief here depends
upon the fact of his having exhausted his
legal remedies without being able to obtain
satisfaction of his judgment." Wiggins v.
Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144, 283; BrinkerhofC V. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 671, and cases
there cited.
The foundation of courts of equity is to
exercise jurisdiction "in cases of rights recognized and protected by municipal jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate and complete
1
remedy cannot be had in courts of law."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 33. Legal remedies are the
cheapest and most expeditious for creditors,
section,
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and in this class of cases they protect both
creditor and the person holding the title.
As between the grantor and debtor, the latter is bound, both in law and equity, to pay
his debts from other property if he has it;
and the dictates of propriety, as well as the
established rules of equity, require that resort should in the first instance be had to
such other property, if it can be reached by
the ordinary process of law. This question
is only pertinent in this case, as an argument
to elucidate the nature of the interest of
creditors under this statute. Although the
indorsement of the execution "nulla bona"
was not filed, it was actually made, which,
with the other facts alleged, may be regarded
a substantial compliance with the equity rule
referred to. But neither the judgment nor
execution constituted a lien upon equitable
Interests. The commencement of the equitable action and the filing of the lis pendens
This is well
was necessary for that purpose.
settled in analogous cases. In Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atk. 357, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
held that a bona fide assignment of such
property after Judgment and execution would
a bill
be valid, and added: "But after
brought, and a lis pendens created, as to this
thing, such assignment could not prevaU."
Weed V. Pierce, 9 Cow. 722; Coming v.
White, 2 Paige, 567; Spader v. Davis, 5 Johns.
Ch. 280; Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige, 687.
Judge Story lays down the general rule that
"courts will also enforce the security of a
judgment creditor against the equitable interest in the freehold estate of his debtor,
treating the judgment as in the nature of a
lien upon such equitable interest. But in all
cases of this sort, the judgment creditor
must have pursued the same steps as he
would have been obliged to do to perfect his
lien, if the estate had been legal." Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1216; Neate v. Duke of Marlborough,
3 Mylne & C. 407, 415.
The nature of the interest of creditors under this statute, and the remedy to enforce
such interest, have not been definitely settled by the courts of this state. Brewster v.
Power, 10 Paige, 562, was a case where the
only point involved, and the only one decided, was whether the plaintiff was and
must be a creditor at the time of the conveyance, in order to avail himself of the interest
secured to creditors under the statute. The
chancellor dismissed the bill, but in the
course of his opinion, made the following remark: "I am not prepared to say that a
judgment for such a debt would not create
a preferable lien in equity upon such real
property, except as against a purchaser for a
valuable consideration."
In McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 53, the
plaintiff had prosecuted the defendant to
judgment and execution in Minnesota, where
he resided, and then commenced
an action
In this state, to reach property which had
been paid for by the debtor and transferred
to his wife.
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infer from the opinions that the court declined to decide whether in such a case it
was necessary to exhaust the legal remedies.
At all events, such is the most favorable construction of the case for the plaintiffs.
Porter, J., who delivered one of the opinions,
said: "The case presented being one of pure
trust, we are not prepared to say that the
action might not have been maintained without recourse in the first instance to all attainable legal remedies against the principal
debtor; but it is unnecessary to determine
this question, as the fact is admitted that all
remedies at law were exhausted against the
debtor in the state in which he resided, and
that in this state no legal remedy was availDavis, J., who also delivered an opinable."
ion, said: "The case is an anomalous one.
There exists concededly in the farm held by
the respondent a pure trust in favor of the
appellants.
But to reach and apply this
trust estate a general rule of equity requires
that they should have exhausted their legal
remedy."
The case was decided upon the
ground that the plaintiffs had exhausted all
available legal remedies, and that the court
would entertain jurisdiction by virtue of its
inherent equitable powers.
The opinions of the learned judges in the
two cases referred to, although not at all decisive, and not very explicit upon the main
point, are not antagonistic
to the views
above expressed.
The most that can be said
is that one or two of them entertained an
undefined impression that the words "resulting trust," as used in this statute, meant
something more than a declaration that the
property was liable for existing debts to be
enforced in the mode prescribed for reaching
other equitable interests.
The learned chancellor was not prepared to
say but a judgment might constitute a "preferable lien;" but as it was unnecessary to decide it, he refrained from expressing an opinion, and Porter, J., was not prepared to say
but the claim might be enforced without resort to any legal remedies, but he expressly
declined on behalf of the court any intention
to determine the question, while Davis, J.,
held that although the court could exercise
jurisdiction independently of the statute, the
general rules of equity required that the legal
remedies should be exhausted.
The decision
in both cases was undoubtedly right, and it
is quite unnecessary in this case to criticise
any of the intimations.
The question of a
lien was not involved in either case. If it
should be conceded that it was not indisI)ensable to exhaust the legal remedies, and
that an action would lie by a creditor at
large, no lien would exist until an action was
actually commenced for that purpose. The
statute does not restrict the creditor to this
property.
It gives him a right to pursue the
property in the hands of the fraudulent grantee, but he is not obliged to do so; and until
he takes some decisive legal step evincing his
purpose to do so no lien is created any more
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than would have been upon property fraudulently transferred by the debtor himself.
The harmony and analogies of the law are
better preserved by requiring all available
legal remedies to be resorted to as a preliminary requisite to an action for the applicaIt is difficult to
tion of the trust property.
perceive any distinction, or any reason for it,
between the rights of creditors as to propertransferred by the debtor
ty fraudulently
himself, and property paid for by him and
Why should
transferred to a third person.
creditors have difEerent and superior rights
to enforce their debts in the latter case to
can see no
those enjoyed in the former?
do not bereason for any distinction, and
lieve the statute has created any. But in
either case the commencement of an equi-

I
I
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table action is necessary to constitute a lien
or charge, in any legal sense, upon the land.
These views dispose of the plaintiffs' case.
The judgment or debt is the foundation of
this action. Both were extinguished before
the action was commenced.
The plaintiffs
sought to enforce and secure a lien against
this property by virtue of their rights ascreditors. The debt having been discharged,
they were not creditors, and could not avail
themselves of the resulting trust, which was
secured to creditors only. The relation must
exist at the time of the conveyance, and at
the time when the action is commenced, tO'
establish the lien.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur, except GROVER, J., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.
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MITCHELL

T.

READ.

y. 123.)
(61 N.
Court of Appeals of New York. May 21, 1874.
Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court in the First judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of
defendant, entered upon decision of the court
Reported below, 61 Barb.
at special term.
310.

This action was brought to have certain

obtained by the defendant during the
existence of a copartnership between him
and plaintiff, for terms to commence at its
termination, of premises leased and occupied
by the firm, declared to have been taken for
the partnership, and to have it adjudged that
the uetenuant held them as trustee for the
The facts found were substanpartnership.
tially as follows:
The plaintiffs veere copartners, conducting
and carrying on the Hoffman House, in the
city of New York. The copartnership, by its
terms, expired May 1, 1871; it owned various leases of premises which were used for
the partnership business. All of the leases
expired at the same time with the copartnership. The firm had spent large sums of
money in making valuable improvements and
in fitting up the leasehold premises so tha1i
they coiild be beneficially used in connection,
and also in fixtures and furnishing, and by
their joint efforts had built up a profitable
business, and largely enhanced the rental valus of the premises. In 1S69 the defendant,
without any notice of his intent to apply
therefor, and without the knowledge of plaintiff, procured renewal leases, in his own name,
of the premises, for terms commencing at the
termination of the partnership leases and of
the partnership, which, upon discovery thereof having been made by plaintiff, defendant
claimed were his property exclusively, and
refused to recognize or acknowledge that the
partnership or plaintiff had any right or interest therein.
Other facts appear in the
opinion.
The court found as conclusions of law that
the defendant Read was the sole owner of
the leases executed to him as aforesaid, and
that the plaintiff had no right, title, nor intei'est in or to them, or either of them, and
that the defendants have judgment accordingly,
duly excepted.
to
which plaintiff
Judgment was rendered accordingly.
The plaintiff commenced
this action soon
after he ascertained that the defendant had
taken the new leases, to wit, in March, 1870,
and the cause was brought to trial in February, 1871.
leases,

A. J. Vanderpoel and J. E. Burrill, for appellant. John K. Porter and Willard O. Bartlett, for respondents.

EARL, O. The relation of partners with
each other is one of trust and confidence.
Bach is the general agent of the firm, and is

bound to act in entire good faith to the othThe functions, rights and duties of partners in a great measure comprehend those
both of trustees and agents, and the general
rules of law applicable to such characters
are applicable to them. Neither partner can,
in the business and affairs of the firm, clandestinely stipulate for a private advantage
to himself;
he can neither sell to nor buy
from the firm at a concealed profit to himself. Every advantage which he can obtain
in the business of the firm must inure to the
These principles are elebenefit of the firm.'
mentary, and are not contested.
Story,
Partn. §§ 174, 175; Colly. Partn. 181, 182.
It has been frequently held that when one
partner obtains the renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in his own name, he will
be held a trustee for the firm as to the reIt is conceded that this is the
newed lease.
rule where the partnership Is for a limited
term, and either partner takes a lease commencing within the term; but the contention is that the rule does not apply where
the lease thus taken is for a term to commence after the expiration of the partnership by its own limitation, and whether this
contention is well founded is one of the
grave questions to be determined upon this
er.

appeal.

It is not necessary, in maintaining the right
of the plaintiff in this case to hold that in
all cases a lease thus taken shall inure to the
benefit of the firm, but whether, upon the
facts of this case, these leased ought to inure to the benefit of this firm
will briefly
allude to some of the prominent features of
this case. These parties had been partners
for some years; ' they were equal in dignity,
although their interests differed. The plaintiff
was not a mere subordinate in the firm, but
so far as appears, just as important and efficient in its affairs as the defendant. They
procured the exclusive control of the leases of
the property, to terminate May 1, 1871, and
their partnership was to terminate on the
They expended many thousand
same day.
dollars in fitting up the premises, a portion
thereof after the new leases were obtained,
and they expended a very large sum in furnishing them. By their joint skill and influence they built up a very large and profitable business, which largely enhanced the
rental value of the premises.
More than
two years before the expiration of their
leases and of their partnership, the defendant secretly procured, at an increased rent,
in his own name, the new leases, which are
of great value. Although the plaintiff was
in daily intercourse with the defendant, he
knew nothing of these leases for about a
year after they had been obtained.
There
is no proof that the lessors would not have
leased to the firm as readily as to the defendant alone.
The permanent fixtures, by
the terms of the leases at their expiration,
belonged to the lessors.
But the movable

I
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fixtures and furniture were worth vastly
more to be kept and used In the hotel than
to be removed elsewhere.
Upon these facts
can entertain no doubt, both upon principle and authority, that these leases should
be held to inure to the benefit of the firm.
If the defendant can hold these leases, he
could have held them if he had secretly obtained them immediately after the partnership commenced, and had concealed the fact
from the plaintifC during the whole term.
There would thus have been, during the
whole term, in making permanent improvements and in furnishing the hotel, a conflict
between his duty to the firm and to his selfinterest. Large investments and Extensive
furnishing would add to the value of his lease,
and
defendant would be under constant
temptation to make them.
While he might
not yield to the temptation, and while proof
might show that he had not yielded, the law
will not allow a trustee thus situated to be
thus tempted, and therefore disables him
from making a contract for his own benefit.
Terwilliger v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 237, and cases
cited.
It matters not that the court at special term found upon the evidence that the
improvements
were judicious and prudent for
the purposes
of the old term. The plaintiff
was entitled to the unbiased judgment of the
defendant as to such improvements, uninfluenced by his private and separate interest.
But, further, the parties owned together a
large amount of hotel property in the form of
furniture and supplies, considerably exceeding, as I infer, $100,000 in value. Assuming
that the partnership was not to be continued
after the 1st day of May, 1871, this property
was to be sold, or in some way disposed of
for the benefit of the firm, and each partner
owed a duty to the firm to dispose of it to the
best advantage.
Neither could, without the
violation of his duty to the fii'm, place the
property in such a situation that it would be
sacrificed,
or that he could purchase it for
his separate benefit, at a great profit. Much
of this property, such as mirrors, carpets, etc.,
was fitted for use in this hotel, and it is quite
manifest that all of it would sell better with
a lease of the hotel, than it would to be removed therefrom. It is clear that one or both
of these parties could obtain advantageous
leases of the hotel for a term of years, and
hence, if the parties had determined to dissolve their partnership, it would have been a
measure
of ordinary prudence to have obtained the leases and transferred the property with the leases as the only mode of realizing its value. This was defeated by the act
of the defendant, if he is allowed to hold these
leases, and thus place himself in a position
where the proprty must be largely sacrificed
or purchased by himself at a great advantage.
This the law will not tolerate. The language
of Lord Eldon. in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 311, a case in many respects
He says:
resembling this, is quite in point.
"If they [the defendants] can hold this lease

I
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and the partnership stock Is not brought to
sale, they are by no means on equal terms.
The stock cannot be of equal value to the
plaintiff, who was to carry it away and seek
some place in which to put it, as to the defendants who were to continue It in the
place where the trade was already established, and if the stock was sold the same construction would give them an advantage over
the bidders.
In effect they would have secured the good-will of the trade to themselves
in exclusion of their partner."
For these reasons, independently of the consideration that
the leases themselves
had a value to which
the firm was entitled upon other grounds and
upon authorities to be hereafter cited, the
plaintiff, who commenced his suit about one
year before the term of the partnership expired, was upon undisputed principles and authorities applicable to all trustees and persons holding a fiduciary relation to others,
entitled to the relief he prayed for.
It has long been settled by adjudications,
that generally when one partner obtains the
renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in
his own name, he will be held a trustee for
the firm, in the renewed lease, and when the
rule is otherwise applicable, it matters not
that the new lease is upon different terms
from the old one, or for a larger rent, or that
the lessor would not have leased to the firm.
The law recognizes the renewal of a lease as
a reasonable expectancy of the tenants in possession, and in many cases protects this expectancy as a thing of value.
I will briefly
notice a few of the cases upon this subject.
In Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30,
Chancellor Kent says: "It is a general principle pervading the cases, that if a mortgagee,
executor,
trustee, tenant for life, etc., who
has a limited interest, gets an advantage by
being in possession, 'or behind the back' of
the party interested
in the subject, or by
some contrivance or fraud, he shall not retain the same for his own benefit, but hold
That was a case where a lease
it in trust."
was assigned as security, and the assignees
surrendered
it to the lessor and took a new
lease for an extended
term of years.
In
Phyfe V. Warden, 5 Paige, 268, Chancellor
Walworth lays down the general rule: "That
if a person who has a particular or special interest in a lease obtains a renewal thereof
from the circumstance of his being in possession as tenant, or from having such particular interest, the renewed lease is in equity
of the origconsidered as a mere continuance
inal lease, subject to the additional charges
upon the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the equitable rights of all parties who had
any interest, either legal or equitable, in the
old lease." That case was followed in Gibbes
V. Jenkins, 8 Sandf. Ch. 131, where it was
held that one purchasing a leasehold which
was subject to a mortgage and contained no
covenant of renewal, could not escape the lien
of the mortgage by suffering the lease to expire and afterward obtaining a new lease of
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the premises; that the new lease in such case,
though not a renewal, was a continuance of
the original lease for the purpose of protecting
the rights of the parties interested in the original lease, both legal and equitable. In these
two cases church leases were involved, and
some stress was laid upon that fact, as the
continuance of such leases was expected as a
matter of course, without any covenant of

renewal. But the fact that they were church
could malie no real difference in the
principle upon which the decisions were based.
The fact that a renewal or continuance of a
lease is more or less certain can malse no difference with the principle; that springs from
the fact that the party obtained a new lease
from the position he occupied, being in possession and having the good-will which accompanies that, or being connected with the
old lease in some way, and thus enabled to
talje an inequitable advantage of other parties also interested, to whom he owed some
duty.
In Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N. Y. 357, it was
held that when during the existence
of a
continuing copartnership of undetermined duration, three or tour copartners, without the
knowledge of the other, obtained a new lease
in their own names, of premises leased and
used by the firm, the same became partnership property, and upon dissolution the other
partner was entitled to his proportion of the
value.
In that case the defendants Intended
to dissolve the copartnership as early as August, and gave written notice on the 18th day
of September, 1865, for the dissolution on the
31st day of December following.
On the 11th
day of September, the defendants secretly obtained a new lease, in their own names, of
the same premises, for a term of five years,
to commence May 1, 1866.
I thinli that case
is fairly decisive of this. It is true that a
period for a dissolution of the partnership had
not been fixed when the new lease was taken,
but negotiations were pending for its dissolution, and a few days after the new lease was
taken, a time for its dissolution was fixed by
a written notice.
But it can make no difference that the partnership might have been
continued by the parties until after the new
term commenced.
So it might here, if the
parties had so willed. There they had the
right to dissolve it at any time. The principle
which lies at the foundation of the decision
of that and all similar cases must be the one
above stated, that the defendants in possession took advantage of their position to procure the new lease, and thus deprived the
plaintiff of a benefit to which he, with them,
was equally entitled. In a note to Moody v.
Matthews, 17 Ves. (Sumn. Ed.) 185, the learned editor says, as a deduction from adjudged
cases, that "with a possible exception in favor
of a bona fide purchaser, it seems to be an
universal rule that no one who is in possession of a lease or a particular interest in a
lease, which lease is affected with any sort of
equity in behalf of third persons, can renew
leases

the same for his own use only; but such renewal must be construed as a graft upon the
old stock."
In Clements v. Hall, 2 De 6ex
& J. 173, where one partner in a mining partnership died in 1847, and the surviving part-

thereafter worked the mine without a
lease thereof, claiming to do so for his
benefit, until 1850, when the lessor gave
notice to quit in March, 1851, when he
entered into new negotiations with the lessor
for a new lease, and obtained one of the
greater part of the mine, on terms much more
burdensome than those of the old tenancy, it
was held that those who claimed under the
will of the deceased partner were entitled to
a share of the benefit of the new lease.
In
Clegg V. Fishwick, 1 Macn. & G. 294, one of
several partners working a mine under a
lease died, and the firm business was thereafter carried on for several years between the
surviving partners and the plaintiff, widow of
the deceased partner.
Finally the old lease
expired, and some of the partners took a new
lease of the mine without the privity of the
plaintiff.
It was held that the estate of the
deceased partner was interested in the new
lease.
The lord chancellor says:
"The old
lease was the foundation of the new lease,
and the tenant's right of renewal arising out
of the old lease giving the partners the benefit
of this new lease; at least, the law assumes
it to be so. Without saying at all what circumstances
there may be to interfere with
that ordinary right, we know that the rule of
equity is that parties interested jointly with
others in a lease cannot take to themselves
the benefit of a renewal to the exclusion of
the other parties interested with them."
In
Clegg V. Edmondson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 787,
the managing partners of a mining partnership at will gave notice of dissolution to the
rest, and intimated their intention, after the
dissolution, to apply for a new lease for their
own exclusive benefit, and did so and obtained a lease, and it was held to inure to the
benefit of the partnership.
See, also, the leading cases of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17
Ves. 298, and Keech v. Sandford, 2 Eq. Gas.
Abr. 741, and notes to the latter case in 1
Lead. Cas. Eq. 32, where the whole doctrine
is discussed, and conclusion reached in harmony with the views above expressed.
I
therefore conclude that it makes no difference
that these leases were obtained for a term to
commence after the partnership, by its own
limitation, was to terminate.
I can find no
authority holding that it does, and there is no
principle sustaining the distinction claimed.
The defendant was in possession as a member
of the firm, and the firm held the good-will
for a renewal, which ordinarily . attaches to
the possession.
By his occupancy, and the
payment of the rent, he was brought into intimate relations with the lessors; he became
well acquainted with the value of the premises, and he took advantage of his position,
during tlie partnership, secretly to obtain the
new leases.
He must hold them for the firm.
ner
new
own
him
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I am therefore of opinion tliat the judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
DWIGHT, C. The question at issue in this
case is, whether a member of a commercial
partnership, during its continuance, and without the consent or knowledge of his associate,
can talse a renewal of a lease of property
used in the business, in his own name and
for his own benefit, the partnership having a
definite termination, and the renewal lease
commencing at its expiration.
The general power of a partner to take a
lease of such property for his own benefit
must be considered
as settled in this court
by the decision in Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N.
In that case the lease was taken
Y. 357.
during the existence of the partnership, which
was of indefinite duration. No notice had been
given of its termination when this lease was
taken.
The facts presented the case of a
lease taken during the existence of tha partnership, and to begin in enjoyment during
that time.
The court expressely distinguished
it from the present case, which had then
been decided in the supreme court. Page 362.
The only point now open for discussion is,
whether the fact that when Read took the
renewal of the lease the partnership had a
precise limit, and was to terminate before
the lease commenced,
is material.
Before
considering that point, it may fairly be claimed that this case comes within the precise
decision in Struthers v. Pearce, on a ground
Read,
not
mentioned in the argument.
though his lease was not to commence in possession until after the expiration of the original lease, acquired an immediate interest by
way of an interesse termini.
This precise
point was decided in Smith v. Day, 2 Mees.
& W. 684, 699 ; 2 Piatt, Leas. 60. This, it is time,
is not an estate, but a right.
Still it is the
subject of grant before ontry. 1 Steph.
Comm. 268; Burt. Real Prop. 18, pi. 61; 2
Crabb, Real Prop. 22T. If the partnership
had acquired this interesse termini, it might,
as the facts of the case show, have been disposed of for a largo sum of money.
the
doctrine of Struthers v. Pearce establishes
that the partner cannot acquire a lease in his
own behalf, to commence while the partnership lasts, by parity of reasoning he cannot
obtain an interesse termini under the same
circumstances.
If however this view is not correct, the
main question must be disposed of.
Can a
partner take a lease for himself, to commence
in possession after the partnership has ex-

If

pired?
essential

In order to settle this point it is
to give the subject a more full ex-

amination than was requisite in Struthers v.
Pearce, and to consider more at large the principles on which this branch of the law rests.
It grows out of the relation of trust and confidence between partners, and is a branch of
the rule that a trustee cannot profit from the
It largely has its
estate for which he acts.
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roots in a principle of public policy, as shown
in one of the early decisions.
Keech v. Sandford, Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; Griffin v. Griffin, 1
Schoales & L. 352, per Lord Redesdale.
The
general rule is so well settled that it would
be a waste of time to refer to authorities.
The text-writers on the law of partnership,
without exception, assert the applicability of
this rule of law to partnership transactions.
Lindl. Partn. 495; Story, Partn. §§ 174, 175;
Parsons, Partn. §§ 224^226; CoUy, Partn §§
281, 282.
The special

rule that a trustee cannot take,
for his own benefit, a renewal of a lease
which he holds in trust, is enforced in a great
number of cases.
The principle on which it
rests is nowhere more fully or clearly stated
than in the argument of Su- Francis Hargrave in Lee v. Yernon, 5 Brown, Pari. Cas.
(10th Eng. Ed.) 1803. Although the passage is
somewhat long, it is quoted aS shedding much
light on a subject, the principle of which has
in course of time, become somewhat obscure.
He said: "It has long been an established
practice to consider those who are in possession of lands under leases for lives or years
as having an interest beyond the subsisting
term, and this interest is usually termed the
tenant right of renewal, which though according to language and ideas strictly legal, is
not any certain or even contingent estate;
but only a chance, theie being no means of
compelling a renewal, yet is so adverted to in
all transactions relative to leasehold property, that it influences tbe price in sales, and
is often an inducement to accept of it in
mortgages and settlements.
This observation
is more especially applicable to leases from
the crown, the church, colleges or other corporations, and indeed from private persons,
where the tenure is of ancient date. * * *
This 'tenant right' of renewal as it is termed,
however imperfect or contingent in its nature, being still a thing of value, ought to
be protected by the courts of justice, and
when those who are entitled to its incidental
advantages, whether by purchase or other derivation, are disappointed of them by fraud,
imposition, misrepresentation, or unfair practice of any kind, it is fit and reasonable that
Accordingly
this injury should have redress.
courts of equity have so far recognized the
tenant right of renewal as frequently to interpose in its favor by decreeing that new or
reversionary leases gained by means or supposition of the tenant right of renewal should
be for the benefit of the same persons as
were interested in the ancient lease, and those
who procured such new leases and were legally possessed of them, should be trustees
Thee is a great variety of
for that purpose.
authorities on this head, but the cases which
have hitherto occurred have been principally
of two kinds, some being cases of persons
not having any beneficial interest in the old
lease, as guardians and executors, and others
being cases of persons having only partial
and limited interests, as tenants for life, mort-
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and mortgagors, and in cases of both
descriptions tliose who have procured a new
lease in such situations have been uniformly
declared trustees for the persons beneficially
interested in the ancient lease, either wholly
or in part, according to the particular circumstances, the court ever presuming that the
new lease was obtained by means of a connection with and a reference to the interest
in the ancient one, without in the least regarding whether the persons renewing intended to act as trustees, or for their own emolument."
From this exposition so luminous and judicial in its tone, which is fully sustained by
the authorities, it is clear that the rule under consideration is not confined to crown,
church or college leases, but embraces those
of every kind.
The same principle appertains to all. The cestui que trust has a right
to the chance of renewal.
Though this is
termed a "tenant right" as between the lessee and the landlord, that is a mere phrase.
It is a hope, an expectation, rather than a
right.
Such as it is the trustee shall not
take it to himself, but if it results in any
substantial benefit he shall hold it for his
Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, 268;
beneficiary.
Bennett v. Van Syckel, 4 Duer, 162; Gibbes
V. Jenkins,
130; Davoue v.
3 Sandf. Ch.
Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 572; Dickinson v. Codwise,
1 Sandf. Ch. 226.
Some of these were instances of church or other corporation leases,
and others were not.
In no case has it been
held that the rule is confined to these, as it
certainly cannot be on principle.
The whole doctrine is extended to the case
of partners in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick,
17 Ves. 298; Clegg v. Edmondson,
8 De
Gex, M. & G. 787; Clements v. Hall, 2 De
Gex & J. 173; Clegg v. Fish wick, 1 Macn.
& G. 294; Struthers v. Peai-ce, supra.
The principle cannot depend on the fact
whether the lease is made to begin during
the continuance of the partnership or at its
close.
Once
admit the general principle,
and it must result in this. While the relation lasts, one partner cannot clandestinely
and exclusively profit by the trust relation.
There may perhaps be cases where the act
is openly done by the trustee and acquiesced
in by the beneficiary that would admit of
different considerations.
It is not now necessary to decide that in no case can "a partner take a lease for his own benefit.
What
is now to be decided is, whether he can do
so behind the back of his associate and without his consent.
The bad consequences
of
making any such distinction as the defendant seeks to maintain in the present case is
easily shown by a reference to the relation
of a guardian and his ward. A guardian,
we may suppose, holds a lease in his official
character which is to expire at his ward's
majority.
While the relation of guardian
and ward exists, he takes a lease to himself
to commence at the termination of the exgagees

isting lease.
Could that be sustained? Has
he not profited by the trust relation?
When
he takes a lease to himself, can a tenable
distinction be taken between one commencing immediately and one beginning at a
future day, even though that day be postponed until the trust relation expires? The
sound rule is that he cannot make any profit
to himself from a secret transaction initiated while the relation of trustee and cestui

que trust exists, no matter when it springs
into active operation. It must never be forgotten that on general principles of the law
of contracts his right to the lease, as between
him and his landlord, commences as soon
as he has made his agreement for it. This
is an immediate subject of sale, and if the
trustee can hold it he wiU be allowed to
profit by the trust relation which, as has
been shown, he cannot do.
The cestui que
trust may accordingly say: "All the value
of this lease you hold in trust for me. Grant
that it is not yet an estate but only a rightmake it over to me in the condition in which
you hold it."
While no case has been found
presenting the precise facts in the case at
bar, the principles which should govern it
may be derived from the result in Featherstonhaugh V. Fenwick, supra, Clegg v. Edmondson, and Clegg v. Fishwick, supra.
In the first of these cases the partnership
was for an indefinite period, and might be
dissolved at the pleasure of either party, on
notice. It was dissolved November 22, 1804,
the day on which the lease expired. Two of
the partners, without communication with
the plaintiff, had applied for a renewal of the
lease, ajid obtained it before giving notice of
the dissolution of the partnei-ship. The new
lease was to run for eight years from the
expiration of the old one.
On October 19
they gave notice to dissolve the partnership.
The court held that the new lease belonged
to the partnership and was assets of the
firm.
Much stress was laid on the fact that
the transaction was a clandestine one, and
the court thought if notice had been given
the case might have admitted of different
consideration. The case is not in aU respects
parallel in its facts with the case at bar,
for at the time the lease was taken the period for the termination of the partnership
had not been fixed, and only became subsequently ascertained by notice.
In the case of Clegg v. Edmondson, which
was also an instance of a partnership to he
dissolved at the pleasure of the parties, the
effect of a notice to dissolve, preceding the
execution of the renewal lease, came before
the court.
In that case five managing partners had determined to dissolve their partnership, and had communicated their intent
in June, 1846, and their determination to
take a renewal to themselves. To this two
other partners objected, claiming that the
renewal should be for the benefit of all. Formal notice of dissolution was given in July,
to take effect on September 30. On the sue-
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ceeding 11th of December a new lease was
executed
for twenty-one years to the managing paitners, to taJie effect from September 29, 1846. The defendants endeavored to
distinguish this case from that of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwlck, on the ground of the
and fairness of the transaction.
openness
The court however held that the mere communication of an Intent on the part of the
managing partners to apply for a lease for
their own benefit was not sufllcient to give
them an exclusive right to it.
This case, on
the point of time, is stronger than the case
at bar, for the new lease was taken after the
was dissolved,
though some
partnership
stress was laid upon a point which does not
appear here, that the act was that of managing partners.
On principle, in many cases. It is of but little consequence whether the partnership is
dissolved or not before the renewal, since, if
the former partners become tenants in common, the result Is the same.
Clements v.
Hall, 2 De Gex & .T. 1T3; Van Home v.
Fonda, 5 Johns. Gh. 388; Baiier v. Whiting,
3 Sumn. 475, Fed. Gas. No. 787.
The case of
Clegg V. Fishwlck is still nearer to the one
In this instance, the
under consideration.
renewal lease was obtained during the existence of the partnership, and the lease commenced at its expiration.
This lease was declared to be held in trust for the firm.
Without further collation of authorities,
the fair deductions from the principles on
which they rest may be summed up as follows:
1. A trustee holding a lease, whether corporate or individual, holds the renewal as a
trustee, and as he held the original lease.
2. This does not depend upon any right
which the cestui que trust has to the renewal, but upon the theory that the new
lease is, in technical terms, a "graft" upon
the old one; and that the trustee "had a facility," by means of his relation to the estate,
for obtaining the renewal, from which he
shall not personally profit.
extends to commercial
3. This doctrine
partnerships, and one of several partners
cannot, while a partnership continues, take
a renewal lease clandestinely, or "behind the
backs" of his associates, for his own benefit.
It Is not material that the landlord would not
have granted the new lease to the other partners, or to the firm.
the
4. It is of no consequence whether
partnership is for a definite or an indefinite
period.
The disability to take the lease for
individual profit grows out of the partnership relation.
While that lasts, the renewal
cannot be taken for individual purposes, even
though the lease does not commence until
after the expiration of the partnership.
be assumed that
5. It cannot necessarily
the renewal can be taken by an individual
member of the firm, even after dissolution.
The former partners may still be tenants In
common; or there may be other reasons, of

a fiduciary nature, why the transaction
not be entered into.
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The authorities cited on behalf of the defendant do not disprove these conclusions.
In Lee v. Vernon, supra, there was no
trust. The question arose between a stranger to the lease and the claimant.
The point
made by the plaintifC was that the "tenant
right" of renewal had become strictly a right,
so that even a stranger could not take' a renewal and hold it for his own benefit.
It
was an extraordinary
claim, having no
foundation in principle, and was rejected.
In Van Dyke v. Jackson, 1 B. D. Smith,
419, the party had made a special contract
with his partner to abandon the place where
the business was carried on. The case turned on the special coilti-act to leave the business in the hands of the other party.
Musselman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 81, does not
raise the question. It was not sought there
to charge a partner with the value of a renewal lease which he had taken to himself
during the existence of the partnership, but
rather with that of the good-will as it existed after the partnership was dissolved.
In
fact the place where the business was carried on was sold for the benefit of the firm,
and it was held. In substance, that the goodwill had been realized in the enhanced value
of the property sold.
It is said, in the present case, that Read
was not authorized, by the articles of partnership, to contract for Mitchell after the expiration of the firm; and that therefore
Mitchell cannot take advantage from the re^
newal lease.
The answer Is that he made
the contract while the firm was in existence,
and Mitchell may adopt and ratify it. The
objection also proves too much, as it applies
to all the cases in which the partner, acting
clandestinely, has been declared a trustee.
In Phillips V. Reeder, 18 N. J. E'q. 95, one
of the partners, R., prior to the partnership,
owned the lease, exclusively, of certain stone
quarries. He entered into a partnership with
P. for three years, and so much longer as R.
In
should continue lessee of the quarries.
the lease, there was a covenant of renewal
at the option of R. He having declined to
renew, it was held that the partnership expired; or, in other words, that R. was un^
der no obligation to renew, and thus to conThere could be no
tinue the partnership.
pretense in this case that the doctrine under
the review applied, since the original lease
did not itself belong to the firm. It was the
private property of one of the partners,
which he was under no obligation to preserve
for the firm's benefit.
In Achenson v. Fair, 3 Dm. & War. 512,
the point decided was, that the doctrine was
not to be extended to additional lands purchased by trustee; in other words, the rule
was fully recognized, but nothing was to be
governed by it except that which could be
fairly regarded as a graft on the former
lease.
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In Nesbitt v. Tredennick, 1 Ball & B. 29,
48, a mortgagee, not in possession, obtained
a renewal, the original lease having been for-

feited, both in law and equity, for nonpayment of rent. Here there was no violation
of trust. The rule under discussion was fully recognized, but its application to the ex"'In all
isting case denied. The court said:
the cases upon this subject, either the party,
by being in possession, obtained the renewal,
or it was done behind the back, or by some
contrivance in fraud of those who were interested in the old lease; and there was either a remnant of the old lease, or a tenant
right of renewal, on which a new lease could
be engrafted."
There could be no plainer
recognition of the general principle maintained by the plaintiff.
In Munsell v. O'Brien, 1 Jones, Ir. 184, the
facts were, that there was an under-tenant
who took a new lease from the original landlord without advising his own immediate
landlord.
The court held that there was no
fiduciary relation between these parties.
The principle was fully admitted, but the
facts did not raise a case for its application.
Joy, C. B., said: "It is admitted that there
is no authority which can be produced where
such a lease as the present has been declared
to be a trust; and that we are now called
upon to go further than any decision has
ever gone before, and to make an authority
for future decisions. We are called upon to
do this on what are called the principles of a
court of eauity; namely, that where a person is clothed with a fiduciary chai'acter, and
in that character becomes possessed of an interest in land, held under a determinable
lease, any acquisition by him of a new interest in those lands is a continuation of the old
This however
lease, and a 'graft' upon it.
is the first time that I have heard it asserted
that if an under-tenant obtains a lease of his
lands from the head landlord without consulting his own immediate landlord that
lease is a trust for his immediate landlord,
because that person had a tenant right of
But there is no fiduciary character
renewal.
imposed on an under-tenant, in reference to
his landlord, by the creation of the relation
of landlord and tenant, which would entitle
the plaintiff to the relief he seeks, on the
ground of his having a tenant right of renewal. A cestui que trust Is entitled to the
benefit of a new lease, obtained by a trustee
by means of a tenant right of renewal, which
the latter became entitled to as trustee, but
there is no such person in the present case.'"
This language plainly shows that the court
was but following In the wake of Lee v.
Vernon; and holding that the doctrine of
tenant right of renewal, and that the new
lease is a graft on the old stock, are not to
be extended to strangers, but confined to persons acting in a fiduciary character.
The only other case that will be noticed is
Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y. 236, which holds,
that one partner may in good faith purchase

and hold, for his own us€, the reversion of
real estate occupied by the copartnership, under a lease for years, with the qualification
that if he secretly makes such purchase in
his own name while the other partner with
his concurrence Is negotiating with the owner to obtain the property for the use of the
firm, the purchaser will be declared a trustee.
This decision carefully admits the general
doctrine, but considers It not applicable to
the case where one of the partners purchases
in good faith the landlord's Interest as distinguished from taking a new lease. It is
simply a case of an exception to a general
rule. It can scarcely be considered as a decision in favor of a partner's right to purchase, since he was, under the circumstances,
Should the question be distinctly
a trustee.
presented, it will deserve consideration
whether the view in Anderson v. Lemon,
that one partner may even in good faith buy
the reversion for himself. Is correct.
There
is a great cogency in the remarks of Sir William Grant, that the partner may in this way
Intercept and cut off the chance of future renewals and consequently make use of his
situation to prejudice the Interests of his associates. Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190, 197.
There appears to be no direct decision allowing the partner thus to purchase, and the
right to do so is treated as doubtful by approved text-writers.
1 Lead. Cas. Eq. (3d.
Am. Ed.) 43, 44, marg. paging.
The application of the principles discussed
in this opinion to the case at bar Is obvious.
The plaintiff and defendant were owners,
as partners, of a lease of premises In the city
of New York, on which a hotel business was
carried on, yielding a large profit.
These
consisted of Nos. 1111, 1113, 1115 Broadway
and Nos. 1 and 3 West Twenty-fourth street
The leases of the Twenty-fourth street property were made directly to them, November
17, 1866.
The Broadway property, through
a series of ti'ansactions not necessary to be
detailed, becames vested, according to the
fair construction of the various agreements
respecting it, in the partnership.
The leases
expired on the same day. May 1, 1871, when
the partnership terminated. While the partnership continued, both parties thought it
necessary to provide a place for a bar-room,
and with this view the premises No. 3 West
Twenty-Fourth street were connected witli
the rear of the premises fronting on Broadway, known as the "Hoffman House," and
the first story fitted up and used for that
purpose. A considerable expenditure was
made with this view, and large profits were
realized, as the course taken was judicious.
While all of the leases owned by the firm
were still in existence, viz. April 20, 1869,
and on January 21, 1869, the owners of tlie
hotel property made leases to the defendant,
to commence from May 1, 1871, and to continue as to part of the property for five
years, and as to another portion for ten years
from that date, at specified rents. The leases
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were obtained by Read without notice to the
plaintiff, and he now claims that they are
They are of great
his exclusive property.
value, and the hotel at the commencement
of the action, March, 1870, was still in operafixtures, stock, etc.,
tion. The furniture,
were valuable, and the business carried on
was profitable.
The case has in it every element of the
equity which has been already considered.
The partnership is undisputed; the leases
were in existence when the renewal was
The act of renewal was clandestine,
made.
or occurred "behind the back" of the plaintiff. It took place while the partnership was
in force. The right to renewal was immediate and vested in Read during the partnerThe property belonging
ship's continuance.
to the firm, and which will be prejudiced by
the prospect of disposing of it at a sacrifice
at the close of the existing lease, is large and
valuable.
Common justice and a due regard to rules
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of public policy demand that the renewal
lease should be declared to belong to the
firm, and that the defendant should be required to account to the plaintiff for his portion of its value. The clauses in the leases
to Read that there shall be no assignment
without the consent of the landlord do not
stand in the way of the plaintiff's relief.
This does not consist in an assignment in
the ordinary SMise of that term. On the contrarj', the ground of relief is that the defendant acted inequitably when he entered into
the contract; that he must therefore be considered as a trustee, while the assignment to
the firm simply follows as an incident to the
giving complete effect to the trust relation
declared by the court to exist between the
Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, suparties.
pra.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new
trial ordered.
All concur; REYNOLDS, C, not sitting.
Judgment reversed.
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Action to recover proceeds of stolen bonds.
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendants appealed.
M. M. WaM. Goodrich, for appellants.
ters, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J. This is an equitable action
brought to establish the right of the plaintiff
to certain securities, the proceeds of stolen
bonds, and to compel the defendants to account therefor.
In March, 1869, the plaintiff was the owner
of $13,000 of government bonds, and of a railroad bond for $1,000, negotiable by delivery,
which, on the 12th of March, 1869, were stolen from her, and soon afterward $11,500 of
the bonds were sold by the thief and his confederates, and the proceeds divided between
them.
William Warner loaned a part of his
share in separate loans and took the promissory notes of the borrower therefor. George
Warner invested $2,000 of his share in the
purchase of a bond and mortgage, which was
assigned to his wife Cordelia without consideration.
In January, 1870, William Warner, George
Warner, Cordelia Warner and one Lusk were
arrested upon the charge of stealing the
bonds, or as accessories to the larceny, and
were severally indicted in the county of Cortland.
The Warners employed the defendants,
who are attorneys, to defend them in the
criminal proceedings, and in any civil suits
which might be instituted against them in respect to the bonds, and to secure them for
their services and expenses, and for any liabilities they might incur in their behalf; William Warner transferred to the defendants
Miner and Warren promissory notes taken on
loans made by him out of the proceeds of the
stolen bonds, amounting to $2,250 or thereabouts, and Cordelia Warner, for the same
purpose, assigned to the defendant Porter the
bond and mortgage above mentioned.
The learned judge at special term found
that the defendants had notice at the time
they received the transfer of the securities,
that they were the avails and proceeds of the
stolen bonds, and directed judgment against
them for the value of the securities, it appearing on the trial that they had collected or disposed of them and received the proceeds.
The doctrine upon which the judgment in
this case proceeded, viz.: that the owner of
negotiable securities stolen and afterward
sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of
the sale in the hands of the felonious taker
or his assignee with notice, through whatever
changes the proceeds may have gone, so long
as the proceeds or the substitute therefor can
be distinguished or identified, and have the
proceeds or the property in which they were
invested subjected, by the aid of a court of

equity, to a lien and trust In his favor for
the purposes of recompense and restitution, is
founded upon the plainest principles of justice and morality, and is consistent with the
rule in analogous cases acted upon in courts
of law and equity. It is a general prmciple
of the law of personal property that the title
of the owner cannot be divested without his
The purchaser from a thief, howconsent.
ever honest and bona fide the purchase may
have been, cannot hold the stolen chattel
against the true proprietor, but the latter may
follow and reclaim it wherever or in whosesoever hands it may be found. The right of
pursuit and reclamation only ceases when its
identity is lost and further pursuit is hopeless; but the law still protects the interest of
the true owner by giving him an action as for
the conversion of the chattel against any one
who has interfered with his dominion over
It, although such interference may have been
innocent in intention and under a claim of
right, and in reliance upon the title of the felonious taker. The extent to which the common law goes to protect the title of the true
owner has a striking illustration in those
cases in which it is held that where a willful
trespasser converts a chattel into a different
species, as for example, timber into shingles,
wood into coal, or corn into whisky, the product in its improved and changed condition belongs to the owner of the original material.
Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 380, and cases'
The rule that a thief cannot convey a
cited.
good title to stolen property has an exception
in case of money or negotiable securities
transferable by delivery, which have been put
into circulation and have come to the hands
of bona fide holders. The right of the owner
to pursue and reclaim the money and securities there ends, and the holder is protected in
his title. The plaintiff was in this position.
The bonds, with the exception stated, had, as
the evidence tends to show, been sold to bona
fide purchasers, and she was precluded from
following and reclaiming them.
The right of the plaintiff in equity to have
the notes and mortgage while they remained
iu the possession of the felons or of their assignees with notice, subjected to a lien and
trust in her favor, and to compel their transfer to her as the equitable owner, does not,
we think, admit of serious doubt The plaintiff, by the sale of the bonds to bona fide
purchasers, lost her title to the securities.
She
She could
not further follow them.
could maintain an action as for a conversion
of the property against the felons. But this
remedy in this case would be fruitless, as
they are wholly insolvent. Unless she can
elect to regard the securities in which the
bonds were invested as a substitute, pro
tanto, for the bonds, she has no effectual
no
remedy. The thieves certainly
have
claim to the securities in which the proceeds
of the bonds were invested as against the
plaintiff.
They, without her consent, have
disposed of her property, and put it beyond
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If

her roach.
the avails remained in their
hands, in money, the direct proceeds of the
sale, can it be doubted that she could reach

it?

It

is not necessary to decide that in the
she would have the legal title
but if that question was involved in the case I should have great hesitation in denying the proposition. That she
could assert an equitable claim to the money
I have no doubt. And this equitable right
to follow the proceeds
would continue and
attach to any securities or property in which
the proceeds were invested, so long as they
could be traced and identified, and the rights
of bona fide purchasers had not intervened.
In Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, an
agent, intrusted with a draft for money to
buy exchequer bills for his principal, received the money and misapplied it by purchasing American stocks and bullion, intending to abscond and go to America, and absconded, but was arrested before he quitted
England, and surrendered the securities and
bullion to his principal, who sold them and
received the proceeds.
It was held that the
principal was entitled to withhold the proceeds from the assignee in bankruptcy of the
agent, who became bankrupt on the day he
leceived and misapplied the money.
Lord
Ellenborough. in pronouncing the opinion in
that case, said: "It makes no difference, in
reason or law, into what other form different from the original the change may have
been made, whether it be into that of promissory notes for the security of money produced on the sale of the goods of the principal, as in Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400, or into
other merchandise, as in Whitecomb v. Jacob, Salk. 160, for the product or substitute
for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself so long as it can be
ascertained to be such, and the right only
of ascertainment
ceases when the means
fails."
If, In the case now under consideration,
the plaintiff had intrusted the Warners with
the possession
of the bonds, and they had
sold them in violation of their duty, for the
purpose of embezzling the proceeds, and invested them in the notes and mortgage in
question, the plaintiff could, within the authority of Taylor v. Plumer, have claimed
them while in their hands, or in the hands
of their assignees with notice, and would be
adjudged to have the legal title.
In courts of equity the doctrine is well
settled and is uniformly applied that when
a person, standing in a fiduciary relation,
misapplies or converts a trust fund into another species of property, the beneficiary will
be entitled to the property thus acquired.
The jurisdiction exercised for the protection
of a party defrauded by the misappropriation of property, in violation of a duty, owing by the party making the misappropriation, is exceedingly broad and comprehensive.
The doctrine is illustrated and applied
most frequently in cases of trusts, where
case supposed
to the money,
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trust moneys have been, by the fraud or
violation of duty of the trustee, diverted
from the purposes of the trust and converted
into other property.
In such case a court
of equity will follow the trust fund into the
property into which it has been converted,
and appropriate it for the Indemnity of the
beneficiary. It is immaterial in what way
the change has been made, whether money
has been laid out in land, or land has been
turned into money, or how the legal title to
the converted property may be placed. Equity only stops the pursuit when the means
of ascertainment fail, or the rights of bona
fide purchasei-s
for value without notice of
the trust, have intervened. The relief will
be moulded and adapted to the circumstances of the case, so as to protect the interests and rights of the true owner.
Lane v.
Dighton, Amb. 40f); Mansell v. Mansell, 2
P. AVms. 670; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511;
Lewis V. Madocks, 17 Ves. 56; Perry, Trusts,.
§ 821); Story, Eq. Jur. § 1258.
It is insisted by the counsel for the defendants that the doctrine which subjects property acquired by the fraudulent misuse of
trust moneys by a trustee to the influence of
the trust, and converts it into trust property
and the wrong-doer into a trustee at the election of the beneficiary, has no application to
a case where money or property acquired by
felony has been converted into other property. There is, it is said, in such cases, no
trust relation between the owner of the stolen property and the thief, and the law will
not imply one for the purpose of subjectiuir
the avails of tlie stolen property to the claimi
of the owner. It would seem to be an anomaly in the law if the owner who has been deprived of his property by a larceny should
be less favorably situated in a court of equity, in respect to his remedy to recover It,,
or the property into which it had been converted, than one who by an abuse of trust
has been injured by the wrongful act of a
trustee to whom the possession of trust property has been confided.
The law in such a
case will raise a trust in invitum out of thetransaction, for the very purpose of subjecting the substituted property to the purposes
of indemnity and recompense.
"One of the
most common cases," remarks Judge Story,
"in which a court of equity acts upon the
ground 9f implied trusts in invitum, is when
a party receives money which he cannot conscientiously withhold from another party."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1255. And he states it to
be a general principle that "whenever the
property of a party has been wrongfully
misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into another species of property, if its identity can be traced, it will be
held in its new form liable to the rights of
the original owner, or the cestui que trust."
Id. § 1258. See, also, Hill, Trustees, p. 222.
We are of opinion that the absence of the
conventional relation of trustee and cestui
que trust between the plaintiff and the War-
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ners is no obstacle to giving the plaintiff the
benefit of the notes and mortgage, or the
See
proceeds in part of the stolen bonds.
Bank of America v. Pollock, 4 Edw. Ch. 215.
It is however strenuously insisted that the
defendants had no notice when they received
the securities that they were the avails or
proceeds of the bonds.
That if they had notice they would stand in the position of their
assignors, and that the property in their
hands would be affected by the same equities as if no transfer had been made, is not
Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566;
denied.
Hill, Trustees, p. 259. The learned judge at
special term found as has been stated, that
the defendants had notice of the larceny of
the bonds, and the use made of the money
arising from their sale, at the time they reThe duty of
ceived the notes and mortgage.
this court upon the question of notice is
limited to the examination of the case, with
a view of ascertaining whether there was
evidence to support the finding of fact. If
such evidence exists, the finding of the trial
judge is conclusive.
We have examined with much care the
voluminous record before us, and are of opinion that the finding is sustained by the eviThe testimony was conflicting. The
dence.
circumstances under which the defendants
took the transfer of the securities were certainly unusual, and the facts then known by
the defendants were calculated to create a
strong presumption that the notes and mortgage came from investments of the stolen
property. It was for the trial court to weigh
the testimony, and in the light of all the
facts developed on the trial, to determine
It would be a usethe question of notice.
less labor to collate the testimony on this
subject, and we content ourselves with stating our conclusion, that the finding was warranted by the evidence.
The objection to the evidence, under a commission issued to William Jessup of Montrose, Pennsylvania, and which was executed by William H. Jessup as commissioner
was, we think, properly overruled.
In support of the objection, one of the defendants
testified that he resided at Montrose in 1858,
and that at that time two attorneys resided
there, named respectively William and William H. Jessup, and an offer was made to
prove that the judge who granted the order
for the commission consulted a register of at-

torneys in which both names appeared, and
selected the name of William Jessup, and inserted it in the order.
The commission was
executed
two years and a half before the
trial.
It does not appear at what time it
was returned to the clerk, but the presumption is that it was returned within a reasonThe objection
able time after its execution.
that the commission was not executed by
the person intended was not made until the
evidence taken under it was offered on the
trial.
That the defendants were apprised of
the objection was
the facts upon which
founded before the trial is quite evident
Prima facie a commission directed to a
omitting any mention of a middle
person,
name, and returned e.xecuted by a person of
the same name, with the addition of a middle name, is executed by the person named
in the order. Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns.
84. The ruling of the judge, in respect to
the objection made to the commission,
was
clearly in furtherance of justice. The defendant had ample opportunity to raise the
objection to the commission before the trial
by a motion to suppress, and it should not
be permitted that a party may lie by, and
spring an objection of this kind on the trial
for the first time, when the other party may
be unable to meet it by proof, and when
there is no opportunity to issue a new commission, or send it back to be executed by
the proper person. It is we think a wholesome rule that objections to the execution
of a commission where the party has an opportunity to make them before the trial,
should be raised by motion, and if not raised
in that way when such opportunity exists,
they should be deemed to have been waived.
Whether such objection is to formal defects
merely, or as in this case goes to the right
of the person who executed the commission
we think,
to act as commissioner, makes,
no difference in the application of the rule,
if the fact of disqualification is known to
the party who seeks to exclude the evidence
a sutficient time before the trial, to enable
him to make his motion. See Kimball v.
Davis, 19 Wend. 438; Sturm v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co.. 63 N. Y. 77; Drury v. Poster, 2
Wall. 33; Sheldon v. Wood, 2 Bosw. 267;
Zellweger v. Caft'e, 5 Duer, 100.
The judgment should be aflflrmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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McLEOD

V.

EVANS,

Assignee,

etc.

(28 N. W. 173, 214, 66 Wis. 401.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. May 15,

1886.

Appeal from circuit court, Grant county.
A. W. & W. B. Bell, Bushnell & Watkins,
and J. W. Murphy, for appellant, Robert E.
McLeod.
Carter & Cleary, for respondent,
Jonathan H. Evans, assignee, etc.

COLE, G. J. This is a suit in equity to recover in full from the defendant, who is an
assignee of one Hodges, the proceeds of a
draft of $1,500. The nret most serious question of law we have to consider arises upon
these facts found by the leai-ned circuit court:
The plaintifC had a draft for $1,500, drawn on
the Ninth National Bank of New York City.
Desiring to cash this draft, he went to the
bank of Mr. Hodges, in the city of Platteville,
on the thirtieth of January, 1884, to get the
money upon it. Hodges told him that he was
not in funds at the time so as to cash the
draft, but said he would collect it for him.
Thereupon the plaintiff left with Hodges the
draft for collection, and took a receipt, which
reads as follows: "Platteville, Wis. 1-30-84.
By Robert E. McLeod, for collection. Currency,
coin,
;
;
checks,
.
Ninth National, New York. $1,500. O. F.
Griswold, Cashier."
Mr. Hodges told the
plaintiff to return in a week, when he expected the money would be there for him;
that at the end of the week the plaintiff came
to the bank, but was informed by Hodges
that the money had not yet come from the
Ninth National Bank of New York; that it
took some time to make collections of this
kind; whereujKm the plaintiff went away,
and did not again return until after Hodges
had suspended banking business, which was
on the evening of the eighth of February,
1884; that as a matter of fact the draft was
not sent by Hodges to the Ninth National
Bank of New York for collection, but was
sent to the National Bank of America, Chicago, with which bank Hodges did his business in that city. The Chicago bank did not,
for such draft, send the cash to Mr. Hodges,
but gave him credit for the amount on its
books, and Mr. Hodges drew on that bank,
after this, drafts, which were cashed by the
bank; and that at the time Hodges suspended banking business there was nothing due
him from the Chicago bank. It is admitted
that on the eleventh of February, 1884,
Hodges assigned to the defendant all his
property for the benefit of his creditoi-s.
Among the assets, thei-e was $500 cash in
Hodges' bank which came to the hands of
the defendant, but it does not appear that
this sum was a part of the proceeds of the
$1,500 draft.
Now, the first question upon this state of
facts is, does the plaintiff stand upon the
same ground as the other creditors of Hodges
in respect to the estate in the hands of the
assignee, or has he a paramount right to be
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paid first out of such assets? The argument
of the plaintiff's counsel in support of
his
superior right in equity is briefly this:
That
the collection of the draft was a trust assumed by Hodges; that neither the
draft nor its
proceeds belonged to him; that it
was his
plain duty to collect it, and keep its proceeds
separately, and deliver them to the plaintiff
when demanded; that it was a gross fraud
on his part not to do so; that he knew
when
he received the draft for collection he
was in
failing circumstances, and largely insolvent;
that the testimony indisputably shows that
it was a mere pretense that he had sent the
draft to New York for collection; that he
really had the avails of it when the plaintiff
called for his money at the end of the week
as he was directed to do, and was told
that
it had not come. It is said the relation between Hodges and the plaintiff was not that
of debtor and creditor, but that a fiduciary
relation existed between them; that the proceeds of the draft was a trust fund in his
hands which did not belong to him, and
which the assignee could not take as a part
of his estate.
Coimsel says that "the general proposition which is maintained, both at
law and in equity, upon this subject is that
if any property, in its original state and form,
is covered with a trust in favor of the principal, no change of that state and form can
divest it of such trust, or give the agent or
trustee converting it, or those who represent
him in any right, (not being bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration, without
notice,) any more valid claim in respect to
it than they respectively had before such
change.
An abuse of a trust can confer no
rights on the party abusing it, or those who
claim in privity with him." 2 Story, Bq.
Jur. § 1258; Snell, Eq. Prac. 155.
The counsel on the other side does not challenge the correctness of this argjment, or the
soundness of the principle of law relied on,
but he says they have no just application to
the facts here, because the proceeds of the
draft cannot be traced to, or identified in respect to, any property which has come to the
Consequently, he
hands of the assignee.
says the plaintiff's claim is simply this: because he left his draft for collection with the
assignor, which the latter wrongfully converted, that this gives him a lien in equity upon
the general property of the wrong-doer for
its value. The able counsel frankly admits
if the proceeds of the draft had been found
in the safe of Sir. Hodges when the assignment was made, with marks to identify the
fund, that then such proceeds would not have
passed to the defendant. He also concedes
if the proceeds could be traced into any
other property into which they had been converted, or had been mixed by Hodges with
his own funds, that then the plaintiff could
claim such property, or follow and reclaim
the proper amount of money, as against the
This would be so, because he was
world.
the real owner; Hodges holding the proceeds
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only as his agent, as trust funds; or tlie
property into which the proceeds had been
converted would be impressed with the trust.
But it is said none of the proceeds of that
draft are in the hands of the assignee, nor is
there any security bought or obtained by the
Still, these facts
draft in his possession.
are indisputable: The Chicago bank to which
Hodgas sent the $1,500 draft gave him credit for the amount on its books. Hodges
drew against that credit in the regular course
of his business as a banker, and his drafts
were honored by the drawee. Presumably,
Hodges obtained money for his drafts which
he used in the transaction of his business,
So,
or applied to the payment of his debts.
these funds which he obtained by his own
drafts against the $1,500 credit were substituted for the proceeds of the $1,500 draft,
and went into his estate. The conclusion is irresistible, from the facts, that the proceeds of
the trust property found its way into Hodges'
hands, and were used by him either to pay
In eioff his debts or to increase his assets.
ther case, it would go to the benefit of his
estate.
It is not to be supposed the trust
fund was dissipated and lost altogether, and
did not fall into the mass of the assignor's
property; and the rule in equity is well established that so long as the trust property
can be traced and followed into other property into which it has been converted, that
remains subject to the trust.
The authorities cited by plaintiff's counsel
fully sustain this proposition. We do not
understand that it is necessary to trace the
trust fund into some specific property in order to enforce the trust
If it can be traced
• into the estate of the defaulting
agent or
trustee, this is sufficient. The decisions in
Frith V. Cartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417; Pennell
V. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372; KnatchbuU V. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; National
Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54; Van
Alen V. American Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 1;
People V. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y.
32; Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. King, 57
Pa. St. 202; Peak v. EUicott, 30 Kan. 156,
1 Pac. 499, — in principle sustain this conclusion.
The cases in 96 N. Y., 30 Kan., and
1 Pac, are directly in point.
In People v.
Bank of Rochester the head-note states the
decision as follows: "The Bank of R. having discounted certain notes for the firm of
S., H. & F., a depositor with it, and that
firm wishing to anticipate payment, gave to
the bank its checks for the amount of the
notes, less rebate of interest, which checks
the bank received and charged in the firm account, and entries were made in the bankbooks to the effect that the notes were paid.
The firm at the time supposed that the bank
held the notes, but they had in fact been
previously sold by it. Before the notes became due the bank failed, and, in an action
brought by the attorney general in the name
of the people, a receiver was appointed of its
Held, that an order reproperty and effects.

quiring the receiver to pay the notes out of
the funds in his hands was properly granted;
that the transaction between the bank and
said firm was not in their relation of debtor
and creditor, nor in that of bank and depositor, but by it a trust was created, the violation of which constituted a fraud by which
the bank could not profit, and to the benefit
of which the receiver was not entitled." The
ruling in the Kansas case was to the same
effect, upon a similar state of facts. The
court say in the opinion, by Horton, C. J.,
that "the defendant, as assignee of the bank,
succeeds to all the rights of the bank, but as
such assignee he has no lawful authority to
retain a trust fund in his hands belonging to
the plaintiff, and which the bank at the time
of receiving the same promised and agreed
to apply in payment of plaintiff's note. As
the money was a trust fund, and never belonged to the bank, its creditors will not be
injured if it is turned over by the assignee
to its owner."
The case of People v. Merchants' & M.
Bank, 78 N. Y. 269, to which we were referred by defendant's counsel, as we understand it, contains nothing in conflict with
the Rochester Bank Case, supra. In the
former case the Chemical Bank of New York
received a check on the M. & M. Bank of
Troy, drawn by the T. & B. R. R. This
check the Chemical Bank sent by mail to the
M. & M. Bank for the purpose of being paid.
The latter bank debited the railroad company
in its account, which was good, with the
amount of the check, and returned it to that
company as paid. It also sent to the Chemical Bank a draft on a New York bank for
the amount of the check. Two days after
the M. & M. Bank closed its doors, and a reThe
ceiver of its assets was appointed.
draft on the New York bank was not paid.
The Chemical Bank applied for an order directing the receiver to pay the amount of the
cheek on the ground that the assets came to
his hands impressed with a trust in its favor.
On these facts the court held that "to authorize the relief prayed for it was necessary
to trace into the hands of the receiver money or property belonging to the Chemical
Bank, or which had before the receivership
been set apart and appropriated to the payment of the check; that charging said check,
and returning
it to the drawer, did not
amount to a payment, and setting apart of
sufficient of the drawer's deposit to cover it;
nor did it impress a special trust on any part
of the drawer's assets; but by the transaction the drawee simply reduced its indebtedness to its depositor to the amount of the
check, and constituted itself a debtor to the
holder to a corresponding amount" The case
is clearly distinguishable from the one we
have before us.
The same counsel has referred us to numerous cases where the simple relation of
creditor and debtor or bank and depositor
existed, and where all preference of one cred-
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Itor over another for payment out of assets
has been denied. But this case stands on
entirely different grounds. The evidence is
entirely conclusive that the plaintiff left his
draft -with Hodges for collection, and for no

purpose. Hodges veas merely his agent
to perform that specific duty.
He had no
more right to use the proceeds of the draft
in his business than a merchant or lawyer
would have who had been intrusted with
it for a like purpose.
Beyond all controversy
the proceeds of the draft in Hodges' hands
were a trust fund.
He having used them in
his business,— having benefited his estate by
such use,— as we must assume, a trust attaches to that estate which came to the defendant under the assignment.
It appears that the plaintifC learned of the
assignment which was made by Hodges, and
in due time filed his claim as a creditor of
the assignor to the amount of $1,500; that at
the time he filed his claim he believed from
reports that the bank of Hodges would pay
dollar for dollar to its creditors; that subse-quently, when a 6 per cent, dividend was declared, he, as a creditor, took the 6 per cent,
upon his claim allowed, and at that time had
learned that the bank could not pay in full,
but that there would be a large deficiency.
The question is, has the plaintiff, by proving
his claim as an ordinary creditor, waived or
lost his light to insist upon his equitable
lien?
We think not. The plaintiff, doubtless, acted not only in ignorance of his legal
rights, but also under a mistake as to the
solvency of Hodges' bank.
He had a right to
suppose from the schedule of its assets and
liabilities that all debts would be paid in
full.
It is said he knew to the contrary
when he received the dividend, which he retains.
But he has only received a portion
that was due him.
The rights of no one
iave been prejudiced by this. No one has
changed his position, or lost any advantage
which the law gave him, in consequence of
what the plaintiff did in the matter; and
there are no facts upon which a waiver or
equitable estoppel can be fairly predicated.
There is no defect of parties.
It follows from the views that we have expressed that the judgment of the circuit court
must be reversed and the cause remanded,
with directions to grant the relief asked.
■other

GASSODAY, J. (dissenting).
I fully indorse
what is termed the "progressive" or "modern
rule" of equity, as stated by Jessel, the late
learned master of the rolls, in Re Hallett's
Estate, 13 Ch. Div. G96, to the effect that if
a person holding money as a trustee, or in a
fiduciary character, pays it to his account
at his banker's, where it is mixed with his
own money, and thereafter draws out sums
by checks in the ordinary manner, he must be
taken to have (}rawn out his own money in
In that case
preference to the trust money.
the trustee, Hallett, died, and the action was
for the administration of bis estate. The
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question arose upon claims by several persons
against moneys in the hands of Hallett's
bankers. There was no question as to the
solvency of the estate. There was no dispute
that the money received by Hallett for the
bonds he improperly sold was deposited with
his bankers to the credit of his account, and
"that the money remained at his banker's
mixed with his own money at the time of his
death." It was simply held that the cestui
que trust could take the proceeds of the sale
if they could be identified, and, if not identified, but traceable into other property, or
a mixed fund, then she could have a charge
or equitable lien upon such other property
or fund for the payment of the amount which
her money had increased
the fund. Such
seems to be the well-established rule. Here
the draft did not go into the assets of Hodges'
bank. He sent it to the Chicago bank, where
it was credited to his general account. Whether his account with the Chicago bank was
then overdrawn or not does not appear, but
when he failed, a few days later, it was
overdrawn $1,200. At that time there was
only $600 in the bank. The assets which
went into the hands of the assignee included
nothing dated within a month.
It conclusively appears from the undisputed evidence,
and is, in effect, found by the
court, that the assets which came into the
hands of the assignee neither include the
draft nor the proceeds arising therefrom,
nor anything taken in exchange for it, or
any part of it, unless it was the $000. Of
course, the plaintiff has no right of action
against the assignee personally.
He seeks
to charge the assets in the hands of the
assignee only by reason of a supposed equitable lien. Upon what theoiy was he entitled to it? If so, for what amount? The
mere wrongful conversion of the draft by
Hodges certainly gave the plaintiff no equitable lien upon property belonging to him
prior to such conversion, nor upon assets
subsequently acquired from sources entirely
outside and independent of, and wholly foreign to, the draft, or the proceeds of it. To
say that it does, is to hold that such wrongful conversion of itself gave the plaintiff a
preference over aU other creditors, regardless of what became of the draft, or the proI am not aware of any adjudiceeds of it.
cated case sanctioning such a preference.
An equitable lien exists only when the trust
money is directly or indirectly traceable to
Such, as I
the fund sought to be charged.
understand, are the cases cited in the opinion of the chief justice.
It is probable, as claimed, that the draft,
or the proceeds of it, were used by Hodges
prior to the assignment in payment of some
of his debts. But this would in no way
swell the volume or value of his assets which
It
went into the hands of the assignee.
would merely diminish the amount of his
indebtedness to the extent of such payment.
That would, in a general way, benefit the
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estate to the extent that it increased the
per cent, that the other creditors would in
But as this estate is
consequence
receive.
badly insolvent, the aggregate amount of
such
increase would necessarily be very
much less than the amount of the draft. The
amount of the equitable charge upon the
assets ought not, upon any principle of equity, to exceed the amount of benefit to the estate derived from the draft or its proceeds.
None of the authorities cited, as it seems to
me, go any further, and some of them not
In so far as the assets of the esas far.
tate in the hands of the assignee are held
chargeable beyond the amount of benefit
which the estate derived from the draft or

its proceeds, the equitable doctrine of the
eases cited, and many others which might
be cited, has, as it seems to me, been misapplied.
cannot join in sanctioning such
a departure from a rule so well established
and so thoroughly equitable.

I

TAYLOR, J.

I

concur in the opinion of

Justice CASSODAY.

BY THE COURT. The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to grant the relief
asked.
A motion for a rehearing was denied September 21, 1886.
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MYERS

V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF
CITY OF CLAY CENTER.

(32 Pac. 658,
Supreme

51 Kan.

Court of Kansas.

87.)

March

11,

1893.

Error from district court, Clay county;

R.
B. Spilman, Judge.
Action by the board of education of the city
of Clay Center against D. H. Myers, assignee
of the estate of John Higlnbotham, to recover the amount of a trust fund belonging to
plaintiff.
There was judgment for plaintiff,
and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
The other facts fully appear in the following statement by JOHNSTON, J.:
Action brought by the board of education
of the city of Clay Center against D. H.
Myers, as the assignee of the estate of John
Higinbotham, to recover $3,265.71, alleged
to be a trust fund in the hands of the assignee, to which it was entitled.
Upon the
evidence submitted, the district court made
the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law:
Findings of fact: "(1) For several years
prior to the 8th day of June, 1889, John Higlnbotham was doing business as a private
banker at Clay Center, Kansas, and carrying
on a private bank under the name of the Clay
County Bank, and H. G. Higlnbotham, was
cashier of said bank and manager of said
John Higinbotham's banking business, having full supervision and control of the same.
(2) On the 8th day of June, 1889, and for ten
years prior thereto, said H. G. Higinbotham
had been treasurer of the board of education
of the city of Clay Center, the plaintiff herein, and, as such treasurer, had received and
disbursed large sums of money belonging to
said board of education, and during all the
time he was such treasurer he was also
cashier and manager of said private bank
of John Higinbotham.
(3) During all the time
said H. G. Higinbotham was acting as such
treasm-er he had an account on the books
of said Clay County Bank as 'H. G. Higlnbotham, Treasurer,' and all moneys which
came into his hands as treasurer of the board
of education of the city of Clay Center were
deposited by him in said bank, and credited
to said account, and mingled with the general
funds of the bank, and orders drawn on him
as such treasurer were paid out of the general funds of the bank, and charged to said
account. No other money except such as
came into his hands as such treasurer was
credited to said account, nor were any payments, except such as were made on orders
drawn on him as such treasurer, charged to
said account.
(4) During the time he was
treasurer of the board of education of the
city of Clay Center, and prior to the 8th day
of June, 1889, the said H. G. Higinbotham,
as such treasurer, had deposited in said
bank, to the credit of said account, $3,265.71
more than had been paid out and charged to
said account, which said sum $3,265.71 had
of
been mingled with the general funds
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said bank, and used in the ordinary course
of the private banking business of said John
Higinbotham, in the payment of the debts of
the bank.
coming into
(5) The last money
the hands of said H. G. Higinbotham, as
such treasurer, which was so deposited in
said bank and credited to said account, was
deposited on the 3d day of April, 1889.
On
the 8tli day of May, 1889, the total amount of
cash in said bank was $544.15 and no more.
After said 8th day of May, 1889, there was
paid out of the funds of said bank, on orders
di-awn on said H. G. Higinbotham
and
charged to said account, $1,236.02; and on
the 8th day of June, 1889, when the business
was closed, the total amount of cash in said
bank was $1,535.57.
(6) Said John Higinbotham knew that said H. G. Higinbotham
was depositing the money coming into his
hands as such treasurer in said bank, and
that such money was being used in the same
manner as other funds of said bank, in the
ordinary course of its business.
(7) The
board of education of the city of Clay Center
never authorized said H. G. Higinbotham
to deposit the funds coming into his hands
as its treasurer in the Clay County Bank,
and never consented thereto, but some of the
members of said board of education had actual knowledge that said funds were so deposited for some time before the 8th day of
June, 1889.
(8) On the 8th day of June,
1889,
said John Higinbotham made an assignment of all his property and assets of every kind, including said banking business,
to D. H. Myers, for the benefit of his creditors, and on that day said Clay County Bank
was closed, and thereafter no further business was done therein.
(9) Said D. H. Myers, who is the defendant in this action, took
possession,
as temporary assignee,
of all
the property and assets of every kind belonging to said John Higinbotham;
and being
afterwards duly elected permanent assignee
of said John Higinbotham, and duly qualified
as such assignee, he retained possession of
said property and assets, and still has the
same in his possession, or so much thereof
as have not been paid out in the due
course of the administration of said estate;
and there was at the time this suit was commenced in his hands, as such assignee, belonging to said estate so assigned to him,
real estate of the value of $7,000 or more.
(10) At the time said assignment was made,
there was in said bank cash to the amount
of $1,535.57, and no more; and said assignee
has never received from the assets of said
estate so assigned to him any cash other than
said sum, except such as was derived from
the sale of some of the assets of said estate;
and all the cash so coming into his hands,
Including said sum of $1,535.57, had, prior to
the commencement of this action, been used
In paying a dividend on claims allowed
against said estate, and other legitimate charges against the same.
(11) On the 12th day
of June, 1889, said H. G. Higinbotham re-
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signed the ofBee of treasurer of the board of
education of the city of Clay Center, and at
the time there was in his hands as such
treasurer the sum of $3,265.71, which said
sum had been by him deposited in the Clay
•County Bank, as heretofore stated in the
fourth finding of fact, and which said sum
he then, and has ever since, failed to pay
over to his successor in office, or to any one
authorized by said board to receive the same,
except $210 thereof, and of said sum there is
still unpaid $3,055.71. (12) At the time said
H. G. Higinbotham resigned said office of
treasurer there was not, and for a long time
prior thereto there had not been, in existence,
any valid bond executed by him for the faithful performance of his duties as such treasurer. (13) On the 14th day of June, 1889,
said H. 6. Higinbotham, in order to secure
to said board of education payment of said
sum of $3,265.71, executed to said board, pursuant to a demand made by it upon said H.
G. Higinbotham to secure the same, a chattel mortgage on certain personal property,
and also a mortgage on his homestead, consisting of certain lots in the city of Clay Center, which lots were subject to two prior
mortgages of $1,200 and $120. Afterwards
said personal property so mortgaged was sold
under said mortgage, and the proceeds arising therefrom, amounting to $210, were applied by said board in part payment of said
sum of $3,265.71, and said real-estate mortgage is still in full force, and no action has
been taken by said board to realize anything
thereon.
(14) In said real-estate mortgage H.
G. Higinbotham and Lillie G. Higinbotham,
his wife, were the parties of the first part,
and the board of education of the city of
Clay Center was the party of the second part,
and in said mortgage the following conditions were written, to wit: 'Provided, nevertheless, and these presents are upon the following conditions expressly made, to wit:
that whereas, the said H. G. Higinbotham is
justly indebted to the said party of the second part in the sum of thirty-two hundred
and sixty-five and seventy-one one hundredths dollars, ($3,265.71), the same being
the balance of the funds and moneys of the
said party of the second part now remaining
in the hands of said H. G. Higinbotham, deposited with him as treasurer of the said party of the second part; and whereas, said H.
G. Higinbotham has resigned said office, and,
upon legal demand made upon him for said
funds and moneys by his duly-qualified successor in said office, said H. G. Higinbotham
has failed and refused to pay over and deliver said funds and moneys to his successor
in office; and whereas, a claim for said funds
and moneys, made In behalf of the treasurer
•of the said party of the second part, against
the estate of John Higinbotham and D. H.
Myers, assignee thereof, is pending, and may
l5e paid in whole or in part by said assignee:
Now, if the said first parties shall, on or before the 14th day of June, 1890, pay or cause

to be paid to the qualified treasurer of said
party of the second part the funds and sums
of moneys aforesaid, with interest thereon
from the date hereof, at ten per cent, per
annum, or such part thereof as shall not previous to said 14th day of June, 1890, be

paid by the assignee of John Higinbotham's
estate, in that case this deed shall become
void, and the premises hereby conveyed shall
be released at the proper cost of the said parties of the first part or their legal representatives; and it is hereby agreed and understood that the execution and delivery of this
instrument by said parties of the first part
to said party of the second part does not and
shall not in any way lessen the obligation of
said H. G. Higinbotham respecting the funds
and moneys of said second party heretofore
delivered to him as treasurer as aforesaid,
and this instrument is intended as security
for the payment of said funds and moneys
as aforesaid, in addition, and in no way
affecting the rights of the said second party under any bond or bonds which may
have been heretofore given to said party of
the second part or under any of the laws of
the state of Kansas on and after June 14,
1890.' The conditions above recited are followed by a provision that, in case the parties
of the first part shall fail to pay said funds
and sums of money or the interest thereon
or the taxes or insurance on the mortgaged
premises, then the party of the second part
might proceed to foreclose and mortgage and
sell the mortgaged premises, and apply the
proceeds of such sale to the payment of said
sums of money. (15) Said D. H. Myers, as
assignee of said John Higinbotham, gave notice by advertisement, published as required
by law, of the time and place when he would
hear and allow claims against said estate,
and also notified by mail H. G. Higinbotham,
treasurer of the board of education of Clay
Center, as one of the creditors of said John
Higinbotham, of the time and place when he
would hear and allow claims, but no notice
of said time and place of hearing and allowing claims was given to the board of education of the city of Clay Center or any officer or member thereof except as above stated,
and, at the time said notice by mail was given to H. G. Higinbotham, he was not treasurer of said board of education. (16) Neither
said H. G. Higinbotham nor any one for him,
nor any one acting for the board of education of the city of Clay Center, presented any
claim or demand for said sum of $3,265.71
to said assignee at the time and place fixed
by him in said notices for hearing and allowing by said assignee as a claim by said
estate, and said sum of $3,265.71 was not
allowed by said assignee as a claim against
said estate.
(17) On the 15th day of May,
1891, and before the commencement of this
action, demand was made by the plaintiff upon said D. H. Myers, as assignee of John Higinbotham, for the payment of said sum of
$3,265.71, as a trust fund in his hands as
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such assignee belonging to tlie plaintifC, and
payment tliereof was refused; and no other
demand was ever made by plaintiff or in its
behalf on said D. H. Myers, as such assignee,
for the payment of said money as a trust
fund or otherwise.
(18) When said demand
was made by plaintiff on the loth day of
May, 1891, said D. H. Myers did not have in
his hands, as such assignee, any of the
money which was in the Clay County Bank
on the Sth day of June, 1889, when said assignment was made, and which he then received as such assignee."
Conclusions of law: "(1) That money of
the boai-d of education of the city of Clay
Center deposited by H. G. Hig'inbotham,
while ti-easurer of said board, in the private
bank of John Higintiotkam, was impressed
with the character of trust funds, and was
held as a trust fund by said John Hlginbotham; (2) that the ajssets of John Higinbotham in the hands of D. H. Myers, as his
assignee, are subject to a charge of $3,055.71,
as a trust in favor of the board of education of the city of Clay Center; (3) that the
plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the payment to it by D. H. Myers, assignee of John
Higinbotham, of the sum of $3,055.71 out of
the assets of said John Higinbotham, in his
hands as such assignee."
Judgment was accordingly given, and to
reverse the same the assignee brings this
proceeding in error.
Harkness & Godard, for plaintiff in error.
C. Coleman, P. L. Williams, and B. B.
Tuttle, for defendant in error.
C.

JOHNSTON, J. (after stating the facts).
There is no doubt or question about the character of the moneys, amounting to $3,055.71,
sought to be recovered in this action. They
were school funds, collected and held for
specific public pxuTposes, and the bank, its
•owners and manager, all knew of the trust
character of the funds, and hence there is
no excuse for their misappropriation.
The
treasurer of the board of education, who
placed these trust funds in the bank, was its
manager; and, without authority from the
Tjoard of education, he mingled them with
the funds of the bank, and used them In
paying the creditors of that institution. At
one time, subsequent to the last deposit of
school money, the total amount of cash on
Tiand In the bank was $544.15, and subsequent to that time $1,236.08 was drawn from
the funds of the bank upon the order of the
t)oard of education. When the bank closed,
the whole amount of cash on hand was $1,535.57. It is said that no portion of this sum
was the identical money received from the
board of education, and that neither the money nor any specific property into which it
had been converted can be clearly traced to
Under these cirthe hands of the assignee.
cumstances, has the board of education a
preferred right over general creditors to the
HUTCn.EQ.JUK. — 10
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assets in the hands of the assignee?
It is not
denied that the school funds were impressed
with a trust, and, if susceptible of identity,
could be followed and reclaimed from the
assignee.
It is also admitted that, if they
could be traced into any other specific property, the cestui que trust might claim such
property or a lien upon it; but it is insisted
that, unless the ti-ust funds can be traced and
identified, the cestui que trust is to be treated
as a simple creditor, and not entitled to an
equitable preference in the distribution of the
assets of the estate. The view of the plaintiff
in error Is not without support, and many of
the older cases, while holding that a trust
fund wrongfully converted into another species of property, of whatever form, will be
held liable to the rights of the beneficial owner in its new form if its iden tity can possibly
be traced, still adopt the old doctrine stated
by Judge Story as follows: "The right to follow a trust fund ceases when the means of
ascertainment fail, which, of course, is the
case when the subject-matter is turned into
money, and mixed and confounded in a general mass of property of the same description."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1259.
The modern
doctrine of equity, and the one more in consonance with justice, is that the confusion of
trust property so wrongfully converted does
not destroy the equity entirely, but that,
when the funds are traced into tlie assets of
the unfaithful trustee or one who has knowledge of the character of the funds, they become a charge upon the entire assets with
which they are mingled.
This principle was
fully recognized, and the question in the present case was substantially decided, in Peak
V. EUicott, 30 Kan. 156, 1 Pac. 499.
In that
case it was said: "As the money was a trust
fund, and never belonged to the bank, its
creditors will not be injured if it is turned
over by the assignee to its owner. Even if
the trust fund has been mixed with other
funds of the bank, this cannot prevent the
plaintiff from following and reclaiming the
fund; because, if a trust fund is mixed with
other funds, the person equitably entitled
thereto may follow it, and has a charge on
the whole fund for the amount due." It
would seem to be immaterial whether the
property with which the trust funds were
mingled was moneys, or whether it was bills,
notes, securities, lands, or other assets.
The
bank which assigned in this case appears to
have been engaged in a general business, and
its assets consisted of moneys, securities, and
lands; and, as the estate was augmented by
the conversion of the trust funds, no reason is
seen under the equitable principle which has
been mentioned why they should not become
In McLeod
a charge upon the entire estate.
V. Evans, 66 Wis. 410, 28 N. W. 173, 214, an
unfaithful trustee made an assignment, and
among the assets there was a small amount
of cash, and it was not shown that it was a
part of the proceeds of the draft or trust fund.
The question was whether the owner of the
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trust fund stood upon the same ground as
the general creditors of the trustee, or whether he had a paramount right to be first paid
out of the assets of the estate. It was found
that the proceeds of the trust property were
used by the trustee either to pay off his debts
or to increase his assets, and it was held to
be unnecessary to trace the trust fund into
any specific property in order to enforce the
trust; and that, if it could be traced into the
estate of the defaulting agent or trustee, that
was sufficient. It was further decided that,
whether the trust funds were used to increase
the assets or to pay off the debts, in either
case it would be for the benefit of the estate ;
and, having been so used, it was held that a
trust attached to the entire estate which came
into the hands of the assignee.
The court in
that case cites Peak v. EUicott, supra, and
expressly approves the dlctrine of that case.
In Independent Dist. v. King, 80 Iowa, 497,
45 N. W. 908, the treasurer of a school district, as in this case, wrongfully deposited the
funds of the district in a bank which knew
the character of the funds. Subsequently the
bank failed, and made an assignment for the
benefit of its creditors. It was there insisted
that, as none of the Identical money deposited
went into the possession of the assignee, no
trust could be enforced against the estate of
the assignor to the prejudice of other general
creditors. Speaking of the bankers, the court
said that they "were fully advised as to the
material facts, and therefore could acquire
no title to the deposit adverse to the plaintiff.
As to them, the money constituted a
trust fund, which they had no right to convert to their own use; and the fact that they
mingled it with other money, so that the
identity of that deposited was lost, would not
destroy the trust character of the deposits,
nor prevent the enforcement of the trust
against property to which they had contributed. To hold otherwise would be to ratify a
willful violation of law, at the expense of an
innocent party, and thus perpetrate a wrong.
The defendant [who was the assignee] acquired no property rights, as against plaintiff, which the Cadwells [the bankers] could
not have enforced, and he had no special interest which requires protection. The same
Is true of the general creditors. They are entitled to only so much of the estate of the
insolvents as remains after liens paramount
to their claims and other preferred charges
are satisfied." In Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa,
722, 45 N. W. 1049, the supreme court of Iowa
considered the same question in a case where
the trust funds had been used, as in the present case, by the trustee for the payment of
debts.
The trustee having become insolvent,
and made an assignment, the assignee contended that the estate in his hands was not
chargeable with the trust funds, but that the
owner of the funds should be placed on an
equal footing with general creditors, and only
receive a pro rata payment out of the estate.
The court said: "The money was used by the

Globe Company in its business, and in payment of its debts.
It became liable to the
plaintiff to replace the trust funds with other
money in its possession or with money reOf course the
alized out of other property.
Globe Company and its stockholders can urge
no equity nor reason against the enforcement
of these rules. Can its creditors? We think
not,
for these reasons: The money was
wrongfully mingled, as it were, with the asThe money did not besets of the company.
long to the Globe Company. The creditors,
if permitted to enforce their claims as against
the trust, would secure the payment of their
If they are not
claims out of trust moneys.
permitted to do this, they are simply denied
the remedy of enforcing their claims against
property acquired by the use of trust money.
They are deprived of no right, for the property acquired by the trust money became subject to the trust, and therefore could not have
In Harrison v.
been subject to the claims."
Smith, 83 Mo. 210, where trust money was
wrongfully mingled with the funds of a bank
which became insolvent, and subsequently
made an assignment, it was held that, although the trust money was not clearly traceable to any particular asset of the bank, the
fact that it went into and swelled the volume
of its assets, gave the beneficial owner an
equitable right to have his demand first paid
out of the assets of the estate, and before distribution Was made to the general creditors.
The same court, in a later case, held that,
while it might "be impossible to follow the
fund in its diverted uses, it is always possible
to make it a charge upon the estate or assets
to the increase or benefit of which it has been
appropriated. The general assets of the bank
having received the benefit of the unlawful
conversion, there is nothing inequitable in
charging them with the amount of the converted fund, as a preferred demand." StoUer
v. Coates, 88 Mo. 514. This principle of equity
was approved by the supreme court of the
United States in National Bank v. Insurance
Co., 104 U. S. 54, where it was held that, "if
a man mixes trust funds with his, the whole
will be treated as trust property, except so
far as he may be able to distinguish what is
his.
This doctrine applies in every case of a
trust relation, and as well to moneys deposited in bank, and to the debt thereby created, as to every other description of property."
See, also, KnatchbuU v. Hallett, 13
Ch. Div. 696; People v. Bank, 96 N. X. 32;
Bank v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259, 23 Pac. 986;
Smith V. Combs (N. J. Ch.) 24 Atl. 9; San
Diego Co. V. California Nat. Bank, 52 Fed. 59.
These authorities are in line with Peak v.
Ellicott, supra, and fully sustain the ruling
of the district court in this case, making the
trust fund a charge on the assets In the hands
of the assignee.
The court below held that the fact that the
board of education sought and obtained some
security from H. G. Higinbotham who had
been the treasurer of the board, for the pay-
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ment of the money which he had misappropriated, did not prevent the hoard from following and recovering the trust fund. In this
we see no error. As treasurer of the board,
he was personally liable for the wrongful conThe
version of the money intrusted to him.
collateral security for the payment of the
money was taken soon after the assignment
was made, and before it was known whether
the trust money could be reclaimed; and
probably it was not then known whether
there were sufficient assets against which the
The taking of coltrust might be enforced.
lateral security for the whole of the trust
fund which the board was seeking to find, or
for that part which they might ultimately fail
to recover, does not appear to us to be inconsistent with the remedy sought in this action,
and should not prevent it from insisting upon
its equitable lien against the assets of the
The rights of no creditor of the bank
estate.
have been prejudiced by the taking of the
security, and It does not appear that any proceeding to enforce the same has been begun.
Another point made by plaintiff in error is
that the board, having failed to present its
claim to the assignee for special allowance,
is precluded from availing itself of its equitable lien against the assets of the estate.
This contention is based on the provisions of
section 21 of the assignment act. It provides
that the assignee shall give certain notice to
the creditors of the estate of the time for the
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presentation and allowance of demands; and,
further, that all creditors who, after being
notified, fail to attend and present the nature
and amount of their demands, shall be precluded from any benefit in the estate. This
point cannot be sustained. Under the view
which we have taken, the board of education
can hardly be regarded as a "creditor," within the meaning of the statute. The funds
sought to be recovered were never the property of the bank. The title and beneficiary
interest in the same remained in the board of
education, so that the relation of debtor and
creditor never in fact existed between the
bank and the board. Bank v. Hummel, supra.
But, even if the board was to be treated as
a creditor under this statute (which we need
not decide now), it is not concluded by its failure to present a claim for the trust money to
the assignee.
No written notice, as required
by section 21, was given to the board of education or any officer or member thereof of
the time when claims would be heard and allowed by the assignee.
A notice was sent to
H. G. Higinbotham, but at that time he was
not the treasurer of the board.
If the board
of education is to be regarded as an ordinary
creditor, it should have been notified; and,
as the notice was not given, there can be
no claim that it is estopped to avail itself of
The
the remedy which it is now seeking.
judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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GAVIN f. GLEASON.i
(11 N. E. 504, 105 N. Y. 256.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 19, 1887.
J. B. Gleason, for appellant. W. H. Jolm-

son, for respondents.

It

ANDREWS, J.

may properly be conced-

ed that the $3,000, received by White from
the petitioners on the third day of January,

1883, for investment in the Gould mortgage,
constituted in his hands a quasi trust fund,
which White was bound to use for the specific purpose contemplated, and which he could
not divert to any other use without commitThe securities which
ting a breach of trust.
formed the greater part of the fund were immediately convertible into money, and authority in White to make such conversion
was implied, but only as a means of realizing
the money with which to make the mortgage
loan. The securities, while in the hands of
White, remained the property of the petitioners; and, when converted by him, their title
attached to the proceeds of the converted
property. White collected the securities actuHe collected the notes
ally or constructively.
against third persons, and drew the moi;;y
in the Delaware National Bank.
deposited
The two certificates of deposit issued by himself, amounting in the aggregate to $780, he

accepted

It

as money.

is material to a proper understanding of
the question presented, to state a few other
facts which appear in the record. White was
On the fifth of January,
a private banker.
1883, two days after the transaction with the
petitioners to whi^ch we have alluded, he was
taken sick, and on or about the ninth of January a run commenced on the bank, and on the
twelfth of January he made a general assignment to the defendant, Gleason, for the benefit of creditors, having at the time on hand in
The
eash assets only the sum of $64.75.
Gould mortgage was never procured by White,
and he made no investment for the petitioners of the $3,000 received on the third day of
January. On the contrary, it was found by
the judge at special term that White, after
receiving and collecting the securities, and
prior to the eleventh day of January, in violation of his trust, used the entire fund of $3,•000 excepting the sum of $30, which came to
the hands of the assignee, in paying his perBut on the elevsonal debts and liabilities.
enth of January, the day prior to the making of the assignment, for the purpose of seeuring the claim of the petitioners, he transferred to them a land contract, from which
and other sources the petitioners have realized sufficient to reduce their claim to the
sum of $877.27. It was admitted on the hearing of the petition, which took place in January, 1885, that the assignee had then on hand
proceeds of the assigned estate sufficient to
pay the said sum of $877.27, but it was con1

Modifying

39

Hun,

655.

ceded by the petitioners that the assigned estate was insufficient to pay in full the debts

of the assignor.
The special term granted the prayer of the
petitioner, and made an order directing the
assignee to pay the claim of the petitioners
out of the money in his hands, and this order
was aflirmed by the general term. The order
in effect appropriates out of the assigned estate the sum of $877.27 to the payment of the
claim of the petitioners, in preference to the
claims of the general creditors.
The petitioners, to maintain the order in
question, rely upon the rule in equity that, as
between cestui que trust and trustee, and all
parties claiming under the trustee otherwise
than by purchase for valuable consideration,
without notice, all property belonging to a
trust, however much it may be changed or
altered in Its nature or character, and all the
fruit of such property, whether in its original or altered state, continues to be subject
to or affected by the trust. Pennell v. Deffell,
4 De Gex, JI. & G. 387, Turner, L. J. This
settled doctrine of equity has its basis in the
The owner of personal
right of property.
property which, by the wrongful act of his
agent or trustee, has been changed and converted into chattels of another description,
may elect to treat the property into which the
conversion has been made as his own.
Upon
such election the title to the substituted property is vested in him as fully as if he had
originally authorized the wrongful act, which
title he may assert in a legal action to the
same extent as he could have asserted title
in respect to the original property. The reason of the doctrine is stated by Lord Ellenborough in the leading case of Taylor v.
Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, in language often
"For," he says, "the product or subquoted:
stitute for the original thing still follows the
nature of the thing itself, so long as it can be
ascertained to be such, and the right only
ceases when the means
of ascertainment
fail." The question in that case involved the
legal title to certain stock and bullion which
an agent of the defendant, intrusted by his
principal with money to invest in exchequer
bills, had wrongfully misapplied to the purchase of the stock and bullion. Intending to
abscond with it and go to America, and the
court sustained the defendants' title.
Courts go very far to protect rights of propThey follow it
erty as against a wrong-doer.
through whatever changes and transmutations it may undergo in his hands, and as
against him, transferred to the changed and
altered product the original title, however
much the original property has been increased in value by his labor or expenditure,
provided only that the product is still a chattel, and is composed of the original materials.
But a court
Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379.
of law, as a general rule, deals only with the
legal title; and when the legal identity of the
property is destroyed, or the property cannot
be traced specifically into another thing, it Is
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powerless to give relief, except by action for
The landamages against the wrong-doer.
guage of Lord EUenborough, already quoted,
that the right to follow property only ceases
when the means of ascertainment fail, is illustrated by what follows, "which," he adds,
"is the case when the subject is turned into
money and mixed and compounded in a general mass of the same description."
It is not important to inquire whether later
decisions have not established, even in respect to strictly legal actions, a somewhat less
stringent limitation upon the right of pursuit
than that indicated in the language just quoted.
But it is unnecessary to pursue this inquiry here.
It is clear that in this case the
trust fund has been dissipated and lost by
the act of the trustee.
It is neither specifically in the hands of the trustee or of his assignee, nor it is represented by other property into which it has been converted. The
fund, according to the finding, (with the exception of the sum of $30,) was paid out on
the debts of White before the assignment.
Plainly, there is no room for any contention
that the petitioners have legal title to any of
the assigned property.
The sole inquiry is
whether a case is made for equitable Intervention in favor of the petitioners in the administration of the insolvent estate.
It is
clear, we think, that, upon an accounting in
banliruptcy or insolvency, a trust creditor is
not entitled to a preference over general creditors of the insolvent, merely on the ground
of the nature of his claim; that is, that he is
a trust creditor as distinguished from a general creditor.
We know of no authority for
such a contention.
The equitable doctrine
that, as between creditors, equality is equity, admits, so far as we know, of no exception founded on the greater supposed sacredness of one debt, or that it arose out of a violation of duty, or that its loss involves greater apparent hardship in one case than another, unless it appears, in addition, that there
is some specific recognized equity founded on
some agreement, or the relation of the debt
to the assigned property, which entitles the
claimant, according to equitable principles, to
preferential payment. If it appears that trust
property specificall/ belonging to the trust is
included in the assets, the court doubtless
may order it to be restored to the trust.
So,
also, if it appears that trust property has been
wrongfully converted by the trustee, and constitutes, although in a changed form, a part
of the assets, it would seem to be equitable,
and in accordance with- equitable principles,
that the things into which the trust property
has been changed, should, if required, be set
apart for the trust, or, if separation is impossible, that priority of lien should be adjudged
in favor of the trust-estate for the value of
the trust property or funds, or proceeds of the
trust property, entering into and constituting
a part of the assets. This rule simply asserts
the right of the true owner to his own property.
But It is the general rule, as well in a court
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of equity as in a court of law, that, in order
to follow trust funds, and subject them to the
operation of the trust, they must be identified.
A court of equity, in pursuing the in-

quiry and in administering relief, is less hampered by technical difficulties than a court
of law; and it may be sufficient, to entitle a
party to equitable preference in the distribution of a fund in insolvency, that it appears
that the fund or property of the insolvent remaining for distribution includes the proceeds
of the trust-estate, although it may be impossible to point out the precise thing^ in which
the trust fund has been invested, or the precise time when the conversion took place.
The authorities require at least this degree of
distinctness in the proof before preference can
be awarded.
See Van Alen v. American Nat.
Bank, 52 N. Y. 1; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133; Ferris v. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113;
Pennell v. DefCell, supra; Frith v. Cartland,
2 Hem. & M. 417.
The facts in this case fall short of the proof
required within any case which has come to
our notice.
The trust fund, with the single
exception mentioned, was misappropriated by
White to the payment of his private debts
prior to the assignment. It cannot be traced
into, the property in the hands of the assignee, for the plain reason that it is shown
to have gone to the creditors of White in satisfaction of their debts.
The courts below
seem to have proceeded upon a supposed equity springing from the circumstance that, by
the application of the fund to the payment of
White's creditors, the assigned estate was relieved pro tanto from debts which otherwise
would have been charged upon it, and that
thereby the remaining creditors, if entitled
to distribution without regard to the petitioner's claim, will be benefited.
We think this is
quite too vague an equity for judicial cognizance, and we find no case justifying relief
In a very general
upon such a circumstance.
sense, all creditors of an insolvent may be
to have contributed to the assets
supposed
which constitute the residuum of his estate.
The case of People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N; y. 32, seems to have been misunderstood.
The question considered in this
case was not raised there, and it was not
claimed in that case that the proceeds of the
checks of Sartwell, Hough & Co., the petitioners, had not gone into the general fund of the
bank, or that they had not passed in some
The court did not deform to the receiver.
cide that the petitioners would have been entitled to a preference in case the proceeds of
the checks had been used by the bank, and
were not represented in its assets in the
hands of the receiver.
For the reasons stated, we are of opinion
that the orders of the special and general
terms should be modified by reducing the sum
directed to be paid by the assignee to the
sum of $30, with interest from April 19, 1883,
but without costs to either party.

All

concur.

Ordered accordingly.
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DAVIES, C. J. This action was tried by
a referee who held as matter of law, that
unless the agreement set out in the complaint
in relation to the purchase by the defendant
at the master's sale of the premises in question, or some note or memorandum thereof,
expressing the consideration be in writing,
the same was void, and created no Interest
in the plaintiffs in said premises, and could
not be enforced against said defendant in
law or equity. And he further reported, as
matter of fact, that no proof was made or
offered on said trial by or in behalf of the
plaintiff of any such agreement in writing,
or of any note or memorandum in writing
of such an agreement, or of any deed, conveyance or instrument in writing subscribed
by the defendant or his lawful agent, creating or declaring any trust or interest In said
premises in favor of said plaintiffs, and that
Qo proof was made or testimony or evidence
offered on the part of the defendant.
The
judgment entered for the defendant upon
the report of the referee was affirmed at the
general term, and the plaintiffs now appeal
to this court.
We are at liberty to assume from this finding, that the agreement set out in the complaint was proven on the trial before the
referee.
To ascertain what that agreement
was, we must have reference to the complaint and the offer made by the plaintiffs
on the trial.
The plaintiffs averred in the
complaint that the plaintiff Michael Ryan,
being seized of certain lands In the town
of Seneca, made and executed a mortgage
thereon in the year 1889, to secure the sum
of $800, part of the purchase-money thereof,
and that in the month of October, 1841,
said plaintiff Ryan conveyed to the said Nevins, the other plaintiff, an equal undivided
half of the said premises; that plaintiffs
being unable to pay the installments on said
mortgage as they became due, the said mortgage was foreclosed, and said plaintiffs procured of one Lewis the sum of $300, which
was paid on account of said judgment of
foreclosure, and a portion thereof, to the
extent of $300, was assigned to said Lewis
as his security for such advance; that said
Lewis becoming importunate for his money,
and the plaintiffs being unable to raise the
.same for him, Lewis proceeded
to advertise
said premises for sale on the 12th day of
October, 1843, for the purpose of raising said
sum of about $300, while said premises were
worth the sum of $4,000.
The complaint
further averred that while said premises
were thus advertised for sale, and before the
day of sale had arrived, the plaintiffs being
men of limited means, and unable to raise

the money which would be needed to stop
the said sale, and to pay up the amount due
on the said decree for the debt and the costs
which had accrued, applied to the defendant
Dox, reported to be a man of ready money,
and who had always professed to be interested in their behalf, and asked him to assist
them, and aid them to raise the money to
pay the amount due on said decree and save
the said premises from being sold away
from them, and from being sacrificed for the
small amount, compared with their value,
That
which was claimed upon said decree.
said Dox did then profess and declare a willingness to help said plaintiffs for such purpose, and did then and there agree with
the said plaintiffs that on the day of said
sale, he, the said Dox, would attend the
same and bid off and purchase the said
premises at such sale, upon the express
agreement and understanding, between the
plaintiffs and said Dox, that S'.ich bidding
and purchase, if made by the said Dox,
should be for the benefit and advantage of
these plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs upon such
agreement and understanding agreed that
they would not find any other one to go
their friend at the said sale, and to bid in
and purchase the said premises for them;
and that it was expressly understood and
agreed between the plaintiffs and said Dox,
that if he became the purchaser of said premises at said sale he should take the deed of
the same from the said master in his own
name, but only by way of and as security
to himself for what money he should have
to advance and pay on such purchase, and
with the agreement, promise and undertaking between said Dox and these plaintiffs,
that whenever these plaintiffs should repay
him the amount which he should pay to procure and effect such purchase and to get
the deed therefor, with the interest thereon, and a reasonable compensation for his
services therein, he, the said Dox, should convey the said premises to these plaintiffs and
again vest the title thereto in them, and
should in the mean time hold the said premises in his own name as security only for
the said moneys, and always subject to the
above agreement and defeasance.
That in
pursuance of said agreement, said Dox attended said sale and bid off the same for
the sum of $100, he being the only bidder at
said sale, and the same was strutk off to him
and he received the deed therefor.
That at
said sale it was talked about and understood
by those present thereat, that said Dox was
bidding for the benefit of these plaintiffs,
and that said premises were struck off to
him only as security to him for the repayment to him by these plaintiffs of the moneys
he should advance and pay for the same
and interest thereon, and his reasonable
charges for his attention thereto.
And the
plaintiffs averred that such was the fact,
and that in truth said Dox did bid off and
purchase the said premises for these plain-
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tiffs, and to save the same for them, and
took the deed in his own name, only as such
security as aforesaid, and that in consequence of such understanding other persons
abstained from bidding on said premises,
and the same was struck off to said Dox
without any opposing bid, although the plaintiffs aver that the same were then worth
$4,000 and upwards.
And the plaintiffs also
averred that if they had not relied upon said
promise and undertaking of said
agreement,
Dox, they would not have allowed the said
premises to have been struck off for the
said sum of $100, but would have found
other persons to have purchased the said
premises, and saved the same from sacrifice,
but that as said agreement was made more
than a month before said sale, these plaintiffs relied upon it and made no other effort
to procure the money, or the assistance of
friends to save and buy said premises.
That at the time of said sale these plaintiffs were in the possession of said premises,
arid continued in possession thereof and made
payments on account of the Incumbrances
thereon until some time in the year 1849,
with the knowledge, privity and consent of
said Dox.
And that during all that time
said Dox never exercised any acts of ownership over said premises, or interfered with
the ownership, use, occupation or possession
thereof by the plaintiffs, and that during all
that time the assessments and taxes thereon were paid by the plaintiffs,
with the
knowledge, privity and assent of said Dox.
That in the year 1849, the said plaintiffs
were induced by said Dox to surrender the
possession of said premises to him, and in
the year 1851 he refused to come to a settlement with the plaintiffs, and denied that
he held the said premises for their benefit,
or that they had any interest therein. The
referee excluded such evidence, and decided
that he would not receive any parol evidence to establish, or tending to establish,
the said agreement,
and that upon the case
made by the pleadings, assuming there was
no agreement in writing as stated in the answer, there can be no recovery by the plaintiffs. To this decision and ruling, the plaintiffs' counsel duly excepted.
This exception presents the main question
for consideration and decision upon this appeal, and the referee in his report states the
ground or reason of his decision to be that
unless the agreement mentioned, or some
note or memorandum thereof expressing the
consideration be in writing the same was
void, and could not be enforced against the
defendant. If the referee was right in this
conclusion, then the plaintiffs were properly
nonsuited, and the judgment for the defendant should be affirmed. If in error then it
follows that there must be a reversal and a
new trial. The Revised Statutes declare that
no estate or interest in lands, nor any trust
or power over or concerning lands, or in
any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
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granted or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in
writing, subscribed by the party creating,
granting or declaring the same.
1 Rev. St.
p. 134, § 6.
It is manifest that the referee
had this provision before him, and that his
decision was based upon the assumption of
its applicability to the case in hand.
In arriving at this conclusion he entirely Ignored
all consideration of fraud or of part performance, as elements of the transaction.
Section
10 of the same title declares that "nothing
In this title contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of a court of equity to
compel the specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance of such
agreements." 1 Rev. St. p. 135, § 10. It is
well settled that courts of equity will enforce a specific performance of a contract
within the statute when the parol agreement
has been partly carried into execution.
2
Story, Eq. Jur. § 759.
And the distinct
ground upon which courts of equity interfere
in cases of this sort is, that otherwise one
party would be enabled to practice a fraud
upon the other, and it could never be the
intention of the statute to enable any party
to commit such a fraud with impunity.
Indeed fraud in all cases constitutes an answer
to the most solemn acts and conveyances,
and the objects of the statutes are promoted
instead of being obstructed by such a jurisdiction for discovery and relief.
And
when one party has executed his part of the
agreement
In the confidence that the other
party would do the same, it is obvious that
if the latter should refuse it would be a
fraud upon the former to suffer his refusal
to work to his prejudice.
In Fonblanque's Equity it is said: "If the
contract be carried into execution by one of
the parties, as by delivering possession, and
such execution be accepted by the other, he
that accepts it must perform his part, for
when there is a performance the evidence
of the bargain does not lie merely upon the
words but the facts performed, and it is
unconscionable that the party that received
the advantage should be admitted to say that
such contract was never made." Ponbl. bk.
And the universal rule is
1, p. 181, c. 338.
correctly enunciated by Brown on Frauds,
when he says: "The correct view appears
to be that equity will at all times lend its
aid to defeat a fraud, notwithstanding the
Brown, St. Frauds, §
statute of frauds."
In the present case we are to assume
438.
that the agreement was made as set out in
the complaint, and performed on the part of
We then
the plaintiffs as therein stated.
have a distinct and unequivocal agreement
established, and performance by one party
of all that was to be done in pursuance of it
on his part.
We find the other party, by
reason of the acts and omissions of this party, obtaining the possession and title to a
large amount of real estate for a trifling sum
compared to its actual value, and refusing
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to fulfill the agreement on his part. He interposes the statute of frauds as a shield,
thus using a statute designed to prevent
frauds as an instrument whereby one can be
perpetrated with impunity.
This a court of
equity cannot tolerate. Wetmore v. White,
2 Gaines, Cas. 87, was an action brought in
chancery to compel the specific performance
of a contract by parol relating to lands. The
chancellor dismissed the bill, but the court
of errors unanimously reversed his decree.
Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, says: "The appellant's claim resting
altogether upon parol contract, it becomes
necessary to examine whether any obstacle
to relief is interposed by the statute for the
prevention of fraud.
I thinii there is not.
It is an established rule in equity that a
parol agreement
in part performed is not
within the provisions of the statute. Citing
1 Fonbl. Eq. 182, and cases there noted.
To
allow a statute having for its object the prevention of frauds to be interposed in bar of
the performance of a parol agreement in
part performed, would evidently encourage
the mischief the legislature intended to pre*
*
* Possession delivered in purvent.
suance of an agreement is such a decree of
performance as to take a contract out of the
statute." The same doctrine was reaflirmed
in Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 14 Johns. 15,
In Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407,
35, 3G.
413, the chancellor said the principle upon
which courts of equity hold that a part performance of a parol agreement is sufiicient
to take a case out of the statute of frauds is,
that a party who has permitted another to
perform acts on the faith of an agreement
shall not be allowed to insist that the agreement is invahd, because it was not in writing, and that he is entitled to treat those acts
as if the agreement,
in compliance with
which they were performed, had not been
made.
In other words, upon the ground of
fraud in refusing to execute the parol agreement after a part performance thereof by
the other party, and when he cannot be placed in the same situation that he was before
such part performance by him."
See, also,
Phillips V. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 131; Murray V. Jayne, 8 Barb. 612.
In Hodges v. Tennessee Marine & Fire Ins.
Co., 8 N. Y. 416, this court held that in equity parol evidence was admissible to show
that a deed absolute on its face was in fact
a mortgage, and so intended by the parties
thereto.
And in Despard v. Walbridge, 15
N. Y. 374, this court also held that an assignment of a lease, absolute on its face, was
in fact made for the purpose of secm-ing a
debt, and that such debt had been fully paid;
and that under the Code of Procedure, parol
evidence Is admissible to show that such assignment, though absolute in its terms, was
intended as a mortgage.
The case of Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147,
Is so like to that now under consideration
that it may be profitable to refer to it at

A mortgage upon a farm was foreclosed in chancery and advertised for sale
by a master. Before the sale. Brown, the
length.

defendant, made an arrangement with the
plaintiffs, the Lynches, whereby he agreed
to purchase the farm in for their benefit,
for which he was to receive a stipulated
compensation.
The mortgagee, in order to
favor the Lynches, agreed with Brown that
he might bid off the property for about half
the amount of the mortgage. Brown, at the
sale, prevented others bidding by representing that he intended to buy for the Lynches,
and he purchased the farm at the master's
sale for $1,500, about ?1,000 below its value.
Afterward Brown refused to convey the farm
to the Lynches, or to account to them for
the value, although they tendered to him
the amount of his bid, with interest, and the
sum agreed for his services.
And it was
held by the court of chancery that Brown
was a trustee for the Lynches, and had no
other interest in the farm than that of mortgagee to secure the repayment of the purchase-money,
and of the payment of the sum
agreed to be allowed him for his services.
And that the court of chancery would relieve against a fraud by converting the person guilty of it into a trustee for those who
have been injured thereby. Emott, vice
chancellor, decreed for the plaintiffs, holding
the defendant had committed a fraud upon
the plaintiffs by agreeing to pmxhase for
their benefit, when, in truth, he meant to
purchase for himself, and that he had committed a fraud upon the plaintiffs, by his
acts and representations, in preventing bidding at the sale.
And he proceeds to show,
by the citation of numerous authorities, that
a court of equity can provide adequate relief by declaring the purchaser a trustee for
the person defrauded.
And he quotes with
approbation the remarks of Lord Eldon, in
Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 626, where he
says:

"Upon the statute of frauds, though declaring that interest shaU not be barred except by writing, cases in this court are perfectly familiar, deciding that a fraudulent
use shall not be made of that statute; when
this court has interfered against a party
meaning to make it an instrument of fraud,
and said he should not talie advantage of
his own fraud, even though the statute has
declared that in case these circumstances do
not exist, the instrument shall be absolutely
void."
The chancellor affirmed the decree,
and observed, that the Lynches had an interest in the premises which they had a right
to protect and preserve, and it would have
been a gross fraud for any one to hold out
to them, under such circumstances, that he
was bidding ofE the property for their benefit, when he in fact intended to appropriate
it to his own use.
If the appellant did in fact
bid it off for them, under the agi-eement,
he held it in tnist for them, and had no
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other Interest in it tlian that of a mortgagee, to secure the repayment of the purchase-money
and the $60 agreed to be paid
him for his ti'ouble.
But if he had no such
intention, and did not in fact Bid off the
property in trust for them, he was guilty of
a fraiid which the court will relieve against.
The cases referred to by the circuit judge
(vice-chancellor), fully establish the principle
that this court has power to relieve against
such fraud, and the means to be employed
is to convert the person who has gained an
advantage by means of his fraudulent act,
into a tnistee for those who have been inThis case was cited with
jured thereby."
approbation in Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y.
239, and the principle of it adopted by this
com-t in that case.
Its principle was also adopted and approved of in Sandford v. Norris, decided at
special term of supreme court in May, 1859,
and affirmed at general term in the First
disti-ict in June, 1861. 4 Abb. Dec. 144. In
that case, certain premises were owned by
the plaintiff's husband, and he made an assignment thereof, and his assignees adverThe plaintiff was
tised the same for sale.
anxious to purchase them in at the sale, and
made an arrangement with the defendant,
Norris, by which he agreed to attend the
sale and bid them off in his name for the
plaintifC, and on payment of the sum bid
In conseconvey the same to the plaintiff.
quence of this arrangement, the plaintiff refrained from bidding at the sale, and the
premises were struck; off to the defendant
for the sum of $20, subject to the prior incumbrances.
The defendant subsequently
sold the premises so purchased for the sum
of $2,000, of which the plaintiff had received
one-half, and the action was brought to recover the residue.
It was held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that the
defense of the statute of frauds, interposed
by the defendant, was no bar to the relief
sought by the plaintiff;
that the agreement
was established beyond controversy, and the
defendant was boimd as well by sound
morals as established principles of law to
the performance of it.
On the hearing of
that case, the opinion of Mr. Justice Emott,
in the case of Bergen v. Nelson (not reported), was read, distinctly affirming the doctrine of Brown v. Lynch, supra. The case
of Osborn v. Mason, before the vice-chancellor of the first circuit (not reported), also
affirmiug the doctrine of that case, was also
cited.

Mason in that case. agreed with Osborn to
attend a sale of certain premises, Osborn being either owner or a subsequent incumbrancer. Mason also having a claim upon
Mason
the premises as an incumbrancer.
agreed to bid in the premises at the sale,
and then to let Osborn have them for the
amount at which they stood him in, including his own incumbrance. Mason bid off the
premises and then refused to fulfill his agree-
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ment which was by pai'ol.
The vice-chancellor held that the statute of frauds was no
bar to the suit for a specific performance of
the agreement which was decreed, and on
appeal to the chancellor the same was affirmed.
Voorhies v. St John was argued
and decided in this com-t in December, 1863.
It was an action brought to recover moneys
received by the defendant on a sale of a
house and lot in the city of New York, and
a leasehold estate in two buildings on other
lots therein, and for an account of the rents
and profits received therefrom.
The property had formerly belonged to the husband
of the plaintiff, and consisted of three parcels, and upon a sale thereof by his assignees, the plaintiff requested
two of her
friends to attend the sale and bid off twoof said parcels for her benefit
They subsequently, at her request, transferred their bids
to the defendant, St. John, and he took the
conveyance therefor to himself, and paid the
assignee for the same, declaring at the time
that the plaintiff wished him to buy that
property for her.
At the sale of the other
parcel, St. John attended the assignee's sale
and bid off the same himself, and the assignments of the two bids and the titles t»
aU the three pieces of property made out
to him together in his own name.
All these
acts were done by St. John for Mrs. Voorhies, at her request and for her benefit.
The referee reported in favor of the plaintiCf,.
and the judgment thereon was affirmed at
the general term of the First district, on the
authority of Sandford v. Norris, supra. On
appeal to this court, that judgment was affirmed in December, 1863, and distinctly on
the ground that the statute of frauds was n*
bar to the performance of the agreement
We must hold this case as decisive of that
The same docnow under consideration.
trine has frequently been affirmed in other
cases.

In Cox v. Cox, 5 Rich. Eq. 36o, the owner
of land, in danger of being summarily dispossessed by a sheriff's sale, agreed with his
brother, the defendant, that the latter should
bid off the land and pay the bid and make
This agreea reconveyance on repayment.
ment was declared to the bystanders at the
sale, and competition being thus prevented,
the land was bought by the brother for onetenth of its actual value. The whole transaction was alleged to be "a fraudulent contrivance on the part of the defendant toobtain his brother's land for one-tenth of its
The court enjoined the defendant
value."
from proceeding at law under the title thus
"This court
fraudulently obtained, saying:
has often repeated that the statute of frauds
should never be perverted to an instrument
Thus, in a case of an agreement
of fraud.
such as the statute plainly declares void, if
not reduced to writing, yet if this was omitted by fraud, the defendant would not be
permitted to avail himself of the statute.
In Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Brown Oh. 565,.
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Lord Thurlow says, if you interpose the
medium of fraud, by which the agreement
Is prevented from being put in writing, 1
See Keith
agi-ee the statute is inapplicable.
,
V. Purvis, 4 Desaus. Eq. 114."
In the case cited of Keith v. Purvis, a
creditor induced his debtor's agent not to
bid at a sale of his debtor's land by promising to give the debtor time to pay the debt,
and then to reconvey the land. This agreement was disclosed at the sale, and prevented other bids, whereby the creditor
bought the land at one-third of its value, but
afterward refusing to reconvey, the debtor
To this it was
brought his bill for relief.
objected that the agreement was void by the
statute of frauds; but the court held, "that
if the agreement was void, the creditor must
surrender up his advantage under it and be
liable to make good the loss sustained by the
"Can it
adverse party from his conduct."
be tolerated," says the comt at page 121,
"that a creditor shall, at a sale of his debtor's property, lull him to sleep and keep off
other purchasers by an agreement under
which he buys in the land for a small sum
much below the value, and then that he
should declare that the agreement was void
under the statute of frauds, and that the
other party should have no benefit from the
agreement, whilst he reaped all the fruits?
Sm'ely not.
Courts of justice would be blind
Indeed if they could permit such a state of
things."
In Peebles v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 492,
the supreme court of Pennsylvania said: "If
by the artifice of the purchaser declaring he
was to buy for the owner, others were prevented from bidding, and the land was sold
at a great undervalue, this would make him
a trustee." And in Trapnall v. Brown, 19
Ark. 49, property of the value of $5,000 was,
by agi-eemeut similar to the one in the present case, bought in for $176, other persons
declining to bid on being informed of the object of the agi'eement.
"Under these circumstances," the court said, "we think it
would be a fraud in the purchaser to keep
the property in violation of the agreement.

That the statute which was designed to prevent fraud would be used as a shield and in.
the commission of fraud, which the courts
of equity will not tolerate. We think therefore that the court below did not err in
treating the purchaser as a trustee."
These
observations, made in these cases, are as pertinent to that now under consideration, as
Many of these cases
they were in them.
are identical in aU important particulars
with this, and there is no good reason why
the same rules of law and morals enunciated
in them should not govern and control the
decision in this case.
The fact that an
agreement is void, under the statute of
frauds, does not entitle either party to relief in equity, but other facts may; and
when they do, it is no answer to the claim
for relief, that the void agreement was one
of the instrumentahties through which the
fraud was effected.
Ormond v. Anderson, 2
Ball & B. 309. Where one of the parties to
a contract, void by the statute of frauds,
avails himself of its invalidity but unconscientiously appropriates what he has acquired under it, equity will compel restitution; and it constitutes no objection to the
claim, that the opposite party may happen
to secure the same practical benefit, through
the process of restitution, which would have
resulted from the observance of the void
agreement.
Floyd v. Buckland, 2 Freem.
Ch. 268; Oldham v. Litchford, Id. 284; Devenish v. Baines, Finch, Prec. 3; Thynn v.
Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Reech v. Kennegal, 1
Ves. Sr. 12.j; Davis v. Walsh, 2 Har. & J.
329; Wilcox v. Morris, 1 Murph. 116; Stoddard V. Hart, 23 N. Y. 500.
It is very clear to my mind, both upon
principle and authority, that the referee
erred in excluding the evidence offered, and
that the judgment must be reversed and a
new trial ordered, with costs to abide the
event

PORTER,

MORGAN,

WRIGHT,

JJ.,

concurred.

LEONARD,

HUNT, J.,

and
dis-

sented.

Judgment reversed, and new ti-ial ordered.
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EARL, J. TUis action was brought by the
receiver of the Central Savings Bank of the
<:ity of New York against the defendants,
who were trustees of the bank, to recover
damages which, it is alleged, they caused the
bank by their misconduct as such trustees.
The first question to be considered is the
measure of fidelity, care and diligence which
such trustees owe to such a bank and its depositors. The relation existing between the
corporation and its trustees is mainly that of
principal and agent, and the relation between
the trustees and the depositors is similar to
that of trustee and cestui que trust.
The
trustees are bound to observe the limits placed
upon their powers in the charter, and if they
ti-anscend such limits and cause damage, they
incur liability. If they act fraudulently or
do a willful wrong, it is not doubted that
they may be held for all the damage they
But if
cause to the bank or its depositors.
they act in good faith within the limits of
powers conferred, using proper prudence and
diligence, they are not responsible for mere
mistakes or errors of judgment.
That the
trustees of such corporations are bound to
use some diligence in the discharge of their
duties cannot be disputed. All the authorities hold so. What degree of care and diligence are they bound to exercise?
Not the
highest degree, not such as a very vigilant
or extremely careful person would exercise.
If such were required, it would be difficult
to find trustees who would incur the responsibility of such trust positions. It would not
be proper to answer the question by saying
the lowest degree.
Few persons would be
willing to deposit money in savings banks,
or to take stock in corporations, with the understanding that the trustees or directors
were bound only to exercise slight care, such
as inattentive persons would give to their
own business, in the management of the large
and important interests committed to their
hands.
When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corporation,
thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property, he expects and has the
right to expect that the trustees or directors
who are chosen to take his place in the management and control of his property, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts
committed to them—the same degree of care
and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs.
When one voluntarily takes the position of
trustee or director of a corporation, good faith,
exact justice, and public policy unite in re<iuiring of him such a degree of care and prudence, and it is a gross breach of duty — crassa
negligentia— not to bestow them.
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It is impossible to give the measure of culpable negligence for all cases, as the degree
of care required depends upon the subjects to
which it is to be applied. First Nat. Bank v.
Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. 278. What would be
slight neglect in the care of a quantity of iron
might be gross neglect in the care of a jewel.
What would be slight neglect in the care exercised in the affairs of a turnpike corporation or even of a manufacturing corporation,
might be gross neglect in the care exercised
in the management of a savings bank intrusted with the savings of a multitude of poor
people, depending for its life upon credit and
liable to be wrecked by the breath of suspicion. There is a classification of negligence
to be found in the books, not always of practical value and yet sometimes serviceable, into slight negligence,
gross negligence,
and
that degree of negligence intermediate the
two, attributed to the absence of ordinary
care; and the claim on behalf of these trustees is that they can only be held responsible
in this action in consequence of gross negligence,
according to this classification.
If
gross negligence be taken according to its ordinary meaning— as something nearly approaching fraud or bad faith— I cannot yield
to this claim; and if there are any authorities upholding the claim, I emphatically dissent from them.
It seems to me that it would be a monstrous proposition to hold that trustees, intrusted with the management of the property,
interests and business of other people who divest themselves of the management and confide in tliem, are bound to give only slight
care to the duties of their trust, and are liable only in case of gross inattention and negligence; and I have found no authority fully
upholding such a proposition. It is true that
authorities are found which hold that trustees are liable only for crassa negligentia,
which literally means gross negligence; but
that phrase has been defined to mean the absence of ordinary care and diligence adequate
to the particular case.
In Scott v. De Peyster, 1 Edw. 513, 543— a case much cited—
the learned vice-chancellor said: "I think the
question in all such cases should and must
necessarily be, whether they (directors) have
omitted that care which men of common pruTo redence take of their own concerns.
quire more, would be adopting too rigid a
rule and rendering them liable for slight neglect; while to require less, would be relaxing
too much the obligation which binds them to
vigilance and attention in regard to the interests of those confided to their care, and expose them to liability for gross neglect only—
which is very little short of fraud itself." In
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, Judge Sharswood said: "They [directors] can only be regarded as mandataries— persons who have
gratuitously undertaken to perform certain
duties, and who are therefore bound to apply
ordinary skill and diligence, but no more."
In Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.
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Jenckes, J., said: "The sole question
is, whether the directors have or have not bestowed proper diligence. They are liable only for ordinary care; such care as prudent
And in the
men take in their own affairs."
same case, Ames, J., said: "They should not
therefore be liable for innocent mistakes, unintentional neghgence, honest errors of judgment, but only for willful fraud or neglect,
and want of ordinary knowledge and care."
The same case came again under consideration in 3 R. I. 9, and Green, G. J., said: "We
think a board of directors, acting in good
faith and with reasonable care and diligence,
who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either
as to law or fact, are not liable for the conseIn the case of
quences of such mistake."
Liquidators of Western Bank v. Douglas, 11
Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 112, it is said: "Whatever
the duties (of directors) are, they must be disand
charged with fidelity and conscience,
with ordinary and reasonable care. It is not
necessary that I should attempt to define
where excusable remissness ends and gross
That must depend to a
negligence begins.
large extent on the circumstances. It is
enough to say that gross negligence in the
performance of such a duty, the want of reasonable and ordinary fidelity and care, will
impose liability for loss thereby occasioned."
In Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 405,
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, that a person who accepted the office of director of a
corporation "is obliged to execute it with
fidelity and reasonable diligence," although
In Litchfield
he acts without compensation.
V. White, 3 Sandf. 545, Sandford, J., said:
"In general a trustee is bound to manage
and employ the trust property for the benefit
of the cestui que trust with the care and diliConsequently
gence of a provident owner.
he is liable for every loss sustained by reason
of his negligence, want of caution or mistake,
as well as positive misconduct."
In Spering's Appeal, Judge Sharswood said
that directors "are not liable for mistakes of
judgment, even though they may be so gross
as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they were honest, and provided they are
fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body." As
I understand this language, I cannot assent
to it as properly defining to any extent the
nature of a director's responsibility.
Like a
mandatary, to whom he has been likened, he
Is bound not only to exercise proper care and
diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment.
As he is bound to exercise ordinary skill and
judgment, he cannot set up that he did not
When damage is caused by
possess them.
his want of judgment, he cannot excuse himself by alleging his gross ignorance. One
who voluntarily takes the position of director,
and invites confidence In that relation, undertakes, like a mandatary, with those whom he
represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at least ordinary knowledge and skill,
and that he will bring them to bear in the
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discharge of his duties. Story, Bailm. § 182.
Such is the rule applicable to public ofiicers,
to professional men and to mechanics, and
such is the rule which must be applicable to
every person who undertakes to act for another in a situation or employment requiring
skill and knowledge; and it matters not that
the service is to be rendered gratuitously.
These defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of the bank. They invited
depositors to confide to them their savrngs,
and to intrust the safe-keeping and management of them to their skill and prudence.
They undertook not only that they would discharge their duties with proper care, but that
they would exercise the ordinary skill and
judgment requisite for the discharge of their
delicate trust.
Enough has now been said to show what
measure of diligence, skill, and prudence the
law exacts from managers and directors of
corporations; and we are now prepared to
examine the facts of this case, for the purpose of seeing if these trustees fell short of
this measure in the matters alleged In the
complaint.
This bank was incorporated by the act
chapter 467 of the Laws of 1867, and it commenced business in the spring of that year,
in a hired building on the east side of Third
avenue, in the city of New York.
It remained there for several years, and then removed to the west side of the avenue, between Forty-Fifth and Forty-Sixth streets,
where it occupied hired rooms until near the
time of its failure in the fall of 1875. During the whole time the deposits averaged only about $70,000. In 1867, the income of the
bank was $942.12, and the expenses, including amounts paid for safe, fixtures, charter,
current expenses and interest to depositors,
In 1868, the income was
were $5,571.34.
$5,471.43, and the expenses including interest
In 1869, the income
to depositors, $5,719.43.
was $3,918.27, and the expenses and interest
paid, $5,346.05.
In 1870 the income was $5,784.09, and expenses and interest, $7,040.22.
In 1871 the income was $13,551.14; which included a bonus of $4,000, or $6,000 obtained
upon the purchase of a mortgage of $40,000,
which mortgage was again sold In 1874 at a
discount of $2,000, and the expenses, including interest paid, were $9,124.05.
In 1872
the income was $5,100.51, and the expenses,
including interest paid, were .$7,212.49. Down
to the 1st day of January, 1873, therefore, the
total expenses, including interest paid, were
$5,046 more than the income.
To this sum
should be added $2,000, deducted on the sale
of the large mortgage in 1S74, which was
purchased at the large discount in 1871, as^
above mentioned, and yet entered in the assets at its face.
From this apparent deficiency should be deducted the value of the safe
and furniture of the bank, from which the receiver subsequently realized $500. At the
same date the amount due to over one thousand depositors was about $70,000, and the
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assets of the bank consisted of about $13,000
in cash and the balance mostly of mortgages
upon real estate.
While the bank was in this condition, with
a lease of the rooms then occupied by it expiring May 1, 1S74, the project of purchasing
a lot and erecting a banking-house thereon
began to be talked of among the trustees.
The only reason put on record in the minutes
of the meetings held by the trustees for procuring a new banking-house was to better
the financial condition of the bank. In February, 1873, at a meeting of the trustees a
committee was appointed "on site for new
■building;" and in March the committee entered into contract for the purchase of a
plot of land, consisting of four lots, on the
comer of Forty-Eighth street and Third avenue, for the sum of $74,500; of which $1,000
was to be paid down, !p9,000 on the 1st day
of May then next, and $64,000 to be secured
by a mortgage, payable on or before May 1,
1875, with interest from May 1, 1873, at seven per cent.; and there was an agreement
that payment of the principal sum secured
ty the mortgage might be extended to May
1, 1877, provided a building should, without
unavoidable delay, be erected upon the corner lot, worth not less than $25,000. This
contract was reported by the committee to
the trustees, at a meeting held April 7. On
the 1st day of May, 1873, the real estate was
conveyed and the cash payment was made,
and four separate mortgages were executed
to secure the balance, one upon each lot.
The mortgage upon the lot upon which the
bank building was afterward erected was
for $30,500. At the same time the bank became obligated to build upon that lot a building covering its whole front, twenty-five feet,
and sixty feet deep, and not less than five
stories high, and have the same inclosed by
the 1st day of November then next. Upon
that lot the bank proceeded, in the spring of
1875, to erect a building covering the whole
front, and seventy-six feet deep, and five
stories high, at an expense of about $27,000.
And the buiding was nearly completed when
the receiver of the bank was appointed in
November of that year.
The three lots not
needed for the building were disposed of,
as we may assume, without any loss, leaving the corner lot used for the building to cost
the bank $29,250; and we may assume that
that was then the fair value of the lot. This
case may then be treated as if the trustees
had purchased the comer lot at $29,250, and
bound themselves to erect thereon a building
costing $27,000. When the receiver was appointed that lot and building, and other assets which produced less than $1,000, constituted the whole property of the bank; and
subsequently the lot and building were swept
a,way by a mortgage foreclosure, and this action was brought to recover the damages
caused to the bank by the alleged improper
investment of its funds, as above stated, in
the lot upon which the building was erected.
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At the time of the purchase of the lot the
bank was substantially insolvent. If it had
gone into liquidation, its assets would have
fallen several thousand dollars short of discharging its liabilities,
and this state of
things was known to the trustees. It had
been in existence about six years, doing a
losing business. The amount of its deposits,
which its managers had not been able to
increase, shows that the enterprise was an
abortion from the beginning, either because
it lacked public confidence, or was not needed in the place where it was located.
It
had changed its location once without any
benefit.
It had on hand but about $13,000
in cash, of which $10,000 were taken to make
the first payments. The balance of its assets
was mostly in mortgages not readily convertible. One was a mortgage for $40,000,
which had been purchased at a large discount, and we may infer that it was not very
salable, as the trustees resolved to sell it as
early as May, 1873, and in August, 1S73, authorized it to be sold at a discount of not
more than $2,500, and yet it was not sold
until 1874. In this condition of things the
trustees made the purchase complained of,
under an obligation to place on the lot an
expensive banking-house.
Whether
under
the circumstances the purchase was such as
the trustees, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, skill and care, could make; or whethrash,
er the act of purchase was reckless,
extravagant, showing a want of ordinary prudence, skill and care, were questions for the
jury. It is not disputed that, under the
charter of this bank, as amended in 1868
{Chapter 294), it had the power to purchase a
lot for a banking-house "requisite for the
That was a
transaction of its business."
power, like every other possessed by the
with prudence and
bank, to be exercised
care.
Situated as this moribund institution
was, was it a prudent and reasonable thing
to do, to invest nearly half of all the tmst
funds in this expensive lot, with an obligation to take most of the balance to erect
thereon an extravagant building? The trustees were urged on by no real necessity.
They had hired rooms where they could have
remained; or if those rooms were not adequate for their small business, we may ascould have been hired.
sume that others
They put forward the claim upon the trial
that the rooms they then occupied were not
That may have been a good reason
safe.
for making them more secure, or for getting other rooms, but not for the extravaIt is infergance in which tliey indulged.
able however that the principal motive which
influenced the trustees to make the change
of location was to improve the financial condition of the bank by increasing its deposits. Their project was to buy this corner
lot and erect thereon an imposing edifice, to
inspire confidence, attract attention, and thus
It was intended as a sort ol
draw deposits.
advertisement of the bank, a very expensive
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one Indeed.
Savings banks are not organTliey have no
ized as business enterprises.
stockholders, and are not to engage in speculations or money-making in a business sense.
They are simply to take the deposits, usually small, which are offered, aggregate them,
and keep and invest them safely, paying
such interest to the depositors as is thus
made, after deducting expenses, and paying
the principal upon demand.
It is not legitimate for the trustees of such a bank to seek
deposits at the expense of present depositors.
It is their business to take deposits
v^hen offered.
It was not proper for these
trustees—or at least the jury may have

found that it was not—to take the money
then on deposit and invest in a bankinghouse, merely for the purpose of drawing
other deposits.
In making this investment
the interests of the depositors whose money
was taken, can scarcely be said to have been
consulted.

It matters not that the trustees purchased
this lot for no more than a fair value, and
that the loss was occasioned by the subsequent general decline In the value of real
They had no right to expose their
estate.
bank to the hazard of such a decline.
If the
purchase was an improper one when made,
it matters not that the loss came from the
unavoidable fall In the value of the real estate purchased.
The jury may have found
that it was grossly careless for the trustees
to lock up the funds In their charge in such
an investment, where they could not be
reached in any emergency which was likely
to arise in the affairs of the crippled bank.
We conclude therefore that the evidence
justified a finding by the jury that this was
not a case of mere error or mistake of judgment on the part of the trustees, but that it
was a case of Improvidence, of reckless, unreasonable extravagance, in which the trustees failed in that measure of reasonable prudence, care and skill which the law requires.
This case was moved for trial at a circuit
court, and before the jury was impaneled the
defendants claimed that the case was improperly in the circuit, and that it should be
tried at special term; and the court ordered
that' the trial proceed, and at the close of
the evidence the defendants moved that the
complaint be dismissed, on the ground that
the action was not a proper one to be tried
before a jury, and should be tried before the
equity branch of the court The motion was
denied, and these rulings are now alleged for
error. The receiver in this case represents

the bank, and may maintain any action the
bank could have maintained.
The trustees
may be treated as agents of the bank.
In
re German Min. Co., 27 Eng. Law & Eq. 158;
Belknap v. Davis, 19 Me. 455; Bedford R.
Co. V. Bowser,
48 Pa. St. 29; Butts
v.
Wood, 38 Barb. 181; Austen v. Daniels, 4
Denio, 299; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson,
And for any misfeasance or non35 Mo. 13.
causing damage to the bank, they
feasance,
were responsible to it, upon the same principle that any agent Is for like cause responsible to his principal. It has never been
doubted that a principal may sue his agent
in an action at law for any damages caused
by culpable misfeasance or non-feasance in
The only relief
the business of the agency.
claimed in this complaint was a money judgment, and we think it was properly tried as
an action at law.
No equitable rights were
to be adjusted, and there was no occasion to
appeal to an equitable forum.
Treating this therefore as an action at
law, it follows also that the objection taken
that other trustees should have been joined
In actions ex
as defendants cannot prevail.
delicto the plaintiff may sue one, some or all
Liquidators of Western
of the wrong-doers.
Bank v. Douglas, 22 Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 475;
Barb. Parties, 203.
The defendants Hoffman and Gearty filed
petitions for their discharge In bankruptcy
after the commencement
of this action, and
were discharged before judgment, and they
alleged such discharge as a defense to the
action. The trial judge and the general term
held that the discharge furnished no defense,
and we are of the same opinion. This claim
was purely for unliquidated damages occasioned by a tort. Such a claim was not provable in banliruptcy, and therefore was not
discharged.
Rev. St. U. S. (2d Ed.) §§ 5115,
5119, 5067-5071;
Zinn v. Ritterman, 2 Abb.
Prac. (N. S.) 261; Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2 Denio, 73; Crouch v. Gridley. G Hill, 250; In
re Wiggers, 2 Biss. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 17,623;
In re Clough, 2 Ben. 508, Fed. Cas. No. 2,905; In re Sidle, 2 N. B. R. 77, Fed. Cas. No.
12,844.
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conclude therefore that the judgment apfrom should be affirmed.
The appeal by the plaintiff from the order
of the general term, granting a new trial as
to defendant Smith, must, for reasons stated
on the argument, be dismissed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed, and appeal from order
dismissed.
pealed

PROPEHTY

V

KING

V.

(40 N.

IN EQUITY— TRUSTS.

TALBOT.
Y.

76.) 1

Court of Appeals of New York. 1869.
an action for an accounting
against the defendants, as the surviving executors of the will of the father of the plaintiffs. By the will the executors were directed to invest $15,000 for each of the plaintiffs, and the executors made these investments in certain railroad bonds and stock,
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WOODRUFF, J. It is conceded that in
England the rule is, and has long been settled, that a trustee, holding funds to invest
for the benefit of his cestui que trust, is
bound to make such investment in the public debt, for the safety whereof the faith of
their government is pledged; or in loaus, for
which real estate is pledged as security.
And that although the terms of the trust
commit the investment, in general terms, to
the discretion of the trustee, that discretion
is controlled by the above rule, and is to be
exercised within the very narrow limits,
which It prescribes.
As a purely arbitrary rule, resting upon
any special policy of that country, or on any
peculiarity in its condition, it has no appliIt is not of the comcation to this country.
It had no applicability to the conmon law.
dition of this country, while a colony of
Great Britain, and cannot be said to have
been incorporated in our law.
So far, and so far only, as it can be said to
rest upon fundamental principles of equity,
commending themselves to the conscience,
and suited to the condition of our affairs,
so far it is true, that it has appropriate application and force, as a guide to the administration of a trust here, as well as in England.
do not therefore deem it material to inof English
quire through the multitude
cases, and the abundant texts of the lawwriters, into the origin of the rule in England, or the date of its early promulgation.
deem it necNor in this particular case do
essary to determine whether it should, by
precise analogy, be deemed to prohibit here
investments In any other public debt than
that of the state of New York.
Neither, in my judgment, are we at liberty, in the decision of this case, to propound any new rule of conduct, by which
to judge of the liability of trustees, now subjected to examination.
Under trusts heretofore created, the managers thereof per-
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forined their duty with the aid of rules for
the exercise of their discretion, which were
the utterance of equity and good conscience,
intelligible
to their
understanding,
and
available for their information;
otherwise,
trusts heretofore existing have been traps
and pitfalls to catch the faithful, prudent
and diligent trustee, without the power ta
avoid them.
But it is not true that there is no underlying principle or rule of conduct in the administration of a trust, which calls for obedience.
Whether it has been declared by
the courts or not, whether it has been enacted in statutes or not, whether it is in
familiar recognition in the affairs of life,,
there appertains to the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust, a duty to be faithful,^
to be diligent, to be prudent in an administration intrusted to the former, in confidence in his fidelity, diligence and prudence.
To this general statement of the duty of
trustees, there is no want of promulgation
or sanction, nor want of sources of information for their guidance. In the whole history of trusts, in decisions of courts for a
century in England, in all the utterances of
the courts of this and the other states of
this country, and not less in the conscious
good sense of all intelligent minds, its recognition is uniform.
The real inquiry therefore is, in my judgment, in the case before us, and in all like
Has the administration of the trust,
cases:
created by the will of Charles W. King, for
the benefit of the plaintiff, been governed
by fidelity, diligence and prudence? If it
has, the defendants are not liable for losses
which nevertheless have happened.
This however aids but little in the examination of the defendants' conduct, unless
the terms of definition are made more precise.
What are fidelity, diligence and discretion? and what is the measure thereof,
which trustees are bound to possess and exercise ?

It is hardly necessary to say that fidelity
imports sincere and single intention to administer the trust for the best interest of the
parties beneficially interested, and according
And
to the duty which the trust imposes.
this is but a paraphrase of "good faith."
The meaning and measure of the required
prudence and diligence has been repeatedly
discussed, and with a difference of opinion.
In extreme rigor, it has sometimes been
said that they must be such and as great as
that possessed and exercised by the court
And again, it has been
of chancery itself.
said that ttiey are to be such as the trustee
exercises in the conduct of his own affairs,
of like nature, and between these is the declai-ation that they are to be the highest prudence and vigilance, or they will not exonerate.

My own judgment, after an examination
of the subject, and bearing in mind the nature of the office, its importance and the
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•considerations which alone induce men of
suitable experience, capacity and responsibility to accept its usually thankless burden,
is that the just and true rule is that the
trustee is bound to employ such diligence
and such prudence in the care and management as In general prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters employ
in their own like affairs.
This necessarily excludes all speculation,
^11 inyestments for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market, and of course every
thing that does not take into view the nature and object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the
investment to be made.
It therefore does not follow that because
prudent men may, and often do, conduci
their own affairs with the hope of growing
rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures which they deem hopeful, trustees
may do the same; the preservation of the
fund and the procurement of a just income
therefrom are primary objects of the creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded.
If it be said that trustees are selected by
the testator or donor of the trust, from his
■own knowledge of their capacity, and without any expectation that they will do more
than, in good faith, exercise the discretion
and judgment they possess, the answer is:
First, the rule properly assumes the capacity of trustees to exercise the prudence and
•diligence of prudent men in general; and
second, it imposes the duty to observe and
know or learn what such prudence dictates
In the matter in hand.
And once more the terms of the trust, and
its particular object and purpose, are In no
case to be lost sight of in its administration.
Lewin, in his treatise on the law of Trusts,
■etc., (page 332), states, as the result of the
several eases, and as the true rule, that "a
trustee is bound to exert precisely the same
care and solicitude in behalf of his cestui
que trust as he would do for himself; but
greater measure than this a court of equity
will not exact." In general this is true; but
if it imports that if he do what men of ordinary prudence would not do, in their own
affairs, of a like nature, he will be excused,
on showing that he dealt with his own property with like want of discretion, it cannot be
sustained as a safe or just rule toward cestuis que trust; nor is it required by reasonable indulgence to the trustee; it would be
laying the duty to be prudent out of view
entirely, and I cannot think the writer intended it should be so understood.
The Massachusetts cases (Harvard College
V. Amory, 9 Pick. 446; Lovell v. Minot, 20
Pick. 116) cited by the counsel for the defendants, are in better conformity with the
rule as have stated it.
To apply these general views to the case
before us, and with the deductions which
necessarily flow from their recognition: The

I

testator gave to each of his children $15,000,
the interest on the same, so far as required,
to be applied to their maintenance and education, and the principal, with any accumulations thereon, to be paid to them severally
on their majority; appointed the defendant,
Talbot, and his partner, Mr. Olyphant, executors, "intrusting to their discretion the
settlement of my affairs and the investment
of my estate for the benefit of my heirs."
If am correct in my views of the duty
of trustees, this last clause neither added to,
nor in any wise affected the duty or responsibility of these executors; without it they
were clothed with discretion; with it their
discretion was to be exercised with all the
care and prudence belonging to their trust
relation to the beneficiaries.
Such Is the
distinct doctrine of the cases very largely
cited by the counsel for the parties, and is,
I think, the necessary conclusion from the
just rule of duty I have stated.
What then was the office of the trustees,
as indicated by the terms and nature of the
trust?
If its literal reading be followed, it
directed that "$15,000" in money be placed
at "interest."
The nature of the trust, according to the manifest intent of the testator, required that in order to the maintenance and support of Infant children, whose
need, in that regard, would be constant and
unremitting,
that interest should flow in
with regularity and without exposure to the
uncertainties or fluctuations of adventures
of any kind.
And then the fund should continue, with any excess of such interest accumulated for their benefit, so as to be delivered at the expiration of their minority.
Palpably then the first and obvious duty
was to place that $15,000 in a state of security; second, to see to it that it was productive of interest; and third, so to keep the
fund that it should always be subject to
future recall for the benefit of the cestui que
trust.
do not attach controlling importance to
the word "interest" used by the testator, but
I do regard it as some guide to the trustees,
as an expression of the testator, that he
did not contemplate any adventure with the
fund, with a view to profits as such.
But apart from the inference from the use
of that word,
think it should be said, that
whenever money is held upon a tnist of this
description, it is not according to its nature,
nor within any just idea of prudence to place
the principal of the fund in a condition in
which it is necessarily exposed to the hazard
of loss or gain, according to the success or
failure of the enterprise in which it is embarked, and in which by the very terms of
the Investment, the principal is not to be
returned at all.
It is not denied that the employment of
the fund, as capital In trade, would be a
clear departure from the duty of trustees.
If it cannot be so employed under the management of a copartnership,
see no reason
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for saying that the incorporation of the partners tends, in any degree, to justify it.
The moment the fund is invested in bank,
or insurance, or railroad stocli, it has left
the control of the trustees; its safety and
the hazard, or risk of loss, is no longer dependent upon their skill, care or discretion
in its custody or management, and the terms
of the investment do not contemplate that
it ever will be returned to the trustees.
If it be said that at any time the trustees
may sell the stock (which is but another
name for their interest in the property and
business of the corporation), and so re-possess themselves of the original capital,
reply that is necessarily contingent and uncertain; and so the fund has been voluntarily placed in a condition of uncertainty, deFirst, the
pendent upon two contingencies:
practicability of making the business profitable; and, second, the judgment, skill and
fidelity of those who have the management
of it for that purpose.
If it be said that men of the highest prudence do in fact invest their funds in such
stocks, becoming subscribei-s and contributors thereto in the very formation thereof,
and before the business is developed, and
in the exercise of their judgment on the
probability of its safety and productiveness,
the answer is, so do just such men, looking
to the hope of profitable returns, invest
money in trade and adventures of various
kinds.
In their private aifEairs they do, and
they lawfully may put their principal funds
at hazard; in the affairs of a trust they may
not.
The very nature of their relation to it
forbids it.
If it be said that this reasoning assumes
that it is certainly practicable so to keep the
fund that it shall be productive, and yet safe
against any contingency of loss; whereas
in fact if loaned upon bond and mortgage, or
upon securities of any description, losses
from Insolvency and depreciation may and
often do happen, nothwithstanding due and
proper care and caution is observed in their
selection.
Not at all. It assumes and insists that the trustees shall not place the
fund where its safety and due return to their
hands will depend upon the success of the
business in which it is adventured, or the
skill and honesty of other parties Intrusted
with its conduct; and it is in the selection
of the securities for its safety and actual return that there is scope for discretion and
prudence, which if exercised in good faith,
constitute due performance of the duty of
the trustees.
My conclusion is therefore that the defendants wei-e not at liberty to invest the fund
bequeathed to the plaintiff in stock of the
Delaware and Hudson Canal Company; of
the New York and Harlem Railroad Company; of the New York and New Haven
Railroad Company; of the Bank of Commerce; or of the Saratoga and Washington
Railroad Company; and that the plaintiff
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was not bound to accept these stocks as and
for his legacy, or the investment thereof.
In regard to the bonds of the Hudson
River Railroad Company and of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, it appears by schedule B, given in evidence, that
the former were mortgage bonds; but what
was the extent or sufficiency of the security
afforded by such mortgage, or what property was embraced in it does not appear,
nor does it appear whether there was any
security whatever for the payment of the
canal company's bond.
It is not necessary for the decision of this
case; and
am not prepared to say that an
investment in the bonds of a railroad or
other corporation, the payment whereof is
secured by a mortgage upon real estate, is
not suitable and proper under any circumstances.
If the real estate is ample to insure the
payment of the bonds,
do not at present
perceive that it is necessarily to be regarded
as inferior to the bond of an individual secured by mortgage; it would of course be
open to all the inquiries which, prudence
would suggest if the bond and mortgage
were that of an individual.
The nature,
the location and the sufficiency of the security and the terms of the mortgage, and
its availability for the protection and ultimate realization of the fund, must of course
enter into the consideration.
But it is not necessary to pursue that subject. The plaintiff in his complaint rejects
The court below
the entire investment.
held that it was equitable that the plaintiff
should be held to receive the whole or none
of the stocks and bonds, and to that ruling
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have
excepted; and therefore the question whether the judgment below was correct in that
respect is not before us.
It is proper however to say that do not
clearly apprehend the propriety of that ruling, unless it be on the ground that the
plaintiff in his complaint did so elect.
The rule is perfectly well settled that a
cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment and enjoy its profits, or to reject it at his option;
perceive no reason for saying that
and
where the trustee has divided the fund into
parts and made separate investments, the
cestui que trust is not at liberty, on equitable as well as legal grounds, to approve and
adopt such as he thinks it for his interest
to approve.
The money invested is his
money; and in respect to each and every
dollar, it seems to me he has an unqualified
right to follow it, and claim the fruits of its
investment, and that the trustee cannot deny
it. The fact that the trustee has made
other investments of other parts of the fund,
which the cestui que trust is not bound to
approve, and disaffirms, cannot, I think,
affect the power. For example, suppose in
the present case the cestui que trust, on de-

I

I

I
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livery to him of all the securities and bonds

Saratoga and Washington
Railroad Comreject and return to you. Is
In which his legacy had appeared invested, pany. That
had declared: Although these investments it doubtful that his position must be susare improperly made, not in accordance vs^ith tained?
the intent of the testator, nor in the due perThe result is, that the main features of the
formance of your duty,
veaive all objection judgment herein must be affirmed.
on that account, except as to the stock of the

I

I
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struments by which the trust in this case
was created and declared,
indicating any
agreement on the subject of commissions,
nor manifesting any intent that the service
with its responsibilities should be assumed
or borne gratuitously.
The property in question consisted of seven
steamships, transferred to the appellants and
their associate. Snow (now deceased), to hold
for the use and benefit of the Accessory
Transit Company, and in trust and confidence that the trustees wUl account for and
pay over to the company, or to whomsoever
the company may appoint, all earnings, receipts and profits from or on account thereof,
or of any or either of them, which they may
receive, and any and all insurance moneys
which may be received, on account of the
ships, or either of them; and will assign,
transfer and convey the said ships and any
of them, on request of the company, to the
said company or such appointee.
It is true that the trustees permitted the
ships to be employed and run by other agents
of the company, and the company received
the earnings directly.
But although this
may be a reason for denying to them commissions on such receipts and earnings, it
would not deprive them of their just claim to
compensation for the discharge of the trust,
in holding the property subject to a liability
to account therefor, and to convey the same,
and a further responsibility to third parties,
who would have a right to look to the legal
title to the ships, and charge the trustees as

(39 N. Y. 202.)

of Appeals

Court

of New York.

March,

Bidwell, for appellant.
wood, for respondent.
M.

S.

M.

1868.

Sher-

GROVBR, J. It is settled by repeated adjudication in this state, aeauieseed in for
many years, although the question does not
appear to have been passed upon in the court
of last resort^ that where an active ti-ust for
the care, management, conveyance and appropriation of personal property has been
created,
and the instrument creating the
trust makes no provision for the compensation of the ti-ustees, they are prima facie entitled to the same commissions as are by
statute allowed to guardians, executors and
administrators.
The terms of the instrument may be such
as to negative the idea that any compensation to the trustees was contemplated; the
relationship of the parties or other extrinsic
facts may clearly indicate that the labor and
responsibility of the trust were voluntarily
assumed, and were intended by all parties
performed.
to be gratuitously
Mason v.
Koosevelt,
5 Johns. Ch. 534;
Mumford v.
Murray. 6 Johns. Ch. 452.
The subject is discussed by Chancellor
Walworth in Meacham v. Sternes, 9 Paige,
398.
The doctrine of that case is strongly
reasserted in Matter of De Peyster, 4 Sandf.
Ch. 511, by Vice-Chancellor
Sandford, and
held not to require, that the property held
should be converted by the trustee into money;
that though delivered in specie and
in the very form in which it came to his
hands, commissions should be allowed thereon.
And the supreme court, in WagstafC v.
Lowerre, 23 Barb. 209, held the same rule,
in favor of a trustee appointed by will. That
the JKngllsh rule and the law of this state
was otherwise, prior to the statute of 1818,
fixing the compensation of executors and administrators, appears in these cases, and in
Manning v. Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 534. See
2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1268, and notes; Robinson
V. Fitt, White
& T. Lead. Cas. Eq. (Am.
Notes)

70;

Law Lib.

such.

I

p. 353 et seq.

Without affirming that the rale is so unqualified that the rate of compensation allowed by statute to executors, administrators and guardians must, in all cases where
compensation is allowed to trustees, be the
exact measure, without any consideration of
the nature and extent of the duties and responsibilities imposed by the trust, or that in
no case the court will inquire what less
amount would be a reasonable compensation,
think the rule above stated should in
general be regarded as reasonable and just,
and therefore to be adopted, unless there are
controlling considerations which forbid the
allowance.
There is nothing in the language of the in-
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think therefore that there is nothing in
the nature and terms of the trust which precludes the allowance of commissions to the
trustees under the general rule above stated.
But the trustees were themselves directors
of the company, and as such were already
trustees bound to manage the affairs and
property of the company for the interest of
its stockholders, and by familiar and wellsettled principles of law, as well as the most
obvious rules of justice, forbidden to administer its affairs for their private emolument.
There were seven directors. The creation
of the trust and the designation of the trustees was authorized by a resolution passed
at a meeting of the directors, at which they
were present and voted; and although they
did not constitute a majority, their voice
and influence was cast in favor of the arrangement by which property, to the amount
of $1,350,000, purchased and paid for by the
company, was placed in their hands. Prima
facie, this act was itself a breach of trust.
The directors had prima facie no right to
place the property in the hands of third persons, and thus put the title beyond the proper control of the board of directors, who were
by law trustees for the control, employment
and management of the property of the company, for the benefit of its stockholders.
True, they declared a trust to hold for the
use of the company, but it is no part of the
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proper duty and power of the directors of the
company to divest the company itself of the
title to its property, and subject it to 'the
hazard of the fidelity of trustees, or make the
actual benefits to be derived by the stockholders depend upon the efficiency of proceedings
in court to compel the perfoimance of such a
trust.
It is however not necessary to say that
there may not be circumstances in the condition of an incorporated company, which will
warrant the transfer of its property, or portions of it, to trustees, for purposes which
are lawful and consistent with the duty owed
do say however that the
to the company.
creation of such a trust requires some legal
and sufficient purpose to excuse it.
find no facts stated in the ease agreed
upon here, as the reasons for creating the
trust in question. The company was incorporated by the "state or republic of Nicaragua." Its "corporate object and business was
the transportation of passengers and freight
from the city of New York to certain ports
on the Pacific, and it was necessary, in order
to carry out the objects of its incorporation,
that the said company should own or have
the control of several steamships running on
either side of the Isthmus of Nicaragua."
Nothing in the case agreed upon indicates
that the company could not own, hold and
run steamships agreed to be "necessary to
carry out the object of its corporation," towit, "the transportation of passengers and
freight."
What was then the impediment? It is suggested, in argument, that the laws of the
United States prevented the company, a foreign corporation, from taking and holding
the title to these ships. The case states, that
in July, 1854, an act of congress was passed
authorizing this company to hold steamships
in their own name.
And the argument is therefore this: At the
time this trust was created, the company
could not, by law, take the legal title to itself.
The conveyance to the trustees was therefore
necessary; and if necessary, then as between
the trustees and the company, was proper,
in order to carry out the objects of the incorporation, and secure to the stockholders
the means of carrying on the business for
which it was created, and the profits and
emoluments derivable therefrom.
It is doubtless true that a foreign corporation cannot take title to a vessel, and retain
her registration as a vessel of the United
States, entitled to the privileges and protection of a national as distinguished from a
foreign ship. But I find no warrant for saying that the Accessory Transit Company had
no legal capacity to take the title to these
steamships, and hold and employ them for all
purposes for which citizens of Nicaragua
may hold and employ vessels, and among
other purposes, the running them between
their own ports, and the ports of the United
States, subject to all the disadvantages, of

I
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of being treated as foreign vessels,
and restricted in their trade, by all the disabilities to which foreign ships are subject.
The objects of their incorporation declared
in their charter import the power to hold and
employ such ships.
The question thereupon arises, may a foreign corporation, in order to obtain and keep
all the advantages derivable from a trade
which can only be advantageously carried on
in American vessels, registered as such, under a system which makes a fraudulent registry a forfeiture of the ship, and which requires the oath, that no foreigner has any
interest in the ship,— purchase and employ
ships for the sole use and benefit of the corporation, and with expressed authority to direct and control their use and disposition,
and cover the ownership under a trust in
American citizens, they taking the title for
that purpose.
cannot resist the conclusion that this is
not only an evasion, but a fraud upon the
laws of the United States, which ought not
to be sustained or sanctioned, directly or indirectly, and that no court should hold that
a trust for such a purpose should be upheld
either to give compensation to the trustees
or for any other object.
If there was any other purpose, or any other ground upon which the propriety of the
trust may be vindicated (and for the purposes of this case it is not necessary to say
that there may not have been), it is at least
true that there was legal capacity in the company to take the steamships; and the expediency and propriety of doing so was a
proper subject of consideration by the board
of directors.
Whether it was for the interest of the stockholders to pay the purchaseprice, and leave the title in third persons,
subject to a charge by way of compensation
therefor, and subject to any of the hazards
consequent thereupon, was a subject of grave
consideration, in reference to which the directors, as trustees, were not at liberty to
act under the influence of self-interest.
In this aspect of their relation to the subject, the appellants and their associates were
not in a situation permitting them to secure
to themselves a personal advantage in the
matter. The stockholders and creditors were
entitled, not only to their vote in the board,
but to their influence and argument in the
discussion which led to the passage of the
resolution in pursuance of which they took
title as trustees.
This brings the case within the rule, which
rests in the soundest wisdom, and is sustained by the best consideration of the infirmities of our human nature, and called for
by the only safe protection of the interests
of cestuls que trust, or beneficiaries, viz.:
That trustees and persons standing in similar fiduciary relations, shall not be permitted to exercise their powers, and manage
or appropriate the property of which they
have control, for their own profit or emolucourse,

I
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oi" as it lias been expressed, "shall not
take advantage of their situation to obtain
any personal benefit to themselves at the exStory, Eq.
pense of their cestuis que trust."
Jur. § 466a; Hill, Trustees, 535.
This by ho means assumes that the trustees were not, in this case, in the actual exercannot for
cise of the highest Integrity.
a moment doubt that in reference to the particular case before us; but the principle is
one of great importance, and it forbids any
inquiry into the honesty of a particular caae.
If it would have been competent to select
their trustees disconnected from the company, still it was not competent for the directors themselves to create a trust of this
description, consider and determine its expediency, and thereby create a claim to compensation in their own favor for the performance of its duties.
thinli the judgment
For these reasons
should be affirmed.

ment,

I

I

OLERKB, J.

The defendant is the receivTransit Company, now
It was a corporation created by
insolvent.
and it carried on
the republic of Nicaragua;
business in the city of New York. A purchase was made, on its behalf. In December,
1852, of seven steamships from Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, for the purpose of running
them on their line between New York and
Being a forSan Francisco, via Nicaragua.
eign corporation, the company could not then
take the title, and have the ships registered
in its ovsTi name; and on the 30th of December, 1852, the board of directors, seven in
number, passed a resolution that the vicepresident of the company and two of the directors be appointed trustees to receive a
transfer of the ships, and hold them subject to the control and disposition of the
company.
These were the two plaintiffs, Mr.
Ogden, the vice-president, and Mr. Wright;
and the third was Mr. Snow, since deceased.
Mr. Ogden received as vice-president, a salary of $4,000 a year. They were all present
at the meeting, and voted for the resolution.
They received bills of sale of the ships in
their names, and signed an instrument declaring that they had received the bills of
sale, and held the ships for the company.
On the 27th of July, 1854, the company indemnified each of the trustees by a bond in
a penalty of $100,000, against any claims and
demands on account of the ships; soon after, an act of congress was passed, authorizing the company to hold steamships in its
own name; and thereupon Messrs. Ogden,
Wright and Snow transferred the title in
er of the Accessory
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them to the company by bills of sale. After
this transfer they addressed a letter to the
president and directors, claiming compensation as trustees, which the company refused
to pay. In 1858, the company became insolvent; and soon afterward the defendant
was appointed receiver.
After the ti-ansf er to the trustees, they had
no more to do with the control and management of the ships than any other members of
the board; and the ships were actually run
under the supervision of the whole board, by
Mr. Vanderbilt, as the agent of the company.
The plaintiffs now claim, by way of compensation, the same commissions as are allowed %o executors and administrators.
They
claim $3,950, being the amount of commission upon the sum of $1,350,000, the amount
paid by the company to Vanderbilt, as the
purchase-money. They also claim interest on
this sum of $3,950, from the 27th of January, 1854, making in the whole $7,900.
It does not appear that the purchasemoney, or any portion of it, passed through
the hands of the trustees, or that they performed any seiTices, or incurred any risks
or responsibilities, beyond taking the bills
of sale in their names, and holding them,
and executing bills of sale to the company.
So that no active duties devolved upon them;
and for any responsibilities which they incurred, they were fully indemnified by having the legal title to the ships, and by the
bond of indemnity which they subsequently
received. They did not, like executors, administrators, guardians and other trustees,
become the custodians of the funds of the
company, receiving its earnings or paying
They demand this sum of $3,them out.
950, merely for allowing their names to be
In my opinion
inserted in the bills of sale.
they are not entitled to compensation on any
In all probability, at the
equitable grounds.
time of the passage of the resolution appointing them trustees, neither they, nor any other member of the board, had any idea that
compensation would be required, or was necessary. Not a word was said on the subject
at the time the resolution was passed, nor
was any intimation given by them of a claim
for services at any time, until they presented
their demand, more than two years and six
when they had transmonths afterwards;
ferred the ships to the company.
The judgment should be affirmed, with
costs.

All concur,
DWIGHT, J.
Judgment

except

affirmed.

HUNT,

0.

J.,

and
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SCHELL.

N. Y. 263.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Sept. 23, 1873.

Appeal from order on settlement of accounts of Edward. Schell, trustee, etc., of the
estate of Jacob Appley, which disallowed an
item of $2,500 charged for his services as
sucli trustee.
Jacob Appley died seized of a large real
By his last will and
and personal estate.
testament he devised and bequeathed all his
property, with certain exceptions, to his executors and the survivor of them, upon certain trusts therein named.
The will, after
reciting the trusts, contained this clause:
"And also that my said executors retain and
pay unto themselves out of said rents and
incomes all costs, charges and expenses that
they shall have to pay or be put imto in the
fulfillment of this my will, and a reasonable
compensation for their services."
By an order of the supreme court, Schell
was appointed trustee in place of those namIn his accounts he made a
ed in the will.
charge in gross of $2,500 for his services.
The referee reported in favor of its allowance.

Amasa J. Parker, for appellant.
Hand, for respondent.

Samuel

RAPALLO, J. The order appealed from
shows upon its face that it was made upon
the ground that the compensation of the
trustee for his services should be limited to
commissions, at the rate allowed by statute
to executors and administrators, for receiving and paying out moneys.
This is the settled rule in cases where the
creator of the trust has made no provision
for compensation to the tnistee. Under such
circumstances the courts have by analogy
allowed the same commissions which are by
statute allowable to executors and administrators, and have restricted the allowances
to those rates.
But where the instrument creating the
trust provides that the trustee shall have a
compensation for his services in executing
the trust, such provision will be enforced.
If the instrument declares the rate of compensation, it must be followed.
If it establishes no rate, the value of the services
should be ascertained by judicial investigation. Meacham v. Stemes, 9 Paige, 398.
The provision of the will in question is
that the trustees (of whom the applicant is
the successor)
shall retain and pay unto
themselves, out of the rents and income of
the testator's estate, all costs, charges and
expenses that they shall have to pay or be
put unto in the fulfillment of his will, and
a reasonable compensation for their services.
It would seem a sufficiently simple proposition that the question, what is a reasonable sum to be allowed to the trastee over
and above his proper disbursements for his

services, is a question of fact determinable
upon the same principles which would regulate such an inquiry were the controversy
one arising upon an employment inter vivos.
But it is claimed on the part of the respondent that the statute which regulates
the commissions of executors, administrators
and guardians determines that the rate thereby allowed is a reasonable compensation,
and that the subject of the amount of comThe
pensation is closed to further inquiry.
learned court at special teimi seems to have
adopted this view, and Its decision has been
affirmed at general term. We cannot concur
in the soundness of these conclusions. In
the first place, the provisions of the statute
The origdo not in terms apply to trustees.
inal trustees in this case were the same persons who were named in the will as executors, but their offices as trustees were additional to and distinct from their legal duties
as executors.
The applicant succeeds to the
office of trustee and not of executor. The decisions which apply to trustees the same
rules as to compensation which the statute
applies to executors, etc., rest upon the principle of analogy and not upon the command
of the statute. They are confined to cases
where no provision is made by the creator of
the trust for the compensation of the trusIn such cases, there being no express
tees.
declaration of the creator of the trust that
his appointees should be compensated, yet it
being unreasonable under ordinary circumstances to require them to perform their responsible duties gratuitously, it is a fair presumption that the testator assumed that they
would be entitled to the commissions established by law for similar services when rendered by executors, etc.
Where however he
expressly provides that they shall have a reasonable compensation for their services, he
must be supposed to have intended that the
compensation should be reasonable with reference to the special circumstances of his estate and the services which he has required
them to perform.
The object of the statute is to furnish a
general and arbitrary rule for cases not otherwise provided for; but it should not govern where the testator has, by reason of peculiar circumstances existing in reference to
his estate, required extraordinai-y services
on the part of those to whose care he has
confided it, and has specially provided that
their compensation shall be reasonable, which
is equivalent to declaring that it shall be proportioned to the value of the services they
may render. By such a direction the testator necessarily confides to the tribimals under whose jurisdiction the administration of
his estate may come, the adjustment of the
compensation of his trustees, and this is a
duty which those tribunals must perform
conscientiously
upon the evidence before
them.
It was therefore the duty of the court
below in the case to determine whether the
sum claimed by the trustee was or was not
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reasonable under the circumstances, and to
allow or reduce it according to their judgment, without being controlled by the statute.
The case shows that the duties of the
trustee were onerous, and involved more
than the mere receipt and disbursement of
He was Intrusted with the managemoney.
ment of forty houses and lots, the buildings
being old and requiring frequent repairs,
and the trustee swears that he has given
them his personal care and attention, besides
attending to the receipt and application of
the funds.
Whether the sum of $2,500 allowed by the
referee is a reasonable amount Is a question
The report of the reffor the court below.
eree is not conclusive, but merely for the in-
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formation of the court. The court, at special
term, should exercise its discretion whether
to confirm or modify it, and if the amount is
in its judgment excessive. It should be reduced, but the amount should be determined
with reference to the facts of the case and
not by the statute.
The orders of the special and general
terms should be reversed, and the proceedings remitted to the court below to rehear
at special term the motion to confirm the report of the referee.
The costs of the appellant should be allowed to him out of the fund.

All

concur, except GEOVEE, J., not voting.
Ordered accordiugly.
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PATTON

et al. v.

CAMPBELL,

(70 111. 72.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. Term, 187!?.

Bentley, Swett & Quigg, for appellants.
iWaite & Clarke, for appellee.

CRAIG, J. This was a bill in chancery,
filed in the superior court of Cook county,
by George W. Campbell, as assignee in bankruptcy of the late firm of Durham & Wood,
against William Patton and others, to recover the value of certain goods which had
been replevied by Patton & Co. from Durham & Wood.
It appears from the record that on or about
the 20tii of October, 1870, Patton & Co., of
New York, sold Durham & Wood, of Chicago, a bill of goods, amounting to $1,600, on
a credit of four months. About the first of
November, after the sale, Durham & Wood
failed, and Patton & Co. commenced an action of replevin to recover the goods they
had sold. A replevin bond in the penal sum
of $1,000, in the usual form, was filed with
the papers la the action, and $800 or $900
worth of the goods were replevied.
In the fire of October 8th and 9th, 1871, the
papers in the case, including the bond, were
destroyed. Subsequently the action was dismissed.

The defendants answered the bill, to which
replication was filed, the cause was heard on
the proofs taken, and decree rendered In
favor of complainants for $850.
The defendants bring the cause to this
court, and seek to reverse the decree on two
grounds:
First. For the reason a court of chancery
has no jurisdiction, the remedy of complainants being complete at law.
Second. The purchase of goods from Patton & Co., by Durham & Wood, was fraudulent, and Patton & Co., upon discovery of
the fraud, had the right to rescind the sale
and replevy the property.
The questions wiU be considered in the
order in which they are raised.
The bill in this case is filed to recover upon
an instrument under seal, which had been
destroyed.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity arising from accident is a very old head,
in
equity, and probably coeval with its existence. But it is not every case of accident
which win justify the interposition of a
court of equity. The jurisdiction
wUl be
maintained only when a court of law can not
grant suitable relief; and where the party
has a conscientious title to relief. 1 Story,
Eq. Jur., § 79.
In case, however, of lost instruments under
seal, equity takes jurisdiction, on the ground
that, until a recent period, it was the settled
doctrine that there was no remedy on a lost
bond in a court of common law, because there
could be no profert of the instrument, withput which the declaration would be defect-

The jurisdiction having been assumed
and exercised on this ground, it is still retained and upheld. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., § 81;
Walmsley v. Child, 1 Vesey, Sen., 341; Fisher
v. Sievres, 65 lU. 99.
Under the allegations in the bill in this
cause, we think it is well settled that a court
of equity had jurisdiction.
The remaining question in the case is, were
the goods purchased under such circumstances as gave the appellants the right of
rescission on the ground of fraud, or was
there such a fraud practised that the title
to the property did not pass to Durham &
Wood?
The evidence shows that Hart, who was a
traveling agent for appellants, called on Durham & Wood, in Chicago, to sell them goods.
They examined his samples and told him
they wanted to make a large order, and
wanted to buy on four months' time. Hart
told them, Patton & Co. hardly ever vary
from three months' time. Durham remarked,
he had bought and could buy of A. T.
Stewart & Co., of New York, on four months'
time. On tliis statement. Hart sold the
goods on four months' time.
It turned out, on investigation, that Durham & Wood had only bought two bills of
goods of Stewart & Co., and they were sold
on thirty days' credit.
While it is true the statement made by
Durham, that he had bought and could buy
goods of Stewart & Co. on four months'
time, was false, yet, it does not appear that
this statement induced Hart to sell the goods;
it only had the effect to cause him to
give one month longer credit on the goods
than he otherwise would, which did not, in
this case, in anywise affect the rights of appellants, for the reason that the failure occurred and the goods were replevied within
less than two months after the sale.
It appears, from the evidence, that Hart
made no objection to sell the goods on three
months' time; he neither asked nor required
any representations from Dm'ham, as to the
standing or responsibility of the firm, to induce him to sell the goods on a credit of
three months. At the time the goods were
purchased, it does not appear that Durham
&, Wood were in failing circumstances, insolvent, or in any manner pressed by their
creditors; for aught that appears they were
at that time solvent, and responsible for all
their contiacts.
Neither does it appear that they made any
false representations in regard to what they
were worth, what property they owned, or
the amount of debts they had contracted.
It is not shown that the goods were bought
with the intent not to pay for them, or with
a view to make an assignment
We understand the rule to be, that if a
party, knowing himself to be Insolvent, or
in failing circumstances, by means of fraudulent pretenses or representations, purchases
goods with the intention not to pay for them,
ive.
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that the goods were bought with any Impureor wrong motives.
It is true that, some two months after th»
purchase of the goods, the parties went intobanliruptcy, but this was involuntary, andl
does not, of itself, show the condition of thefirm at the time the goods were bought.
Upon a careful examination of the whole
4 Scam. 97.
But the case under consideration does not record, we are satisfied the decree of thecourt below was correct, and It will be afcome within this rule.
There is no evidence in this record to show firmed.

but with the design to cheat the vendor out
of his goods, such facts would warrant the
vendor in rescinding the contract for fraud,
and would justify him in recovering possession of the property by replevin, where the
goods had not in good faith passed into the
hands of third parties. Henshaw v. Bryant,

EQUITABLE EIGHTS.

170

HUNT

v.

ROUSMANIER'S
(8

Supreme

ADM'ES.

Wheat. 174.)

Court of the United States.
14,

March

1823.

Appeal from circuit court of Rhode Island.
The original bill, filed by the appellant.
Hunt, stated, that Lewis Rousmanier, the intestate of the defendants, applied to the
plaintiff, in January, 1820, for the loan of
$1,450, ofCering to give, in addition to his
notes, a bill of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as
collateral security for the repayment of the
The sum requested was lent; and
money.
on the 11th of January the said Rousmanier
executed two notes for the amount; and on
the 15th of the same month, he executed a
power of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff
to make and execute a bill of sale of threefourths of the said vessel to himself, or to
any other person; and in the event of the
said vessel, or her freight, being lost, to collect the money which should become due on
a policy by which the vessel and freight
This instrument contained
were insured.
also, a proviso, reciting, that the power was
given for collateral security for the payment
of the notes already mentioned, and was to
be void on their payment; on the failure to
do which, the plaintifE was to pay the amount
thereof, and all expenses, out of the proceeds
of the said property, and to return the resiThe bill furdue to the said Rousmanier.
ther stated, that on the 21st of March, 1820,
the plaintiff lent to the said Rousmanier the
additional sum of $700, taking his note for
payment, and a similar power to dispose of
his interest in the schooner Industry, then
also at sea. The bill then charged, that on
the Gth of May, 1820, the said Rousmanier
died insolvent, having paid only $200 on the
The plaintifC gave notice of his
said notes.
claim; and on the return of the Nereus and
Industry, took possession of them, and offered the intestate's interest in them, for sale.
The defendants forbade the sale; and this
bill was brought to compel them to join in It.
The defendants demurred generally, and the
court sustained the demurrer; but gave the
plaintifC leave to amend his bill. Hunt v.
Bnnis, 2 Mason, 244, Fed. Gas. No. 6,889.
The amended bill stated, that it was expressly agreed between the parties, that
Rousmanier was to give specific security on
the Nereus and Industry; and that he offera mortgage on them.
ed to execute
That
counsel was consulted on the subject, who
advised, that a power of attorney, such as
was actually executed, should be taken in
preference to a mortgage, because it was
equally valid and effectual as a security,
and would prevent the necessity of changing
the pa)pers of the vessels, or of taking possession of them on their arrival in port. The
were, accordingly, executed,
powers
with
the full belief that tboy would, and with the
intention that they should, give the plaintiff

as full and perfect security as would be
given by a deed of mortgage. The bill prayed, that the defendants might be decreed to
join in a sale of the interest of their intestate ^,
in the Nereus and Industry, or to sell the
same themselves, and pay out of the proTo this
ceeds the debt due to the plaintiff.
amended bill, also, the defendants demurred,
and on argument, the demurrer was sustainFrom this deed, and the bill dismissed.
cree, the plaintiff appealed to this court.
The cause was argued at the last term.

Mr. Wheaton,

for appellant.

Mr. Hunter,

for respondents.

MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion
of the court. The counsel for the appellant
objects to the decree of the circuit court on
He contends, 1. That this
two grounds.
power of attorney does, by its own operalion, entitle the plaintifE, for the satisfaction
of his debt, to the interest of Rousmanier in
2. Or, if this
the Nereus and the Industry.
be not so, that a court of chancery will, the
conveyance being defective, lend its aid to
carry the contract into execution, according
to the intention of the parties.
1. We will consider the effect of the power
This instrument contains no
of attorney.
words of conveyance or of assignment, but
As
is a simple power to sell and convey.
the power of one man to act for another,
depends on the will and license of that other,
the power ceases, when the will, or this perThe general rule,
mission, is withdrawn.
therefore, is, that a letter of attorney may,
at any time, be revoked by the party who
makes it; and is revoked by his death. But
this general rule, which results from the nature of the act, has sustained some modification. Where a letter of attorney forms a
part of a contract, and is a security for
money, or for the performance of any act
which is deemed valuable, it is generally
made irrevocable, in terms, or if not so, is
deemed irrevocable in law.
2 Esp. 565. Although a letter of attorney depends, from its
nature, on the will of the person making it,
and may, in general, be recalled at his will;
yet, if he binds himself, for a consideration,
in terms, or by the nature of his contract,
not to change his will, the law will not permit him to change it. Rousmanier, therefore, could not, during his life, by any act
of his own, have revoked this letter of attorney. But does it retain its efficacy after
his death? We think, it does not. We think
it well settled, that a power of attorney,
though irrevocable during the life of the party, becomes extinct by his death.
This principle is asserted in Littleton (section 66), by Lord Coke, in his commentary
on that section (52b), and in Willes'
Reports (lO.-), note, and 565). The legal reason
of the rule is a plain one. It seems founded
on the presumption, that the substitute acts
by virtue of the authority of his principal,
existing at the time the act is performed;
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and on the manner in which he must execute
his authority, as stated in Combes' Case, 9
Coke, 766.
In that case, it was resolved, that
"when any has authority, as attorney, to do
any act, he ought to do it in his name who
gave the authority."
The reason of this
resolution is obvious. The title can, regularly, pass out of the person in whom it is
vested, only by a conveyance in his own
name;
and this cannot be executed by another for him, when it could not, in law, be
executed by himself.
A conveyance in the
name of a person, who was dead at the time,
would be a manifest absurdity.
This general doctrine, that a power must
be executed in the name of a person who
gives it, a doctrine founded on the nature
of the transaction, is most usually engrafted in the power itself. Its usual language is,
that the substitute shall do that which he is
empowered to do, in the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of
his principal, and is to act in his name.
This accustomed form is observed in the
instrument under consideration. Hunt is constituted the attorney, and is authorized to
a regular bill of sale,
make, and execute,
Now, as an
in the name of Rousmanier.
authority must be pursued, in order to make
the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is necessai-y, that this bill of sale
should be in the name of Rousmanier; and
it would be a gross absurdity, that a deed
should purport to be executed by him, even
by attorney, after his death; for, the attorney is in the place of the principal, capable
of doing that alone which the principal might
do.

This general rule, that a power ceases with
the life of the person giving it, admits of
one exception. If a power be coupled with

an "interest," it survives the person giving
it, and may be executed after his death. As
this proposition is laid down too positively
in the books to be controverted, it becomes
necessary to inquire, what is meant by the
expression, "a power coupled with an interest?" Is it an interest in the subj ect on which
the power is to be exercised? or is it an interest In that which is produced by the exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear,
that the interest which can protect a power,
after the death of a person who creates it,
must be an interest in the thing itself. In
other words, the power must be engrafted on
The words theman estate in the thing.
selves would seem to import this meaning.
"A power coupled with an interest," is a
power which accompanies, or is connected
with, an interest. The power and the interest are united in the same person. But if we
are to understand by the word "interest,"
an interest in that which is to be produced
by the exercise of the power, then they are
The power, to produce the
never united.
interest, must be exercised, and by its exThe power ceases,
ercise, is extinguished.
when the Interest commences, and therefore.
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cannot, In accurate law language, be said
to be "coupled" with it.
But the substantial basis of the opinion of
the court on this point, is found in the legal
reason of the principle. The interest or title
in the thing being vested in the person who
gives the power, remains in him, unless it
be conveyed with the power, and can pass
out of him only by regular act in his own
name.
The act of the substitute, therefore,
which, in such a case, is the act of the
principal, to be legally effectual, must be in
his name, must lie such an act as the principal himself would be capable of performing,
and which would be valid, if performed by
him.
Such a power necessarily ceases with
the life of the person making it. But if the
interest, or estate, passes with the power,
and vests in the person by whom the power
is to be exercised, such person acts in his
own name. The estate, being in him, passes
from him, by a conveyance in his own name.
He is no longer a substitute, acting in the
place and name of another, but is a principal, acting in his own name, in pursuance
The legal
of powers which limit his estate.
reason which limits a power to the life of the
person giving it, exists no longer, and the
rule ceases with the reason on which it is
The intention of the instrument
founded.
may be effected, without violating any legal
principle.
This idea may be in some degree illustrated
by examples of cases in which the law is
clear, and which are incompatible with any
other exposition of the term "power coupled
If the word "interest,"
with an interest."
thus used, indicated a title to the proceeds
of the sale, and not a title to the thing to be
sold, then a power to A., to sell for his own
benefit, would be a power coupled with an
interest; but a power to A., to sell for the
benefit of B., would be a naked power, which
could be e.>:ecuted only in the life of the perYet, for this distinction,
son who gave it.
no legal reason can be assigned. Nor is
there any reason for it in justice; for, a
power to A., to sell for the benefit of B., may
be as much a part of the contract on which
B. advances his money, as if the power had
been made to himself. If this were the true
exposition of the term, then a power to A.,
to sell for the use of B., inserted in a conveyance to A., of the thing to be sold, would
not be a power coupled with an interest,
and, consequently, could not be exercised,
after the death of the person making it;
while a power to A., to sell and pay a debt
to himself, tiough not accompanied with any
conveyance which might vest the title in
him, would enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title, not in him, even
after the vivifying principle of the power
But eveiy day's exextinct.
had become
perience teaches us, that the law is not, as
We know,
the first case put would suppose.
that a power to A., to sell for the benefit
of B., engrafted on an estate conveyed to
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A., may be exercised at any time, and is
not affected by the death of the person who
created it. It is, then, a power coupled with
an interest, although the person to whom it
is given had no interest in its exercise. His
power is coupled with an interest in the
thing, which enables him to execute it in
his own name, and is, therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who created it.
The general rule, that a power of attorney,
though irrevocable by the party, during his
life, is extinguished by his death. Is not affected by the circumstance, that testamentary powers are executed after the death of
the testator.
The law, in allowing a testamentary disposition of property, not only
permits a will to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an operation which is
not allowed to deeds which have their effect
during the life of the person who executes
An estate given by will may take efthem.
fect at a future time, or on a future contingency, and in the meantime, descends to the
heir. The power Is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person who
makes it, and cannot exist during his life.
It is the intention, that it shall be executed
after his death.
The conveyance made by
the person to whom it is given, takes effect
by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds
his title under it. Every case of a power
given in a will, is considered in a court of
chancery as a trust for the benefit of the
person for whose use the power is made,
and as a devise or bequest to that person.
It is, then, deemed perfectly clear, that the
power given in this case, is a naked power,
not coupled with an interest, which, though
irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired
on his death.
It remains to inquire, whether
the appellant is entitled to the aid of this
court, to give effect to the intention of the
parties, to subject the interest of Kousmanier
in the Nereus and Industry to the payment
of the money advanced by the plaintiff, on
the credit of those vessels, the instrument
taken for that purpose having totally failed
to effect its object.
This is the point on which the plaintiff most
relies, and is that on which the court has
felt most floubt. That the parties intended,
the one to give, and the other to receive, an
effective security on the two vessels mentioned in the bill, is admitted; and the question is, whether the law of this court will
enable it to carry this intent into execution,
when the instrument relied on by both parties has failed to accomplish its object The
respondents Insist, that there is no defect
in the instrument itself; that it contains
precisely what it was intended to contain,
and is the instrument which was chosen by
the parties, deliberately, on the advice of
counsel, and intended to be the consummation of their agreement. That in sucn a case
the written agreement
cannot be varied by
parol testimony. The counsel for the appellant contends, with great force, that the cases

in which parol testimony has been rejected,
are cases in which the agreement itself hasbeen committed to writing; and one of the
parties has sought to contradict, explain or
vary it, by parol evidence.
That in this case,
the agreement is not reduced to writing. The
power of attorney does not profess to be the
agreement, but is a collateral instrument, tO'
enable the party to have the benefit of it,
leaving the agreement still in full force, in itsoriginal form. That this parol agreement, not
being within the statute of frauds, would be
enforced by this court, if the power of attorney
had not been executed; and not being merged
in the power, ought now to be executed. That
the power being incompetent to its object, the
court will enforce the agreement against general creditors.
This argument is entitled to,
and has received, very deliberate consideration.

The first inquiry respects the fact. Does
this power of attorney purport to be the
agreement ? Is it an instrument collateral to
the agreement?
Or is it an execution of the
agreement itself, in the form intended by
both the parties ? The biU states an offer on
the part of Rousmanier to give a mortgage
on the vessels, either in the usual form, or
in the form of an absolute bill of sale, the
vendor taking a defeasance; but does not
state any agreement for that particular security.
The agreement stated in the bill is,
generally, that the plaintiff, in addition to
the notes of Rousmanier, should have specific
security on the vessel; and it alleges that the
parties applied to counsel for advice respecting the most desirable mode of taking
this security. On a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of a mortgage,
and an irrevocable power of attorney, counsel
advised the latter instrument, and assigned
reasons for his advice, the validity of which
being admitted by the parties, the power of
attorney was prepared and executed, and
was received by the plaintiff as full security
for his loans. This is the case made by the
amended bUl; and it appears to the court, to
be a case in which the notes and power of
attorney are admitted to be a complete consummation of the agreement. The thing
stipulated was a collateral security on the
Nereus and Industry.
On advice of counsel,
this power of attorney was selected, ajid given as that security. TVe think it a complete
execution of that part of the agreement; as
complete,
though not as safe an execution
of it, as a mortgage would have been.
It is contended, that the letter of attorney
does not contain all the terms of the agreement.
Neither would a bill of sale, nor a
deed of mortgage, contain them.
Neither instrument constitTites the agreement itself,
but is that for which the agreement stipulated.
The agi-eement consisted of a loan of
money on the part of Hunt, and of notes for
its repayment, and of a collateral security
on the Nereus and Industry, on the part of
Rousmanier.
The money was advanced, the
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notes were given, and this letter of attorney
was, on advice of counsel, executed and re■ceived as the collateral security whieli Hunt
required. The letter of attorney Is as much
-an execution of that part of the agreement
which stipulated a collateral security, as the
notes are an execution of that part which
stipulated that notes should be given.
But this power, although a complete security, during the life of Rousmanier, has been
rendered inoperative by his death. The legal character of the security was misunderThey did not suppose,
stood by the parties.
that the power would, in law, expire with
The question for the considRousmanier.
If money be
eration of the court is this:
advanced on a general stipulation to give security for its repayment on a specific article;
and the parties deliberately, on advice of
instrument,
counsel,
agree on a particular
which is executed, but, from a legal quality
inherent in its nature, that was unknown to
the parties, becomes extinct by the death of
one of them; can a court of equity direct a
new security of a different character to be
given? or direct that to be done which the
parties supposed would have been eifected
by the instrument agreed on between them?
This question has been very elaborately
argued, and every case has been cited which
could be supposed to bear upon it. No one
of these cases decides the very question now
before the court It must depend on the
principles to be collected from them.
It is a general rule, that an agreement In
writing, or an instrument carrying an agreement into execution, shall not be varied by
parol testimony, stating conversations or circumstances anterior to the written instruThis rule is recognized In courts of
ment.
equity as well as in courts of law; but
courts of equity grant relief in cases of
fraud and mistake, which cannot be obtained
In such cases, a court of
in courts of law.
equity may carry the intention of the parties
into execution, where the vsritten agreement
fails to express that intention. In this case,
Mistake is
there is no ingredient of fraud.
the sole ground on which the plaintiff comes
into court; and that mistake is in the law.
The fact is, in all respects, what it was supThe instrument taken, is the
posed to be.
instrument intended to be taken. But it is,
contrary to the expectation of the parties, extinguished by an event not foreseen nor adverted to, and is, therefore, incapable of effecting the object for which it was given.
Does a court of equity, in such a case, substitute a different instrument for that which
has failed to effect its object?
In general, the mistakes against which a
court of equity relieves, are mistakes in fact
The decisions on this subject, though not always very distinctly stated, appear to be
founded on some misconception of fact. Yet
some of them bear a considerable analogy to
Among these, is
that under consideration.
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that class of cases In which a joint obligation has been set up in equity against the
representatives of a deceased obligor, who
were discharged at law.
If the principle of
these decisions be, that the bond was joint,
from a mere mistake of the law, and that
the court will relieve against this mistake, on
the ground of the pre-existing equity, arising
from the advance of the money, it must be
admitted, that they have a sti-ong bearing
on tlie case at bar.
But the judges in the
coui'ts of equity seem to have placed them
on mistake in fact, arising from the ignorance of the draftsman.
In Simpson v.
Vaughan, 2 Atk. 33, the bond was drawn by
the obligor himself, and under circumstances
which induced the court to be of opinion,
that it was intended to be joint and several.
In Underhill v. Hoi-wood, 10 Ves. 209, 22T,
Lord Bldon, speaking of cases in which a
joint bond has been set up against the representatives of a deceased obligor, says, "the
court has Inferred, from the nature of the
condition, and the transaction, that it was
That is, the instrumade joint, by mistake.
ment is not what the parties intended la
fact. They intended a joint and several obligation; the scrivener has, by mistake, prepared a joint obligation."
All the cases in which the court has sustained a joint bond against the representatives of the deceased obligor, have turned upon a supposed mistake in drawing the bond.
It was not until the case of Sumner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 36, that anything was said by
the judge who determined the cause, from
which it might be inferred, that relief in
these cases would be afforded on any other
principle than mistake in fact. In that case,
the court refused its aid, because there was
In
to the obligation.
no equity antecedent
delivering his judgment, the master of the
rolls (Sir W. Grant) indicated very clearly
an opinion, that a prior equitable consideration, received by the deceased, was indispensable to the setting up of a joint obligation against his representatives; and added,
"so, where a joint bond has, in equity, been
considered as several, there has been a credit
previously given to the different persons who
Had this
have entered into the obligation."
case gone so far as to decide, that "the credit
previously given" was the sole ground on
which a court of equity would consider a
joint bond as several, it would have gone far
to show, that the equitable obligation remained, and might be enforced, after the
legal obligation of the instrument had expired. But the case does not go so far;
it does not change the principle on which the
court had uniformly proceeded, nor discard
the idea, that relief is to be granted, because
the obligation was made joint, by a mistake
in point of fact. The case only decides, that
this mistake, in point of fact, will not be
presumed by the court, in a case where no
equity existed antecedent to the obligation,
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where no advantage was received by, and
no credit given to, the person against whose
Yet,
estate the instrument is to be set up.
the course of the court seems to be uniform,
to presume a mistake, in point of fact, In every case where a joint obligation has been
given, and a benefit has been received by the
deceased obligor.
No proof of actual mistake is required; the existence of an antecedent equity is sufficient.
In cases attended by precisely the same circumstances, so
far as respects mistake, relief will be given
against the representatives of a deceased
obligor, who had received the benefit of the
obligation, and refused against the representatives of him who had not received it.
Yet the legal obligation is as completely extinguished in the one case as in the other;
and the facts stated, in some of the cases in
which these decisions have been made,
would rather conduce to the opinion, that the
bond was made joint, from ignorance of the
legal consequences of a joint obligation, than
from any mistake in fact
The case of Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mos.
3(34, if it be law, has no inconsiderable bearing on this cause.
The right of the heirat-law was contested by a younger member
of the family, and the arbitrator to whom
the subject was referred decided against
him. He executed a deed in compliance with
this award, and was afterwards
relieved
against it, on the principle that he was ignorant of his title. The case does not suppose this fact, that he was the eldest son,
to have been unknown to him ; and if he was
ignorant of anything, it was of the law,
which gave him, as eldest son, the estate he
had conveyed to a younger brother. Yet he
was I'elieved in chancery against this conveyance.
There are certainly strong objections to this decision in other respects; but,
as a case in which relief has been granted
on a mistake in law. It cannot be entirely
disregarded.
Although we do not find the naked principle, that relief may be granted on account
of ignorance of law, asserted in the books,
we find no case in which it has been decided,
that a plain and acknowledged mistake in
law is beyond the reach of equity. In the
case of liOrd Irnham v. Child, 1 Brown, Ch.
91, application was made to the chancellor
to establish a clause, which had been, it was
said, agreed upon, but which had been considered by the parties, and excluded from
the written Instrument, by consent.
It is

true, they excluded the clause, from a mistaken opinion that it would make the contract usurious, but they did not believe that
the legal effect of the contract was precisely
the same as if the clause had been inserted.
They weighed the consequences of inserting
and omitting the clause, and preferred the
latter. That, too, was a case to which the
statute applied. Most of the cases which
have been cited were within the statute of
frauds, and it is not easy to say, how much
has been the influence of that statute on
them.

The case cited by the respondent's counsel
from Precedents in Chancery, is not of this
description; but it does not appear from that
case that the power of attorney was Intended, or believed, to be a lien. In this case,
the fact of mistake is placed beyond any
controversy. It is averred in the bill, and
admitted by the demurrer, that "the powers
of attorney were given by the said Rousmanier, and received by the said Hunt, under the belief that they were, and with the
intention that they should create, a specifio
lien and security on the said vessels."
We
find no case which we think precisely in
point; and are unwilling, where the effect of
the instrument is acknowledged to have been
entirely misunderstood by both parties, to
say, that a court of equity is incapable of
affording relief. The decree of the circuit
court is reversed; but as this is a case in
which creditors are concerned, the court, instead of giving a final decree on the demurrer, in favor of the plaintifC, directs the cause
to be remanded, that the circuit court may
permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill.
Decree: This cause came on to be heard,
on the transcript of the record of the cir-

cuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, and was argued by
counsel: on consideration whereof, this court
Is of opinion, that the said circuit court erred.
In sustaining the demurrer of the defendants, and dismissing the bill of the complainant. It Is, therefore, decreed and ordered,,
that the decree of the said circuit court In
this case be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled. And it Is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to
the said circuit court, with directions to permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill of the complainants.
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PARK BROS. & CO., Limited, v. BLODGBTT & CLAPP CO.
(29 Atl. 133, 64 Conn. 28.)
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
8, 1894.

Feb.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hartford county; Tain tor. Judge.
Action by Park Bros. & Co., Limited,
against the Blodgett & Clapp Company for
damages for breach of contract. Judgment
for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Albert H. Walker,

S. White,

for

for appellant.

Edward

appellee.

TORRANCE, J. This is an action brought
for the breach of a writ-

to recover damages

ten contract, dated December 14, 1888. The
contract is set out in full in the amended
complaint. It is in the form of a written
proposal,
addressed by the plaintiff to the
defendant, and is accepted by the defendant in writing upon the face of the contract. Such parts of the contract as appear
to be material are here given: "We propose
to supply you with fifteen net tons of tool
steel, of good and suitable quality, to be
furnished prior to January 1, 1890, at" prices
set forth in the contract for the qualities of
steel named therein. "Deliveries to be made
f. o. b. Pittsburgh, and New York freight allowed to Hartford. To be specified for as
your wants may require."
The contract
was made at Hartford, by the plaintiff
through its agent A. H. Church, and by the
defendant through its agent J. B. Clapp.
After filing a demurrer and an answer,
which may now be laid out of the case, the
defendant filed an "answer, with demand
for reformation of contract," in the first
paragi-aph
of which it admitted the execution of said written contract
The second,
third, and fourth paragraphs of the answer
are as follows:
"The defendant avers that
, 1888, it was
on or about December
agreed by and between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff acting by its said
agent, A. H. Church, that the plaintiff should
supply the defendant prior to January 1,
1890, with such an amount of tool steel, not
exceeding fifteen tons, as the defendant's
wants during that time might require, and
of the kinds and upon the terms stated in
said contract, and that the defendant would
purchase the same of the plaintiff on said
terms.
by the mistake of the
(3) That
plaintiff and defendant, or the fraud of the
plaintiff, said written contract did not embody the actual agreement made as aforesaid by the parties.
(4) That the defendant
accepted
the proposal made to it by the
plaintiff, and contained in- said written contract, relying upon the representations of
the plaintiff's said agent, then made to it,
that by accepting the same the defendant
would only be bound for the purchase of
such an amount of tool steel of the kinds
named therein as its wants prior to Janu-

lib

ary 1, 1890, might require, and the defendant then believed that such proposal
embodied the terms of the actual agreement
made as aforesaid by and between the plaintiff and defendant." The fifth and last
paragraph of the answer is not now material. The answer claimed, by way of equitable relief, a reformation of the written
contract. In reply the plaintiff denied the
three paragraphs above quoted; denied specifically that the written contract did not
embody the actual agreement
made by the
parties; and denied the existence of any
joint mistake or fraud. Thereupon the court
below, sitting as a com-t of equity, heard
the parties upon the issues thus formed,
found them in favor of the defendant, and
adjudged that the written contract be reformed to correspond with the contract as
set out in paragraph 2 of the answer. At a
subsequent term of the court, final judgment in the suit was rendered in favor of
the defendant. The present appeal is based
upon what occurred dm-ing the trial with
reference to the reformation of the contract. Upon that hearing the agent of the
defendant was a witness, on behalf of the
defendant, and was ..jked to state "what
conversation occurred between him and A.
H. Church in making the contract of December 14, 1888, at and before the execution
thereof, and relevant thereto." The plaintiff "objected to the reception of any parol
testimony, on the ground that the same was
inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms
of a written instrument, or to show any other or different contract than that specified
in the instrument, or to show anything relevant to the defendant's prayer for its reformation." The com-t overruled the objection,
and admitted the testimony, and upon such
testimony found and adjudged as hereinbefore stated.
The case thus presents a single question,
- -whether the evidence
objected to was admissible under the circumstances; and this
depends upon the further question,
which
will be first considered, whether the mistake was one which, under the circumstances disclosed by the record, a court of equity
will correct. The finding of the court below is as follows: "The actual agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff was
that the plaintiff should supply the defendant, prior to January 1, 1890, with such an
amount of tool steel, not exceeding fifteen
tons, as the defendant's wants during that
time might require, and of the kinds and
upon the terms stated in said contract, and
that the defendant would purchase the same
of the plaintiff on said terms. But by the
mutual mistake of said Church and said
Clapp, acting for the plaintiff and defendant
respectively, concerning the legal construction of the written contract of December 14,
1888, that contract failed to express the
actual agreement of the parties; and that
said Church and said Clapp both intended to
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iiave the said written contract express tlie
actual agreement made by tliem, and at the
time of its execution believed that it did."
No fraud is properly charged, and certainly
none is found, and whatever claim to relief
the defendant may have must rest wholly on
the ground of mistake. The plaintiff claims
that the mistake in question is one of law,
and is of such a nature that it cannot be
corrected in a court of equity. That a court
■of equity, under certain circumstances, may
reform a written instrument founded on a
mistake of fact is not disputed; but the
plaintiff strenuously insists that it cannot,
or will not, reform an instrument founded
upon a mistake like the one here in question,
which is alleged to be a mistake of law. The
distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is certainly recognized in the
text-books and decisions, and to a certain
■
extent is a valid distinction; but It Is not
practically so important as it is often represented to be. Upon this point Mr. Markby, in his "Elements of Law" (sections 268
and 269), well says: "There is also a peculiar class of cases in which courts of equity
to undo what has been
have endeavored
done under the influence of error and to restore parties to their former position. The
courts deal with such cases in a very free
doubt whether it is possible
manner, and
to bring their action under any fixed rules.
can judge by
But here again, as far as
what I find in the text-books and in the cases
referred to, the distinction between errors
of law and errors of fact, though very emhas had very little
phatically announced,
.practical efCeot upon the decisions of the
courts. The distinction is not ignored, and
it may have had some influence, but it is
-always mixed up with other considerations,
which not unfrequently outweigh it. The
distinction between errors of law and errors
of fact is therefore probably of much less
importance than is commonly supposed.
There is some satisfaction in this, because
the grounds upon which the distinction is
made have never been clearly stated." The
distinction in question can therefore afford
little or no aid in determining the question
under consideration. Under certain circumstances a court of equity will, and under
others it wiU not, reform a writing founded
on a mistake of fact; under certain circumstances it will, and imder others it wiU not,
reform an instrument founded upon a mistake of law.
It is no longer true, if it ever
was, that a mistake of law is no ground for
relief in any case, as wiU be seen by the
cases hereinafter cited.
Whether, then, the
mistake now in question be regarded as one
of law or one of fact is not of much consequence;
the more important question Is
whether it is such a mistake as a court of
■equity
will correct; and this perhaps can
only, or at least can best, be determined by
seeing whether it falls within any of the
well-recognized classes of cases in which
such relief Is furnished.
At the same time

I

I

fundamental equitable principle which
was specially applied in the case of Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, may also, perhaps, afford some aid in coming to a right
Stated briefly and generally,
conclusion.
and without any attempt at strict accuracy,
that principle is that in legal transactions
no one shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another through
or by reason of an innocent mistake of law
or fact, entertained without negligence by
the loser, or by both. If we apply this principle to the present case, we may see that, by
means of a mutual mistake in reducing the
oral agreement to writing, the plaintiff, without either party Intending it, gained a decided advantage over the defendant, to
which it is in no way justly entitled, or at
least ought not to be entitled, in a court of
equity.
The written agreement certainly fails to
express the real agreement of the parties in
a material point; it fails to do so by reason of a mutual mistake, made, as we must
innocently, and without any such
assume,
negligence on the part of the defendant as
would debar him from the aid of a coiu"t of
equity. The rights of no third parties have
intervened.
The instrument, if corrected,
will place both parties just where they intended to place themselves in their relations
to each other; and, if not corrected, it gives
the plaintiff an Inequitable advantage over
the defendant
It is said that if, by mistake,
words are inserted in a written contract
which the parties did not intend to insert, or
omitted which they did not intend to omit,
this is a mistake of fact which a com-t of
equity will correct In a proper case. Sibert
If, then, the oral
V. McAvoy,
15 lU. 106.
agreement in the case at bar had been for
the sale and pm-chase of 5 tons of steel, and,
in reducing the contract to writing, the parties had, by an unnoticed mistake, inserted
"15 tons" instead of "5 tons," this would
have been a mistake of fact entitling the defendant to the aid of a com-t of equity.
In
the case at bar the parties actually agreed
upon what may, for brevity, be called a conditional purchase and sale, and upon that
only. In reducing the contract to writing,
they, by an innocent mistake, omitted words
which would have expressed the true agreement,
and used words which express an
agreement differing materially from the only
one they made.
There is perhaps a distinction between the supposed case and the actual case, but it is quite shadowy.
They differ not at aU in their unjust consequences.
In both, by an Innocent mistake mutually
entertained, the vendor obtains an unconscionable advantage over the vendee, a result which was not intended by either.
There exists no good, substantial reason, as
it seems to us, why relief should be given
in the one case and refused in the other,
other things being equal.
It is hardly necessary to .'a.y that, in cases like the one at
bar, courts of equity ought to move with
the
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Before an instrument is reformed, under such circumstances, the proof
of tlie mistake, and that it really gives an unjust advantage to one party over the other,
ought to be of the most convincing character.
"Of course the presumption in favor of the
written over the spolien agreement is almost
resistless; and the court has veearied itself
in declaring that such prayers (for relief of
this kind) must be supported by overwhelming evidence, or be denied." Palmer v. Insui-ance Co., 54 Conn. 501, 9 Atl. 248.
We
are not concerned here, however, with the
amount or sufficiency of the proofs vipon
which the court below acted, nor with the
sufficiency of the pleadings; we must, upon
this record, assume that the pleadings are
sufficient, and that the proofs came fully up
to the higliest standard reqiiirements in sucli
oases. Upon principle, then, we think a com't
of equity may correct a mistake of law in a
case like the one at bar, and we also think
the very great weight of modern authority
The case
is in favor of that conclusion.
clearly falls within that class of cases where
there is an antecedent agreement, and, in reducing it to writing, the instrument executed,
by reason of the common mistake of the parties as to the legal effect of the words used,
fails, as to one or more material points, to
It is perexpress their actual agreement.
haps not essential in all cases that there
should be an antecedent agreement, as appears to be held in Benson v. Markoe, 37
Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; but we have no occasion to consider that question in the case
at bar. The authorities in favor of the conclusion that a com-t of equity in such cases
will correct a mistake, even if it be one of
law, are very numerous, and the citation of
a few of the more important must suffice.
In Hunt V. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1,
decided in 1828, it is said: "Where an instrument is drawn and executed which professes, or is intended, to cany into execution an agreement, whether in writing or by
parol, previously entered into, but which by
mistake of the draftsman, either as to fact or
law, does not fulfill, or which violates, the
manifest
intention of the parties to tho
equity will correct the mistake
agreement,
so as to produce a conformity of the instruIt was said in
ment to the agreement."
the argument before us that this was a mere
obiter dictum, but that is hardly correct. It
is true the case was held not to fall within
the principle, but the principle was said to
(page 13), and was apbe "incontrovertible"
plied to the extent at least of determining
that the case then before the court did not
In Snell v. Insurance Co.,
come within it.
98 U. S. 85, the court applied the principle so
clearly stated in the case last cited, and reformed a policy of insurance, though the
mistake was clearly one as to the legal effect of the language of the policy. In numerous other decisions of that court the
same principle has been cautiously but repeatedly applied, but it is not necessary to
HUTCH. EQ. JUK. — 13
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cite them.
On the general question, whether a court of equity will relieve against a
mistake as to the legal effect of the language
of a writing, the case of Griswold v. Hazard,
141 U. S. 260, 11 Sup. Ct. 972, 999, is a strong
case, though perhaps hardly an authority
upon the precise question in this case.
Canedy V. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373, was a case
where the oral contract was for the sale of
two-thirds of certain premises, but the deed,
by mistake of the scrivener, conveyed the entire premises.
The words used were ones
intended to be used in one sense, the error
being that all concerned
supposed
those
words would carry ovit the oral agreement.
This was clearly a mistake "concerning the
legal construction of the written contract,"
but the court, by Chief Justice Shaw, said:
"We are of the opinion that courts of equity in such cases are not limited to affording
relief only in cases of mistake of fact, and
that a mistake in the legal effect of a description in a deed, or in the use of technical
language, may be relieved against upon propIn Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 585.
er proof."
28 N. E. 228, decided in 1891, the court says:
"The only question argued is raised by the
defendant's exception to the refusal of a ruling that, if both parties intended that the
description should be written as it was written, the plaintiff was not entitled to a reformation. It would be a sufficient answer
that the contrary is settled in this commonIn Kenwealth," — citing a number of cases.
nard v. George, 44 N. H. 440, the parties, by
mistake as to its legal effect, supposed a
mortgage deed to be valid when it was not.
The court relieved against the mistake, and
said: "It seems to us to be a clear case of
mutual mistake, where the instrument given
and received was not in fact what all the
parties to it supposed it was and intended
it should be; and in such a case equity will
interfere and reform the deed, and make it
what the parties at the time of its execution intended to make it; and in this respect it makes no difference whether the
defect In the instrument be in a statutory or
common-law requisite, or whether the parties failed to make the instrument in the
form they intended, or misapprehended its
legal effect." In Eastman v. Association, G5
N. H. 176, 18 Atl. 745, decided in 1889, the
mistake was as to the legal effect of an insurance certificate, but the court granted reThe com't says:
lief by way of reformation.
"Both parties intended to make the benefit
payable to Cigar's administrator. That it wao
not made payable to him was due to thei?
mutual misapprehension of the legal effect of
the language used in the certificate. * * *
Equity requires an amendment of the writing
that will make the coatract what the parties
supposed it was, and intended it should be,
although their mistake is one of law, and not
In Trusdell y. Lehman, 47 N.
of fact."
J. Eq. 218, 20 Atl. 301, the marginal note is
"Where it clearly appears that
as follows:
a deed drawn professedly to carry out the
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in his able argument before us. Upon his
brief, he cites five from Illinois, two froL"
Indiana, and one from Arkansas.
After an
examination of them, we can only say that
most of them seem to support the claims of
the plaintiff.
If so, we think they are opposed to the very decided weight of authority, and do not state the law as it is held in
this state.
Before closing, however, we ought to notice the case of Wheaton v. Wheaton, supra,
upon which the plaintiff's counsel seems to
place great reliance. The case is a somewhat peculiar one.
Even in that case, however, the court seems to recognize the principle governing the class of cases within which
we decide the case at bar faUs, for it says:
"It is not alleged that the writings were not
so drawn as to effectuate the intention of the
parties, through the mistake of the scrivOn the contrary it is alleged that the
ener.
scrivener was not even informed what the
agreement between the parties was."
From
the statement of the case in the record and
in the opinion, it clearly appears that the
mistake was not mutual; indeed, it does not
even appear that at the time when the note
was executed the other party even knew
that there was any mistake at all on he part
Upon the facts stated, the
of anybody.
plaintiff in this case did not bring it within
If
the class of cases we have been considering.
The case was correctly decided, not on the
ground that the mistake was one of law,
but on the ground that the mistake of law
was one which, under the circumstances alleged, a court of equity would not correct.
The court, however, in the opinion, seems to
base its decision upon the distinction between mistakes of law and mistake^ of fact;
holding in general and unqualified terms, as
was once quite customary, that the latter
could be corrected and the former could not.
The court probably did not mean to lay the
law down in this broad and unqualified way;
oral dealings to modify or override what you but if it did, it is sufilcient to say that it is
knew was the effect of your writing."
Goode
not a correct statement of our law, at least
V. Riley, 153 Mass. 585, 28 Atl. 228; Reyn.
since the decision of Northrop v. Gi'aves,
Theory Ev. § 09; 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) § supra. On tlie whole, this case of Wheaton
269a; Steph. Dig. Ev. § 90.
V. Wheaton can hardly be regardea as supThe view we have taken of this case ren- porting the plaintiff's contention. There is
ders it unnecessary to notice at any Ijngth no error apparent upon the record.
In this
the cases cited by counsel for the plaintiff opinion the other judges concurred.

agreement of the parties, previously entered
into, is executed imder the misapprehension
that it really embodies the agreement, whereas, by mistake of the draughtsman either as
to fact or law, it falls to fulfill that purpose,
eqtuity will correct the mistalie by reforming
the instrument in accordance with the contract." In a general way, the same rule is
recognized and applied with more or less
ffifictness in the following cases: Clayton v.
Freet, 10 Ohio St. 544; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N.
Y. 298; Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337, 17
Atl. 166; May v. Adams, 58 Vt. 74, 3 Atl.
187; Grifiith v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13; Benson
V. Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; Gump's
Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 476; Cooper v. Phibbs,
L. E. 2 H. L. 170. See, also, 2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 845, and Bisp. Eq. §§ 184-191. And,
whatever the law may be elsewliere, this is
certainly the law of our own state.
Chamberlain V. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243; Stedwell
V. Anderson, 21 Conn. 144; Woodbury Savings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn.
518; Palmer
v. Insui'ance Co., 54 Conn.
488, 9 Atl. 248; and Haussman v. Bm-nIndeed,
ham, 59 Conn. 117, 22 Atl. 1065.
since the time of Northrop v. Graves, supra,
it is difficult to see how our law could have
been otherwise.
We conclude then that by
our own law, and by the decided weight of
authority elsewhere, the defendant was enthis is so, then
titled to the relief sought.
clearly he was entitled to the parol evidence
which the plaintiff objected to; for in no
other way, ordinarily, can the mistake be
shown. "In such cases parol evidence is
admissible to show that the party is entitled
to the relief sought." Wheaton v. Wheaton,
9 Conn. 96.
"It is settled, at least in equity,
that this particular kind of evidence, that Is
to say, of mutual mistake as to the meaning
of words used, is admissible for the negative
purpose we have mentioned.
And this principle is entirely consistent with the rule that
you cannot set up prior or contemporaneous
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CLINK

C02.

91

Court of ilichigim.

et al.

Mich.

1.)

jSIarch 18, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Cliarlevoix county, in chancery;
Jonatlian G. Ramsdell,
Judge.
Suit to foreclose a mortgage by Louisa
Renard against Alice A. Clink, Eliza S. Fogg,
John Nichols, and Walter L. French.
Bill
Reversed.
dismissed. Complainant appeals.
Norton & Keat, for appellant.
for appellees.

S.

H. Clink,

J. The bill in this cause
filed to foreclose a mortgage executed by
the defendant Alice A. Clink to one A. H.
Van Dusen, and by him assigned to complainant.
The other defendants are subsequent purchasers with notice, after the mortA foreclosure at law was
gage became due.
attempted, a sale made, and a deed executed
to complainant; but, owing to the fact that
the assignment of the mortgage to complainant was not of record at the time of said
iittempted foreclosure, that proceeding proved
ineffectual. After the complainant had obtained her deed on the foreclosure at law, and
before the filing of the present bill, the defendant Clink tendered to complainant the
amount due upon the mortgage, exclusive of
the costs of such former foreclosure; and in
this proceeding it is claimed that such tender
operated to discharge the lien of the mortgage.
The court below sustained this defense, and dismissed the bill.
It is made clear by the testimony that the
<!omplainant, at the time she refused the tender, supposed that she had acquired title by
her former foreclosure, and that, notwithstanding this, she was ready to accept the
amount of the mortgage, interest, and costs.
It also appears that she offered to take the
money tendered so far as It would go, but
that defendant refused to permit this unless
she would accept it in full payment and disUnder these circumcharge of the mortgage.
stances, we think the court below erred in
Under the repeated rul•dismissing the bill.
ings of this court, a tender of the full amount
to dis•due upon the mortgage will operate
charge the lien of the mortgage if the tender
Moynabe refused without adequate excuse.
han v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Eslow v. Mitdiell,
26 Mich. 500; Sager v. Tupper, 35 Mich. 131;
Stewart v. Brown, 48 Mich. 383, 12 N. W. 499.
But in the present case it appears beyond
■question that the complainant had no purpose
of exacting from the defendant any sum beyond what she believed to be her legal due.
MONTGOMERY,
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While it is a general rule that equity will not
relieve against a mistake of law, this rule is
not universal.
Where parties, with knowledge of the facts, and without any inequitable incidents, have made an agreement
or
other instrument as they intended it should
be, and the writing expresses the transaction
as it was understood and designed
to be
made, equity will not allow a defense, or
grant a reformation or rescission, although
one of the parties may have mistaken or misconceived its legal meaning, scope, or effect.
JIartin v. Hamlin, 18 Mich. 354; Lapp v.
Lapp, 43 Mich. 287, 5 N. W. 317. But where
a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect
to his own antecedent and existing pi-ivate
legal rights, interest, or estate, and enters into some transaction the legal scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and
understands, for the purpose of affecting such
assumed rights, interests, or estates, equity
will grant its relief, defensive or afiirmative,
treating the mistake as analogous to, if not
identical with, a mistake of fact. 2 Pom.
Eq. § 849, p. 314; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Hare,
222; Blakeman v. Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320;
Whelen's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 410; Hearst v.
Pujol, 44 Gal. 230; Morgan v. Dod, 3 Colo.
551; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149;
Lansdowne v. Lansdowne. 2 Jac. & W. 205.
In Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, the mortgagor filed his bill to set aside a mortgage
sale, and asked that the premises be relieved
from the mortgage lien.
The court found
that the mortgagee was mistaken as to his
legal rights, but was acting in good faith, and
refused to enforce the statutory penalty, and
decreed that the mortgagor pay the mortgage
debt as a condition to relief. In Canfield v.
Conkling, 41 Mich. 371, 2 N. W. 191, a bill
was filed to set aside a mortgage, and to recover the penalty for refusal to discharge it
The court
on tender of the amount due.
found that the tender was sufficient, and say:
"He [defendant] was bound to accept the tender, and complainant had made out a sufficient
But the question was one on
case for relief.
which he might be mistaken without any
serious fault, and we do not think it one
where the mortgage ought to be held canceled without payment; nor is it a case calling for the statutory penalty for a willful and
knowing wrongful refusal to discharge the
mortgage." The decree below should be reversed, and a decree entered in this court
providing for a sale of the mortgaged premises to satisfy the amount due and unpaid upThe defendant will recover
on the mortgage.
the costs of the court below, and the complainant will be entitled to the costs incurred
in this court. The other justices concurred.
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JACOBS

V.

(47

Court of Appeals

MORANGB.

N. Y.

57.)

of New York.

Dec,

1871.

Appeal from judgment of tlie New York
common pleas, afflrming judgment for plaintiff.
Samuel Hand, for appellant.
for respondent.

M. A. Kur-

shedt,

PECKHAM, J. The defendant in this suit
is a lawyer. The plaintiff some years since
brought an action against the defendant in
the marine coiu-t, in the city of New York.
The defendant recovered a verdict in that
suit, of $86 against the plaintiff. Without
taking the case to the general term of that
court, the plaintiff carried it for review to
the court of common pleas of that city, and
after argument there that court reversed the
judgment, with costs. The defendant paid
these costs voluntarily without the entry of
any judgment. Within a year thereafter
the com't of appeals decided that the court
of common pleas had no jurisdiction of a
case from the marine court, until it had
been first heard and decided by the general
term of that com-t. The common pleas had
previously held the other way, viz., that
it had jm-isdiction in such case. Some nine
years after this reversal in the common
pleas the defendant issued an execution in
the marine court, and then the plaintiff instituted this suit in equity to stay his proceedings, and a judgment is obtained for a
perpetual stay on the gi-ound that the judgment in the marine court was erroneous,
and that both parties in the review in the
common pleas had acted under a mutual mistake of law.
This presents the question, can a court of
equity grant relief in a case of this character upon the sole ground of a mistalce of law?
There is no circumstance of any descrijition
that adds anything to this ground of relief.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat and kindred maxims are old in the law. If they
are true, this judgment is erroneous.
In early times the jurisdiction of tlie court
of chancery in the hands of chancellors unskilled in the law was almost without limit;
but for very many years that court has been
guided by rules and precedents, by the science of the law as much as courts of comand modes of
mon law. Their jurisdiction
The statutes and
relief are well settled.
laws of the land are as much the law there
as in any other court. 1 Story Eq., § 10; Id.,

rule open? If this can be regarded as the
"surprise" that requires or Justifies equitable relief, how broad is the principle, how
Almost every
extensive its ramifications?
case reversed by this court would form a
basis for such "surprise," especially where
courts of last resort reverse or modify their
own decisions. How many cases are lost at
the trial or upon review by the ignorance of
counsel in failing to perceive the point, or
in failing to present it properly for review..
How easy to get up cases, in the ordinary
affairs of life, of a misunderstanding of the
law. Thus the same principle would extend
to courts of equity for errors committed or
assumed to be committed there. Under such
a system of jurisprudence it would be difiicult to reach the end of a lawsuit.
In this case the statute of tliis state provided a mode of review of judgments rendered in the marine court. The time and
the manner were prescribed. This statute
was well known to these parties, or should
Yet the
have been but for their negligence.
plaintiff, with the statute before him, passed
for the sole purpose of enabling the party
aggrieved to review a judgment in the marine court, comes to a court of equity for
relief against his ignorance of the manner of
obtaining such review.
We are referred to no principle or authority to sustain such an action, and
think
none can be found.
On this point Chancellor Kent observed:
"A subsequent decision of a higher com't in
a different case, giving a different exposition
of a point of law from the one declared and
known when a settlement between parties
takes place, cannot have a retrospective effect and overtm-n such settlement. Every
man is to be cliarged at his peril with a
liuowledge of the law." Lyon v. Richmond,
2 Johns. Ch. 51, 60.
Thougli the decree in that ease was reversed by the court of errors (14 Johns. 501),
it was entirely upon other grounds.
In Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166; 10
Am. Dec. 316, where ignorance of the law
was set up as a gi-ound of defense, the court
affirmed the rule that ignorance of the law
with a knowledge of the facts was no ground
of defense.
See 1 Story Eq., § 120, to the

I

same effect.

Suppose the plaintiff had misunderstood
the statute as to the time of appeal, could a
coiu't of equity extend the time prescribed
by the statute? Many such cases have occurred from a misappreliension of the law
as to when a judgment is perfected. Com'ts
§§ 17, 18.
The whole basis for this relief is founded of law could grant no relief, and
am not
upon the fact tliat an inferior court made an aware that any lawyer has supposed that a
erroneous decision upon a question, of law; court of equity had any more power to exthat the plaintiff was misled thereby and tend the statute.
suffered this loss. This is the best position
In Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407;
the plaintiff can take. This must be the 31 Am. Dec. 382, in the court of errors on
"surprise" sometimes spoken of in the books. appeal from chancery, Bronson, J., reviewJeremy Eq. Jur. 360.
ed the authorities in a sound opinion, showWhat a flood of litigation would such a ing as he claimed that there was really no

I
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Authority against the rule that ignorance of and supplies palpable evidence of its existence." He would grant relief in the forthe law simply was no ground for relief.
The opinion of Paige, Senator, the other mer not in the latter.
The difficulty of proving the one or the
way, does not seem to me to be well gi'ounded. He was of opinion that the judgment other seems to constitute all the difference
in that case could be affirmed upon otlier in the cases.
grounds. But the principle laid down by
Without any special review of authorities
him denies relief to the plaintiff in this case. on this question which we have particularly
He recognized a difference between igno- examined, it is enoiigh to say that it is conrance of the law and a mistake of the law. ceded that no case has been found warrantAdopting the langviage of .Johnson, ,T., in ing the interference of a court of equity upLawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey, 623; 23 Am. on facts like these, and no sound principle
Dec. 155, who says: "The former is pas- will authorize it.
sive, and does not presume the reason.
The
The decree must be reversed, without costs.
All concur.
latter presumes to know when it does not,
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PETERSON

V.

GROVBR

et al.

(20 Me. 363.)

Supreme

Judicial Court of Maine.

July Term,

1841.

Bill in equity, lieard on bill, answer, and
proof.
Tlie facts are stated in substance in
tlie opinion of the court.
Mr. Timelier, for plaintift.
Mr. Hobbs. for defendants.

SHEPLEY, J. Tlie bill alleges, in substance, that in the year 1S21, the complainant
made a mistake in writing a deed of release
of a lot of land in the township now called

Cutler, by writing the word "south-east" instead of "south-west," in stating the first
bound of the lot.
That the effect of this mistake was to describe the lot immediately easterly and adjoining, which was owned by the
complainant in fee, instead of the one intended to be conveyed,
in which he owned
only the improvements.
That the lot intended to be conveyed, or part of it, is now numbered twenty-one, and that conveyed is numbered twenty.
That one of the grantees entered upon and has continued to possess the
lot intended to be conveyed, while the complainant and his grantees have continued in
The misthe possession of the one conveyed.
take is clearly proved by the testimony, and
is admitted by the answers.
The rule, that
parol testimony is not to be admitted to vary
an instrument In writing, prevails as well in
equity as at law.
Courts of equity admit an
exception to it, where a mistake is alleged;
and if it be clearly proved or admitted, they
give relief. This is a case in which, according to the rules of equity, the deed should be
reformed by correcting the mistake, unless
the matters set forth in the answers vary the
rights of the parties. The grievances alleged by the respondents, and for which one of
them claims to have compensation made before the error is corrected, so far as they are
proved by their own testimony, are in substance these.
That the complainant was emIjloyed by Jones and others, the oAvners in
fee of the lot intended to be conveyed, to survey it, when, in the same year, 1821, one
of the respondents purchased it of them.
That he was Instructed to run out one hundred acres of good land exclusive of the
heath, and that he did so run it out.
That
there were about fifty acres of heath found
In the lot, not computed as part of it. That
eight or nine years ago the complainant was
again employed to run out the land lying
northerly of the lot, and that he ran the
southerly line of the lot, now partially designated as lot numbered seven, so as to
take ofC a large number of acres belonging
to lot 21, as it was originally surveyed.
That there was a large quantity of timber
on the part so taken off, constituting the principal value of the whole lot.
That when the
fee of the lot was purchased of Jones and

others, the deed was made by copying the
boundaries of the lot described in the deed
That Jones and othfrom the complainant.
ers, in the year 1832, conveyed lot numbered
seven to Marston and others, who prosecuted
one of the respondents for cutting, where healleges it should have been in his own lot^
and that he was obliged to pay damages for
it.
The argument for the respondents is, that
if the deed from the complainant had described and conveyed lot 21, they should haveacquired by that deed and by the deed of thfr
fee of the same, a good title as far northerly
as the spotted tree, named in the deed as thenorth-east comer, although it might havestood more than two hundred and seventyThat in conone rods from the first bound.
sequence of the deed from Jones and others
to Marston and -others^ they cannot, if the
mistake in their deed be now corrected, hold
the title to that extent against them; and
must lose the most valuable portion of their
land, through an error originating with the
complainant.
The allegations and proofs,^
out of which this argument arises, are many
of them strongly controverted: but let them
for this purpose be regarded as proved. Theinquiry will then arise, how far the complainant is responsible for such a result
It
does not appear, that he made or had any
connexion with the deed from Jones and othIf the misers to one of the respondents.
take in his deed to them be corrected, it will
still convey, whatever change may have taken place since, all that it was intended to
convey, the improvements on the lot.
If the
respondent who received the deed from
Jones and others with warranty, obtained no
title, it is to be presumed he will obtain
a full indemnity for the loss of it.
Or If by
any process the error in that should also be
attempted to be corrected, and it should be
found, that by reason of subsequent grants
made by them, it could not be so corrected
as to operate as it would have done, had
it been correctly made, it is to be presumed^
that the court would give relief only upon
the principle of making one who seeks equity, do equity.
It would be a hard rule to
hold, that one \A'ho had committed an error,
was responsible for all the remote and possible consequences, which might arise out of
its leading others to commit errors by placing
confidence in its accuracy, instead of examining for themselves. This would make him
responsible not only for the consequences of
his own errors, but for the negligence of others.
There is little occasion for it here,,
where there is apparently a sufficient remedy
for all losses against the parties, who conveyed the fee, and who are responsible for
Thetheir own errors on their covenants.
complainant does not appear to have committed any fraud in the original survey of the
lot, for the proof is, that it was run out according to his instructions.
The surveys.
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which he has since made, cannot affect the
title, and cannot therefore have occasioned
any essential injury. The complainant is entled to have the mistake corrected by a reform of the deed so as to malse it read as it
should have done, and to a decree, that will
secure the rights of the parties accordingly.
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As he made the mistake, which has brought
difficulties upon the other parties as well as
upon himself, he is not entitled to costs.
Nor are either of the respondents,
for they
had an oppoi-tunity of relieving themselves
from expense and trouble by a voluntary correction of an admitted error.
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Action to reform a bond and mortgage so
as to conform to a previous oral agreement.
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendant appealed.
A.

J.

Parker,

for appellant.

James B. 01-

ney, for respondents.

BALCOM,

J.

conveyed
the farm to the defendant, and he took possession of it and also of the personal property he purchased with it. He paid Rider
$1,100 in ca.sh, and gave him an indorsed
note for $.500 in part payment of the purchase-money. The oral contract therefore
was so far' performed as to relieve it from
the operation of the statute of frauds; and
the defendant could not retain the farm and
personal projDerty without giving Rider such
a bond and mortgage as tlieir oral contract
called for, unless the fact that there was no
fraud or mistake on the part of the defendant, as to the terms of the bond and mortgage he gave to Rider, justified him in so
doing.
Parsons says:
"The question has often
come before our courts, whether oral evidence can be received to show the mistake
(in ii written contract), and thereby make it
in fact a new contract, when an oral contract
would be void or not enforceable by the statThe course of adjudication is
ute of frauds.
not uniform on this point. But while it cannot be denied that numerous authorities support a disregard of the statute in such cases,
others maintain its authority."
1 Pars. Cont.
Justice Story puts the case,
(3d Ed.) 555.
"where the party plaintiff seeks, not to set
aside the agreement, but to enforce it, when
it is reformed and varied by the parol evidence;" and then says: "A very strong inclination of opinion has been repeatedly expressed by the English courts, not to decree
a specific performance in this latter class of
cases;
that is to say, not to admit parol evidence to establish a mistake in a written
agreement, and then to enforce it, as varied
and established by that evidence.
On various occasions such relief has, under such circumstances, been denied.
But it is extremely difficult to perceive the principle upon
which such decisions can be supported, consistently Willi the acknowledged exercise of
jurisdiction in the court to reform written
contracts, and to decree relief thereon. In
Americii, Chancellor Kent, after a most elaborate consideration of the subject, has not
hesitated to reject the distinction as unfounded in justice, and has decreed
relief to a
plaintiff, standing in the precise predicaEq. Jur. (7th Ed.) § 161.
1 Stoi;y,
ment."
Archer, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court in Moale v. Buchanan, 11 Gill & J. 325,
"Had tl;e agreement been entirely by
said:
parol, and a part performance, the complain-

Rider and wife

Shall

he be in a worse situation by having attempted to reduce the whole agreement into the
form of a conveyance, if he shall make an
by mistake of
omission in the conveyance,

He
an essential part of the agreement?"
then answers this interrogatory in the negative, and refers to the opinions of Chancellor
Kent, in Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585,
and Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch.
144.

A judgment was given by this court in De
Peyster v. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582, reforming a mortgage and enforcing it against
premises not originally embraced therein.
The supreme court was therefore justified
by authority as well as principle in reforming the bond and mortgage in this case, unless the fact that there was no fraud or mistake on the part of the defendant In fixing
their terms, or respecting their terms, renders such decision erroneous.
The decisions
in JIatthews v. Terwilliger, 3 Barb. 50, and
Quick V. .Stuyvesant, 2 Paige, Ch. &4, support this conclusion instead of militating
against it.
I am not aware of any adjudged case, in
which it has been held that there must be a
mutual mistake of fact by the parties to a
written contract or some fraud on the part
of the party not mistaken, to entitle the
party who made the mistake and who suffers by it, to have such contract reformed
so that it will truly express the oral agreement of the parties which was to be carried
into effect by the written contract; and such
a doctrine would be contrary to good sense
and sound principle. In Matthews v. Terwilliger, supra, Gridley, J., said:
"Now if by
the actual agreement of the parties, Matthews was to pay interest on the purchaseprice of the farm, how did it happen that
the written contract which should have truly
expressed the agreement of the parties, wholly omitted all mention of interest? Was it
by the fraudulent design of the complainant,
or by the mistake and inadvertence of the
defendant?
If it was owing to either of
these causes, then the complainant is not entitled to have the written contract, on which
he has founded his bill, performed; but the
defendant is entitled to have it reformed,
and the mistake corrected."
In that case
the complainant endeavored to compel the
defendant to specifically perform a conti'act
for the sale of his farm, and the latter set
up a mistirke in the contract by the omission
of an undertaking on the part of the complainant to pay interest on the portion of
the purchase-money which was not to be
paid down; and there was no mistake on
the part of the complainant ils to the terms
of the contract as written and signed by the
parties, and it was framed precisely as he
intended it should be.
See Haire v. Baker,
5 N. Y. 3.17.
Also, see Waite v. Leggett, 8
Cow. 105; JMowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. 355.
It seems to me to be entirely clear, upon
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principle, tliat Rider was entitled to liave
the bond and mortgage reformed so tliat they
would conform to the oral agreement of the
parties for the sale of the farm, although the
■defendant may have known, at the time they
were executed, that they varied from such
oml agreement, and did not say or do any
thing to induce the scrivener to draw them
differently from what they should have been
And as there is no controlling audrawn.
thority to the contrary, I am of the opinion
that this court should so hold, and affirm the
judgment in the case, with costs.

DAVIES, ROSEKRANS, 5IAKYIN,

SELDEN,

JJ.,

WRIGHT, J.

and

concurred for affirmance.

The action was
(dissenting).
the defendant's bond and mortgage
reformed so as to conform to a parol contract between the parties, in pursuance of
which it was alleged they were given. The
bond and mortgage were to secure the payment of $3,000 (a part of the purchase-money
■of the plaintiff's farm), in ten annual installments of $300 each.
As drawn, interest was
to be paid annually on the different installments; but there was no provision for the
^payment of the interest on the whole principal remaining unpaid, at the time of the payIn the
ment of such annual installments.
latter pai-ticular the reformation or correction of the bond and mortgage was asked
for. The pleadings admitted a parol contract
between the plaintiff and defendant, for the
sale of the farm of tlie plaintiff, for the price
of $4,600, of which sum $3,000 was to be paid
in ten annual installments of $300 each; the
first payment to be made on the 1st of December, 1859, and the remaining payments
•on the 1st of December of each year thereafter; and which sum of $3,000 was to be
:secured by the defendant's bond and mortTlie complaint algage on the premises.
leged the contract to have been that the
plaintiff was to have Interest annually on
the whole sum of $3,000; whereas the defendant. In his answer, averred that that
sum was made payable in ten annual payments of $300 each, with interest on such
annual payments. The judge who tried the
cause found only the single fact, viz., that
tliere was a mistake on the part of the plaintiff as to the interest he was to receive by
the bond and mortgage; and decided that as
-matter of law he was entitled to have his
mistake corrected, and the bond and mortgage amended or modified, so that he should
recover annual interest on the whole sum
unpaid, and directed a judgment accordingly.
We can only review the case upon the
pleadings and facts found by the judge;
and the question is, whether in a case where
.a contract between parties provides for the
to have
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performance of a particular act by them,
such contract is entitled to be reformed, in
equity, because there has been a mistake
on the part of one of the contracting parties,
as to its terms, when such mistake is not
occasioned by any fraud practiced by the
other party.
suppose the rule to be lliat when there
is a mistake on one side (and not a mutual
mistake), it may be a ground for rescinding
a contract, or for refusing to enforce its
specific performance, but not a ground for
altering its terms. Adams, Eq. 171. A mistake by the plaintiff when he made the contract, as to the interest he was to receive
on the bond and mortgage, would not entitle him to have the contract so modified
as to conform to his mistaken impression,
though it might be a reason for rescinding
the contract on the ground that the minds
of the parties never met in making it. In
Lyman v. United Ins. Co., 17 Johns. 375,
Chief Justice Spencer lays down the true
rule of law to govern the case (whether the
mistake found relates to the bargain or to
the taking of the bond and mortgage) that
"before a written contract can be amended
or altered on the pretense of mistake, the
proof must be entirely clear that tliat mistake has occurred; and secondly, that the
amendment sought would conform the contract to the intention of both parties."
If we were to look, however, in this case,
beyond the findings of fact by the com-t, it
is clear that the deed, bond and mortgage
constituted the true contract, and that all
previous negotiations were merged in them.
It would be a violation of the plainest elementary principles to permit a party who has
entered into a written contract to have the
written contract altered so as to confoi-m to
his understanding of a previous negotiation,
when the opposite party understood it differently, and as it was set forth in the written contract. The parol bargain was void by
the statute of frauds; neither possession being taken under it or consideration paid. It
was after the deed, bond and mortgage were
executed and delivered, and under them the
money was paid and possession taken. The
court was asked in the case not only to
enforce an agreement void by the statute,
but one that the parties did not understand
alike.
The judgment of the supreme court should
be reversed and a new trial ordered, with
costs to abide the event.

I

DEXIO, C. J., and EMOTT, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed on the ground that the
judge's finding of facts must be construed
as a finding of fraud or a mistake of fact on
the part of the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.

/
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LUDINGTON

et al. v.

FORD

et al.

Mich. 123.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Jan. Term, 1876.
Appeal froin circuit court, Mason county;
in chancery.
(33

Shubael F. White and Mariner, Smith &
Ordway, for complainants. E. N. Fitch, William L. Mitchell, and Robert Rae, for defendants.

MARSTON, J. The bill in this case was
filed to correct a mistake.
It is claimed that
at the time of the agreement of April 5, 1859,
referred to in the case of Ford v. Loomis, 33
Mich. 121, a certain description of land which
was not embraced in the tax deeds to Durand, but which was embraced in the deeds
from Ford to Durand of November 16, 1858,
was by mistake omitted from the deed made
by Durand to complainants.

In order for the complainants to obtain'
the relief sought, it must appear not only
that there was an error on both sides, but
the mistake must be admitted or distinctly
proved. Tripp v. Hasceig, 20 Mich. 254; CaseV. Peters, Id. 298.
The complainants have wholly failed in.
establishing
either of these propositions.
We are rather of opinion, on the contrary,
that the only lands contracted to be conveyed
by Durand to the complainants were thoseNone others are
described in the tax deeds.
embraced in the deed from Durand, and it
refers to the tax deeds "for a more full and
perfect description of the lands and premisesherein and hereby conveyed."
The decree of the court below must be reversed, and the bUl be dismissed, with costsof both courts to defendants.
The other justices concurred.

^— [
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WELLES
Commission

v.

YATES.

or

(44 N. Y. 525.)
of Appeals of New York.

Jlay,

1871.

Appeal from an order of the general term
of the supreme court in the Sixth district,
affirming a judgment of the special term in favor of the plaintiff.
The action was brought for the reformation
of a deed executed by the plaintiff, he claiming that a reservation of certain timber had
been omitted, through mistake on his part;
and also for an accounting by the defendant
for timber taken from the premises conveyed.
An account was ordered to ascertain the
value of the lumber taken since March 10,
1851.
The referee found the value at ?2,041.72.

Upon the coming in of the referee's report,
judgment was entered for the plaintiff that
the deed be reformed and corrected, and that
he have judgment for the value of the timber removed by the defendant.
This judgment was affirmed by the general term in the
Sixth district, and the defendant appeals to
the court of appeals.
The facts appear from
the opinion of the court.

E. H. Benn, for appellant.
for respondent.
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Geo.

Sidney

Camp,

HUNT, C. It will not be necessary to
sider in detail the fifteen points presented
the appellant, and so ably argued by
counsel.
The discussion of a few of them
settle principles that may serve to decide

con-

by
his

will

the

case.

The complaint, in substance, alleged that on
the 28th of May, 1846, the plaintiff was the
owner of one hundred and ten acres of land,
being lot No. 4; that on that day he sold the
same by executory contract, with the timber
thereon, to T. & T. Trevor, for $17 per acre.
That on the 7th day of December, 184(5, he
was the owner of lot No. 5, containing one
hundred and forty-one acres, and then entered
into an agreement with the same parties, by
which they undertook to cut the timber standing thereon, manufacture the same into boards
and planks, and to give the plaintiff one-half
of the lumber thus manufactured.
Certain
other details were provided, which it is not
necessary to specify.
At the same time, the
plaintiff entered into an executory contract
with the same persons, for the sale of the one
hundred and forty-one acres, at $4 per acre.
That these two pieces of land were of the
same value; that the timber growing on the
latter piece was of the value of $5,000, and
that such timber, in the understanding of
the parties, was reserved to the plaintiff by
and
contract mentioned,
the manufacturing
that the price of $4 per acre was for the land
simply, the timber reserved to the plaintiff.
That, after proceeding for some time in the
manufacture of the lumber, the purchasers
became embarrassed, and the defendant took
their place in the contract, and without new

further negotiations, a calculation was
made of their payments,
the balance found
due paid by the defendant, and an absolute
deed of the two pieces of land, without res-

ei-vation of the timber, made by the plaintiff
to the defendant.
That the defendant well knew all of the
facts in the complaint recited.
The plamtift'
then avers "that through and by mistake he
failed to insert in the said last-mentioned deed
(of the one hundred and forty-one acres) any
reservation of the timber mentioned and embraced in the contract secondly above mentioned;" and also avers demand and refusal
to amend.
The prayer is that the deed may
be corrected, so as to be made to contain a
reservation of the timber, and that the plaintiff may have an accounting as to the timber
taken and removed by the defendant.
The judge found that there was an error
and mistake on the part of the plaintiff, as
averred by him. He found also that there
was no mistake on the part of the defendant,
but that he well understood the plaintiff's error. He knew that the timber was not reserved, and he knew that the plaintiff supposed and understood that it was reserved.
He received the deed, failing to correct the
plaintiff's error, but intending to reap the
profits of it. He knew that he received of
the plaintiff's
estate $4,000 or $5,000 more
than the plaintiff intended to give him, or than
he supposed he had given him. The mistake
was unilateral; on the part of the plaintiff
only. On the part of the defendant, there was
no mistake, but something worse. It was a
fraud, as palpable as if he had made affirmative representations to induce the error; as
gross as if he had put his hands in the plaintiff's pocket and feloniously abstracted his
money.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 187, 137, 140, 147,
Waldron v.
1.j2, 153, 167, 168, 191, 214-217;
Stevens, 12 Wend. 100; Wiswall v. Hall, 3
Paige, 313; Hill v. Gray, 1 Starkie, 434; 2
B. C. L. 167.
The point here arises, can there be a judgment to reform the contract, there not being
a mutual error, but error on one part and
fraud on the other?
It is laid down in many authorities reported and elementary works, that there must be
a mutual error, to authorize this interposition
of a court of equity. See Story, Eq. Jur.
§ 155; Story v. Conger, 30 N. Y. 673; Nevius
V. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 670; Lyman v. United
States Ins. Co., 17 Johns. 376. The cases where
this general statement is made are very numerous, and it is well said that to exercise this
power, where one party only has been in error
and the other has correctly understood it,
would be making a new contract for the parties, and would be doing injustice to the party
who made no mistake. On this point two dis1st. Those cases
tinctions may be noticed.
will be found to have in them the element of
the honesty on the part of the one correctly
understanding the contract. AVhere two parties enter into a contract, and an error is
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claimed by one party to exist on an important
point, which is claimed to be correct by the
other party, it cannot be amended, as against
the party correctly understanding It, he acting
in good faith, and supposing the other to have
understood the contract as he did. This rule
Either
does not apply where there is fraud.
fraud or mutual mistake will authorize the
reformation. See authorities supra; De Peyster V. Hasbroucli, 11 N. Y. 582; and Gillespie
V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Barlow v. Scott,
24 N. Y. 40; Rider v. Powell, 28 N. Y. 310.
In his supplemi^ntai'y points the appellant exIjressly concedes this proposition.
2. This is the consummation of an existing
contract, about the terms of which there was
This contract it was attempted
no dispute.
to perform. There has been a failure to perform, it, by the misunderstanding, on the part
of the plaintiff, of the effect of the instrument
A refby which performance was attempted.
ormation is permitted in such case, although
the mistake be not mutual. See the cases before cited, and Coles v. Bowne, 10 Paige, 534.
The result of the cases justifies a reformation of a contract, when there is either a mutual mistake, that is, a mistake common to
both parties, or when there is fraud. In his
complaint, the plaintiff has simply stated the
facts on which he claims relief. After setting forth the facts, he adds, that by mistake,
he failed to insert in the deed a reservation of
the timber. He does not charge that it was a
mistake common to both parties. Nor does he
charge it to have been a fraud. He gives no
name to the conduct of the defendant.
The
facts, as found by the referee, and the judgment rendered by him, are in conformity to
the allegations of the complaint. They establish, not a mutual or common error, but an
error on the part of the plaintiff and fraud on
the part of the defendant.
The defendant, by the judgment of the court
upon the facts, occupied the place of the original contractors and undertook to perform
their contract. This was the finding of the
judge, and the evidence, with the circumstances, justified this finding. The fraud was in
If the judgment of
the deceitful ])erformance.
the court below is carried out, he will not be
made a party to a new contract, which he
would never have assumed.
He did assume
the original contract. He therefore became
bound by it. AMien the court now compel him
to abandon his fraudulent contract, he is remitted to the original agreement.
He has no
ground therefore to say that by being convicted of a fravid, he is compelled to enter
into a new contract. Nor is he to be relieved
by the nile that a party seeking to be relieved
from fraud, must be ready, prompt and eager
in his demand for redress. When a party
seeks to rescind a contract, on the ground of
fraud, he must undoubtedly be prompt and
ready in his disaffirmance. He has the election to affirm or disaffirm. If he elects the
latter he must do it at once. He is not permitted to hesitate and balance advantages.
Masson V. Bovet, 1 Denio, G9; Beers v. Hen-

drickson, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 54; Tomlinson v.
Miller, *42 N. Y, 517.
In the present case the party does not ask
to have the contract rescinded.
He does not
seek to have it declared void. On the contrary
he insists that it is valid. He asks that it
may read exactly as the parties originally
agreed, and that all its parts may be completeIn such case the nile is that
ly perfoi-med.
the party must show himself ready and eager
for its performance. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 776.
The plaintiff has given sufficient evidence of
his readiness and eagerness to perform. If
there has been an unreasonable delay in seeking relief, the court will refuse it. Id., and 1
Fonbl. Eq. bk. 1, c. 6, § 2, note e. It is a
question of discretion in the court whether
under all the circumstances of time, repeated
applications
and refusals,
the
condition,
knowledge, expectations and hopes of the parties, the relief should be granted.
There is no
positive or rigid rule, like that existing in the
case of an attempted rescission.
am satisfied with the decision on this point of the court
below, and the judge trying the cause. 1
Story, Eq. Jur. § 529; Bidwell v. Insurance
Co., 16 N. Y. 203.
The court having jurisdiction of the cause to
amend the contract, thereby acquired the right
incidentally to give relief in damages, or in
such mode as justice required. Rathbone v.
Warren, 10 Johns. 587; Kempshall v. Stone,
193; "Woodcock
5 Johns. Ch.
v. Bennett, 1
Cow. 711; Bidwell v. Insurance Co., 16 N.
Y. 263; Story, Eq. § 794; Rundle v. Allison,
34 N. Y. 180.
The defendant contends further, that no
damages can be recovered by the plaintiff for
timber that was cut more than six years before the commencement
of the action. The
argument of the defendant's counsel is that
the reformation of the deed is merely a means
by which the iilaintiff seeks to recover damages for the timber taken, and that its correction is simply a part of the evidence to authorize him thus to recover; that his claim
is therefore a legal one and cannot extend
back beyond six years. The authorities cited
by the defendant do not sustain this position.
The most plausible is that of Boret v. Corey,
15 N. Y. 505, which was an action to enforce
in equity a lien for the unpaid purchase-money
of land. The court held that the action could
not be sustained, for the reason that the debt
sought to be enforced was barred by the statute of limitations.
The debt they held to be
the principal, the lien the incident, and the
principal being ended the incident could not
be enforced. At the same time the court conceded that where a mortgage was given to si^
cure the payment of a simple contract debt,
the lapse of six years was no bar to an action
to foreclose the mortgage.
The authority of
Mayor v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 140, was conceded, where an assessment was attempted to be
enforced more than six years after the assessment had become due and payable.
In the
present case the question is not what action
can be sustained after the deed is reformed,
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but what action could have been sustained before its reformation?
The reformation had
not occurred wlien the suit was commenced,
and the right of the parties was determined
by the nnreformed deed. That deed conveyed
to the defendant without reservation, the one
hundred and forty-one acres in question.
It
carried witli it complete title to the trees.
The plaintiff could not have sustained an action for their conversion.
He would have
been told that defendant had a legal title. The
reformation of the deed in the present case
is the principal and not the Incident. Damages are the. incident, not the principal.
It is
the title which tlie judgment of reformation
gives that warrants the claim for damages;
not the claim for damages that creates the
legal title. Complete justice and nothing more
is done by the judgment in this respect as it
stands.

The defendant also insists that in the view
that the recoveiy against the defendant is
sustained upon the ground of fraud and not
of mutual mistake, the cause of action is barred in six years from the discovery of the
fraud. He further says that the judge has
expressly found as a fact that the cause of
action has not accrued within six years from
the commencement of the suit. I have looked
through the testimony carefully, and do not
And any evidence that the plaiutiffi discovered
the fraud perpetrated upon him as early as
of the
six years before the commencement
suit. He did undoubtedly discover his own
error soon after its occurrence, and applied
to the defendant's agents for its correction.
He says that "he had confidence in them and
expected all would have gone on as though it
had been reserved." In other words, he had
discovered his own mistake and believed it
to be a mutual mistake, which the defendant
would willingly rectify. He says further of
the defendant's agent: "He seemed willing to
They proposed leaving it out.
do something.
They never told me
could not have the timber. They always gave me to understand that
they would settle it in some way. They always gave me to understand that they would
do something about it. Neither of them ever
told me I should not have so given the deed,
if I did not mean to part with the timber."
This evidence does not show a knowledge of
the fraud. It does not show the plaintiff's
knowledge that the defendant knew, when he
took it, that the deed conveyed the absolute
ownership of the trees, and that the plaintiff
was ignorant of that fact, but supposed the
trees were reserved, and that the defendant
failed to correct his error. It does not even
show that he supposed the defendant meant
to insist upon retaining the benefits of the error. It shows rather that the plaintiff was
constantly deluded with the idea that the mistake would be corrected. The judge has not
found that the plaintiff discovered the fraud
within more than six years before suit brought,
and there was no evidence on which he could
have been justified in so finding.

I
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\¥hen the cause of action accrued in this
is a question of law.
It was either
when the transaction occuiTed or when the
fraud was discovered.
The judge has found that the cause of action did not accrue within six years before
suit brought. He states, in his opinion, that
the action being to reform the contract, and
the accounting being incidental, the action
falls under the ninety-seventh section of the
Code, which requires it to be brought within
ten years after action accrued.
He fixes the
occurrence of the transaction as the time
from which by law the statute begins to
run. The defendant now asks us to hold
this as a conclusive finding of fact, that the
fraud was discovered more than six yeare
before suit brought. This we cannot do.
Upon the theory that the running of the
statute begins with the date of the occurrence more than six years had elapsed, and
such was the theory of the judge tidying the
cause.
On the theory that it runs from the
discovery of the fraud, there is no such finding, nor is there evidence to prove it. All
presumptions are in favor of the judgment,
and the contrary must be taken to be the
fact.
I have thus considered the most important
of the questions i-aised by the appellant.
There are several other objections stated in
the points, which I have also examined.
They fm-nish no valid ground for asking a
reversal of the judgment.
A majority of the court concur in the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. A
majority of the court do not concur with me
on the question of damages, and are of the
opinion that the recovery of damages for a
period exceeding sis years prior to the commencement of the suit was erroneous. The
judgment of the court will therefore be, that
the judgment of the general term be affirmed, without costs of the court of appeals to
either party, provided that the plaintiff shall,
within thirty days after the entry of this orattorney a
der, sei-ve on the defendant's
stipulation, deducting from the judgment of
April 6, 1863, the sum of $2,107.45 as of that
If such stipulation be not seiTed, then
date.
the judgment shall be reversed and a new
trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
In case the attorneys do not agree as to the
details of the judgment, the same can be settled before one of the commissioners.
case

EARL, C. (dissenting). As I cannot concur with my brethren in this case, I will
briefly give the reasons for my dissent.
No mistake is alleged in the contracts, and
no reformation of them is claimed. And under no allegations or proof could the contracts be reformed, as a cause of action, for
such purpose, would be barred by the statute of limitations.
If, as claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, and by his counsel on the alignment
before us, the deed was given in pursuance
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and in fulfillment of tlie contracts, then there
can be no reformation of the deed, as it is
If
in precise conformity to the contracts.
the two contracts of December 7, 1846, are
construed together, they must be read as if
embodied in one; and the timber is not reserved, and the contract does not provide for
any reservation in the deed.
The vendees
were to get out certain lumber upon shares,
and were to pay $4 per acre besides. The
contract in reference to the lumber vpas a
binding contract and, if performed as the
parties contemplated, it would be fully performed before the deed was required to be
^iven; and such was manifestly the intention of the parties, and hence no provision
was made for any reservation in the deed.
The deed was given without any mention of
the lumber, and hence the only claim the
vendor could thereafter have, upon the lumber contract, was to sue for damages on account of its non-performance.
The only contract the defendant ever made
or intended to make, as found by the referee,
is that which is embodied in the deed.
He
never intended or was willing to take a
deed with any reseiTation in it. What right
then has a court of equity to reform the deed,
so as to give him such a deed as he was
never bound to take? There was never a
time when, by action for specific perfoi-mance, he could have been compelled to take
a deed with a reservation, and the court has
no right to compel him to take such a deed
by the reformation of the one he did take.
If by fraud or mistake on his part, the
plaintiff was induced to give this deed, the
only relief he could have was to set aside
the deed;
and to obtain this relief, it was
his duty, on the discovery of the fraud or
mistake, to proceed promptly and not ratify
the deed by taking the money on the note
given for the purchase-price, after he discovered the mistake or fraud.
As I understand the opinion in which my
brethren have concurred, it sustains the relief granted to the plaintiff, upon the ground
of fraud, and yet the complaint does not in
any way intimate even that the defendant
was guilty of any fraud, nor does it allege
that the defendant used any artifices to procure the deed to be drawn with the reservation omitted, or that he knew it was omitted.
The charge of fraud should have been distinctly made in the complaint, so th.it the defendant could have taken issue «.ipon it.
And it does not appear that any claim was
made, at the trial, that the defendant was
guilty of fraud, and the case was manifestly
not tried upon any such theory. The judge
at special term did not put his decision upon
If he had, he would
the ground of fraud.
certainly have decided against the plaintiff,
under his finding as to the statute of limitations, as follows:
"That within a month
after the execution of said deed, the plaintiff discovered said mistake, and shoi-tly
thereafter applied to the defendant to cor-

rect the same, which he neglected and refused to do; but proceeded to cut large quantities of said timber and appropriate the
same to his own use; that the cause of action
for which this suit is brought has not accrued to the plaintiff within six years before
the commencement of this suit."
The learned judge evidently proceeded and
granted relief upon the ground that the scrivener made a mistake in drawing the deed,
and this was the ground upon which the general term placed its decision of affirmance.
The cause of action for the mistake was not
barred by the statute of limitations, because
the action was commenced within ten years
from the time the alleged mistake occurred.
A cause of action, for such a fraud as is
now alleged in this case, is deemed to accrue,
when the aggrieved party discovers the facts
constituting the fraud, and it is barred in six
years from that time. Code, § 91. All the
fraud, if any, that was perpetiated in this
case was in procuring and taking the deed
without the reservation, and this was discovered, according to the finding of the judge,
more than nine years before the suit was
commenced, and hence I cannot be mistaken
in saj-ing that relief was granted at Special
Term upon the ground of mistake alone, and
not of fraud.
And still further, the counsel for respondent in his argument before us, did not claim
to sustain the judgment below upon the
ground of fraud, but upon the ground of mistake alone.
Hence under all the circumstances I cannot
consent to uphold this judgment, or any part
of it, upon the ground of fraud, against the
decisions of both courts below, the claims of
plaintiff's counsel, and the explicit finding of
the judge at special term, that the cause of
action for fraud was barred by the statute of
limitations.
It was the duty of the plaintiff
to show that he discovered tlie fraud within
six years before the commencement of the
suit, and there can be no pretense that he
gave any evidence to show this.
I concur with my brethren in holding that
in any view of the case the plaintiff could recover only for timber cut within six years before the suit was commenced.

For affirmance, as modified: LOTT, 0. C,
HUNT and LEONARD, CC.
For reversal: EARL and GRAY. GC. not

and

voting.

Judgment affirmed without costs to either
party in the court of appeals, provided the
plaintiff within thirty days after the entry
of this order, serves on the defendant's attorney a stipulation i-educing the judgment
$2,407.45 and interest from the date of the
judgment, April 6, 1863. If such stipulation
be not served, then the judgment is reversed
and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the
event.

Judgment

affirmed.
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Bill in equity for the reformation of a conveyance of lands, and for further relief. The
«ase was reserved by the chief justice "for
tlie consideration and decision of the full
court upon the question whether, upon the
xiUegations of the bill, the plaintiff is entitled
to relief in equity, and whether the plaintiff
has not a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law; the defendant also relying in
his answer upon the statute of frauds."
W. H. Swift and S. W. Bowerman, for
plaintiff.
M. Wilcox and W. T. Filley, for
defendant.
W'LLLS, J. The plaintiff jmrchased certain lots of land of the defendant, received a
deed, and paid the whole amount of the purchase money.
This suit is brought for relief
or redress in several particulars, dissimilar
in character, but all connected with the alleged oral contract of purchase.
He complains:
First. That a proviso was inserted
in his deed, imposing upon him the burden of
supporting the whole fence upon the south
line of the land conveyed; and that he was
induced to assent to its insertion upon the
consideration, and false representation of the
defendant, that the whole fence upon the east
side of said laud was to be maintained by
the adjoining proprietor, I'atrlcK JIcDaniels,
by virtue of a written obligation to that effect, and- that the plaintiff would be relieved
from all liability to maintain any fence upon
that side; as well as by certain other false
representations of the defendant in relation
thereto. Second. That he delivered to the
<Jefendant, in part payment of said purchase
money, three bonds of the United States of
■!|>1,000each, upon the agreement of the defendant that he would allow the full market
value of the same, including premium and ac•crued interest at the time of the transfer
thereof; and that the defendant refuses to
■allow and pay him the value of such premium and interest, amounting together to
the sum of $315; that sum being in excess
«f the whole purchase money due to the defendant. Third. That during the negotiations
for the sale and purchase of said lands the
•defendant pointed out the southeast corner
of the premises proposed for sale, and represented that the land of the adjoining proprietor, McDaniels, extended to that point, and
that the southerly line of the land sold would
extend from the same corner to a point on
the highway near a bridge; that the deed
was accordingly written and accepted, describing the land as bounded on the south by
a line running from the southwest corner of
land of said McDaniels, at right angles to
the westerly line of said McDaniels, to the
highway, the defendant representing said line
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to be the same line previously pointed out by
him to the plaintiff, and that it would strike
the highway within one rod of said bridge;
whereas in fact the land of said McDaniels
did not extend so far as to the southeast corner of the defendant's land as pointed out
by him, and the south line, running at right
angles therefrom to the highway, did not
strike the same witliin one rod of said bridge:
and the deed so written and accepted did not
include a considerable part of the land so
offered and represented to be sold, and intended and understood by the plaintiff to
have been purchased by him; the pait so
excluded consisting of about 17 acres of
land, comprising the greater part of the
meadow land in the tract as pointed out by
the defendant.
The plaintiff, by his bill, does not seek to
rescind the contract and conveyance,
and
does not offer to reconvey or release to the
defendant the land conveyed, nor pray that
he may be allowed to do so, and recover back
the purchase money paid and bonds delivered
in payment. The relief prayed for is that
the defendant may be required to convey to
the plaintiff the portion of the tract which
was so by fraud or mistake omitted from the
conveyance already made to release the plaintiff from the proviso in his deed in regard to
the fence, and to pay to the plaintiff the
aforesaid amount of premium and interest
upon said bonds.
The argument of the plaintiff is addressed
mainly to the question of the equity jurisdiction of this court in cases of fraud or mistake
hke that alleged in the present suit. There
can be no doubt upon that point.
There is
no ground upon which jurisdiction in equity
is so readily entertained and freely exercised,
It is given to this court without restriction,
if the parties have not a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy at law.
Gen. St. c. 113,
Having jurisdiction, the question is as
§ 2.
to the appropriate remedy.
Jurisdiction in
equity is often maintained, even when there
is a remedy at law, for the sake of the greater facility it aft'ords for adapting the proper
relief to the peculiar necessities of each case.
If the party suing is entitled to no relief other than that which may be had in an action
at law, he is remitted to his remedy in that
form.
Even in a proper case for an appeal
to equity the remedy must be sought in reference to certain recognized rules and principles of chancery jurisprudence, and is often
restricted by provisions of positive law. It
It must flow
is not administered arbitrarily.
out of and accord with the agreements and
obligations of the parties, and be adapted to
the condition of facts to which it is to be
applied.
In the present case, the principal ground of
action is the fraud or mistake by which an
important part of the subject-matter of the
alleged contract of sale and purchase was
If the
omitted from the deed of conveyance.
allegations of the bill should be sustained by
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angles with his westerly line, to the highway.
But the plaintiff claims that he In fact purchased the whole of a certain tract of land
which Included the 17 acres now In dispute;,
that the description of the boundaries, as.
agreed upon and Inserted in the deed, was so
agreed on and inserted upon the representa'tion of the defendant and the belief of theplaintiff that It did include said 17 acres;
and that the failure of the deed to embraceand convey that part of the land was occasioned either by the mutual mistake of the
parties as to the position of the southwest
corner of land of McDaniels, or else by the
deed.
If the case stood merely upon the oral con- misrepresentation, deceit, and fraud of the
In either aldefendant in relation thereto.
tract of sale, with a conveyance of part and
ternative, the plaintiff contends that he is
a neglect of refusal to convey another part of
entitled to a reformation of the deed, tothe land which was the subject of the almake it conform to the sale actually conleged contract, we do not think it would be
tracted by the paitles.
contended that the plaintiff could compel a
Such a reformation not only requires a deconveyance of the other land, against a party
scription of the subject-matter of the sale,,
denying the contract and setting up the statdifferent from the express terms of the oral
Courts are bound to regard
ute of frauds.
contract, but would enlarge the effect and
The
that statute in equity as well as at law.
It
operation of the deed as a conveyance.
only remedy in equity, in such case, would
involves the transfer of the legal title to land
be by a rescission of the entire contract, in
It
not covered by the deed already given.
which the aid of the court could be obtained,
requires a new deed to be executed and deif necessary, upon projfer grounds.
livered by the defendant to the plaintiff.
There has been no part performance here,
Whether that deed shall embrace the entire
such as, according to the general practice in
subject of the alleged contract of purchase,
courts of equity, would be held to take the
with a corrected description to make it concase out of the statute of frauds.
form to facts and abuttals as they were rep1. Payment of the whole consideration Is
resented to be, or merely convey the 17 acres
not sufficient for that purpose. Hughes v. Morris, 2 De Gex, .M. & G. ooO; Thompson v.
omitted from the deed already given, the orGould, 20 Pick. 184, 138; Browne, St. Frauds,
der for its execution will enforce the specific
Fry, Spec. Pert. § 403; Dale v. Hamilperformance of a contract for the sale of
§ 4G1;
lands, for which there exists no memoranton, 5 Hare, :i(>!J; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales
dum, note, or other evidence in writing sign& L. 22, 41; Allen's Estate, 1 "Watts & S.
3S3; Purcell v. Jliner, 4 Wall. .")i;!.
ed by the party to be charged therewith.
2. Possession by the purchaser, under such
As to the 17 acres in dispute, the obligation
a deed as was given to the plaintiff, is posto convey them rests solely in the oral consession according to the title thereby contract.
The defendant denies any contract
veyed; and Is not such a possession as to
The plaintiff seeks to
which Includes them.
afford ground for enforcing an alleged oral
establish such a contract by parol evidence,
agreement to convey other land, claimed to
and enforce it. The deed itself furnishes no
have been embraced in the same oral agreemeans of making the correction sought for,
Moale v. Buchanment with that conveyed.
and no evidence of the contract relied on for
an, 11 Gill & J. 314.
The plalntifC does not
this purpose; nor Is it in any sense an acappear to have been let into actual possesknowledgment of the substance of the alsion of the 17 acres, nor to have been inleged oral agreement.
duced to do any acts thereon, as owner, unThe power to rectify deeds and other writder his supposed rights as purchaser.
ten instruments undoubtedly exists in this
court, under the clauses of the statute giving
3. The conveyance of a portion of the land
is neither a part performance, nor is it a
equity jurisdiction in cases of fiaud, accirecognition of the alleged oral contract, so far
dent, and mistake, or the clause giving It genas it relates to the remaining land not Inerally where there is no adequate remedy at
cluded in the deed. On the contrary, it is in
law. It has been exercised in several cases.
Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray. 373; Metcalf v.
distinct disregard and Implied disavowal of
Putman, 9 Allen, 07. But the power will be
such a contract. The deed was given and accepted in execution of the entire contract of
exercised in subordination to other fixed prinsale. Its terms are In literal conformity with
ciples of law, and especially to statute prothe agreement as made.
The plaintiff convisions. If the rules, restricting the admincedes that the southern boundary was stipuistration of judicial remedies, which are prelated to be described as it is written In the
scribed by the statute of frauds, were to be
deed, to wit, running from the southwesterly
disregarded in this branch of equity procorner of land of McDaniels, and at right
cedure, It would open the door to all the

tlie proofs, they Avould show a clear right to
have a rescission of the contract; and, upon
reconveyance of the land covered by the deed,
to have restoration of the bonds and money
tliat were delivered in payment. But this relief the plaintiff does not seek; and his bill
contains no offer to reconvey, without which
The prayer of
he cannot have such relief.
the bill, and its sole purpose in this particular, is that the defendant may be compelled
to convey to the plaintiff the 17 acres of land
which he alleges were included in the oral
contract of sale, or represented by the defendant to be so included, but omitted from the

EQUITABLE RIGHTS.
forms of fraud -wMoh that statute was Intended to prevent. The statute Is not a mere
rule of evidence, but a limitation of judicial
It requires
authority to afCord a remedy.
that contracts for the sale of lands. In order
to be enforced by judicial proceedings, must
This probe substantiated by some writing.
vision of law cannot be dispensed with merely for the reason that the want of such
writing was occasioned by accident, mistake,
or fraudulent representations, unless some
other ingredient enters into the case to give
rise to equities stronger than those which
stand upon the oral conti-act alone, which
estop the other party from setting up the
statute.

It

of

a

makes no difCerence

whether the want

writing was accidental or intentional, by

way of refusal or by reason of mutual mistake; nor that there were false representations, and a pretence of conveying the land,
but a fraudulent evasion, by means whereof
there was no conveyance in fact, and no
proper written evidence of the agreement to
convey. From the oral agreement there can
be derived no legal right, either to have performance of its stipulations or written evidence of its terms. So long, therefore, as the
effect of the fraud or mistake extends no further than to prevent the execution, or withhold from the other party written evidence
of the agreement, it does not furnish sufficient ground for the court to disregard the
statute of frauds, and enter into the investigation of the oral agreement for the purpose of enforcing it. And we do not see that
the present case stands otherwise in this respect than it would if there had been no conAs alveyance of any part of the land.
ready shown, that conveyance was not in execution or recognition of the contract which
the plaintiff seeks, by this bill, to enforce;
and does not furnish any reason for taking
the case out of the statute, on the ground of
part performance. Indeed, the rule seems to
be that no part performance by the party
sought to be charged will take an agreement
out of the statute of frauds, except in those
cases where the statute itself provides for
It is part performance by the
such effect.
seeking
to enforce, and not by the othparty
er party, to which courts of equity look, in
Caton v.
giving relief from the statute.
Cs^on, 1 Ch. App. 137, L. R. 2 H. L. 127;
Mundy v. Jollifee, 5 Mylne & C. 167; Buckmaster V. Harrop, 7 Ves. 369; Browne, St.
Frauds. § 453.
When the proposed reformation of an instrument involves the specific enforcement of
an oral agreement within the statute of
frauds, or when the term sought to be added
would so modify the Instrument as to make
it operate to convey an interest or secure a
right which can only be conveyed or secured
through an instrument in writing, and for
which no writing has ever existed, the statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to such a
proceeding, unless the plea of the statute can
HUTCH. EQ. JUB. — 13

193

met by some ground of estoppel to deprive the party of the right to set up that
defence.
Jordan v. Sawkins, 1 Ves. Jr. 402;
Osbom V. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63; Olinan v.
Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22.
The fact that the omission or defect in the
writing, by reason of which it failed to convey the land or express the obligation which
it is sought to make it convey or express,
was occasioned by mistake, or by deceit and
fraud, will not alone constitute such an estoppel.
Thei'e must concur, also, some
change in the condition or position of the
party seeking relief, by reason of being induced to enter upon the execution of the
agreement,
or to do acts upon the faith of
it as if it were executed, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the other party, either
express or implied, for which he wduld be
left without redress if the agreement were
to be defeated.
Upon a somewhat extended examination
of the decisions in regard to the effect of the
statute of frauds upon the right to have equitable relief where the writing Is defective,
although many of them, where relief has
been granted, hardly come within this definition in the apparent character of the particular facts upon which they were decided,
yet we are satisfied that this principle of discrimination is the only one which can give
consistency to the great mass of authorities
upon this subject
The case of Smith v. Underdunck, 1 Sandf.
Ch. 579, is nearly like the present in its facts;
and the opinion of the assistant vice-chancellor would seem to sustain the right of the
plaintiff here. There was no fraud in the
preparation of the deed. The judgment was
based mainly upon the ground of part performance. It was held to be suflicient to
take the case out of the statute that the
plaintiff had been let into possession as purchaser; and the opinion indicates that possession under and in accordance with a deed
of part would be a sufficient possession of
the whole for the purpose of requiring a deed
of the remainder. But the decision rests upby the plaintiff of
on the fact of possession
the entire premises, including the part for
which the bill was brought. The case arose
upon demurrer to the bill, which of course
admitted the contract, and the alleged possession of the whole tract. The question of
the statute of frauds did not arise therefore.
That the purchaser has been let into possession in pursuance of a parol agreement
has been very generally recognized as sufficient to take it out of the statute. The reasoning by which this result was reached is
far from satisfactory; and even where the
rule prevails there are frequent intimations
that it is regarded as trenching too closely
upon the spirit as well as the letter of the
statute. If it were now open to settle the
rule anew, we cannot doubt that it would
accompanied with
be limited to possession
or followed by such change of position of the
be
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purchaser as would subject him to loss for
which he could not otherwise have adequate
compensation or other redress; and that
mere change of possession would not be held
to take a case out of the statute. However
it may be elsewhere, we are disposed to hold
the rule to be so in Massachusetts.
Previously to the Statutes of 1855, c. 194,
and 1856, c. 38 (Gen. St. c. 113, § 2), the
power of the court to direct specific performance was confined to written contracts.
Rev. St. c. 74, § 8. That power was held to
be strictly limited to contracts in which the
was ex'whole obligation to be enforced
Dwight v. Pomeroy,
pressed In the writing.
17 Mass. 303; Brooks v. Wheelock, 11 Pick.
439; Leach v. Leach, 18 Pick. 68; Buck v.
Dowley, 16 Gray, 555; Park v. Johnson, 4
Allen, 259. The provision conferring that
power specifically in case of written contracts is still retained in the Gen. St. c. 113,
If the subsequent clauses, conferring
§ 2.
jurisdiction generally, are to be construed,
as we think they are, to extend the power
of the court, so as to give relief by way of
performance, either of contracts
specific
wholly unwritten, or of stipulations proved
by parol and incorporated into a contract by
judicial rectification of a written instrument,
as in Metcalf v. Putman, 9 Allen, 97, still
that power ought to be exercised with constant reference and in subordination to the
condition that "the party asking relief has
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at common law," which accompanied each
enlargement of the equity power of the
court, and which prefaces and closes the
enumeration of those powers in the General
Statutes. The force of this consideration is
not lessened when applied to agreements
within the statute of frauds.
Mere possession of land does not expose
the party to loss or danger of loss without
redress at law. The parol agreement of sale
and purchase, with permission to enter,
though not to be enforced as a valid contract
of sale, will constitute such a license as will
protect the party from liability for acts done
before the license is revoked, and for all acts
necessary to enable him to remove himself
and his property from the premises after
such revocation. If possession
be taken
without such permission, express or implied,
it is no foundation for relief in equity, according to any of the authorities. The argument, for the admission of parol evidence to
prove an agreement
within the statute of
frauds in order to enforce it in equity, drawn
from the admissibility of such evidence to
maintain a defence, either at law or in equity, seems to be based upon a misconception of the purport and force of the statute,
which reaches no farther than to deny the
right of action to enforce such agreements.
In this commonwealth, the possession of
land by a purchaser is not even notice to a
third party of an unrecorded deed.
The
1^hole spirit of our laws in respect to real es-

tate is against the policy of enabling parties
to acquire or confer title, either legal or eq-

uitable, by mere parol and delivery of possession.
The possession of the plaintiff,
therefore, even if it extended to the tract in
dispute, Is not sufllclent to entitle him to re
lief against the statute.
The principle, on which courts of equity
rectify an Instrument, so as to enlarge its
operation, or to convey or enforce rights not
found in the writing itself, and make it conform to the agreement as proved by parol
evidence,
on the ground of an omission, by
mutual mistake, in the reduction of the
agreement to writing. Is, as we understand
it, that In equity the previous oral agreement Is held to subsist as a binding contract,
notwithstanding the attempt to put it in
writing; and upon clear proof of Its terms
the courts compel the incorporation of the
omitted clause, or the modification of that
which Is inserted, so that the whole agreement, as actually intended to be made, shall
Hunt v.
be truly expressed and executed.
Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1; Oliver v. Mutual
Commercial Marine Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 277,
Fed. Cas. No. 10,498. But when the omitted
term or obligation is within the statute of
frauds, there Is no valid agreement which
the court Is authorized to enforce, outside of
the writing. In such case, relief may be had
against the enforcement of the contract as
written, or the assertion of rights acquired
under It contrary to the terms and intent of
the real agreement of the parties. Such relief may be given as well ujwn the suit of a
plaintiff seeking to have a written contract,
or some of its terms, set aside, annulled, or
restricted, as to a defendant resisting Its
specific performance. Canedy v. Marcy, 13
Gray, 373; Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch.
585; Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch.
148.

Relief In this form, although procured by
parol evidence of an agreement dififerlng
from the written contract, with proof that
the difference was the result of accident or
mistake, does not conflict with the provisions of the statute of frauds. That statute
forbids the enforcement of certain Idnds of
agreement without writing; but it does not
forbid the defeat or restriction of written
contracts; nor the use of parol evidence for
the purpose of establishing the equita\ile
grounds therefor. The parol evidence is introduced, not to establish an oral agreement
independently of the writing, but to show
that the written instrument contained something contrary to or in excess of the real
agreement of the parties, or does not properly express that agreement.
Higglnson v.
Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; Clowes v. Higglnson, 1
Ves. & B. 524; Squler v. Campbell, 1 Mylne
& C. 459, 480.
But rectification by making the contract
obligations
include
or subject-matter
to
which its written terms will not apply is a
direct enforcement of the oral agreement, as
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much in conflict with tlie statute of frauds
as if there were no writing at all. Moale v.
Buchanan, H Gill & J. 314; Osborn v. Phelps,
19 Conn. 63; Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80. In
Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14 Johns. 15, 32,
it is said that, "where it is necessary to
make out a contract in writing, no parol evidence can be admitted to supply any defects
in the writing." Per Thompson, C. J. Such
rectification, when the enlarged operation includes that which is within the statute of
frauds, must be accomplished, if at all, under
the other head of equity jurisdiction, namely,
fraud. Irnham v. Child, 1 Brown, Ch. 92;
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 770a; Da vies v. H'itton,
2 Dru. & War. 225; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H.
Ii. Cas. 40, 65; Manser v. Back, 6 Hare, 443;
Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Clinan v. Cook,
1 Schoales
& L. 22.
The fraud most commonly treated as taking an agxeement out of the statute of frauds
is that which consists in setting up the statute against its performance, after the other
party has been induced to make expenditm'es, or a change of situation in regard to
the subject-matter of the agreement, or upon the supposition that it was to be carried
into execution, and the assumption of rights
thereby to be acquired; so that the refusal
to complete the execution of the agreement
is not merely a denial of rights which it
was intended to confer, but the infliction of
an unjust and unconscientious injury and
loss. In such case, the party is held, by
force of his acts or silent acquiescence,
which have misled the other to his harm, to
be estopped from setting up the statute of
frauds. Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770;
Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. 274,
14 Johns. 15; Browne, St. Frauds, § 437 et
seq.; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 384^388; Caton y.
Caton, 1 Ch. App. 137, 147, L. R. 2 H. L. 127.
In the last named case it is said that "the
right to relief in such cases rests not mer'ely on the contract, but on what has been
Per
done in pursuance of the contract."
See, also, 1
Lord Chancellor Cranworth.
Story, Eq. Jur. § 759. But the present case,
as we have already seen, does not come
within the principle of this ground of equitable relief.
Fraud, which relates only to the preparation, form, and execution of the writing, is
sufficient to vitiate the instniment so made.
It may be set aside either in equity or at
law.
it is made to include land not the
subject of the actual sale, it is inoperative
as to such land; and the fraud may be
shown, for the purpose of defeating its reWalker v.
covery, in an action at law.
Swasey, 2 AUen, 312, 4 AUen, 527; Bartlett
V. Drake, 100 Mass. 174. It has been questioned whether any other effect can be given
to such fraud than to defeat the operation of
the instrument altogether; and whether a
court of equity can reform by giving it a
narrower operation, as modified by parol
proof, in a case within the statute of frauds.

If
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Attorney General v. Sitwell, 1 Younge & C.
Exch. 559. The difficulty is that, if the
fraud vitiates and defeats the instrument,
then the modified agreement to be enforced
must be that which is proved by parol evidence;
and this seems to violate the statute. But the instrument, in such case, is
not void. It is voidable only; and that not
at the election of the party who committed
the fraud. He is not entitled to control the
extent of the effect that shall be given to
his fraudulent conduct; and it is not for
him to object that the fraud is availed of
only to defeat the rights, which he has secm-ed by fraud, beyond what he is fairly entitled to by the terms of the real agreement
between the parties. When those are separable, and the natui'e of the case will admit of it, the court may enforce the written
contract in accordance with its terms, giving
relief against the fraudulent excess, or the
clause improperly inserted. Parol testimony,
used to defeat a title or limit an interest acquired under a written instrument, or to convert it into a trust, does not necessarily conflict with the statute of frauds. It has been
held that an absolute deed may, in this
moue, be converted,
in equity, into a mortgage.
Washbm-n v. Merrill, 1 Day, 140;
Taylor v. Luther, 2 Sumn. 228, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,796; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Stoiy,
181, 293, Fed Cas. No. 7,266; Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 118; 4 Kent, Comm. (6th Ed.)
143.
ivhemer this can be done in Massachusetts has not yet been decided.
Newton v.
Fay, 10 Allen, 505. But if it were to be so
held, it would not be upon the ground of enforcing a parol agreement to reconvey; but
upon the grormd tiat such an agreement, together with proof that the deed was given
and accepted only as secm-ity for a debt,
made out a case of fraud, or trust, which
would warrant a decree vacating the title of
the grantee, as far as he attempted to hold
contrary to the purposes of the conveyance.
In such cases the court acts upon the estate
or rights acquired under the written instrument; and within the power over that instrument which is derived from the fraud or
But when it
other ground of jurisdiction.
is sought to extend that power to interests
in land not included in the instrument, and
in I'elation to which there is no agreement
in writing, the case stands differently.
Fraud may vitiate the vmting which is
tainted by it, but it does not supply that
which the statute requires. It may destroy
a title or right acquired by its means; but
it has no creative force. It will not confer
title. In the absence of a legal contract by
the agreement of the parties, it will not establish one, nor authorize the court to declare one, by its decree.
This distinction is illustrated by the analGen.
ogous rule in regard to implied trusts.
St. c. 100, § 19. Parol evidence may charge
the grantee of lands conveyed with a resulting or implied trust, which equity will en-
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But such evidence win not create a
force.
trust in lands already held by an absolute
title.
A fraudulent misrepresentation, altbough
sufficient to sustain an action for damages,
cannot be converted into a contract to be
enforced as such. Neither wUl it furnish the
measure by which a written contract may be
In this discussion we have asreformed.
sumed that there was a clear agreement between the parties, which the deed fails to
carry out, and to which it might properly be
made to conform, but for the obstacle in the
statute of frauds.
It has been of ten asserted that where one by
deceit or fraudulent contrivance prevents an
agreement intended to be put in writing
from being properly written or executed, he
shall not avail himself of the omission, and
shall not be permitted to set up the statute
of fraud against the proof and enforcement
of the parol agreement, or of the parol stipulation improperly omitted. But in our opinion this doctrine would practically annul the
statute. The tendency of the human mind,
when fraud and injustice are manifest, is to
strain every point to compass its defeat; and
to render full redress
to the party upon
whom it has been practiced. Mundy v. JolUffe, 5 Mylne & C. 107; Taylor v. Luther, 2
Sumn. 233, Fed. Cas. No. 13,796. This influence has led to decisions in which the facts
of the particular ease were regarded more
than the general considerations, of public policy upon which the statute is founded and
entitled to be maintained. Courts have sometimes regarded it as a matter of judicial merit to wrest from under the statute aU cases
in which the lineaments of fraud in any
form were discernible.
But the impulse of
moral reprobation of deceit and fraud, however commendable in itself, is liable to mislead, if talien as the guide to judicial decrees.

We apprehend that in most instances where
fraud occasioning a failure of written evidence of an agreement
or particular stipulation has been held to take the case out of the
statute of frauds, there was some fact of
prejudice to the party, or change of situation consequent upon the fraud, which was
regarded as sufficient to make up the elements of an equitable estoppel.
In such case,
the argument is transferred to the simple
question of the sufficiency of the additional
circumstance for that purpose.
The cases
most frequently referred to are those arising
out of agreements for marriage settlements.
In such cases the marriage, although not regarded as a part performance of the agreement for a marriage settlement, is such an
Irretrievable change of situation, that, if procured by artifice, upon the faith that the settlement had been, or the assurance that it
would be, executed, the other party is held
to make good the agreement, and not permitted to defeat it by pleading the statute.
Max-

Mountacute, Prec. Ch. 526; Browne,
§§ 441^45.
Another class of cases are those where a
party acquires property by conveyance or devise secured to himself under assurances that
he will transfer the property to, or hold and
appropriate it for the use and benefit of, another.
A trust for the benefit of such other
person is charged upon the property, not by
reason merely of the oral promise, but because of the fact that by means of such
promise he had induced the transfer of the
property to himself.
Brown v. Lynch, 1
Paige, 147; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296;
Oldham v. Litchfield, 2 Vern. 506; Devenish
V. Baines, Prec. Ch. 3;
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
well

V.

St. Frauds,

768.

When these cases are cited in support of
the doctrine that artifice or fraud in evading
or preventing the execution of the writing is
alone sufficient to induce a court of equity to
disregard the statute and enforce the oral
agreement,
the subsequent change of situation or transfer of property, without which
the deceit would be innocuous, seems to be
overlooked,
because it is not strictly in part
performance of the agreement sought to be
enforced. It must be manifest, however, that
without such consequent act there would be
no standing for the case in a court of equity.
That which moves the court to a decree to
enforce the agreement is not the artifice by
which the execution of the writing has been
evaded, but what the other party has been
induced to do upon the faith of the agreement for such a writing.
It is not that deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud, of itself, entitles a party to an equitable remedy; but
that equity will interfere to prevent the accomplishment of the fraud which would result from the enforcement of legal rights contrary to the real agreement of the parties.
Indeed, the fraud which alone justifies this
exercise of equity powers by relief against
the statute of frauds consists in the attempt
to take advantage of that which has been
done in performance or upon the faith of an
agreement, while repudiating its obligations
under cover of the statute. When a writing
has been executed, the courts allow the fraud
or mistake by which an omission or defect in
the instrument has been occasioned to defeat
the conclusiveness of the writing, and open
the door for proof of the real agreement.
But the obstacle of the statute of frauds to
the enforcement of obligations, or the security
of rights not expressed in the instrument remains to be removed in the same manner as
if there were no writing.
Phyfe v. Wardell,
2 Edw. Ch. 47; Moale v. Buchanan, 11 Gill &
J. 314. The power to reform the instrument
is not an independent power or branch of equity jurisdiction, but only a means of exercising the power of the court under its general
jurisdiction in cases of fraud, accident, and
mistake.
We are aware that the limitation which we
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undertaken to define has not heen uniformly observed or recognized.
In Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313, Chancellor Walworth granted a perpetual injunction,
and ordered a deed of release of title to land
omitted from a deed by fraud and secret conThere was no discussion of the autrivance.
thorities, nor of the principles upon which the
case was decided;
and no reference to the
statute of frauds; and the statute does not
appear, by the report, to have been set up
against the prayer for relief.
In De Peyster v. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 591,
a similar decision was made in the court of
Here again there Is
appeals in New York.
no reference to the statute of frauds, no discussion of the principles involved in the decision, and no authority or precedent cited except that of Wiswall v. Hall. The mortgagor
whose deed was reformed put in no answer
The defence was made by parties
whatever.
claiming under him, and the statute of frauds
Dedoes not appear to have been pleaded.
nio, C. J., in giving the opinion, proceeds to
say: "It is unnecessary to refer to cases to
establish the familiar doctrine that when
through mistake or fraud a contract or conveyance fails to express the actual agreement
of the parties, it will be reformed by a court
of equity, so as to correspond with such acThe English cases have been
tual agreement.
ably digested by Chancellor Kent, and the
principle has been stated with his accustomed care and accuracy, in Gillespie v. Moon,
2 Johns. Ch. 585."
But in Gillespie v. Moon the relief sought
and granted was by way of restricting, and
not by enlarging, the operation of the deed.
Such relief would not, as already shown, conflict with the statute of frauds; and neither
the discussion in that case nor the citation
of authorities had reference to the bearing of
the statute of frauds upon the question of aff oi'ding relief upon contracts relating to land.
Indeed, the English cases furnish but little
aid upon that point, for the reason that the
courts there have generally, without reference to the statute of frauds, refused to enforce written contracts with a modification
Woollam
or variation set up by parol proof.
V. Heam, 7 Ves. 211, and notes on the same
in 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 404; Nurse v. Seymour,
13 Beav. 254.
The principle which was maintained by
Chancellor Kent, and upon which the English authorities were cited by him in Gillespie V. Moon, was that relief in equity against
the operation of a written instrument, on the
ground that by fraud or mistake it did not
express the true contract of the parties,
might be afforded to a plaintiff seeking a
modification of the contract, as well as to a
That
defendant resisting its enforcement.
proposition must be considered as fully esIt is
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 161.
tablished.
quite another proposition, to enlarge the subject-matter of the contract, or to add a new
term to the writing, by parol evidence, and
have
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enforce it. No such proposition was presented by the case of Gillespie v. Moon, and it
does not sustain the right to such relief
against the statute of frauds.
That Chancellor Walworth, in Wiswall v.
Hall, did not intend to decide that the statute of frauds could be disregarded if properly
set up against such an enlargement of the
operation of the written contract is apparent
from the remarks of the same learned judge
in the subsequent case of Cowles v. Bowne,
10 Paige, 535.
He says: "Whether a party
can come into this court for the specific performance of a mere executory agreement for
the sale of lands, which in its terms is materially variant from the written agreement
between the parties that has been executed
according to the statute, where there has
been no part performance or other equitable
circumstance sufl[icient to take the case out
of the statute of frauds, as a mere parol contract between the parties, is a question
which it will not be necessary for me to consider in this case."
In Gouverneur v. Titus, 1 Edw. Ch. 480,
there was a deed of land described as being
in the northwest comer of a township by mistake for the northeast corner. The grantor
admitted the real contract, and had corrected
the mistake by deed. The only question was
whether equity would enforce the corrected
deed against the lien of a judgment creditor,
who had notice of the mistake. In the opinion
it is said: "It is a case in which this court
would interfere, as between the immediate parties, to correct the mistake." The judgment
was clearly right. The dictum we are disposed to question, unless the deed itself contained some other description by means of
which the land might be identified and the
mistake corrected.
In Newson v. BufCerlow, 1 Dev. Eq. 379, a
deed was reformed, which was made, by
fraud, to include land not sold; and the fraudulent grantee was required to execute a reconveyance of the excess. The opinion contains
a remark of the court that this power may be
exercised as well by inserting what was omitted as by striking out what was wrongfully included. But this remark is clearly
obiter dictum, and is not sustained by the
authority cited, namely, Gillespie v. Moon.
In Blodgett v. Hobart, 18 Vem. 414, a
mortgage was reformed by including other
lands omitted by mistake. The statute of
frauds was not set up in the answer nor referred to in the opinion of the court, and the
answer was considered by the court to be
evasive in regard to the alleged agreement
for security upon such other lands.
In Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, the court
controvert the doctrine of such a limitation,
as declared in Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80; but
the decision did not involve the question so
discussed. The case arose from an attempted
partition between tenants in common of real
There was a written agreement for
estate.
partition according to the award of certain
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arlDitrators named, and tlie only question was
as to tlie effect of a substitution of other arbitrators by parol. Deeds had been executed,
and the plaintiff had fully performed his part
of the agreement.
It was a case of part performance sufficient to take the case out of
the statute of frauds, and was decided upon
Besides, a partition of lands,
that ground.
though effected by mutual deeds of release,
is not a contract for the sale of land.
Craig V. Kittridge, 3 Fost. (N. H.) 231,
arose upon a partition, and was decided upon
Smith v.
the authority of Tilton v. Tilton.
Greeley, 14 N. H. 378, was a decree upon de-

fault, without

argument or opinion, against

and heirs of a party whose
the executors
deed, by mutual mistake, failed to include
certain land sold. It does not appear whether

there was written evidence of the agreement,
nor whether there was possession or acts of
performance. It was sufficient, perhaps, that
the statute was not pleaded, and the default
admitted the agreement.
Caldwell v. Oarrington, 9 Pet. 86, was an
agreement for exchange of lands, and stands
entirely upon the ground of part performance.
Notwithstanding contrary decisions and dicta, we are satisfied that upon principle the
conveyance of land cannot be decreed in equity by reason merely of an oral agreement
therefor against a party denying the alleged
agreement
and relying upon the statute of
frauds, in the absence of evidence of change
of situation or part performance creating an
estoppel against the plea of the statute.
This
rule applies as well to the enforcement of
such an agreement by way of rectifying a
deed as to a direct suit for its specific performance. We are satisfied also that this is
the rule to be derived from a great preponderance
of the authorities. Whitchurch v.
Bevis, 2 Brown, Oh. 559; Woollam v. Hearn,
7 Ves. 211; 2 Lead. Gas. Eq. (3d Am. Ed.)
notes, [*414], Am. Notes, 691; Townshend
V. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328; Beaumont v. Bramley. Turn. & R. 41. See, also, Moale v. Bu-

chanan,

Gill & J. 314; Osborn
and Elder v. Elder,

v. Phelps,
10 Me. 80,
already cited above; Adams, Eq. 171, 172;
Churchill v. Rogers, 3 T. B. Mon. 81; Purcell
V. Miner, 4 Wall. 513.
The prayer in regard to the fence stands
11

19 Conn. 63;

differently. If that stipulation
had been
fraudulently inserted in the deed, the agreement being otherwise, the deed might be reformed by striking out that provision, or requiring a release of it, so as to make the writing correspond with the actual agreement.
But upon the allegations of the bill there is
no other agreement by which to reform the
deed, and to which to make it conform. The
plaintiff admits that the stipulation in the
deed is precisely in accordance with the actual agreement. The fraud which he alleges
relates only to the consideration or inducement upon which he was led to make that
agreement; not to the form of the agreement
itself. If that stipulation were to be stricken
out, the writing would then not express the
agreement actually made by the parties. The
court cannot rectify an instrument otherwise
than in accordance
with the actual agreement.
It cannot make an agreement for the
parties. Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1,
14; Brooks v. Stolley, 3 McLean, 523, Fed.
Cas.
No. 1,902. If the subject-matter of
this stipulation were of sufficient materiality,
the fraud alleged might have the effect to
defeat the whole instrument. But this effect
Is not sought.
The plaintiff's remedy, therefore, is at law, in damages for the deceit and
false representation.
The alleged agreement In regard to the premium and accrued interest upon the bonds
transferred in payment for the land will not
sustain a bill in equity. If such an agreement
was made and broken, we see no reason why
an action of assumpsit will not lie upon the
agreement,
or for the ovei-payment
of the
agreed price of the purchase. The remedy
at law is as effectual as it can be in equity.
The entry must therefore be, bill dismissed.
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which the administrator tendered to
them, and by them refused. No exhibit is
made of these proceedings or of this deed.
The title bond is alleged to have been written by the intestate, and delivered to the
complainants and accepted by them' without
any objection, on the 30th of March. 1850.
In the following year, 1851, the intestate left
the state, and in 1852 died, leaving these infant defendants his only heirs at law.
The prayer of the bill is. that the court
would order and direct the defendants to
convey to complainants all of the land agreed
to be conveyed to them by the intestate, and
to annul and hold for naught the order of
the circuit court in behalf of the administrator, or to amend and correct the decree so as
to comport with justice and good conscience,
and perpetually enjoin the collection of the
note sued on, until they are able to comply
with the understanding of Samuel W. Hunter, the intestate.
The bond is made an exhibit, and describes
the lands sold, and to be conveyed on payment of the purchase money.
They are:
"The undivided half of a certain lot, beginning at the south corner of the south-west
quarter of section 14, town 5 north, of range
4 west of the third principal meridian; thence
running north fifty poles; thence west to the
middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence
down the channel of Shoal creek, to the section line; thence east to the beginning corner, containing thirty-eight acres, more or
Also, the undivided half of so much of
less.
the west half of the north-west quarter of
section 23, town 5 north, range 4 west of the
third principal meridian, lying on the west
side of Shoal creek. Also, twenty poles south
from the creek on the east line of said half;
thence west to said creek; thence up said
creek to the beginning. Also, the undivided
half of twelve acres, more or less, of the
south-west quarter, town 4 west of the third
principal meridian, commencing at the southwest corner of said section; thence north
fifty; thence east to the middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence down said creek
to the section line; thence west to the beginning. Also, two acres and a half of the
west half of the north-west quarter of section
23, in same township and range, commencing
at a stake on the east line of said land at the
south-east corner of the mile post; thenco
west twenty
south twenty poles; thence
poles; thence north twenty poles; thence
This
east twenty poles, to the beginning."
last tract was in a separate bond to Finis
Bilyeu, one of the complainants, made at the
same time and on the same conditions, as
and for
the bond to complainants jointly,
convenience,
no question being made on it,
both bonds are considered as one.
There is a slight apparent ambiguity in the
description of the undivided half of twelve
acres, which is explained by the plat sworn
to by the witnesses, and is the tract on the
west side of the creek, contained within the
deed

(30 HI. 228.)
1S63.

W. H. Herndon, and S. P. Moore, for appellant J. & D. Gillespie, for appellees.

BRBESE, J. John B. Hunter, as administrator of Samuel W. Hunter,
deceased,
brought his action in the circuit court of
Bond county, against Wesley A. and Finis
Bilyeu, on a note executed by them to the
intestate, dated March 30, 1850, and due
March 30, 1855. Pending the action the defendants obtained an injunction on their
bill of complaint, to which the administrator, and the heirs-at-law of the intestate,
who were minors, and their guardian, together with Joseph Smith, were made defendants.
The bill alleges, that the note sued upon, together with others which were paid, was
one and the last of a number of notes they
had executed to the intestate, for certain
lands lying in Bond county, for which a
bond for a deed was executed and delivered
to them by the intestate. That they were
put into possession of the lands, and made
lasting and valuable improvements on some
of the tracts, but have discovered that one
or more tracts, which they supposed they
had bought, were not included in the bond.
One of those tracts is described as "the old
field tract" lying south-east of Shoal creek,
and being part of the west half of the northwest quarter of section twenty-three, in
town five north, range four west, containing
forty and nineteen-hundredths acres; and the
other, the "Gillespie tract," being the ea^t
half of the north-west quarter of the northeast quarter of the same section, township
and range, containing twenty acres; the undivided half of both which tracts, the complainants allege, was purchased by them of
the intestate, and was to have been included
in the title bond, but by mistake was left
out, and these tracts subsequently sold by
the intestate to Joseph Smith.
The bill also alleges, that some time anterior to the commencement of this suit on
the note, the administrator had filed a petition in the circuit court, at the September
term, 1855, praying the court for an order to
authorize him to make a deed to complainants for the land described in the bond; that
this petition contained the same errors and
mistakes as are now complained of, with
another error superadded in describing the
lands as being in section "twenty-five."
The
complainants admit they were made defendants, and had due notice of the pending of
the petition, but they did not appear to defend, supposing the lands were described as
in the bond, and their being made defendants was a mere ceremony, and the proceedings consistent with their rights. That these
errors and mistakes were carried into the
decree rendered on this petition, and in the
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north and south lines of the tract of thirtyeight acres, if extended west to the section
line. There is no dispute about this tract.
The tract described as "also twenty poles
south from the creek on the east line of said
half; thence west to said creek; thence up
said creek to the beginning," is understood
to describe the mill yard, having the shape
of a rectangular triangle, the south line being the perpendicular, the west line the base,
and the creek the hypothenuse. About this
tract there is no dispute.
The administrator demurred to the bill,
which was afterwards withdrawn, and his
answer filed, not admitting the mistake alAt a
leged, to which there was a replication.
subsequent term, he also filed a plea of the
Smith also
statute of frauds and perjuries.
answered, denying any knowledge when he
purchased, of any sale of the tract south-east
On
of Shoal creek, in section twenty-three.
the hearing, the bill was dismissed as to him.
Much testimony was introduced on behalf
of complainants, for the purpose of showing
by the declarations of the intestate, that an
undivided half of other tracts besides these,
namely, the tracts known as the "old field"
tract, sold to Smith, and the "Gillespie" tract,
were bargained for and sold, but, for some
cause not fully explained, omitted from the
title bond.
The lasting and valuable improvements
were made by complainants on other tracts,
about which there is no dispute.
The bill is, in efCect, a bill to reform by
parol, this title bond by incorporating into it
the part lying south-east of the creek, called
the "old field" tract, and the "Gillespie"
tract, and when reformed, to decree a specific
performance. The contract must be reformed before such a decree can pass.
This presents a question which has been
much discussed in the courts of this country and of England, and on which there Is
great contrariety of opinion.
The question is, in a bill to reform a written instrument, in the absence of any allegation or proof of fraud, and on the ground of
accident and mistake alone, is parol evidence admissible to prove an agreement to
do something further than is contained in
the writing, the statutes of frauds and perjuries being relied on in the defense, and
which that statute requires to be proved by

writing?
Whilst in England, the weight of adjudica-

tions seems to be opposed to the admission
of parol evidence, in this country, it appears
One of the leading
to be the other way.
cases in England, is that of Woollam v.
Hearn, 7 Ves. 211. It is prominent among the
Leading Cases of White & Tudor (pt. 1,
vol. 2), with copious notes by Hare & Wallace,

In
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this case the bill filed by Wm. Woollam
against Hearn, stated that the rent of seventy-three pounds ten shillings was inserted in
the written lease by mistake, or with some

unfair view;

the real agreement being that
the plaintiff was to have the lease upon the
same rent as the defendant paid to his lessor,
and that he did not pay more than sixty
pounds. The prayer was for a specific performance, and that the defendant may be
decreed to execute a lease according to the
at the rent of sixty pounds, or
agreement,
such other rent as the defendant paid his
lessor. Tlie defendant, in his answer, denied
that seventy-three pounds ten shillings was
inserted by mistake, or with any unfair view;
or that the agreement was that the plaintiff
should pay the same rent as the defendant
paid, which he admitted was sixty-three
The bill was proved by depositions.
pounds.
Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., said: "By the rule
of law, independent of the statute (of frauds
and perjuries), parol evidence cannot be received to contradict a written agreement.
To
admit it, for the purpose of proving that the
written instrument does not contain the real
agreement, would be the same as receiving
it for every purpose. It was for the purpose
of shutting out that inquiry, that the rule of
law was adopted. When equity is called upon to exercise its peculiar jurisdiction by decreeing a specific performance, the party to
be charged is let in to show, that, under the
circumstances, the plaintifC is not entitled to
have the agreement specifically performed;
and there are many cases in which parol
evidence of such circumstances has been admitted, as in Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 38S.
There on the face of the instrument, a specific sum was to be given for the timbers,
but it was shown, by parol, that the defendants were induced to give that, upon the
representation that it was valued by two
timber merchants which was not true. If
this had been a bill brought by this defendant
for a specific performance, I should have
been bound by the decisions to admit the
parol evidence, and to refuse a specific performance. But this evidence is offered, not
for the purpose of resisting, but of obtaining
a decree, first to falsify the written agreement, and then to substitute in its place a
parol agreement to be executed by the court
There is no case in which the court has gone
the length now desired. The evidence offered
is to vary an agreement in a material part,
and having varied it, to procure It to be executed in another form.
There is nothing to
show that ought to be done; and my opinion being that it ought not,
must dismiss
the bill."
In the case of Rogers v. Earl, 1 Dickson,
294, which was a bill to rectify a mistake of
the solicitor in drawing a marriage settlement; in Thomas v. Davis, Id. 301, to rectify
a mistake in a conveyance by the omission of
one of the parcels of land intended to be conveyed; in Sims v. Urry, 1 Ch. Gas. 225, to
prove a mistake in the penal sum of a bond,
by writing it forty Instead of four hundred
pounds, —verbal evidence was admitted.
In Hardwood v. Wallace, cited in Targus v.
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Tuget, 2 Yes. Sr. 195, where it was proposed
to prove a mistake in drawing a settlement;
and in Attorney General v. Sit well, 1 Young
& 0. 559, etc., where It was proposed to
show, by parol, that in a contract with the
crown for the sale of a certain manor, with
the appurtenances, the advowson was omitted by mistake, — such evidence was rejected,
or deemed inadmissible. In this case Baron
Alderson said: "I cannot help feeling that
In the case of an executory agreement, first
to reform and then to decree an execution
of it, would be, virtually, to repeal the stat'
ute of frauds."
In cases within the statute of frauds,
verbal evidence was held inadmissible, as in
Dwight V. Pomeroy, 17 Mass. 303, where the
plaintiCC, being creditor of an insolvent debtor who had executed a deed of assignment
in trust, for the benefit of his creditors, filed
his bill against the trustees to reform an alleged mistake in the trusts expressed in the
deed. And in Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80,
where the written agreement was for the conveyance of a lot of land in Windham, formerly owned by J. E., and the plaintiff proposed to prove by parol that it was intended
to include the adjoining land In Westbrook,
under the same ownership, but that this was
omitted by mistake. In Osbom v. Phelps,
19 ConB. 63, an agreement for the sale of
land was drawn in two separate instruments,
one to be signed by the vendor, and the
other by the purchaser, and neither of the
instruments contained any reference to the
other, but each was signed by the wrong
party by mistake. This the plaintiff sought
to prove by parol evidence,
but the court
held it inadmissible.
In other American cases, such evidence has
In Gillespie v. Moon,
been held admissible.
2 Johns. Oh. 585, which was a bill for relief
and for the reconveyance of a tract of land,
which had been included by mistake or
fraud in a deed of conveyance, verbal evidence of the mistalvC, on a review of all the
rases, was admitted, and a reconveyance decreed.
In Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, where
tenants in common agreed to make partition
pursuant to a verbal award, and executed
deeds accordingly; but, in the deed to the
plaintiff, a parcel assigned to him was omitted by mistake; in a bill for relief, verbal
evidence
was held admissible, and relief
thereupon decreed.
So in Langdon v. Keith,
9 Vern. 299, where upon the transfer of a
part of several promissory notes, secured by
mortgage, an assignment of the mortgagee's
entire interest In the mortgage was made, by
mistake, instead of a part, relief was decreed
In De Rlemer v. Canupon verbal proof.
tillon, 4 Johns. Ch. 85, where a portion of the
land purchased at sheriff's sale was by mistake omitted in his deed to the purchaser,
upon parol evidence of the fact the judgment
debtors were decreed to convey to the purchaser the omitted parcel. Several other
cases are referred to In this note.
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It does not appear that thf> statute of fraudsand perjuries was pleaded in any of thesecases, though referred to in the argument,,
and in the opinion of the court.
In AVoollam v. Hearn, and In many of thecases referred to in Hare & Williams' notes
to that case, a distinction is made between'
seeking and resisting specific performance,
as to the admission of evidence.
It Is said,
though a defendant resisting a specific performance, may go into parol evidence to showthat by fraud the written agreement does
not express the real terms, a plaintiff cannot do so for the purpose of reforming theagreement and obtaining a specific performance of it as reformed.
This doctrine is critically examined in Gillespie V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, before cited. In that case the bill was filed to rectify
a mistake in the conveyance
which, by an;
error in the description of the land, conveyed the whole lot, or two hundred and fiftyacres, instead of two hundred acres, parcel of"
the same.
The mistake is positively denied In the answer, and the point was, is parol proof of
this mistake admissible, in opposition to theplaln language of the deed, and especially la
opposition to the defendant's answer?
It will be seen the statute of frauds an(J
perjuries was not set up in the case.
After entering minutely into the parol
proof of the fact of the mistake. Chancellor
Kent says: "The rule In courts of law is,
that the written instrument does, in contemplation of law, contain the true agreement of the parties, and that the writing furnishes better evidence of the sense of theparties, than any that can be supplied by
parol. But equity has a broader jurisdiction, and will open the written contract to
let in an equity arising from facts perfectly
distinct from the sense and construction of
the instrument Itself.
have
looked Into
most. If not all the cases on this branch of
equity jurisdiction, and it appears to me to
be established on great and essential grounds
of justice, that relief can be had against any
deed or contract In writing, founded in mistake or fraud. The mistake may be shown
by parol proof, and the relief granted to theinjured party, whether he sets up the mistake afiirmatively by bill, or as a defense."
After reviewing many of the decisions on
this question, the chancellor decides that
parol proof was admissible, and that it established the mistake as charged In the bill.
It will be observed, the contract in this
contract, a deed of
case was an executed
conveyance having been made; there was
no prayer for a specific performance of a
contract, but to correct a mistake in thechancellor
remarks: "Whether
deed. The
such proof be admissible on the part of a
plaintiff, who seeks a specific performance
of an agreement In writing, and at the same
time seeks to vary It by parol proof, has
In
been made a question. Lord Hardwicke,

I
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Jacques v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388, seemed to
think it miglit be done, but sucti proof was
rejected in Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211
(wliich we liave cited at length) ; and in Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; and when Lord
in Olinan v. Cooke,
1
Redesdale said,
Schoales & L. 39, that he could find no decision in which a plaintiff had been permitted
to show an omission in a written agreement,
"by mistake or fraud, he must be understood
to refer to the eases of bills for a specific performance of an agreement, which was the
case then before him."
This case would seem to decide nothing
more than this: that in a bill to correct a mistake in an executed contract, parol proof of
the mistake is admissible, and that such
proof is as available for one party, or for one
purpose, as for another, — as available for the
plaintiff in setting up a claim, as for the
defendant in resisting it. It is nowhere said,
that a bill to reform an executory contract,
and then decree a specific performance when
reformed, against a denial, in the answer, of
any mistake, and the plea of the statute of
frauds and perjuries, can be sustained by
parol evidence.
This decision, so far as it goes, has been
followed by the courts of many other states.
The cases are referred to by Hare & Wallace,
on pages 539, 540, but in none of them was
the denial in the answer accompanied by a
plea of the statute of frauds and perjuries.
Nor do these cases go farther than to assert
the general principle, that independent of
this statute, where it is not set up as a defense, parol evidence will be received to correct an alleged mistake in a written executed
■contract,
when asserted by a plaintiff, and
is as available for him, as for defendant.
The cases go to the extent of declaring,
that parol evidence shall be admissible to
correct a writing as well for a plaintiff as
against him, thus establishing mutuality and
equahty in the operation of the doctrine.
In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § ISl, in commenting
on the distinction set up, the learned author
says, in a note, that it is of a very artificial
chai'acter, and difficult to be reconciled with
the general principles of courts of equity.
He says: "The ground is very clear, that a
court of equity ought not to enforce a contract, when there is a mistake, against the
defendant insisting upon and establishing
the mistake; for it would be inequitable and
unconscientious. And if the mistake is vital
to the contract, there is a like clear ground,
why equity should interfere at the instance
of the party as plaintiff, and cancel it; and if
the mistake is partial only, why, at his instance, it should reform it. In these cases,
the remedial practice is equal; and the parol
evidence to establish it, is equally open to
both parties to use as jiioof. Why should
not the party aggrieved by a mistake in an
agreement, have relief in all cases when he
is plaintiff, as well as when he is defendant?
If the doctrine be founded upon the impro-

priety of admitting parol evidence to contradict a written agreement, that rule is not
more brolcen in upon by the admission of it
for the plaintiff' than it is by the admission
of it for the defendant. If the doctrine had
been confined to cases arising under the statute of frauds, it would, if not more intelligible, at least have been less inconvenient in
practice."
In a subsequent case,— Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 145,— which was a bill
for the specific performance of an agreement
in writing to execute a lease for lives "containing the usual clauses, restrictions and
reservations contained in the leases given by
defendant," the bill stated that a lease was
offered, containing a provision that upon every sale of the demised premises, one-fifth of
the purchase or consideration money should
be taken by the defendant to his own use,
which complainant refused to receive, alleging, that at the time of the execution of the
writing, it was agreed no such quarter or
fifth sales should be demanded or paid.
The defendant did not, in direct and clear
terms, deny any such agreement,
but denied
any other or different contract than the one
set forth made in writing, and as to the validity of the supposed verbal agreement, he
pleaded the statute of frauds.
The point in the case was, whether this
verbal agreement could be established by parol. The learned chancellor says, it did not
appear to him, that the statute of frauds
had any bearing on the case.
"The agreement for the three life lease is in writing, and
it has been partly performed, by possession
taken and transferred, and rent paid. The
right of the plaintiff rests upon the contract
in writing, and the only Inquiry is, whether
there is not a mistake in the generality of
the expression, that the lease was to contain
the 'usual clause,' etc., and whether the parties did not intend an exception in respect
to the quarter sales.
There is no doubt of
their declared intention to make such an exception at the time the agreement was drawn;
and I am inclined to think that the writing
is, and ought to be, susceptible of amendment and correction in that particular."
The proof was admitted, and the mistake
corrected,
partly upon the ground, that the
writing itself let in parol proof, to show
which were "the usual clauses," etc., and such
proof being let in by the contract itself, it
might, on the principle of the agreement itself, be applied to correct any mistake manifestly shown to exist, in the general and unqualified terms of that part of the written
agreement which depended for its explanation upon external proof.
This court has held, as a general proposition, that tho terms of a written agreement
cannot be changed by parol. Baker v. Whiteside, Breese, l.J2; Penny v. Graves, 12 111.
298.
And so it is held by all courts. At the
same time, we have said, that whatever covenants an absolute deed may contain, parol
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may be admitted to show tliat it
was intended as a mortgage, or mere security
for the payment of the debt, and the grantor can have relief in equity, and this, where
mistake is not alleged.
Purviance v. Holt,
3 Gilman, 405; Ferguson v. Sutphen, Id. 547.
And it is also held, in Harlow v. Boswell, 15
111. 57, where parties commit their contracts
to writing, this forms the only evidence of
its terms.
In Scott V. Bennet, 3 Gilman, 254, this
court said, it is a familiar principle that you
may give evidence to explain, but not to vary,
add to, or alter a written contract.
Courts
cannot make a new contract for the parties.
But if there is doubt and uncertainty, not
about what the substance of the contract is,
but as to its particular application, it may
be explained, and properly directed.
As a general principle, where a contract is
reduced to writing, the writing affords the
only evidence of the terms and conditions of
the contract; all antecedent and contemporaneous verbal agreements are merged in the
written contract.
There is an apparent conti-adiction in these
several opinions, but we think a few familiar
considerations will serve to reconcile them, or
show that it is not real. The subjects peculiarly proper for the jurisdiction of courts of
equity, are well understood to be, fraud,
trusts, accident and mistake, and these courts
are vested with the power to afford relief in
all cases, wherein, by reason of the universality and rigor of the rules of the common law,
a remedy cannot otherwise be had.
The
power to correct a mistake in a writing, is as
much within the scope of this jurisdiction as
The whole realm of
any other mistake.
mistake is laid open to the court, and its powers are limitless to correct, on a proper case
made.
That it should be dormant, when invoked to correct a mistake in a written conIt is no antract, would be strange indeed.
swer to say, that within the rigid rule of law,
the power may be exercised, but not outside
In our
of it, as that would destroy the rule.
The jurisjudgment, it has no such effect.
diction of a court of chancery to correct
mistakes, is no less important to the due administration of justice, and the safety of the
citizen, than the rule of the common law, that
parol evidence cannot be received to add to,
or vary a written contract, and in a court of
equity, it must be determined, on the circumstances of each case, which shall prevail, the
exercise of an unquestioned power of the
court, or the rule of the common law.
The doctrine is undisputed and incontestable, that a deed, absolute on its face, may be
shown, by parol, to have been intended by
the parties to it, as conditional, merely, and a
court of equity, on proper proof, will so hold.
This contract is explained by parol evidence,
and if it is made to speak a language its
words do not import, who will deny that it
is within the competency of that court to ascertain the real contract of the parties, and
evidence
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then enforce it, according to the intention of
the parties?
If a court of equity has not the
power to correct mistakes in a deed, or other
writing, on convincing proof of the existence
of the alleged mistake, great injustice would
be perpetrated with impunity.
A man sells
a vacant lot adjoining the lot on which he
has a costly residence, but by the mistake of
the scrivener, the deed describes the lot of
his residence.
An ejectment is brought— the
purchaser claiming under his deed— and if
no power exists in a court of equity to correct the mistake, he must surrender that
which he never sold, and the purchaser recover a property he never bought.
A court
of chancery should not hesitate to receive parol evidence of this mistake, and on sulBcient
proof, correct it, else the most flagrant injustice would be perpetrated, and an imdoubted
power of that court be rendered ineffectual
and worthless.
There can be no danger in
exercising this power, since the court has
before it all the facts, and if they are not convincing, the stern rule of law wiU prevail.
The court has, in many cases, acknowledged and exercised this power, and we do
not know that it has been questioned by the
bar here or elsewhere.
The doctrine is fully recognized in the case
of Broadwell v. Broadwell, 1 Gilman, 599,
that a court of chancery will always coi'rect
any mistakes of fact which have occurred in
drawing up a paper, when a proper case is
presented and clearly proved, and then carry
into effect the instrument when thus corrected.
And herein is found the safeguard for
those so litigating, a proper case must- be
If it be clearpresented and, clearly proved.
ly proved, who shall say that a court of equity transcends its powers, or violates the
rule of law, in declaring the contract to be
as the parties have made it? We cannot
think the statute of frauds and perjuries has
any application to such cases.
Here the bill is filed to reform this contract,
by inserting in it several tracts of land, alleged to have been omitted from it by mistake, and parol evidence is relied on for such
purpose; and when reformed, then the prayer
is, to decree a specific performance of the contract. This proof makes the contract different from what its words import, and adds
It, in
to it, and varies it very materially.
fact, makes a new and different contract;
yet if the mistake is clearly established,
which should give way, that rigid rule of the
common law, or that power residing in a
The
court of equity, to correct mistakes?
strongest and most convincing evidence will
be required, before the common law rule is
postponed, and the power of the court exerNow, what is the testimony in this
cised.
case?
It consists, in great part, of loose conversations held by one Gillespie and others, with
the intestate, in which he said, there was a
that the tract lying
mistake in the bond;
south-east of Shoal creek, being part of the
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west half of the north-west [quarter] of
[section] twenty-three was not in the bond,
or not in right, and the Bilyeus had found it
This witness states nothing in positive
out.
tei-ms, but "thinks" the facts were so and so,
He "thinks" all the
as he details them.
lands claimed by complainants were included
in the bond, except the Gillespie tract, and
thinks that intestate told him some of the
numbers were wrong, and some of the land
was not named in the bond. He spoke of the
west half of the north-west [quarter of section] twenty-three lying south-east of Shoal
creek, as not included in the bond, and that he
would not rectify the mistake because they
could not agree upon a division of the lands
according to his understanding of the contract. This witness says that he can neither
read nor write, and details only such parts
of the conversation, as he "thinks" was had
with the intestate. He does not say in positive terms, that the intestate admitted to
him he had sold this tract to complainants,
or that it was left out of the bond by misNo testimony could be more unsatistake.
factory than his, taking the whole of it toHunter
Fenton says he "thinks"
gether.
told him he drew the bond himself and that
there was a mistake in it, but does not recolHe says it was
lect what the mistake was.
his understanding a bond was given by Hunter to complainants, and notes given for the
payment of the money— does not say he ever
saw the bond or notes— says the complainants
never took possession of the Gillespie tract—
on the tract south-east of the creek; they cut
some timber oft, put a blacksmith shop upon,
and pastured the field on it while they and
Hunter were in partnership; there was some
money paid on the general contract, but don't
know how much.
Paine states that Hunter told him complainants were to have half of this tract,
when he. Hunter, sold or left, according to
the contract as made with complainants, in
the sale of the mill, which was In 1850. He
had this conversation in the winter after the
sale of the mill property; that complainants
have cut and hauled saw logs, and Hunter
and complainants built a blacksmith shop on
complainants rethis land; and "thinks"
paired the fences some, but is not certain,
and they used it as a pasture in connection
with Hunter. Hunter also said he had sold
the Gillespie tract to them, and that David
Hunter was to make a deed to it. Don't
know that complainants ever exercised any
Hunter
acts of ownership over this tract.
said there was a mistake in the bond, and if
his health would permit, he was coming to
tovra to get it fixed; "thinks" the mistake applied to the tract south-east of Shoal creek,
on which there was an old field.
Does not
know of complainants exercising any acts of
ownership over this "old field tract," since
they and Hunter dissolved partnership; don't
know the numbers of the land.
The testimony of Clouse, and of L. G. Bll-

yeu, does not differ, substantially,

from that
of other witnesses.
Smith says. Hunter told him, that all thelands the complainants were to get, were included in the bonds; that half of the timber
on the tract lying on the south-east
side of
Shoal creek, on which there was an old field,
was included In the contract with complainants, and that they had got their share off,
and that he had not sold the land to them.
Wesley Bilyeu had stated to witness that he
had an interest in this tract, and Hunter then
told him as above stated.
Hunter had possession of this tract when witness bought it,
and had corn standing in the field on it.
George Smith stated that Hunter told him
that complainants had no right to the tract
lying south-east of Shoal creek, but as soon
as he could buy a piece from John Clouse, h&
would make it right, but they were to have
it when he sold or left; understood this same
tract was included in the original contract.
This is the substance of the evidence to
prove the mistake in the bond, and part performance, which, It is very clear, is wholly
insufficient for either purpose.
It would be
relaxing too much those salutary rules of evidence, which require a contract to be clearly
proTed, before a specific performance of it
will be decreed.
It is discretionary with the
court, in all such cases, to decree or not a
specific performance of a contract, and that
discretion will not be exercised except in a
very clear case.
This contract was made in March, 1850,
and the intestate remained in the state until
1851, during a part of which time he was in
partnership with complainants, in using the
mill property. They paid their notes as they
became due, and not a word of complaint is
heard of any mistake.
They were impleaded, by the administrator of the intestate, in
a petition in chancery, for the purpose of obtaining an order of court, authorizing him to
make a deed to them in performance of the
covenant; in which suit, it was fully competent for the complainants to have litigated
all these matters, but which they neglected
to do.
Though these proceedings are not
pleaded, or set up in bar by the defendants,
they might have been, successfully, and the
case thus disposed of, rendering unnecessary
the examination we have been compelled to
give it on the issues made.
We are satisfied nothing has been shown to
establish a mistake, its nature, or extent, so
clearly, as to leave no doubt on the mind of
the actual existence of the alleged mistake.
The decree, as to the old field tract, being a
part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section twenty-three, lying north-east
of Shoal creek, and as to the Gillespie tract,
is reversed, and the decree so modified as to
The
exempt those tracts from its operation.
injunction will be dissolved, and the administrator, the appellant here, will be allowed to
proceed with his action at law.
Decree modified.
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L. Walk-

CAMPBELL, C. J. The bill is filed to enforce the specific performance of a written
contract for the sale of a farm in the city
■of Owosso.
The defense rests on the ground
that the contract was obtained fraudulently and is unconscionable.
The facts, as we deduce them from the
testimony, were in substance these: Bush
is a clergyman, residing in Eastern Pennsylvania. He had owned property for many
years, and it was in the hands of a tenant
Not far from the end of May, 1868, four
persons had written to Bush to negotiate for
the purchase of the farm, but nothing had
Early In
been done to close with them.
June, Swimm ascertained that various persons were desirous of buying it, and immediately left home and went down to see
Bush, and obtained the contract sued upon,
Jime Sth. He then returned home and got
upon the land, although the tenant also remained there and objected. The contract
was in consideration of three thousand dollars, viz.: four hundred dollars paid down,
and one hundred dollars to be paid on the
exchange of deed, and securities for the balance, whch was to be in thirty days. Nothing was said in it about possession.
A few
days after the contract was made. Bush re•ceived letters satisfying him that the property was worth more than he had sold it
for, and he wrote two consecutive letters to
Swimm desiring to be released, to which
Swimm paid no attention beyond hastening
to take possession.
In July, Bush visited
Owosso, and this suit was commenced on
the 13th, not very far from the time of his arrival. We leave out of consideration many
minor facts which do not affect the rights
of the parties.
The defense rests upon the claim that
Swimm, being in possession of better knowledge of the value and sm'roundings of the
property than Bush, took means to secure
the confidence of the latter, and by his misrepresentations and urgency induced him to
make the sale at an under value, and thereby defrauded him.
The facts are within a narrow compass,
and we are not compelled to pass upon any
very complicated questions, either of law or
fact. It is not claimed that a sale will be disregarded merely because of an undervaluation. And it is not claimed that the ordinary
banter and abating of prices between buyer
and seller, when acting on an equal footing,
can usually have much weight in such a con-

The decision
must rest upon the
presence or absence of such a state of facts
as, under all the circumstances,
renders the
bargain unconscionable.
We think such facts
existed here.
There is a good deal of diflference of opinion
among the witnesses as to the value of the
property, ■\^'ehave no doubt it was worth at
least a thousand dollars more than Swimm
paid for it, and we think it clear he thought
so. His hasty and clandestine jom'ney to an-

ticipate the other purchasers, and his haste to
seize a foothold on the land, go to corroborate
strongly the other proofs of value. It is evident he expected to make a very advantageous bargain. It is also evident that Bush had
no adequate knowledge of the present value
of the farm, or of its prospective value. A
visit to Owosso, or ever a full knowledge of
the value of the land three years before, would
give no means of testing its present value, and
it is quite clear he did not know it. Swimm
had,
then,
all the advantage of superior
and knew that he had it. His
knowledge,
statements and his nonduct must all be viewed from this standpoint. And a willful mis- ',
statement of facts or opinions of value, made
under such circumstances,
and made with a j
design to deceive, and actually deceiving Bush I
to his prejudice, would be fraud in law. '
Pickard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. 68.
We think the course taken by Swimm was
such that it was eminently calculated to deceive Bush, and that the latter cannot be regarded as at fault in believing him.
He obtained from a reputable member of the bar,
who wrote it in good faith, a letter of introduction, stating that the writer, at the request
of Bush's sister, had been looking for a purchaser of the farm, and that Swimm would,
as he thought, buy it and pay its value, and
he recommended him as a man of wealth
and reliability.
Swimm also took a letter
from Mr. Bloss, a brother-in-law of Bush.
Upon presenting these letters of introduction, Swimm inquired the price of the land,
and was answered, four thousand dollars. He
said if that was the price there was no use
talking; that he hoped to buy it for twentysix or twenty-eight hundred dollars. Bush
then showed him the four letters of inquiry,
and asked him about the writers. One of
them he said he did not know; which appears
to be true. One he gave Bush to understand I
was not responsible. The other two letters, |
he said, were written in his own behalf. The I
statements concerning these three were not/
Bush went on to question him about I
correct.
the farm and about Owosso. He thereupon
gave Bush to understand that Owosso was
not flourishing, but was being injuriously afthat property was defected by Corunna;
clining, and that the farm itself was in a
very bad condition, as he described it; which
was not a very great exaggeration. He, when
asked concerning the value of the land, said it
was not worth four thousand nor three thousand dollars, and that he had not expected to

j
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pay more than twenty-eight hundred dollars,
but that he would give three thousand, as
his wife was born on it and had an affection
for it, and an offer of three thousand had
been made for it by one of the letters written by a Mr. Martin, the person he said he
did not know. Bush desired to take the matter of sale into consideration, and said he
would talk it over with his wife (who was
then in New Jersey) on her return. Swimm
urged him to go at once with him and he
They went at once
would bear the expense.
and saw Mrs. Bush, and the bargain was
concluded the same day.
In all of this transaction it is very plain,
from a review of the evidence, that Bush was
Induced by the letters he brought to regard
Swimm as a reliable and veracious man, who
was acquainted with the facts necessary to
form a judgment upon, and would not deceive him. It is just as clear that Swimm
knew this, and gave him the answers and
made the representations in order to induce
him to believe he was getting the outside
value of the land, and that it would not be
safe to lose a good offer. The representations
were of the greatest materiality, and referred
to the matters on which any sensible man
The sale was
would found his conclusions.
the result of nothing but the urgency and deceit of Swimm, and such statements coming
from a man of undoubted character (as
Swimm was naturally assumed to be under
might have deceived a
the circumstances),
man of more experience than Bush. This reason he gave for being willing to pay a larger
price than his real estimate of the value, was
one which appealed very naturally to the better feelings, and would have considerable
weight in confirming the veracity of the purThis reason was without any foundachaser.
tion, as Mrs. Swimm was not born there.
Except as to the condition of the land—
which was mainly important on the supposition that the dead state of Owosso rendered
the land valueless except for farming — the
whole tenor of the representations was contrary to fact.
_
Owosso was improving rapidly, and not
stagnant or retrograding. The land was in
demand and was worth more than four thousand dollars, and the purchaser knew this, and
went down to Pennsylvania on purpose to pre-

vent other offers from reaching Bush, and
used such arguments and made such statements as he found were best adapted to force
him into hasty action, for fear of the danger
of delay. He induced Bush to abstain from
that deliberation which would have inevitably defeated the scheme. And where a party is induced to abstain from informing himself, even material concealment is often sufficient to create fraud, without active misrepresentation.
It does not avail in such a case that sharp
business men might not have been so readily
Possibly they might not. But the
deceived.
law does not seek to encourage the practice
of cunning arts upon those who are not well
qualified to resist them. The character and
business capacity of "the person operated on
form a very important element in fraud. If
the effect is produced, and is intended to be
produced, that is enough. There can be no
splitting of hairs to sustain unconscionable
Every one is expected to use reasonaction.
able diligence in resisting deceit, but each case
must depend on its own facts, and this case
shows no fault in Bush. He was obliged to
depend on information, and he sought it from
what he had reason to believe was a reliable
som'ce. No man of sense would have done as
he did without being deceived.
We do not feel called upon to lay down any
rule as to how far smartness may go without
crossing the legal boundaries of fraud. Neither are we disposed to consider the 'somewhat unprofitable subject of the impeachment
of witnesses. The circumstances which are
most important are not left at all in doubt,
and there can be no reason for refusing relief
in this cause to the defendant, except upon
the theory that he was in fault in aUowing
himself to be overreached in the bargain.
We do not think he contributed enough to
his own loss to be subject to this criticism.
The decree below mus*' be reversed, and the
bill dismissed, with costs of both courts. If,
after the taxation of costs, any balance of the
four hundred dollars advanced by Swimm remains in excess of the taxation, defendant
must pay over such balance within thirty
days after demand, or may deposit it with the
clerk of this court for the benefit of complainant.
The other justices concurred.
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STIMSON

V.

(10 Pao. Rep.

HELPS

et al.

290, 9 Colo. 33.)

Suprfiue Court of Colorado.

Feb. 26,

1SS6.

Appeal from county court, Boulder county.
The complaint sets out that on the sixth
day of October, 18S1, William Stimson leased
to the defendants in error the S. W. Vi of section 21, in township 1, range 70 west, in said
county, for the period of four years and six
months, for the piupose of mining for coal,
under the conditions of said lease; that they
had no knowledge of the location of the
boundary lines of said tract at the time of
the leasing, and that they so informed Stimson, the defendant in the case; that they requested Stimson to go with them and show
them the boundary lines; that the defendant,
pretending to know the lines bounding said
land, and their exact locality, went then and
there with plaintiffs, and showed and pointed
out to them what he said was the leased
land, and the boundary lines thereof, especially the north and south lines thereof;
that plaintiffs not then knowing the lines
bounding said land, nor the exact location
thereof, and relying upon what the defendant
then and there pointed out to them as the
leased land, and the lines thereof, then and
there proceeded to work on the land pointed
out, and sank shafts for mining coal thereon,
and made sundry improvements thereon,—
made buildings, laid tracks, etc. ; that all the
said work was done and labor performcJ
and improvements made on the land pointed
out by defendant to plaintiffs as the leased
land, and that plaintiffs, relying upon the
statements of defendant as aforesaid, and
not knowing otherwise, believed they were
performing the work, and making all the improvements on the land they had so leased,
which they did by direction of the defendant; that while they were working on the
said land Stimson was frequently present,
and told the plaintiffs they were on his land,
and received royalty from ore taken therefrom; that about April 10, 1882, they were
notified to quit mining on said gi-ound by
the Marshall Coal Mining Company; that the
laud belonged to said company; that none of
the said improvements were put on said
leased land; and that they were compelled
to quit work and mining thereon; that the
improvements made by them were worth $2,000; that
Stimson falsely represented to
them other and different lines than the true
boundaries of said premises, and showed and
pointed out to them other and different lands
than the lands leased them, and thereby deceived them, and damaged them, in the sum
of $2,000. Issue joined, and trial to the com-t.
Motion by defendant's counsel for judgment
on the pleadings, and evidence overruled.
Judgment for the plaintiffs in the sum of
?2,000, and costs.
Wright & Griffin, for appellant. G. Berkley, for appellees.
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ELBERT, J. The law holds a contracting
party liable as for fraud on his express representations concerning facts material to the
treaty, the truth of which he assumes to
know, and the truth of which is not known
to the other contracting pai'ty, where the
representations were false, and the other
party, relying upon them, has been misled
to his injm-y. Upon such representations so
made the contracting party to whom they
are made has a right to rely, nor is there any
duty of investigation cast upon him.
In
such a case the law holds a party bound to
know the truth of his representations. Bigolow, Fraud, 57, 60, 63, 67, 68, 87; Kerr,
Fi-aud & M. 54 et seq.; 3 Wait, Act. & Dof.
436.
This is the law of this case, and, on the
evidence,
wari'auted the judgment of the
court below.
The objection was made below, and is renewed here, that the complaint does not state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Two points are made:
(1) That the
complaint does not allege that the defendant
knew the representations to be false; (2)
that it does not allege intent to defraud.
It is not necessary, in order to constitute
a fraud, that the party who makes a false
representation should know it to be false.
He who malves a representation as of his
own knowledge, not knowing whether it be
true or false, and it is in fact untrue, is
guilty of fraud as much as if he knew it to
In such a case he acts to his
be untrue.
own knowledge falsely, and the law imputes
Kerr, Fraud & M. 54 et
a fraudulent intent.
seq., and cases cited; Bigelow, Fraud, 63,
2
84, 453; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 438 et seq.;
Estee, Pr. 394 et seq. "Fraud" is a term
which the law applies to certain facts, and
where, upon the facts, the law adjudges
fraud, it is not essential that the complaint
should, in terms, allege it. It is sufficient if
the facts stated amount to a case of fraud.
Kerr, Fraud & M. 366 et seq., and cases
cited; 2 Estee, PI. 423. The complaint in
this case states a substantial cause of action, and is fully supported by the evidence.
The action of the county com-t in refusing
to aUow the appellant to appeal to the district court after he had given notice of an appeal to this com-t, and time had been given in
which to perfect it, cannot be assigned as
error on this record. If it was an error, it
was error not before, but after, the final
judgment from ^vhich this appeal is taken.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
[Note from 10 Pac. Rep. 292.]

A contract secured by false and fraudulent
Mills v.
caiuiot be enforced.
representations
Collins, 67 Iowa, 164, 25 N. W. Rep. 109.
A court of equity will decree a rescission of
a contract obtained by the fraudulent representations or conduct of one of the parties thereto,
on the complaint of the other, wheu it satisfactorily appears that the party seeking the
rescission has been misled iu regard to a ma-
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-terial matter by such representation or conduct, correct opinion as to the amount, guality, and
But when the facts value of the goods he disiposes of in a sale of
to his injury or prejudice.
are known to both parties, and each acts on his his business and good-will thereof, and the
own judgment, the court will not rescind the purchaser sees or knows the property, or has an
-contract because it may or does turn out that opportunity to know it, no action for false repwill lie. Collins v. Jackson, 54
they, or either of them, were mistaken as to resentations
the legal effect of the facts, or the rights or ob- Mich. 186, 19 N. W. Rep. 947.
ligations of the parties thereunder, and particuMere "dealing talk" in the sale of goods, unlarly when such mistake can in no way injuri- less accompanied by some artifice to deceive
eusly affect the right of the party complaining
the purchaser or throw him off his guard, or
under the contract, or prevent him from obtain- some concealment of intrinsic defects not easily
ing and receiving all the benefit contemplated detected by ordinary care and diligence, does
by it, and to which he is entitled under it. See- not amount to misrepresentation.
Reynolds v.
ley V. Reed, 25 Fed. Rep. 301.
Palmer, 21 Fed. Rep. 433.
When, by false representations
misrepFalse
statements
made
at
the
or
time of the
resentations, a fraud has been committed, and sale by the vendor of chattels, with the fraudl)y it the complainant has been injured, the gen- ulent intent to induce the purchaser to accept
eral principles of equity jurisprudence
afford a an inferior article as a superior one, or to give
remedy.
Singer
Manuf'g Co. v. Yarger, 12 an exorbitant and unjust price therefor, will
Fed. Rep. 4S7. See Chandler v. Childs, 42 render such purchase voidable; but such false
Mich. 128, 3 N. W. Rep. 297; Cavender v. statement must be of some matter aflfecting the
quantity, quality, value, or title of
Tloberson, 33 Kan. 626, 7 Pac. Rep. 152.
character,
V/hen no damage, present or prospective, can such chattel. Bank v. Yocum, 11 Neb. 328, 9
result from a fraud practiced, or false repre- N. W. Rep. 84.
made, a court
sentations
or misrepresentation
A statement recklessly made, without knowledge of its truth, is a false statement knowing•of equity will not entertain a petition for relief.
Dunn V. Remington, 9 Neb. 82, 2 N. W. Rep. ly made, within the settled rule.
Cooper v.
Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360.
230.
A person is not at liberty to make positive
Whether or not omission to communicate
assertions about facts material to a transaction
known facts will amount to fraudulent repreunless he knows them to be true;
and if a sentation depends upon the circumstances
of
statement
so made is in fact false, the as- the particular case, and the relations of the
parties.
sertor cannot relieve himself from the imputaBritton v. Brewster, 2 Fed. Rep. 160.
tion of fraud by pleading ignorance, but must
Where a vendor conceals a material fact,
respond in damages to any one who has sus- which is substantially the consideration of the
tained loss by acting in reasonable reliance upon contract,
and which is peculiarly within his
such assertion. Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co., knowledge, it is fraudulent misrepresentation.
18 Fed. Rep. 4SG.
Bowling V. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 282, 16 N. W.
Equity will not relieve a,gainst a misrepre- Rep. 552.
sentation, unless it be of some material matter
Evidence of fraudulent representations must
constituting some motive to the contract, some- be clear and convincing.
AVickham v. Morething in regard to which reliance is placed by house, 16 Fed. Rep. 324.
■one party on the other, and by which he was
Where a man sells a business, and the conactually misled, and not merely a matter of tract of sale contained a clause including all
opinion, open to the inquiry and examination
right to business done by certain agents, evi-of both parties.
Buckuer v. Street, 15 Fed. dence that the seller was willing to engage in
Rep. 365.
the same business with such agents is not proof
False representations may be a ground for of fraud in making the contract. Taylor v.
relief, though the person making them believes Saurman, 110 Pa. St. 3, 1 Atl. Rep. 40.
them true, if the person to whom they were
It was recently held by the supreme court of
mg.de relied upon them, and was induced there- Indiana, in the case of Cook v. Churchman, 104
"by to enter into the contract.
Seeberger v. Ho- Ind. 141, 3 N. E. Rep. 759, that where money
bert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
is obtained under a contract, any fraudulent
Fraudulent representations or misrepresenta- representations employed by a party thereto as
tions are not ground for relief, where they are a means of inducing the loan to be made, if
immaterial,
even though they be relied upon. otherwise proper, are not to be excluded beHall V. Johnson, 41 Mich. 286, 2 N. W. Rep. cause of the statute of frauds; also that where
55. See, to same effect. Lynch v. Mercantile parol representations
are made regarding the
"Trust Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 486; Seeberger v. Ho- credit and ability of a third person, with the inbert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
tent that such third person shall obtain money
In fraudulent representation or misrepresenta- or credit thereon, the statute of fraud applies,
tion the injured parties may obtain relief, even and no action thereon can be maintained, although they did not suppose every statement
though the party making the representations
■made to them literally true.
Heineman v. Stei- may have entered into a conspiracy with such
«er, 54 Mich. 232, 19 N. W. Rep. 965.
person with the expectation of obtaining some
Where the vendor honestly expresses an in- 1 incidental benefit for himself.

I-Up^c tvi. i- VV--'"."'
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MITCHELL

et al. v.
(62

McDOUGALL.

111. 498.)

Court of Illinois.
Jan. Term, 1872.
Appeal from circuit court, McLean county;
Thomas F. Tipton, Judge.
Bill in equity to rescind a conveyance of
lands on tlie ground of misrepresentation and
fraud.
Supreme

R. E. Williams, for appellants.
& Weldon, for appellee.

BREESE, J. In

Benjamin

Lockridge v. Foster, 4
which was a bill in chancery praying, in the alternative, for the rescission of
an executed contract for the sale of land, on
the ground of fraudulent representations by
the vendor, this court said, on the principles
of equity and justice, a contract, to be obligatory, must be justly and fairly made.
The contracting parties are bound to deal
honestly, and act in good faith with each other. There should be a reciprocity of candor
and fairness. Both should have equal knowledge concerning the subject-matter
of the
contract; especially ought all the facts and
circumstances which are likely to influence
their action to be made known. If they have
not mutually this knowledge, nor the same
means of obtaining it, it is then a duty incumbent on the one having the superior information to disclose it to the other. In making the disclosure, he is bound to act in good
faith and with a strict regard to truth. If
Le
makes false representations respecting
material facts, or intentionally conceals or
suppresses them, he acts fraudulently, and
renders himself responsible for the consequences which may result. Fraud may consist as well In a suppressio veri as in a suggestlo falsi, for, in either case, it may operate
to the injury of the innocent party. A false
inrepresentation
by the vendor, which
fluences the conduct of the other party, and
induces him to make the purchase, will vitiate
and avoid the contract. And in making the
representation, it is Immaterial whether he
knows It to be false or not, for the conseIf he requences are the same to the vendee.
lies on the truth of the declaration, he is
equally imposed on and injured, and ought
to have redress from the one who has been
the cause of the injury. So a suppression or
concealment by the vendor of facts, which,
if known to the vendee, would have the effect to prevent him from making the purchase, will, in equity, equally vitiate the contract. A court of equity will not enforce and
carry into effect contracts thus unfairly and
made; and when the injured
fraudulently
party invokes its aid in proper time, and the
circumstances of the case will permit It to be
done, the contract will be rescinded and the
parties restored to their original rights.
The court refers to 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 191197, 204r-207, and 2 Kent, Comm. 482, 490.
Sections 191-197, inclusive, treat of false
suggestions, and fully supijort the doctrine of
HUTCn.BQ.JUR. — 14
Scam.

509,
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the case cited, on that point. Sections 204
to 207, inclusive, treat of the doctrine of
suppressio veri, a doctrine which, though
true in morals, is not the doctrine recognized
by courts of equity, except under certain circumstances.
The extreme doctrine of some courts is, that
undue concealment of a fact resting in the
knowledge of one contracting party, which,
if known to the other, would have prevented
the conti-act, will vitiate the contract.
The true definition is found in section 207,
supra, where it is said undue concealment
which amounts to a fraud in the sense of a
court of equity, and for which it will grant
relief, is the non-disclosure of those facts and
circumstances which one party is under some
legal or equitable obligation to communicate
to the other, and which the latter has a right,
not merely in foro conscientise, but juris et
de jure, to know.
Under such circumstances, the concealment
of an important fact would be improper and
unjust; it would be an undue concealment
on account of the fiduciary relation existing;
but where two parties, in the absence of any
such relation, are treating for an estate, and
the purchaser knows, from surface indications, or otherwise, by actual boring, there
is a valuable mine upon the land, the purchaser is not bound to disclose that fact to
the owner, for the means of infoi-mation on the
subject were as accessible to the owner of the
land as to the purchaser.
The i-ule stated by Chancellor Kent, at page
482, refeiTed to in the opinion in 4 Scam., supra, is that each party is bound to communicate to the other his knowledge of the material facts, provided he knows the other to
be ignorant of them, and they be not open
and naked, or equally within the reach of his
observation.
This, we admit, is a rule of moral obligation,
but not enforced in the courts. It is by them
qualified, as we have stated above, that the
party in possession of the facts must be under some special obligation, by confidence reposed,

or

otherwise,

to

communicate

them

truly and fairly, and this is the doctrine of
this court in the cases of Fish v. Cleland, 33
111. 243, and Cleland v. Fish, 43 111. 282, referred to by appellee's counsel.
It is qualified by Beach v. Sheldon, 14 Barb.
72; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Whart. 178; Knitzing
5 Pa. St. 467.
V. McElrath,
In Fox V. Mackeath, 2 Brown, Ch. 400,
Thurlow, Lord Chancellor, in delivering the
opinion in the case where undue concealment
of an important fact was charged, said:
"The doubt I have is, whether this case affords facts from which principles arise to set
aside this transaction, which will not, by necessary application, draw other cases into hazard. And, without insisting upon technical
morality, I don't agree with those who say,
that where an advantage has been taken In
a contract, which a man of delicacy would
not have taken, it must be set aside. Sup-
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pose, for instance, that A, knowing there to be
a mine in the estate of B, of which he knew
B was ignorant, should enter into a contract
to purchase the estate of B for the price of the
estate without considering the mine, could the
court set it aside? Why not, since B was not
apprized of the mine and A was ? Because B,
as the buyer, was not obliged, from the nature of the contract, to make the discovery.
It is, therefore, essentially necessary, in order
to set aside the transaction, not only that a

great advantage should be taken, but it must
arise from some obligation in the party to
Not, as Justice Story
make the discovery."
says (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § liS), from an obligation in point of morals only, but of legal
duty. In such a case he says, a court of equity
win not correct the contract merely because a
man of nice morals and honor would not liave
entered into it. Lord Eldon, in Turner v. Harvey, Jac. 178, approved the doctrine of Lord
Thurlow and the illustration of the mine, and
so does Justice Story in 1 Eq. Jur. § 207.
But we are dealing in this case with the
doctrine of suggestio falsi and not of suppressio veri, as the charge in the bill is, false representations made by appellee of the value of
the land and lots in Missouri.
There is much testimony in the record, from
which we derive the knowledge that appellee
represented to appellant, who had never been
in Missouri (appellee having resided there before coming to Bloomington), that the land
was good land, and was the land occupied by
one Judge Smith, before the Rebellion, and improved by him. This land was the south part
of section eighteen and the north part of section twenty -four, in all one hundred and sixty
acres, and was worth, probably, fifteen dollars
per acre. The land conveyed was in section
fifteen, stony, poorly timbered, and comparatively worthless. The bouse in iloutevallo,
instead of being a desirable residence, and
worth one thousand dollars, as represented
by appellee, provetl to be a mere shell, one
story high, occupied by hogs and goats, bringing not eight dollars a month rent "right
along," as represented, but unfit for human
abode, and worth, with the "lot and a half,"
not over two hundred and fifty dollars, and,
as we should judge, not at all saleable.
So
soon as appellant, by personal inspection on
a visit to the locality, discovered the facts, he
came to the conclusion appellee had imposed
upon him, and at once, on his return to
Bloomington, demanded a rescission of the
contract and a reconveyance of the Bloomington property, and tendering deeds for the Missouri property, together with appellee's note
for three hundred dollars, part of the purchase money.
This being refused by appellee,
this bill was filed by appellants, and pending
the bill the house was consumed by fire, on
which, however, appellee had effected an insurance of three thousand dollars.
The court dismissed the bill and complainants appealed.
There is no question of law made except

the one we have discussed, and there is some
conflict in the testimony, but a careful examination of it, as we find it in the record, satisfies us appellant has not received from appellee what he contracted for, and which contract he made whoUy on the representations
of appellee, which have proved to be untrue.
It is said by appellee, there was a mistake
in conveying the land as in section fifteen —
that he supposed the "Smith farm" was on
that section, but is willing and offers to convej' the land in fact occupied by Smith in sections eighteen and twenty-four, and he insists, that a mistake being made is no ground
for the rescission of the contract, as the court
can and will correct the mistake. But this
consideration should not prevail in this case,
because appellee represented the land he was
selling to be worth twenty dollars per acre,
which he had purchased but a short time previously for four dollars per acre, and he asserted to appellant that such land was selling
for twenty dollars an acre in that neighborhood. This he based upon a letter said to
have been received by him from one Selsor, a
land agent in that county.
Selsor in his deposition says, the lands he referred to in that
letter were among the best improved farms in
that portion of Cedar and Vernon counties;
he says he had no idea of fixing the price of
raw lands by these figures, and did not suppose any one would be so foolish as to attempt it.
That letter, which appellee says was burnt
up in the building when it was destroyed,
was to this effect: "We have sold within the
last two weeks ten thousand dollars worth of
land, from fifteen to twenty-five dollars an
acre." This was so construed by appellee to
appellant as to induce the latter to believe
they were lands in the neighborhood of those
he was about to purchase.
The town property was of small value.
Now, under such circumstances,
it would not
be just to allow appellee to con-ect the mistake in the laud and claim the conti-act as
made, but it would be just, as a mistake was
made by appellee in the deed, to permit the
injured party to avail of It, and, through that,
repudiate the entire contract. In a case where
false representations have been made, it is
the province of a court of equity, if applied to
for that purpose, to rescind the contract, putting the parties In statu quo.
It is claimed by appellee that the Bloomington property was taken at a very high valuation, and that he ought to be permitted to
show that appellant has received from him it?
full value.
This we do not consider as the question before us. The question is, did appellant get
what he bargained for? That he did not we
think the evidence satisfactorily shows.
Appellant's right to the insurance money
will hardly be questioned, as the building upon the lot when sold, is now represented by
that money, and after deducting the premium
paid by appellee and the cost of the additiOD
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to the building which he erecterl, and was
covered by the insurance, we are of opinion
the company should pay the balance to appel-

lant.
On the point that Mrs. Mitchell, appellant's
wife, was improperly rejected as a witness,
we think the court ruled correctly; the case
was In no correct legal sense her own case.
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The views here expressed reverse the deof the circuit court dismissing the bill.
The cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
cree

Decree

reversed.

SCOTT, J., did not hear the argument In
this case, and ga'^e no opinion.
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ALLORB
(94

Supreme

V.

JEWELL.

U. S.

506.)

Court of the United

States.

Oct.,

1876.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
estates for the Eastern district of Michigau.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
<'ourt

Alfied Kussell,
nard, contra.

for appellant. A. B. May-

Mr. Justice FIELD deli^ eied the opinion of
the court.
This is a suit brought by the heir at law of
Marie Grenevieve Thibault, late of Detroit,
Mich., to cancel a conveyance of land alleged
to have been obtained from her a few weeks
before her death, when, from her condition,
she was incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the transaction.
The deceased died at Detroit on the 4th of
February, 1S64, intestate, leaving the complainant her sole surviving heir at law. For
many years previous to her death, and until
the execution of the conveyance to the defendant, she was seised in fee of the land in
coatroversy, situated in that city, which she
occupied as a homestead.
In November,
1863, the defendant obtained from her a conveyance of this property. A copy of the conveyance is set forth In the bill.
It contains
covenants of seisin and warranty by the grantor, and immediately following
an
them
agreement by the defendant to pay her $250
upon the delivery of the instrument; an annuity of $500; all her physician's bills during
her life; the taxes on the property for that
year, and all subsequent taxes during her
life; also, that she should have the use and
occupation of the house until the spring of
1864, or that he would pay the rent of such
other house as she might occupy until then.
The property was then worth, according to
the testimony in the case, between $6,000
iund $8,000.
The deceased was at that time
between sixty and seventy years of age, and
was confined to her house by sickness, from
which she never recovered.
She lived alone,
in a state of great degradation, and was without regular attendance m her sickness. There
were no persons present with her at the execution of the conveyance, except the def end.ant, his agent, and his attorney.
The $250
stipulated were paid, but no other payment
was ever made to her; she died a few weeks
afterwards.
As grounds for cancelling this conveyance,
the complainant alleges that the deceased,
during the last few years of her life, was
afflicted with lunacy or chronic insanity, and
was so infirm as to be incapable of transacting any business of importance; that her
last sickness aggravated her insanity, greatly
weakened her mental faculties, and still more
disqualified her for business; that the defendant and his agent knew of her infirmity,
and that there was no reasonable prospect of

her recovery from her sickness, or of her long
surviving, when the conveyance was taken;
that she did not understand the nature of the
instrument; and that it was obtained for an
insignificant consideration, and in a clandestine manner, without her having any independent advice.
These allegations the defendant controverts,
and avers that the conveyance was taken
upon a proposition of the deceased; that 'at
the date of its execution she was in the full
possession of her mental faculties, appreciated the value of the property, and was capable of contracting with reference to it, and of
selling or otherwise dealing with it; that
since her death he has occupied the premises,
and made permanent improvements to the
value of $7,000; and that the complainant
never gave him notice of any claim to the
property until the commencement of this suit.
The court below dismissed the bill, whereupon the complainant appealed here. The
question presented for determination is,
whether the deceased, at the time she executed the conveyance in question, possessed sufficient intelligence to understand fully the nature and effect of the transaction; and, if so,
whether the conveyance was executed under
such circumstances as that it ought to be upheld, or as would justify the interference of
equity for its cancellation.
Numerous witnesses were examined in the
case, and a large amount of testimony was
taken. This testimony has been carefully analyzed by the defendant's counsel; and it
must be admitted that the facts detailed by
any one witness with refei-ence to the condition of the deceased previous to her last illness, considered separately and apart from
the statements of the others, do not show incapacity to transact business on her part, nor
establish insanity, either continued or temporary.
And yet, when all the facts stated by
the different witnesses are taken together,
one is led irresistibly by their combined effect
to the conclusion, that, if the deceased was
not afflicted with insanity for some years before her death, her mind wandered so near
the line which divides sanity from insanity
as to render any Important business transaction with her of doubtful propriety, and to
justify a careful scrutiny into its fairness.
Thus, some of the witnesses speak of the
deceased as having low and filthy habits; of
her being so imperfectly clad as at times to
expose immodestly portions of her person;
of her eating with her fingers, and having
vermin on her body.
Some of them testify
to her believing in dreams, and her Imagining
she could see ghosts and spirits around her
room, and her claiming to talk with them;
to her being incoherent in her conversation,
passing suddenly and without cause from one
subject to another; to her using vulgar and
profane language; to her making immodest
gestures; to her talking strangely, and making singular motions and gestures in her
neighbors' houses and in the streets.
Other
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witnesses testify to further peculiarities of
life, manner, and conduct; but none of the
p3culiantles
mentioned, considered singly,
show a want of capacity to transact business.
Instances will readily occur to every one
where some of them have been exhibited by
persons possessing good judgment in the
management and disposition of property.
But when all the peculiarities mentioned, of
life, conduct, and language, are found in the
same person, they create a strong impression
that his mind is not entirely sound; and all
transactions relating to his property will be
narrowly scanned by a court of equity, whenever brought under its cognizance.
The condition of the deceased was not improved during her last sickness. The testimony of her attending physician leads to the
conclusion that her mental infirmities were
aggravated by it. He states that he had studied her disease, and for many years had considered her partially insane, and that in his
opinion she was not competent in November,
1863, during her last sickness, to understand
executed.
a document like the instrument
The physician also testifies that during this
month he informed one Dolsen, who had inquired of the condition and health of the deceased, and had stated that efforts had been
made to purchase her property, that in his
opinion she could not survive her sickness,
and that she was not in a condition to make
any sale of the property "in a right way."
This Dolsen had at one time owned and
managed a tannery adjoining the home of
the deceased, which he sold to the defendant.
After the sale, he carried on the business as
the defendant's agent. Through him the transaction for the purchase of the property was
The deceased understood English
conducted.
Imperfectly, and Dolsen undertook to explain
to her, in French, the contents of the paper
she executed.
Some attempt is made to show
that he acted as her agent; but this is evidently an afterthought. He was in the employment of the defendant, had charge of his
business, and had often talked with him
about securing the property; and in his interest he acted throughout. If the deceased
was not in a condition to dispose of the property, she was not in a condition to appoint an
agent for that purpose.
The defendant himself states that he had
seen the deceased for years, and knew that
she was eccentric, queer, a"nd penurious. It
is hardly credible that, during those years,
carrying on business within' a few yards of
her house, he had not heard that her mind
was unsettled; or, at least, had not inferred
that such was the fact, from what he saw of
her conduct. Be that as it may, Dolsen's
knowledge was his knowledge; and, when he
covenanted to pay the annuity, some inquiry
must have been had as to the probable duration of the payments. Such covenants are
not often made without inquiries of that nature; and to Dolsen he must have looked for
information, for he states that he conversed
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with

no one else about the purchase.
With
him and with his attorney he went to the
house of the deceased, and there witnessed
the miserable condition in which she lived,
and he states that he wondered how anybody
could live in such a place, and that he told
Dolsen to get her a bed and some clothing.
Dolsen had previously informed him that she
would not sell the property; yet he took a
conveyance from her at a consideration
which, under the circumstances, with a certainty almost of her speedy decease, was an
insignificant one compared with the value
of the property.
In view of the circumstances stated, we are
not satisfied that the deceased was, at the
time she executed the conveyance, capable of
comprehending fully the nature and effect of
the transaction. She was in a state of physical prostration; and from that cause, and
her previous infirmities, aggravated by her
sickness, her intellect was greatly enfeebled;
and, if not disqualified, she was unfitted to
attend to business of such importance as the
disposition of her entire property, and the
securing of an annuity for life. Certain it is,
that, in negotiating for the disposition of the
property, she stood, in her sickness and infirmities, on no terms of equality with the defendant, who, with his attorney and agent,
met her alone in her hovel to obtain the conveyance.

It is not necessary, In order to secure the
aid of equity, to prove that the deceased was
at the time insane, or in such a state of
mental imbecility as to render her entirely incapable of executing a valid deed.
It is sufficient to show that, from her sickness and infirmities, she was at the time in a condition
of great mental weakness, and that t^ere was
gross Inadequacy of consideration for the conveyance.
From these circumstances, imposition or undue influence will be inferred. In
the case of Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, 378,
Fed. Cas. No. 6,051, a conveyance executed by
one to his son-in-law, for a nominal consideration, and upon a verbal arrangement that
it should be considered as a trust for the maintenance of the grantor, and after his death
for the benefit of his heirs, was, after his
death, set aside, except as security for actual
advances and charges, upon application of his
heirs, on the ground that it was obtained from
him when his mind was enfeebled by age and
"Extreme weakness," said Mr.
other causes.
Justice Story, in deciding the case, "will raise
an almost necessary presumption of Imposition, even when it stops short of legal incapacity; and though a contract, in the ordinary
course of things, reasonably made with such a
person, might be admitted to stand, yet if it
should appear to be of such a nature as that
such a person could not be capable of measuring its extent or importance, its reasonableness or its value, fully and fairly, it cannot be
that the law is so much at variance with common sense as to uphold It." The case subsequently came before this court; and, in de-
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elding it, Mr. Chief Justice Marsliall, spealiing of ttiis, and, it would seem, of other deeds
by the deceased, said: "If these
executed
deeds were obtained by the exercise of undue
influence over a man whose mind had ceased
to be the safe guide of his actions, it is against
conscience for him who has obtained them to
derive any advantage from them. It is the
pecuhar province of a court of conscience to
That a court of equity will
set them aside.
interpose in such a case Is among its bestHarding v. Handy, 11
settled principles."
Wheat. 125.
The same doctrine is announced in adjudged
cases, almost without number; and it may be
stated as settled law, that whenever there is
great weakness of mind in a person executing
a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper
and seasonable application of the injured paror heirs, Interfere
ty, or his representatives
and set the conveyance aside. And the present case comes directly within this principle.
In the recent case of Kempson v. Ashbee, 10
Ch. Cas. 15, decided in the court of appeal in
chancery in England, two bonds executed by
a young woman, living at the time with her
mother and steji-father,— one, at the age of
twenty-one, as surety for her step-father's
debt, and the other, at the age of twenty -nine,
to secure the amount of a judgment recovered
on the first bond, — were set aside as against
her, on the ground that she had acted in the
transaction without independent advice; one
of the justices observing that the court had
endeavored to prevent persons subject to influence ft-om being induced to enter into transactions without advice of that kind. The principle upon which the court acts in suh cases,
of protecting the weak and dependent, may always be invoked on behalf of persons in the
situation of the deceased spinster in this case,
of doubtful sanity, living entirely by herself,
without friends to take care of her, and conAs well on
fined to her house by sickness.
this ground as on the ground of weakness of
mind and gross inadequacy of consideration,
we think the case a proper one for the interference of equity, and that a cancellation of
the deed should be decreed.
The objection of the lapse of time — six years
— before bringing the suit cannot avail the deIf during this time, from the death
fendant.
of witnesses or other causes, a full presenta-

tion of the facts of the case had become Impossible, there might be force in the objection.
But as there has been no change in this reit does
spect to the injury of the defendant,
not lie in his mouth, after having, in the manner stated, obtained the property of the deceased, to complain that her heir did not sooner bring suit against him to compel its surrender. There is no statutory bar in the case.
The improvements made have not cost more
than the amount which a reasonable rent of
the property would have produced, and the
complainant, as we understand, does not object to allow the defendant credit for them.
And as to the small amount paid on the execution of the conveyance, it is sufficient to
observe, that the complainant received from
the administrator of the deceased's estate only
?113.42; and there is no evidence that he ever
knew that this sum constituted any portion
of the money obtained from the defendant.
A
decree must, therefore, be entered for a cancellation of the deed of the deceased and a
surrender of the property to the complainant,
but without any accounting for back rents,
the improvements being taken as an equivalent for them.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded with
directions to enter a decree as thus stated.
Mr. Chief Justice WAITE and Mr. Justice
STRONG, concur.

I canMr. Justice BRADLEY (dissenting).
not concur in the judgment given in this case.
Were there no other reason for my dissent, it
would be enough that the complainant has
He knew
been guilty of inexcusable laches.
in
every thing of which he now complains,
February, 1864, when the grantor of the defendant died, and when his rights as her heir
vested; and yet he waited until six years and
nine months thereafter before he brought this
suit, and before he made any complaint of the
Meanwhile, he accepted
sale she had made.
the money the defendant had paid on account
of the purchase, and he stood silently by, asserting no claim, while the defendant was
making valuable improvements upon the lot.
at a cost of $6,000 or $7,000, a sum about
equal to the value of the property at the time
of the purchase. To permit him now to assert that the sale was invalid, because the
vendor was of weak mind, is to allow him to
reap a profit from his own unconscionable silence and delay.
cannot think a court of
equity should lend itself to such a wrong.
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TATE

T.

WILLIAMSON.

(2 Ch.

Court of Appeals

App. 55.)

In Chancery.

Dec.

17,

1866.

This was an appeal by the defendant,
Robert 'Williamson, from a decree of Vice
Chancellor Wood, setting aside a sale, on
the ground that the purchaser stood in a
fiduciary relation to the vendor, and did not
make a full disclosure to him of all material
facts within his knowledge relating to the
value of the property. The facts of the case
fully appear in the report of the case before
the vice chancellor (L. R. 1 Eq. 52S) and the
Judgment of the lord chancellor.
Mr. W. M. James, Q. C, and Mr. Little,
in support of the decree. Attorney General
(Sir J. Rolt), and Mr. Bristowe, for the appellant.
Solicitors for the plaintiff:
Messrs. N. C.
& C. Milne.
Solicitors for the appellant: Messrs. Clowes
& Hickley.

LORD CHELMSFORD, L. C. In this case
the vice chancellor has made a decree that
an agreement for the sale by the intestate,
William Clowes Tate, to the defendant, Robert Williamson, of the undivided moiety of
an estate called the "Whitfield Estate," in
the county of Stafford, consisting of messuages, lands, and coal mines, ought to be set
aside, upon the ground of the defendant not
having communicated to the intestate all
the information which he had acquired with
reference to the value of the property, and,
in particular, of his not having communicated an estimate of the value of the mines
which was obtained by the defendant pending the agreement.
The question raised by the appeal is
whether any such relation existed between
the defendant and the intestate as to render
it the duty of the defendant to make the
eommunication.
The jurisdiction exercised by courts of
equity over the dealings of person.s standing
in certain fiduciary relations has alwaj-s been
regarded as one of a most salutary description. The principles applicable to the more
familiar relations of this character have been
long settled by many well-known decisions,
but the courts have always been careful not
to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining
the exact limits of its exercise.
Wherever
two persons stand in such a relation that,
while it continues, confidence is necessarily
reposed by one, and the influence which natlu'ally grows out of that confidence is posis
sessed by the other, and this confidence
abused, or the infiuence is exerted to obtain
an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of
his position will not be permitted to retain
the transaction
advantage, although
the
could not have been impeached if no such
•confidential relation had existed.
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Did, then, the defendant, R. Williamson,
when he put himself in communication with
the intestate, clothe himself with a character which brought him within the range
of the principle?
In considering this question, it will be necessary to bear in mind the situation of both
the parties at the time when the agreement
for the ,sale of the propt-rty was entered
into.
The intestate, when he was quite an infant,
had become possessed of the property in
question independently of his father. He
contracted habits of extravagance at the university, and in consequence
of some displeasure which he had occasioned to his
father on the subject of his debts, the father's doors were closed against him. He was
thus thrown upon the world at an early age
without any one to control him, and with
scarcely a friend to counsel him, and towards
the close of his life he became addicted to
drinking and died prematurely at the age
of twenty-four. The defendant is the nephew
of Mr. Hugh Henshaw
Williamson,
the
great uncle by marriage of the intestate,
who had been the ti-ustee and manager of
the property, and the receiver of the rents,
which latter duty the defendant had for some
short time been deputed to perform for him.
It does not appear that the defendant by
his employment acquired any particular information respecting the property, but as
he states in his answer that he had "previously" (to his first interview with the in"some idea of endeavoring to be
testate)
the purchaser of the estate, in case the same
should come into the market," it is reasonable to supiiose that he was not altogether
ignorant of its character, and must have
foi-med some idea of its value.
I think no stress can be laid upon the circumstance of Mr. H. H. Williamson having
been the trustee of the property. The trusteeship,
as to the intestate's moiety,
had
come to an end upon his attaining his majority, in July, 1857. The accounts had been
settled, and Mr. Williamson, in surrendering
his ti'ust, had behaved generously to the inThough he continued after this petestate.
riod to receive the rents and manage the
property, yet there appears to have been
nothing in the oflice which he undertook
after his trusteeship expired which would
have preveuted his dealing with the intestate upon the same terms as a mere stranger. Much less could the mere receipt of
the rents for his uncle have placed Robert
Williamson in a different position from that
of any ordinaiy purchaser. But a new and
peculiar relation arose out of the circumIn the
stances which afterwards occurred.
year 1859 the debts which the intestate owed
at the university were causing him considerable embarrassment. He had been pressed
by Mr. Holloway, acting for his Oxford creditors, for payment of an amount of £1,000.
He was unable, in consequence of the unfor-
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tunate quarrel with his fatlier, to apply to
him for advice, and, having before experienced the kindness of Mr. H. H. Williamson, he turned to him again in his difficulThe letter by which the intestate made
ties.
is
his situation known to Mr. Williamson
not forthcoming. The defendant, in his answer, says that he was informed by Mr. H.
H. Williamson that it stated he was again
involved, and either asked for assistance,
or for advice as to the mode of procuring
assistance.
I should have been glad if we
could have seen the terms of this letter, as
it might have explained the exact nature of
the offlce which Mr. Williamson was asked
to undertake. In the answer to this letter,
dated the 30th of July, 1859, which is set
out in the bill, in paragraph 52, Mr. Williamson invited the intestate to his house,
and desired him to bring with him "a correct account of his debts, omitting nothing,
and he would see what could be done."
The intestate did not accept the invitation,
and nothing more was heard of the matter
until about the 26th of August following,
when Mr. H. H. Williamson received a list
of the intestate's debts due to Oxford credto
itors, amounting, as already mentioned,
£1,000. The defendant, in his answer, says
"that the list was given to him by Mr. H.
H. Williamson, and that he, after perusing
the same, remarked that the charges were
excessive, and that the bills might probably
that Mr.
be settled for half the amount;
H. H. Williamson thereupon requested him
to see the intestate, and ascertain upon what
terms he could be relieved from his debts,
and, if this could bo done for £500 or a
little more, he authorized the defendant to
■advance
the intestate that amount on further security of the property." The defendant accordingly wrote to the intestate on
the 26th of August, 1859, the letter, which
is set out in paragraph 58 of the bill, in
which he states that his uncle is not sufficiently well to attend to business; that the
list of debts owing forms a very heavy
amount, which Mr. HoUoway expects to have
paid immediately; and adds, "I wUl meet
you in the course of a few days in London,
upon having a couple of days' notice, and,
after hearing your views on the subject, will
talk over the matter, and see in what way
it can be arranged." The counsel for the
defendant say that his office was merely
to see whether a compromise of the debts
could be effected, and that, at the time of
the purchase,
his mission was at an end.
One can hardly believe that his advice and
assistance could have been understood to
be of this limited character. He knew that
Mr. Holloway was pressing for immediate
payment to the Oxford creditors, and that
if he refused to reduce the amount the whole
must be paid. It does not appear that, if
Mr. Holloway had insisted on a payment
in full, Mr. H. H. Williamson would not have
been disposed to advance a larger sum than

that which he had mentioned, as the property would have been an ample security for
any amount required to cover the whole
of the debts. And tl\e defendant must have
aware that the intestate's,
been perfectly
property in Staffordshire was the only fund
out of which the debts could be discharged.
The account of the defendant's interview
with the intestate we have from the answer
He states that he offered to negotiate
alone.
with the intestate's creditors for an abatement of their claims, telling him "that he
was authorized by his uncle to advance £500
or more if required" (I suppose he must have
added "upon the security of the property"),
"but that the intestate positively refused to
allow him to ask for any deduction from his
debts, saying that any such application would
injure his character." The answer then pro"But he at the same time stated that
ceeds:
he was desirous to sell his share of the WhitMr. Bristowe, for the defendfield estate."
ant, said the instant the intestate refused to
allow any attempt to compromise his debts,
the defendant's office of adviser came to an
end, and from that moment the parties, to use
were dealing "at
expression,
the familiar
I cannot accept this view of
arms' length."
the defendant's iwsition. I think that his visit
to London was not solely for the compromise,
but generally for the arrangement of the intestate's debts; that he came with authority
which Involved a dealing with the property of
the intestate, as he was to advance his uncle's
money on the security of this property. And
it may be observed that he had his attention
particularly directed to the mode of satisfying
the debts by a mortgage.
He knew, too, that
if the payment of the debts in full was insisted upon, and his uncle refused to advance
a larger sum than "£500 or a little more," a
sufficient amount to discharge all the debts
could easily be raised upon the security of the
property, which was subject only to a mortgage for £1,000. It seems to me that the defendant had placed himself in a position which
rendered it incumbent upon him to give the
best advice to the Intestate
how to relieve
himself from his debts, and no one can doubt
that if his judgment had been unbiased that
he would have recommended a morlgage, and
not a sale. But it appears, from the defendant's own statement, that he had a reason for
not giving his advice.
As already stated, he
had previously thought of purchasing the
estate in case it should come into the market
for sale, "an event," he says, "he thought was
not unlikely to happen." I asked the defendant's counsel what he understood by these
words, and was answered that the defendant's
expectation was founded upon the inconvenient nature of property consisting of an undivided moiety.
This may have first led the
defendant to expect that he might have an
opportunity of purchasing the property at no
distant period, but his belief in the probability of a sale must have been considerably
strengthened at the time of his interview with
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from the knowledge he had of
his embarrassments. Whether the conversation between the defendant and the intestate
turned so abruptly from the intestate's refusal
to compromise his debts, to the expression of
his desire to sell his share of the Whitfield
estate, as represented by the defendant or not,
it is quite clear to my mind that the confidential relation between the parties had not
terminated when the negotiation for the purchase of the property by the defendant commenced, and that he did not then, or at any
time afterwards, stand in the situation of an
ordinary purchaser.
This being so, the defendant, pending the
agreement, was bound to communicate all the
information he acquired which it was material
for the intestate to know In order to enable
him to judge of the value of his property. It
was admitted that the valuation of Mr. Cope
was in the hands of the defendant at the time
he wrote his letter of the 10th September, 1859.
The defendant is charged with making untrue representations in that letter. If he had
done so, it would of course strengthen the
case against him, but I find nothing in the
letter which amounts to a misrepresentation,
nor anything more than a disparagement of
the property, not uncommon with a purchaser
when he desires to stimulate the owner of
the property to close with his offer.
Having stated my opinion with regard to
the duty cast upon the defendant to communicate Cope's valuation to the intestate, it seems
unnecessary to pursue the case further. The
fair dealing, in other respects, of the defendant during the negotiation, and before the
agreement was signed, becomes almost irrelevant.
The refusal of the solicitors to proceed with the agreement unless the young
man had some legal assistance, the recommendation of the defendant that the intestate
should apply to his father for advice, the opportunity afforded him pending the negotiation of consulting any friends who were
capable of advising him, the reference to Mr.
Payne whether merely for the purpose of
completing the agreement, or to afford the intestate an opportunity of obtaining his opinion
as to the value, all these considerations are of
when once it is established
no consequence,
that there was a concealment of a material
fact, which the defendant was bound to dis-

the intestate,

close.

Nor, after this, is it of any Importance to
ascertain the real value of the property.
Even if the defendant could have shewn
that the price which he gave was a fair one,
this would not alter the case against him.
The plaintiff, who seeks to set aside the sale,
would have a right to say, "You had the
means of forming a judgment of the value of
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property in your possession, you were
bound, by your duty to the person with whom
you were dealing, to afford him the same opportunity which you had obtained of determining the sufficiency of the price which you
offered; you have failed in that duty, and
the sale cannot stand." But, in truth, there

are strong grounds for thinking that the price
agreed to be paid by the defendant is quite
inadequate to the value of the property. Thereis no occasion to weigh the opposite opinion
of the engineers and surveyors, and to form
a conclusion from them.
It is sufficient to
take the valuation of the mines by Cope,
amounting to £20,000, and the valuation of
the surface by the defendant's own witnesses,
ranging from £10,000 to £11,290, and making
every allowance for a reduction of the value
of the intestate's share, in consequence of its
being an undivided moiety, it will appear
that the value, by the defendant's own shewing, must have been at the least £14,000. For
this property the defendant agreed to pay
£7,000 apparently about half the value, and
that not at once, but £1,500 was to be advanced to the intestate, which was to bear
interest till the day for the completion of the
piu-chase, which advance must have been intended to enable the intestate to pay off his^
debts immediately; £2,000 was to be paid on
the 25th JIarch, 1860, and the residue by yearly instalments in the four following years.
It appears to me, upon a careful review of
the whole case, that it would be contrary to.
the principles upon which equity proceeds, in.
judging of the dealings of persons in a fiduciary relation, to allow the purchase by the defendant, Robert Williamson, to stand.
I am satisfied that the defendant had placed
himself in such a relation of confidence, by his
undertaking the office of arranging the Intestate's debts by means of a mortgage of his.
property, as prevented him from becoming a
purchaser of tiiat property without the fullest
communication of all material information
which he had obtained as to its value; that
this openness and fair dealing were the more
necessary when he was negotiating with an
extravagant and necessitous young man, deprived at the time of all other advice, eager
to raise money, and apparently careless in
what manner it was obtained; and the defendant having, by concealment of a valuation which he had privately obtained, procured a considerable advantage In the price
which the seller was induced to take, and
which even the defendant's witnesses prove
he cannot be perto be grossly inadequate,
mitted so to turn the confidence reposed in
him to his own profit, and the sale ought to
Decree affirmed. Petition of
be set aside.
appeal dismissed, with costs.
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COWEE
(75

V.

CORNELL.

N. Y. 9].)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov.

12, 1878.

Appeal from order of the general term of
the supreme court in the Third judicial department, reversing a judgment entered upon
the report of a referee.
Plaintiff made a claim against the estate of
Ijatham Cornell, of vyhose "svill defendants
were the executors, for Interest upon a promThis
issory note executed by the deceased.
<-laim w'ds rejected, and was referred hy stipulation.
The facts, as stated by the referee, are in
substance as follows:
Latham Cornell, the deceased, was the
grandfather of Latham C. Strong. He was
possessed of large property, consisting of real
estate and of personal property invested in
stocks, bonds and other securities. He died
in 187G at the age of ninety-five. For four
prior to his death he was partially
•years
blind.
From July, 1871, until the time of
liis death, his grandson at his request attended to his affaii's, writing his letters, looking after his banking business and his rents,
making out his bills, cutting off his coupons,
reading to him, and on occasions going away
In
from home to transact other business.
July, 1871, Cornell gave to Strong a deed of
two adjoining houses in the city of Troy,
valued at about $32,000, in one of which
houses the grandfather lived imtil the time
of his death.
The grandson moved into the
adjoining house in the spring of 1872, and
I'esided there until after his grandfather's
During the time that the two thus
death.
they were in
lived in adjoining residences,
daily conference upon business matters of the
old gentleman, in the house occupied by the
The grandson with his family
grandson.
consisting of live persons, during all this time
lived at the sole expense of the grandfather,
and claims to have received, in addition to
the note in suit, as gifts from his grandfather, $30,000 in government bonds and the
assignment of a mortgage for about $1,700.
At what particular time it is claimed these
Mr. Corgifts were made is not in evidence.
uell made his will in 1871, providing a legacy
of $15,000 for Mr. Strong. In the fall of
1872, Mr. Strong expressed a desire to go into business for himself and to be indei^endent
of his grandfather, and actually was in tegotiation with different persons in Troy and
New York with a view of forming business
Mr. Cornell became uneasy at
associations.
the prospect of losing the services of his
grandson and caused him to be written for
Mr. Strong came back to
to come home.
Troy, and his grandfather said to him then,
as he had previously said, that he wanted
him to give up his ideas of leaving and to
devote his whole time to the business of his
Mr. Cornell further said that
grandfather.
he had no one else to look after his business,
and frequently said that there was money

Mr. Strong immeenough for all of them.
diately abandoned his business projects and
devoted his whole time and attention to his
grandfather's business, until the death of the
latter. After this Mr. Cornell sent for his
legal advisers and proposed to alter his will
his
so as to make provision to compensate
grandson for having devoted himself to his
What provision was intended is
business.
The lawyers
not disclosed by the evidence.
advised that his will be left unaltered, and
that he take some other way of compensating his grandson. Mr. Cornell gave to Mr.
Strong the note in question. It is as follows:
Troy, April 1, 1873. Five years
"$20,000.
after date I promise to pay Latham L. C.
Strong, or order, $20,000, for value received,
with interest yearly. L. Cornell."
The note was on a printed form, the name
of the payee being printed "Latham Cornell."
The note was filled up in the handwriting of
the maker, but in striking out with his pen
the name of the payee he left the word
"Latham" and afterwards interlined the full
name, "L. C. Strong."
Annexed to the note
was a stub with some printed forms, on
which Mr. Cornell wrote: "Troy, April 1st,
1873, L. C. Strong, $20,000 at five years, to
make the amount the same as Chas. W.
Cornell." The stub was on the note when it
was delivered to the paj'ee, but was torn oft
by him before it was transferred to the plaintiff'; and there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever knew of the existence of the stub.
The stub and note were taken from a blank
book which belonged to decedent.
No payment of Interest was made upon the note
during the lifetime of the maker. The referee found that the note was given for a
valuable consideration. Jlr. Strong sold the
note to the plaintiff for $19,000, taking his
note, payable in one year after date.
What
that date was has not been disclosed.
Mr.
Strong testified at the trial that he still held
the note.
Mr. Strong was one of the executors.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.

Irving Browne, for appellant. John

TTiomp-

son, for respondents.

HAND. .7. The counsel for respondents
suggested
at the close of his argument before us that there was no evidence of a delivery of the note to Strong, the payee, and
the finding of delivery by the referee was
entirely unsupported. He does not however
make this a point in his printed brief, and

did not present it strenuously or with any
emphasis in his oral remarks.
It is true that the evidence in this respect
was not very satisfactory.
Ordinarily the
possession and prodiiction of the note by the
payee will raise a presumption of delivery
to him. But this presumption must be very
is
much weakened when the possession
shown not to precede the possession of all
the maker's papers and effects by the payee
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as executor, when the note appears to have of the case.
Strong certainly had had and
the deceased knew that he had had property
been all In the handwriting
of the maker
of the value of $32,000 given him before the
and to have been taken with a stub attached,
date of this note, and perhaps $30,000 more
also in his handwriting, from a bank book
in bonds. The $20,000 note could not have
belonging to him, and wlien installments of
been therefore as the general term supposes,
interest falling due in the maker's life-time
a gift to make him equal in gifts with his
were not paid and although years elapsed
cousin Charles, to whom only $20,000 had
after they so became due before his death
been given in all.
there is no proof of any demand of them by
But not only do the circumstances show
the payee or recognition of liability by the
I am not prepared to say however that the memorandum could not mean that
deceased.
this gift of the $20,000 to Strong would
that these circumstances absolutely destroy
make him equal in gifts to Charles, but the
the presumption from possession and producmemorandum itself does not say so. Its
tion of the instrument. While some evidence
language is "to make the amount the same
on the part of the plaintiff, showing that the
as Chas.
W. Cornell." While, as has alnote had been delivered to Strong in his
ready been said, there is probably insupergrandfather's life-time, or at least negativable difliculty in discovering precisely all
ing the idea that Strong found it in the bankthat the deceased meant by this expression,
hook or among the papers of the deceased
its intrinsic sense is merely that the amount
when he took possession of them as executor,
could probably have been easily produced if of this note, $20,000, is so fixed to make it
the same as an amount possessed in some
consistent with the fact, yet we cannot hold
way by Charles, and this is consistent with
its absence conclusive against the plaintiff
both amounts being gifts, or the one being
upon this point, upon the record as it stauds.
No motion for judgment or to dismiss was- fixed upon in the testator's mind as a fair compensation for Strong's services and at the
made on this ground by the respondents alsame time equal to an amount he had given
though the trial was in other respects treated
ty the counsel on both sides as one before a or intended to give to Charles. On the whole
I think this memorandum was a piece of
referee appointed in the ordinary way to
evidence to be submitted with the other evihear and determine and direct judgment as
dence to be considered by the referee on the
in an action, and we cannot say but that if
question of fact. His decision upon all this
the plaintiff had been notified of such an obevidence cannot be disturbed by this court.
jection, the evidence would have been supThe same may be said of the proof of
The finding of the delivery by the
plied.
large gifts to Strong either all before, or
referee was not even excepted to, although
some before and some after the date of the
tliere were exceptions to the finding of connote.
Under thiese circumstances we
sideration.
in the
The reversal by the general term is not
must, I think, assume an acquiescence
stated to be upon the facts, and on the argutruth of the finding by the respondents for
ment it was conceded by the counsel for the
reasons known to them, and which if disIt
respondents to be upon the law merely.
closed would probably be entirely satisfacmay be that a finding upon all the evidence
tory.
that the note was without consideration and
The majority of the general term put their
ground
the
a gift would not be disturbed, and would be
upon
judgment
of
the
reversal
held by us as not unauthorized by the evithat it conclusively appeared from the stub
a
as
intended
was
dence. On the other hand, we cannot accede
note
that
the
attached
gift and was without consideration. In this to the proposition that a finding to the contrary, such as Las been made by the referee
I am unable to concur.
here, must by reason of the contents of this
The referee's finding that the note was deconstub or other testimony be reversed as era
valuable
for
gift
but
a
not
as
livered
in
it,
roneous in law.
sideration has some evidence to support
Strong
by
It follows that except as bearing upon unrendered
services
of
the
the proof
and the relations of parties
due influence,
to the deceased, and his abandonment of a
hereafter considered, the inadequacy of the
profession at the request of the deceased, in
services or the extravagance of the compenthe intention expressed by the latter to make
services,
are not material. That was a matter
and
sation
those
for
compensation
some
purely of agreement between Strong and the
the conversation had with his counsel not
deceased, and with which the court will not
very long liefore the date of this note, in
circumstances.
ordinary
under
interfere
whicli lie was dissuaded from making this
597; Worth v. Case,
Y.
Peck,
N.
64
it
do
V.
to
Earl
advised
and
by
will
compensation
What ap- 42 N. y. 302; Johnson v. Titus, 2 Hill, 606.
while aUve, to which he assented.
Although the consideration of a promissory
my
opinion
in
not
is
stub
the
upon
pears
note is always open to investigation between
conclusive against this result.
any
the original parties (and we agree with the
giving
in
difficulty
There is perhaps
court below that the plaintiff here has no
this
to
construction
satisfactory
entirely
deceased;
better position than Strong himself), yet as
but
the
by
the
memorandum made
chief judge in Earl v.
interpretation of the general term seems to pointed out by the
inadequacy in value of the
mere
Peck,
supra,
facts
known
the
with
my mind inconsistent
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thing bought or paid for Is never intended
by the legal expression, "want or failure of
consideration." This only covers either total
wortlUessness to all parties, or subsequent
destruction, partial or complete.
Assuming then, as I think we must, that
there was no error as matter of law in the
finding of the referee that this note was
given for a valuable consideration, and that
the adequacy of that consideration is something with which we have no concern if the
parties dealt on equal terms, the only point
remaining to consider is the relations existing between the deceased and Strong at the
date of the note.
It is insisted strenuously by the learned
counsel for the respendents that these were
such as to call for the application of the doctrine of constructive fraud, and threw upon
the plaintiff the burden of proving not only
that the deceased fully understood the act,
but that he was not induced to it by any undue influence of Strong, and that the latter
took no unfair advantage of his superior influence or knowledge.
The court below were hardly correct in the
suggestion that the plaintiff conceded this
burden to be upon himself, and for that reason, instead of resting upon the statement of
consideration in the note, gave evidence in
opening his case of an actual consideration;
for this may have been done to show in the
first instance that the note was not a gift
and hence void under the law applicable to
gifts. Indeed it appears from the findings
and refusals to find, and the opinion of the
referee, that such was not the theory upon
which the action was tried or decided.
We return then to the question whether
this case was one of constructive fraud. It
may be stated as universally true that fraud
vitiates all contracts, but as a general thing
it is not presumed but must be proved by
the party seeking to relieve himself from an
obligation on that ground. Whenever, however, the relations between
the contracting
parties appear to be of such a character as
to render it certain that they do not deal on
terms of equality, but that either on the one
side from superior knowledge of the matter
derived from a fiduciary relation, or from
overmastering influence, or on the other from
weakness,
dependence or trust Justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is
rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it
is Incumbent upon the stronger party to show
afiirmatively that no deception was practiced,
no undue infiuence was used, and that all
was fair, open, voluntary and well understood.
This doctrine is well settled. Hunt,
J., Nesbit V. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167; Story,
Eq. Jur. § 311; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268;
Huguenin v. Basely, 13 Ves. 105, 14 Ves.
273, and 15 Ves. 180; Wright v. Proud, 13
Ves. 138; Harris v. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 40;
Edwards v. ilyrick, 2 Hare, f»; Hunter v.
Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 113. And this is

I

think the extent to which the well-considered cases go, and is the scope of "constructive
fraud."
The principle referred to, it must be reIs distinct from that absolutely
membered.
forbidding a purchase by a trustee or agent
for his own benefit of the subject of a trust,
and charging it when so purchased with the
trust. That amounts to an incapacity in the
fiduciary to purchase of himself. He cannot
act for himself at all, however fairly or innocently, in any dealing as to which he has
duties as trustee or agent. The reason of
this rule is subjective. It removes from the
trustee, with the power, all temptation to
commit any breach of trust for his own benefit But the principle with which we are
now concerned does not absolutely forbid the
dealing, but it presumes it unfair and fraudulent unless the contrary is affirmatively
shown.
This doctrine, as has been said. Is well
settled, but there is often great difficulty in
applying it to particular cases.
The law presumes in the case of guardian
and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, and perhaps physician
and patient, from the relation of the parties
itself, that their situation is unequal and of
the character I have defined; and that relation appearing itself throws the burden upon
the trustee, guardian or attorney of showing
the fairness of his dealings.
But while the doctrine is without doubt tO'
be extended to many other relations of trust,,
confidence or inequality, the trust and confidence, or the superiority on one side and
weakness on the other, must be proved im
each of these cases; the law does not presume them from the fact for instance that
one party is a grandfather and old, and the
other a grandson and young, or that one is
an employer and the other an employe.
The question as to parties so situated is ai
question of fact dependent upon the circumstances in each case. There is no presumption of inequality either way from these relations merely.
In the present case it cannot be said that
the fact that the deceased employed Strong
as his clerk to read and answer his letters
and cut off his coupons, and make out his
bills, or as his bailiff to collect his rents, or
that at this time he was old and of defective
vision, or that Strong lived near him and
was his grandson, taken separately or together raise a conclusive presumption of law
that their situation was unequal, and that
dealings between them as to compensation
for these services were between a stronger
and a weaker party, a fiduciary in hac re
and the party reposing confidence.
Theserelations as a matter of fact may have led
to or been consistent with controlling influence on the part of the grandson, or childish
weakness and confidence on the part of thegrandfather, but this was to be shown, and
is not necessarily derivable or presumable-
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from the relations themselves, as In the case

of trustee, attorney or guardian.
From these relations and the large gifts

to Strong, and
shown from the deceased
from the extravagant amount of the compensation in the note, it is very possible the
referee might have found as a fact the existence of weakness on the one side, or undue strength on the other, which rendered
applicable the doctrine of constructive fraud,
and threw upon the plaintiff the burden of
disproving such fraud. These circumstances
may have well been of a character, if not
sufficient to shift the presumption, at least
to authorize a setting aside of a contract
without any decisive proof of fi-aud, but upon the slightest proof that advantage was
taken of the relation, or of the use of "any
arts or stratagems or any undue means or
the least speck of imposition." Whelan v.
Whelan, 3 Cow. 538, Lord Eldon, L. C; Harris V. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 40, Lord Brougham; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 135.
But the referee not only has not found as
fact any inequality in the situation of the
deceased and Strong, but refused to find as
a matter of law its existence, and there is
really no evidence whatever of any arts or
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stratagems or "speck of imposition" on the
part of Strong as to this note.
We are not permitted to supply these findings even if we thought them proper for the
referee to make, nor can we sustain a reversal of the original judgment upon facts
not found and not necessarily inferable from
uncontradicted evidence in the case, the general term not having in any way interfered
with the findings of the referee.
On the whole therefore we reach the conclusion that there was no good reason for
disturbing
the judgment of the referee.
This large claim upon the estate of the deceased is not so clearly justified and explained in the evidence as we could have wished,
and the circumstances are such as to compSl
this court to look upon the case, if not with
suspicion, certainly with anxiety, yet after
careful examination we can find no material
error in the original decision.
The order granting a new trial must be
reversed and judgment for plaintiff affirmed,
with costs.

All

concur, except

JIILIjBR

,T.I., absent.

.Tudgment

accordingly.

and
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ROSS

V.
(28

CONWAY
Pac.

785,

et al.

(No. 13,341.)

92 Gal. 632.)

Supreme Court of California.

Jan.

6, 1892.

Department 2. Appeal from superior
court, Sonoma county; S.K. Doughekty,
Judge.
Suit by James E. Ross against John M.
Conway et al. to annul, on the ground of

made by
undue influence, a trust-deed
his mother,
Elizabeth G. Ross, for the
Plaintiff had judgbenefit of delendanls.
ment, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Georffe D. Collins and Genrffe A. Johnson, (/). M. Delmas, of counsel,) for appellants. John A. Wright, for respondent.

HARRISON,

J.

The plaintiff, as the sole
Elizabeth G. Ross,
brought this action to cancel and annul
two certain deeds of trust conveying certain real estate in Santa Rosa, executed
by his mother, August 11, 1888, and August 18, 1888, respectively, alleging that at
the time of their execution
his mother
was weak in body, and that her mind was
impaired, and that the defendant Conway, who was the pastor of the Roman
Catholic church of Santa Rosa, of which
she had been for many years a member,
and who was also her spiritual adviser,
had thereby acquired great influence over
her, and, taking advantage of such influence and of her mental weakness, had
caused her to execute the said deeds of
trust for the benefit of himself aud of the
church of which he was the pastor. The
defendants denied these allegations, and
the cause was tried by the court, a jury
having been called in as advisory to the
court upon certain issues. The verdict of
the jury and the findings of the court
were in support of tbe allegations of the
complaint, and judgment was rendered in
■favor of the plaintiff. A motion for a new
trial having been made and denied, an
appeal has been taken from both the judgment and the order denying a new trial.
The two deeds of trust aresubstantially
thesame, the last one having been executed
merely for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous description in the first. Under
the trust created by the deeds the trustees are directed to sell one of the parcels
of land "as soon as practicable," and out
of the proceeds thereof apply $8,000 in the
improvement of the other parcel, and pay
the remainder of the proceeds to the defendant Conway. Out of the income to
be derived from the parcel to beimproved,
$75 per month was to be paid to the plaintiff, and the remainder monthly "to the
pastor of the Roman Catholic church in
Santa Rosa, to be disbursed by him in
such manner as he may deem charitable. "
Other provisions contingent upon the
death or change in circumstances
of the
plaintiff are unnecessary to be repeated
here. The issues before the court were, in
substance,
whether Mrs. Ross was, at
the respective dates on which the deeds
of trust were executed, of weak mind, or
able to comprehend the provisions of the
Instruments; and whether the defendant
Conway used the influence whicd he had
acquired over her, by virtue of being her
heir

of his mother,

spiritual adviser, for the purpose of procuring her to make such disposition of her
property. Upon these issues there was
much conflicting evidence before the court,
both in the testimony of the witnesses
who were examined, as well as in the circumstances under which the instruments
were executed, aud

the purposes held by

Mrs. Ross with reference to her son and
to the church. Upon the evidence before
it the court found in favor of the plaintiff. This finding was in accordance with
the verdict of the jury, and upon a motion for a new trial, in which the evidence
was again brought before the court for
consideration, it adhered to its former
Under these circumstances
conclusion.
we cannot disregard its finding. Inasmuch, however, as counsel have elaborately argued the facts, we have examined
the record, and are of the opinion that
the evidence fully justifies the findings of
the court.
The court finds that at the dates of the
execution of the deeds of trust Mrs. Ross
was of weak mind, and in a dying condition, and that she died on the 20th of August; that the defendant Conway was,
and had for a long time previously been,
the pastor of the Roman Catholic church
at Santa Rosa, and the spiritual adviser
of Mrs. Ross; that a confidence was reposed in him by her, and that there existed on his part an influence and apparent authority over her arising out of his
relation to her as her spiritual adviser,
and that lie took an unfair advantage of
this influence, and used this confidence
and authority for the purpose of procuring her to execute the two deeds of trust.
The court also finds that Mrs. Ross had

in December, 1887, executed a will of all
her estate, with the exception
of some
minor legacies, in favor of the plaintiff
herein, and that the provision in the deeds
of trust for the defendants, other than the
any
defendant Conwa.v,
were without
consideration from them, but were made
solely through the influence of Conway.
The rule is inflexible that no one who

holds a confidential relation towards
another shall 'cake advantage of that relation in favor of himself, or deal with
the other upon terms of his own making;
that in every such transaction between
persons standing in that relation the law
will presume that he whoheld aninfluence
over the other exercised it unduly to his
own advantage: or, in the words of Lord
Langdai.k in Casborne
v. Barsham, 2
Beav. 78, the inequality between the transacting parties is so great "that, without
proof of the exercise of power beyond
that which may be inferred from the nature of the transaction itself, this court
will impute an exercise of undue influence;" that the transaction will not be
upheld unless it shall be shown that such
other had Independent advice, and that
his act was not only the result of his own
volition, but that he both understood
the act he was doing and comprehended
its result and effect. This rule finds its
application with peculiar force in a case
where the effect of the transaction is to
divert an estate from those who, by the
ties of nature, would belts natural recipients, to the person through whose influ-
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the diversion is made, whether such
divtrsion be for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interIt
eMt of which he is the repreHentative.
has been more frequently applied to transactions between attorney and client or
gnardian and ward than to any othei
relation between the parties, but the rule
itself has its source in principles
whicli
underlie and govern all confidential relations, and is to be applied to all transactions arising out ot any relation in which
the principle is applicable. It is termed
by Lord Ei-don " that great rule of the
court that he who bargains in any matter
of advantage with a person placing confidence in him is bound to show that a
ence

reasonable use has been made of that confidence. " Gibson V. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 278. It
was said by Sir Samuel Romilly in his
Argument in Hiiguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.
" the relief stands upon a
300, that
g^encral
principle applying to all the variety of
relations in which dominion may be exer"
cised by one person over another, — a
principle which was afterwards affirmed
by Lord Cottknh.^m in Dsnt v. Bennett,
4 Mylne & C. 277, saying that he had received so much pleasure from hearing it
uttered in that argument that the recollection of it bad not been diminished by
the lapse of more than 30 years.
That the influence which the spiritual
adviser of one who is about to die has
over such person is one of the most powerful that can be exercised upon the human mind, especially if such mind is im
paired by physical weakness, is so conso'
nant with human experience as to need
no more than its statement; and in any
transaction between them, wherein the
adviser receives any advantage, a court of
equity will not enter into an investigation of the extent to which such influence
Any dealing between
has been exercised.
will be
them, under such circumstances,
set a«ide as contrary to all principles of
equity, whether the beneflt accrue to the
adviser, or to some other recipient who,
through such influeuce, may have been
made the beneficiary of the transacti(m.
These principles have been so invariably
the question has
announced whenever
arisen that a mere reference to theauthorIties will suffice. Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden,
286; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273;
Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dru. & War.
291; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Mylne & G. 269;
In re Welsh, 1 Redf. Sur. 246; Richmond's
Appeal, 59 Conn. 226, 22 Atl. Rep. 82; Ford

Hennpssy,70Mo.580; Pironiv.Corrigan,
47 N. J. Eg. 135, 20 Atl. Rep. 218; Connor
V. Ntauley, 72 Cal. 556, 14 Pac. Rep. 306 ; 1
Bigplow, Fraud, 352; Story, Eq. Jur. § 311.
The finding of the court that Mrs. Ross
did not have any independent advice upon
the subject of making the deeds of trust
is fully sustained by the evidence. It appears from the record that the attorney
who prepared the instruments was introduced to her by Conway, and that the only persons with whom she had any interview, or from whom she could receive any
edvice respecting the same, were this attorney and the defendant Conway. On
V
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of August she had expressed to
Conway a desire to make a testamentary
disposition or her property, and, upon his
suggestion that Mr. Collins was a suitoble person, she requested that he would
send him to her at the hospital where she
was lying. He thereupon sought Collins,
and, telling him the wish of Mrs. Ross,
accompanied
him to tiie hospital.
On
their way he told Collins of the mode in
which she proposed to dispose of her
property, and, after their arrival, remained in the room with them while she
was giving directions about the will, going out. however, occasionally, for short
intervals to visit other people in the hospital, and leaving the building before the
will was formally executed. Two days
later he visited Collins at his office, and,
after hearing the will read, he made toCollins a suggestion of some changes,
and whether a deed of trust would not be
preferable to a will.
An appointment
was then made between him and Collina
to meet that afternoon in the room of Mrs.
Ross at the hospital. After their arrival
at the hospital, Conway made a suggestion to her that she execute a deed of
trust instead of a will, and also other suggestions in reference to her disposition of
Only him.self and Collins
the property.
were in the room duringtbis consultation,
he, however, leaving it temporarily a
few times during the period over which
the interview extended, but remaining until Collins had received all the directions
that she gave. Assuming that, by virtue
of his relation to her, he had acquired an
influence over her, it must be held that in
the transaction under investigation there
was an undue exercise ot such influence;
that by not insisting that she should
have independent advice, and by continuing to remain in her presence during theinterview with the only other person
whom he permitted to see her, he exercised an influence over her actions which,
though unseen and inaudible, was non&
"The questhe less effective in its results.
tion is, " said Lord Eldon in Huguenin v.
Baseley, 14 Ves. 300, "not whether she
knew what she was doing, had done, or
proposed to do, but how the intention
was produced; whether all that care and
was placed round her, as
providence
against those who advised her, which
from their situation and relation with respect to her they were bound to exert
on her behalf." While the contract of

the 9tli

purchase

made

between

the

defendant

Conway and the trustees under the instruments sought to be annulled was irrelevant to any material issue before thecourt, and would have been properly exclude<l from evidence, we are unable tosee that its admission could in any way
have been prejudicial to the rights of the
appellants. The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
We concur:

LAND,

J.

DE HAVEN,

Hearing in bank denied.

J.;
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SOLXNGER

V.

EARLB.

(82 N. Y. 393.)
■Court

of Appeals

of New York.

Nov.

9, 1880.

Appeal from judgment entered upon an order reversing a judgment for plaintiff upon
SLU order overruling a demurrer to the complaint The judgment of the general term
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the
■complaint.

The facts appear in the opinion.
Abram Kling, for appellant.
Ivens, for respondents.

William M.

ANDREWS, J. The complaint alleges in
substance that the plaintiff, to induce the detendants to unite vrlth the other creditors of
Newman & Bernhard in a composition of the
debts of that firm, made a secret bargain
"With them to give them his negotiable note
for a portion of their debt, beyond the
amount to be paid by the composition agreement.
He gave his note pursuant to the bargain, and thereupon the defendants signed
the composition. The defendants transferred
the note before due to a bona fide holder,
and the plaintiff having been compelled to
pay it, brings this action to recover the money paid. The complaint also alleges that the
plaintiff was the brother-in-law of Newman,
and entertained for him a natural love and
affection, and was solicitous to aid him in
effecting the compromise, and that the defendants knowing the facts, and taking an
unfair advantage of their position, extorted
the giving of the note as a condition of their
becoming parties to the composition.
We think this action cannot be maintained.
The agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendants to secure to the latter payment of
a part of their debt in excess of the ratable
proportion payable under the composition
was a fraud upon the other creditors. The
tact that the agreement to pay such excess
was not made by the debtor, but by a third
person, does not divest the transaction of its
fraudulent character.
A composition agreement is an agreement
AS well between the creditors themselves as
between the creditors and their debtor. Bach
creditor agrees to receive the sum fixed by
the agreement in full of his debt. The signing of the agreement by one creditor is often
an inducement to the others to unite in it.
If the composition provides for a pro rata
payment to all the creditors, a secret agreement, by which a friend of the debtor undertakes to pay to one of the creditors more
than his pro rata share, to induce him to
unite in the composition, is as much a fraud
upon the other creditors as if the agreement
was directly between the debtor and such
It violates the princiiile of equity,
creditor.
and the mutual confidence as between creditors, upon which the agreement is based,
and diminishes the motive of the creditor

who is a party to the secret agreement, to act
in view of the common interest in making
Fair dealing and common
the composition.
If the
honesty condemn such a transaction.
defendants here were plaintiffs seeking to enforce the note, it is clear that they could not
Cockshott v. Bennett, 2 Term R.
recover.
763; Leicester v. Rose, 4 East, 372. The illegality of the consideration upon well-settled
The
principles would be a good defense.
plaintiff, although he was cognizant of the
fraud, and an active participator in it, would
nevertheless be allowed to allege the fraud to
defeat the action, not, it is true, out of any
tenderness for him, but because courts do not
sit to give relief by way of enforcing illegal
contracts, on the application of a party to
the illegality. But if he had voluntarily paid
the note, he could not, according to the general principle applicable to executed contracts
void for illegality, have maintained an action
to recover back the money paid. The same
rule which would protect him in an action to
enforce the note, protects the defendants in
resisting an action to recover back the money
paid upon it. Nellis v. Clark, 4 Hill, 429.
It is claimed that the general rule that a
party to an illegal contract cannot recover
back money paid upon it does not apply to
the case of money paid by a debtor, or in his
behalf, in pursuance of a secret agreement,
exacted by a creditor in fraud of the composition, and the cases of Smith v. Bromley, 2
Doug. 696, note; Smith v. Cuff, 6 Maule & S.
160; and Atkinson v. Denby, 7 Hurl. & N.
934,— are relied upon to sustain this claim.
In Smith v. Bromley the defendant, being the
chief creditor of a bankrupt, took out a commission against him, but afterward finding
no dividend Ukely to be made, refused to sign
the certificate unless he was paid part of his
debt, and the plaintiff, who was the bankrupt's sister, having paid the sum exacted,
brought her action to recover back the money
paid, and the action was sustained. Lord
Mansfield In his judgment referred to the
statute 5 Geo. II. c. 30, § 11, which avoids all
contracts, made to Induce a creditor to sign
and said:
the certificate of the bankrupt,
"The present is a case of a transgression of a
law made to prevent oppression, either on
the bankrupt or his family, and the plaintiff
is in the case of a person oppressed, from
whom money has been extorted and advantage taken of her situation and concern for
And again: "If any near relaher brother."
tion is induced to pay the money for the
bankrupt, it is taking an unfair advantage
and torturing the compassion of his family."
In Howson v. Hancock, 8 Term R. 575, Lord
Kenyon said that Smith v. Bromley was decided on the ground that the money had been
paid by a species of duress and oppression,
and the parties were not in pari delicto, and
this remark is fully sustained by reference to
Smith v. Cuff
Lord Mansfield's judgment.
was an action brought to recover money paid
by the plaintiff to take up his note given to
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the defendant, for the balance of a debt
owing by the plaintifC, which was exacted by
the latter as a condition of his signing with
the other creditors a composition.
The defendant negotiated the note and the plaintiff
was compelled to pay it. The plaintiff recovLord EUenborough said: "This is not
ered.
a case of par delictum; it is oppression on
the one side and submission on the other; it
never can be predicated as par delictum
where one holds the rod and the other bows
to it." Atkinson v. Denby was the case of
money paid directly bj' the debtor to the
creditor.
The action was sustained on the
authority of Smith v. Bromley and Smith v.
Cuff.
It is somewhat difficult to understand how
a debtor who simply pays his debt in full
can be considered the victim of oppression or
extortion because such payment is exacted by
the creditor as a condition of his signing a
compromise, or to see how both the debtor
and creditor are not in pari delicto. See remark of Parke, B., in Higglns v. Pitt, 4 Exch.
312. But the cases referred to go no further
than to hold that the debtor himself, or a
near relative who out of compassion for him
pays money upon the exaction of the creditor,
as a condition of his signing a composition,
may be regarded as having paid under duress
and as not equally criminal with the creditor.
These decisions cannot be upheld on the
ground simply that such payment is against
public policy. Doubtless the rule declared in
these cases tends to discoui-age fraudulent
transactions of this kind, but this is no legal
ground for allowing one wrongdoer to recover back money paid to another in pursuance
of an agreement, illegal as against public
policy. It was conceded by Lord Mansfield
in Smith v. Bromley, that when both parties
are equally criminal against the general laws
of public policy, the rule is "potior est conditio defendentis," and Lord Kenyon in Howson V. Hancock, said that there is no case
where money has been actually paid by one
of two parties to the other upon an illegal
contract, both being particeps criminis, an action has been maintained to recover it back.
It is laid down in Cro. Jac. 187, that "a man
shall not avoid his deed by duress of a stranger, for it hath been held that none shall
avoid his own bond for the imprisonment or
danger of any one than himself only." And
HUTCH. EQ. JUK. — 15
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in Robinson v. Gould, 11 Gush. 57, the rule
was applied where a surety sought to plead
his own coercion as growing out of the fact
that his principal was suffering illegal imprisonment as a defense to an action brought
upon the obligation of the surety given to secure his principal's release.
But the rule in
Cro. Jac. has been modified so as to allow a
father to plead the duress of a child, or a
husband the duress of his wife, or a child the
duress of the parent.
Wayne v. Sands, 1
Freem. 351; Baylle v. Clare, 2 Brownl. & G.
276; 1 RoUe, Abr. 687; Jacob, Law Diet.
"Duress."
We see no ground upon which it can be
held that the plaintiff in this case was not in
par delictum in the transaction with the defendants. So far as the complaint shows he
was a volunteer in entering into the fraudulent agreement.
It is not even alleged that
he acted at the request of the debtor. And
in respect to the claim of duress, upon which
Smith v. Bromley was decided, we are of
opinion that the doctrine of that and the subsequent cases referred to can only be asserted
in behalf of the debtor himself, or of a wife
or husband, or near relative of the blood of
the debtor, who intervenes in his behalf, and
that a person in the situation of the plaintiff,
remotely related by marriage, with a debtor
who pays money to a creditor to induce him
to sign a composition, cannot be deemed to
have paid under duress by reason simply of
that relationship, or of the interest which he
might naturally take in his relative's affairs.
The plaintiff cannot complain because the
defendants negotiated the note, so as to shut
out the defense, which he would have had to
it in the hands of the defendants. The negotiation of the note was contemplated when it
was . given, as the words of negotiability
show. It is possible that the plaintiff while
the note was held by the defendants, might
have maintained an action to restrain the
its cancellation.
transfer, and to compel
Jackman v. Mitchell, 13 Ves. 581. But It is
unnecessary to determine that question in
this case. The plaintiff having paid the note,
although under the coercion resulting from
the transfer, the law leaves him where the
transaction has left him.
The judgment should be aflBrmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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PAGE

V.

MARTIN.

(20 Atl. 46, 46 N. J. Eq. 585.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
June 21, 1890.

Appeal from
Vice-(.'hancellor.

court of chancery; Bird,

The following is the agreement referred
to in the opinion.
"Stanley, N. J., July 30, '84.
"In consideration of his keeping the line
fence dividing my land from that of the
property now occupied by S. K. Bissell,
also exclusive right of way over a strip of
land, adjoining said Bissell's line fence,
one hundred feet wide, from the river to
said woodland, for the term of five years
from August I, 1884, with the privilege of
five years' additional on the same terms.
It is further agreed that the said Page
shall have the option to purchase the desired tract and the right of way strip, at
an.v time during the continuance of this
lease, for the sum of one hundred and fifty
(150) dollars per acre, or any portion of
the tract in the same ratio of value, say
one-half the tract for one-half the sum

stated.
"In case of the sale or mortgage of the
farm by me, this tract is to be excepted.
The said Page is permitted to erect a boathouse, and make such otherlmprovements
as he may deem advisable.
"He is also permitted to inclose it by a
wire barb or other suitable fence to be
kept in repair at his sole expense.
"
Ezra G. Tolman.
[Signed]
"Witness:
Geo. Sheparu Page.

"James McGtiine."

Tbos. N. McC'a/'fer, for appallant.
dore Ranyou, for respondent.

Theo-

GARRISON, J., ( after sta ting the facts as
This bill was for the specific perabove.)
formance of an agreementto conveylands.
The attitude of courts of equity upon applications of this character may be sumFirst, that
marized in two propositions:
the relief invoked is not a matter exdebito
Jiistitise, but rests in Tlie sound discretion
of the court; and, second, that where a
contract is certain in all its parts, and for
a fair consideration, and where the party
seeking its enforcement is not himself in
default, it is as much a matter of course
for courts of equity to decree the perfoj-mance of the contract as it is for courts of
law to give damages for the breach of it.
That relief rests, not upon what the court
must do, but rather upon what, in view of
all the circumstances, it ought to do, is a
distinction which is of little orno practical
moment.
In every case of this character
the court is chiefly concerned with the
equities of the parties before it. In the
present case the party seeking the enforcement of specific performance grounds his
right upon a written contract made with
the owner of the lands, under the supposed protection of which he entered into
possession of the premises, and laid out a
large sum of money in their permanentimResistance comes, not from
provement.
the owner, but from one who, with full
notice of the above facts, purchased the
lands, and is based solely upon the alleged
Incapacity of the owner to make a valid

contract. The dismissal of the complainant's bill, under these circumstances, does
not inure to the benefit of him whose incapacity furnished the sole ground for the
In the absence of
action of the court.
fraud, its effect is simply to transfer the
improvements from him who innocently
volunteer.
made them to a speculative
The defense, being a purely legal one, must
be clearly made out by him who sets it
up. The decree in the court of chancery
dismissed the bill, with the results above
indicated. This appeal questions whether
such a disposition of the case does complete justice between the parties. The
facts necessary to an understanding of the
original transaction are briefly these:
One Ezra Tolman, who was the owner of
two acres of rough land adjoining his
other property, entered into a written
agreement in respect to said lands with
Page, a neighboring proprietor. After the
delivery of this writing. Page inclosed the
tract with wire fencing, and, with the approval of the owner, expended nearly $700
in the construction of a boat-house, and
in otherwise fitting the premises for a
pleasure park and picnic ground. This
was in the spring of 1884, In ©•'cember of
the year following, Tolman was, upon an
inquisition of lunacy, determined to be of
unsound mind ; and in 1887 his guardian
obtained an order for the sale of his lands,
and, among them, the lands in the possession of Page under the said agreement
were offered for sale. Previous to the sale
of these lands. Page notified the guardian
that, in the exercise of the option contained in his agreement with 'Tolman, he
desired to take title to the said lands, and
tendered himself ready to make payment
therefor according to the terms agreed
upon. At the sale, Martin, who is the sole
defendant in this suit, became the purchaser at precisely the same price which
Page had agreed to give. Before the bidding began, Martin was notified by Page
of his said agreement, and of the other
facts above stated. A deed for the lands
was delivered by the guardian to Martin,
but without general covenants of title.
Page then tendered to Martin the full
sum which Page was to pay, and which
Martin had paid, and upon his refusal to
convey filed hie bill in the court of chancery.
'The evidence

as to Tolman's general incapacity to transact business in 1SS4 was
so slight that we must assume what indeed was evident from the conclusions of
the vice-chancellor,
who heard the case,
that the main ground lor declaring void
his contract with Page Is its supposed inadequacy
of consideration. The inadequacy which thus becomes the controlling
feature of the case, will upon examination
be found to attach solely to the leasehold
Interest and easements which Page was
to enjoy prior to the exercise by him of his
option to purchase; and even upon these
points all inadequacy vanishes in view of

the large sum of money Immediately expended by the lessee upon the lands of his
lessor.
Where a tenant, with power to
purchase, expends in one year, on the permanent Improvement of the land, double
Its entire purchase price, It Is a refinement

I
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ol technicality to say tliat all of his rights
shall be lost because he was not, by the
terms of his lease, compelled to make these
improvements. The jurisdiction now exercised concerns itself solely with that
which conduces to justice. Moreover, the
terms of the lease are before us only as evidence of mental incapacity on the one
hand, or of mala Gdes on the other.
For
all other purposes, that portion of the
contract is excluded an <1 passed. Tlie ineistment is not that the agreement was
unfair or disadvantageous as understood
and performed between the parties to it,
but that it ie evidence of inability to contract, because advantage might have been
taken of some of its provisions by a person less scrupulous than the complainant.
The agreement in question actually resulted in changing a piece of land, valueless to
ico owner, into improved property, so that
in any event the owner became assured of
receiving the full value of his land ; for, if
the purchase fell through, he still had the
land permanently improved beyond even
the purchase price. So that, if we are to
judge of Tolman's business capacity by
the only transaction fully before us, it indicates at least average shrewdness and
foresight. As to mala tides on the part
of Page, the contract is singularly at
variance
to such a notion.
It being
admitted that he was not compelled to
put the improvements upon the land,
the fact that he did so is the strongest possible proof of good faith upon
his part. If we look to the part of the
the purchase
agreement which concerns
of the land by Page, it bears the same
evidence of entire fairness.
The price
agreed upon was $150 an acre, which, according to the testimony, was all that it
Moreover, with what force
was worth.
can this price for the bare soil be criticized by one who himself gave precisely the
same price for the same land after f 700
had been expended in its improvement?
It will not, I think, be contended that a
decree which ceries these improvements
without consideration to a mere volunteer
with notice is compelled by the equities
of the case, or that it does complete jusIcannot
tice to the partiestothis dispute.
avoid the impression that the agreement
has been viewed too rigidly as a. lease,
and too little as a contract of sale, in
which latter aspect we are now solely concerned with it. The criticism of the court
below, and much of the argument of counsel, cease to be significanc when the contract is regarded in this latter light. Thus
viewed, it is a contract of sale, plain and
fair in all its parts, wherebj' the owner
agrees to sell for a full price land valueless,
or even an expense, to him, and by which
the vendee is given a period of option, during which time he is to save the owner
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harmless, and bear himself all of the expense of care and improvement.
If there
is anything harsh or suspicious in such a
transaction, I utterly fail tp perceive it.
If Page's object had been to aca uire theland
for an inadequate price, — and, unless this
was a possible result of his contract, the
case against him falls to the ground,— he
must have known that to a man of Tolman's habits a cash sum much smaller
than the purchase price, to say nothing
of the improvements, would have been the
surest means of accomplishing his object.
The result reached in this court is that
Page had a contract fair in all its parts ;
that Tolman's incapacity to make such a
contract is not shown; that Page, infeona,
iicle reliaiice upon this contract, Improved
the property, and was entitled to a deed
upon tender of the purchase money ; that
Martin purchased with notice of the facts
out of which complainant's rights grew ;
and that complete justice will be done to
the parties to this suit by a decree that
Martin deed the property to Page upon
payment of the price paid by him for said
lands, without interest.
Upon the argument, it was insisted that
the contract set out in the bill could not
be enforced because it lacked mutuality of
obligation. In so far as this contention
rests in matter of law, the proposition Is
that a contract to convey, which at Its
inception contemplated an option in the
vendee, cannot be enforced by him after an
aflBrmative exercise of the option, because,
prior to its exercise, he v^'as under no obligation to purchase. In support of this
contention the case of Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124, is cited. That case
was, it is true, almost identical with the
one now before us; but, so far from supporting the proposition for which it is
cited, it is diametrically opposed to such
an insistment. The language of Chancellor Zabkiskie in that case is as follows :
"It is now well settled that an optional
agreement to convey without any covenantor obligation to convey, and without
any mutuality of remedy, will be enforced,
in equity, if it is made upon proper consideration, or forms part of a lease or other
contrHct between the parties that may be
the true consideration for it." Tliis case
by Chancellor
cited
was afterwards
Run YON in Scott v. Shiner, 27 N. J. Eq.l87,
as an authority for the doctrine that a
stipulation that a party shall have an option of purchase is equivalent to a conditional agreement to convey.
The complainant's case must be deemed
to be before us for consideration upon its
merits.
Let the record be remitted in order that
a decree may be entered in accordance
with the views herein expressed.
Reversed unanimously.
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BLANCHARD

v.

& L. M. R.

CO.
(31

Supreme

DETROIT, L.
Mich. 43.)

Court of Michigan.

.Tan.

Term, 1875.

Appeal from circuit court, Ionia county;

in

chancery.

Clute & Smith, for complainant.
Bell & Hutdilnson and G. V. N. Lothrop,
for defendant.

GRAVES, C. J. The court below having
dismissed the complainant's bill after hearing on pleadings and proofs, he has appealed
to this coart.
He sets up a conveyance made by himself
and vcife to the Ionia & Lansing Railroad
Company in June, 1870, of certain ground on
his farm, for a track and depot, the subsequent consolidation of that company vrith the
Detroit, Howell & Lansing Railroad Company, and the assumption by the resulting organization of the name ascribed to defendants in the title of the cause.
The consideration clause of this deed stated
that the conveyance was made "in consideration of five hundred dollars and the covenant
to build a depot hereinafter mentioned," and
following the description and preceding the
was the following clause: "But
habendum
this conveyance is made upon the express
condition that said railroad company shall
build, erect and maintain a depot or station
house on the land herein described, suitable
for the convenience of the public, and that
at least one train each way shall stop at
such depot or station each day when trains
run on said road, and that freight and passengers shall be regularly taken at such depot." Apart from these passages the deed
was in common form, and silent in regard to
a depot.
Together with other matters not
necessary to be mentioned, the bill alleged acceptance of the deed, and that the company
built the road over the land granted, and
that for some time past the consolidated organization has used and occupied the road
for running trains;
that complainant. In
granting to the company, was largely influaccommodations,
in
enced by his expected
having a depot at his place, and the rise In
value which it would caui^e to his surrounding property; that by accepting the grant
the company became bound to perform as
specified in the second of the foregoing clauses, but have totally refused to comply with,
or abide by it, and that complainant is entitled to insist on specific performance, or if
that be found improper, then to such compensation as will indemnify him.
The answer asserts, and this is admitted,
that the deed was wholly prepared by complainant's legal adviser, and that complainant refused to convey on any other terms.
The answer then avers that the clause concerning a depot, and now assumed by complainant to operate as a covenant, is not one,

nor entitled to operate as one, but is simply
and purely a condition subsequent, and that
the company, having become satisfied that
compliance with it would be detrimental to
the public interest and tbeir own, decided not
to observe it, and had therefore refused to
abide by it.
The answer also claims the benefit of a
demurrer for want of equity.
A peculiar feature of this clause is, that it
is the grantee, and not the grantor, as is almost invariably the case, who maintains that
the important clause in the grant which the
grantor relies upon as a covenant, is a condition, and one, too, which the grantee has
distinctly violated. This is the more noticeable since one of the settled rules for deciding in doubtful cases that the writing is a
covenant,
and not a condition, is based on
the idea that a condition, as tending to destroy the estate, would be less favorable to
the grantee.
4 Kent, Comm. 129, 132.
The position of these parties confounds the
reason of this rule, and would dispense with
the rule itself if the case were a doubtful
one.
Catlin v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 1
Sumn. 434, 440, Fed. Cas. No. 2,522.
The real questions necessary to be decided
will hardly admit general reasoning or nice
deductions. Aside from reasons very manifest, they depend upon authority, and can
only be lawfully determined in accordance
with principles which have been fully recognized and adjudged. And the circumstance,
that one of the parties is a natural and the
other an artificial person, giyes no significance whatever to the legal merits, nor does
it in any manner bear upon the proper exposition and application of the controlling principles.

The complainant and the other party to the
grant, being both competent, and able to act
independently and look after their respective
interests, voluntarily bargained with each
other, and complainant, being assisted
by
counsel, caused a provision couched in terms
of his own choice to be incorporated in the
grant, and the grantee deliberately accepted
the grant so drawn, and the defendant, as
successor of the grantees, expressly and finally refuses to execute the provision in question.
After insisting that this provision was binding on them in no other sense or extent than
as a condition subsequent,
and as a necessary consequence
that it affords no basis
whatever for any relief exclusively dependent upon promissory undertaking, the defendant further insists that if the controverted
clause, or rather the clause of which the nature is controverted, were to be regarded as
promissory, still its positive enforcement must
be declined in equity, first, on the ground of
public policy, and second, on the ground that
its requirements are on the one band positively unsuitable to be enforced by chancery,
and on the other hand that in many indispensable particulars the subject matter is left
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too much at large, too vague, and too much
in want of detail, to admit of execution by
the court.
j^-'iDhe first question for consideration appears
naturally to be, whether the particular clause
in the deed is a covenant or mere condition
having no promissory force; and
subsequent,
this is purely a question of authority.
The
language of the clause itself is plain and unambiguous, and the grant must have effect
according to the legal interpretation and
meaning of its terms, and not according to
any erroneous impression either party may
have formed respecting its operation.
Furbush v. Goodwin, 5 Post. (N. H.) -125.
Much stress was placed by complainant's
counsel upon the phrase in the consideration
clause, which speaks of an after-mentioned
covenant to build a depot.
Now this expression must be taken to refer to the subsequent
clause about whose operation the parties differ, or it must otherwise be taken as a mere
purposeless expression.
The reasonable opinion would seem to be,
that this statement in the consideration
clause was actually intended to refer to the
later provision respecting the depot, and to
expressly mark that ti^e right it evidenced
was part of the consideration.
It is hardly admissible to suppose that the
grantor carefully introduced this phrase, and
then omitted to insert anything to satisfy
what he considered the phrase called for.
But, conceding the expression was meant to
apply to the subsequent passage, it is another and very different question, whether it is
entitled to control the proper meaning and
It may be fully adnature of that passage.
mitted that if the terms of the main clause
were not clear and strong to fix its legal
character, or if the other portions of the instrument were such as to cause the mind to
hesitate about its legal significance, the words
of the consideration clause might be resorted
to, to help to a conclusion in harmony with
But this
the literal import of these words.
Apart from the expression
is not the case.
in the consideration clause, the subsequent
provision, as well as the residue of the instrument, is too perfectly worded and too
precise, to admit of any doubt whatever.
Independently of such first expression, there
is no ambiguity, and no obscurity.
Now, in alluding as they did, when writing
down the statement of consideration, to the
positive provision as a covenant, we may suppose that at the most the parties manifested
their opinion of the legal nature of the stipBut as this clause was precisely in
ulation.
the form desired, their opinion of the character the law impressed upon it, or their idea
of the name belonging to it, whether indicated by giving it a specific designation, or in
some other way, cannot alter its necessary
The books are full of illustralegal natm-e.
tions of this point. When an instrument or
provision is clearly and distinctly so drawn
and consummated that the law at once at-
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and determines that it possesses a
legal nature, and exclusively belongs
to a given class of transactions, the parties cannot, by arbitrarily assigning a name
to it wholly foreign to its true character,
succeed
in transforming it, and so cause
it to stand and operate in a manner wholly
alien to it.
To conclude otherwise would be
to reject the legal criteria of certainty in
written transactions. Eadcliff v. Rhan, 5
Denio, 234; Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass.
422; Pearce v. Grove, 3 Atk. 522; Rice v.
Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125; Railroad Co. v.
Trimble, 10 Wall. 3(;7; 1 Cow. & H. Notes,
211 et. seq.
Even when the legislature holds
a mistaken opinion concerning the law, it
does not change it.
Postmaster General v.
Early, 12 Wheat. 136; Talbot v. Seeman, 1
Cranch, 1; Mersey Docks v. Cameron, 11 H.
li. 443, per Lord Chelmsford, page 518; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 285.
A plain condition cannot be Converted into a perpetual
covenant by calling it one. This sentence,
then, cannot be allowed to alter the intrinsic
nature of the main provision.
In noticing
the position that the consideration clause in
the deed ought to help to an opinion that the
second clause constituted a covenant, and not
a mere condition subsequent,
we have assumed that the terms of this second clause
are so clear and explicit that there is no room
for any real question touching its intrinsic
legal nature and true denomination. A few
words may be now proper to sustain the validity of this assumption. We have seen the
language of the provision; and its position
in the instrument, as well as its authorship,
has been explained.
How do the authorities apply to it? An estate upon condition is one which has a qualification annexed, by which, on the happening of a particular event, it may be created,
If set forth, the condienlarged or destroyed.
tion is express; and if it allows the estate to
vest, and then to be defeated in consequence
it is
of non-observance of the requirement,
2 Bl. Comm. c. 10;
a condition subsequent.
4 Kent, Comm. "Of Estates on Condition";

taches,
specific

Co.

Lift.

201a, 215a, 215b, 233b, 234b, 251b;

Com. Dig. tit.
Bac. Abr. tit. "Conditions";
"Conditions";
Shep. Touch, c. 6, "Of Conditions."
The author of the Touchstone says: "Conditions annexed to estates are sometimes so
placed and confounded amongst covenants,—
sometimes so ambiguously drawn,— and at all
times have in the drawing so much alflnity
with limitations, that it is hard to discern and
distinguish them. Know, therefore, that for
the most part conditions have conditional
words in their frontispiece, and do begin therewith; and that amongst these words there are
three words that are most proper, which, in and
of their own nature and efficacy, without any
addition of other words of re-entry in the conclusion of the condition, do make the estate conditional, as: proviso, ita quod, and sub condi-
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tione. And, tlierefore, if A grants lands to B, to
have and to hold to him and his heirs, provided
that,— or so as,— or under this condition,— that
B do pay to A ten pounds at Easter next;
this is a good condition, and the estate is conditional without any more words." Page 121.
See, in addition
last cited,
to the
books

I

Washt). Real Prop., and Hil. Beal Prop. The
question whether there is a limitation or a
condition, or whether there is a condition precedent or subsequent,
or whether what is to
be expounded is a condition or covenant, or
something capable of operating both ways,
frequently becomes very perplexing in consequence of the uncertain, ambiguous, or conflicting terms and circumstances involved; and
the books contain a great many cases of the
kind, and not a few of which are marked by
refinements
and distinctions which the sense
of the present day would hardly tolerate.
Where, however, the terms are distinctly
and plainly terms of condition, where the
whole provision precisely satisfies the requirements of the definition, and where the transaction has nothing in its nature to create any
incongruity, there is no room for refinement,
and no ground for refusing to assign to the
subject its predetermined legal character. In
such a case the law attaches to the act and
ascribes to it a definite significance, and the
parties cannot be heard to say, where there
is no imposition, no fraud, no mistake, that,
although they deliberately made a condition,
and nothing but a condition, they yet meant
that it should be exactly as a covenant.
Among the numerous cases serving to illustrate the subject, which have been examined,
the following may be referred to: Michigan
State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225,
229, 230, 249-256; Merritt v. Harris, 102 Mass.
320; Tilden v. Tilden, 13 Gray, 103; Gray
V. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284; Attorney General
V. Merrimack
Manuf'g Co., 14 Gray, 586;
Allen V. Howe, 105 Mass. 241; Jackson v.
Florence, 16 Johns. 47; Jackson v. Allen, 3
Cow. 220; Livingston v. Stickles, 8 Paige,
398; Stuyvesantv. Mayor, 11 Paige, 414; Palmer V. Ft. Plain & C. Plank-Road Co., 11 N.
Y. 376; Hefner v. Yount, 8 Blackf. 4.j.j; Cross
V. Carson, Id. 138; Sperry's Lessee v. Pond,
5 Ohio, 387; Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196;
Willard v. Henry, 2 N. H. 120; Doe v. Asby,
10 Adol. & E. 71; Churchward v. Queen, L.
R. 1 Q. B. 173, per Shee, J., 211; Mead v. Ballard, 7 Wall. 290.
The cases are of course numerous where,
on controversy about the meaning or operation, the writing has been held either to create
a limitation or a covenant, or to work both
as a condition and covenant. But on examination it will appear that in all the cases in
which it has been deliberately determined
that the writing, though possessing many or
all of the characteristics of a condition, was
still susceptible of operating as a covenant,
there were grounds for claiming that promissory words existed, or at least words which,
in the light of pertinent facts, were fairly

capable of a promissory sense. Among the
cases of this class, are the following:
Spaulding V. Hallenbeck, 35 N. Y. 204; Stuyvesant
V. Mayor, ubi supra; Doe v. Watt, 8 Bam. &
C. 308.
And It is believed that no considered case
can be shown, that assumes to decide that a
writing which, like that before the court, precisely answers, in verbiage, position, and relative facts, to all the requirements of an express condition subsequent,
and stands without any thing except the hasty opinion of the
grantor to gainsay its apparent legal nature,
is either a covenant, or susceptible of being
proceeded on as a covenant, in opposition to
a claim by the grantee that it is a bare condition, and which by his non-observance
has entitled the grantor to forfeiture.
The result, upon the whole, is, that the provision relied on by complainant as a covenant
to be specifically enforced against the defendants, must be considered an express condition
subsequent,
and not a covenant, and not
specifically enforceable against defendants as
—^
one.
Having reached this conclusion, this opinion
might here end. But, as the case was fully
argued in another aspect, it is deemed admissible to go further.
Supposing it to be admitted that the provision in the grant is susceptible of being understood in a promissory sense, and is capable
of being considered as in the nature of an
agreement
by the defendants with the complainant, is it capable of specific enforcement
by the court?
.Setting
aside the objection
founded on public policy, which is not examined, are the requirements in the writing
of such a nature, and so fully and clearly
marked out, defined, identified, or indicated,
as to make specific execution by the court
practicable? We had occasion in the recent
case of Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich. 166, to submit some observations respecting the power
and duty of the court to execute agreements

for the performance of an indefinite number
and variety of future acts within the scope
of a business not distinctly and exactly mapped out and particularized,
and what was
there stated has some application here.
The jurisdiction of equity in specific performance proceeds on the supposition that the
parties have not only agreed, as between themselves, upon very material matter, but that
the matters so agreed on are of such a nature,
and the subjects of enforcement so delineated
or indicated, either directly or by reference to
something else, or so raised to view by legitimate implication, that the court can and may
collect, and in their proper relations, all the
essential elements, and proceed Intelligently
and practically in carrying into execution the
very things agreed on and standing to be performed.
If, however, it appears, either that the
things to be performed are in their nature
incapable of execution by the court, or that
needful specilications are omitted, or that
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material matters are left by the parties so obscure or undefined, or so in want of details,
or that the subjects of the agreement are so
conflicting or incongroous, that the court cannot say whether or not the minds of the parties met upon all the essential particulars, or
if they did, then can not say exactly upon
what substantial terms they agreed, or trace
out any practical line where their minds met,
the case is not one for specific performance.
As the court docs not malie contracts for
parties, so it never undertaiies to supply material ingredients which they omit to mention,
and which cannot be legitimately considered
as having been within their mutual contemplation.
And where the party to perform is
left by the agreement with an absolute discretion respecting material and substantial
details, and these are therefore indeterminate
and unincorporated until by his election they
are developed, identified, and fixed as constituents of the transaction, the court cannot
substitute its own discretion, and so by its
own act perfect and round out the contract.
If the court were to do this, it would be to
assume a right not belonging to it, but one
which the parties reserved to themselves.
Now what is it that the complainant in this
cause asks the court to execute'.'
It is— First, that defendants shall make and
maintain on the premises a depot or stationhouse, suitable for the convenience of the
public.
Second, that during all future time, when
trains run on the road, at least one train each
way shall every day stop thereat; and
Third, that in all future time freight and
passengers shall be regularly received and
discharged at such depot.
It is extremely plain that the requirements
for stopping trains and receiving and discharging freight and passengers were leading
objects, and that the building a station-house
was of secondary consideration.
The putting up of such a building could be of little
consequence if no trains stopped there.
The
other requirements should therefore be regarded as the chief subjects of complainant's
equity.
Supposing all other objections removed, is
it practicable for the court to execute them ?
May it take upon itself for all the future to
supervise the daily running and stopping of
trains, both of passengers and freight, and
the regularity of action in regard to the reception and discharge of passengers and
freight ?
If the writing embodies any promissoiy
agreement at all, It is that when and so long
as trains run on the road, one train each way
shall every day stop at this place, and also
that passengers and freight shall be there
regularly received and discharged.
Waiving all considerations of possible future action by government under the postal,
war, police, or other power, inconsistent with
any particular decree which might now be
made, can the court see that in all coming
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time these requirements are carried out?
Can it know or keep informed whether trains
are running, and what accommodations are
suitable to the public interest?
Can it see
whether the proper stoppages are made each
day? Can it take notice, or legitimately and
truly ascertain from day to day, what
amounts to regularity in the receipt and discharge of passengers and freight?
Can it
have the means of deciding at all times
whether the due regularity is observed? Can
it superintend and supervise the business,
and cause the requirements in question to be
carried out? If it can, and if it may do this
in regard to one station on the road, it may
with equal propriety, upon a like showing, do
the same in regard to all stations on the road,
and not only so, but in regard to all stations
on all the present and future roads in the
state.

That any such jurisdiction is impracticable,
appears plain, and the fault lies in the circumstance that the objects of the parties,
as they were written down by them, are by
their very nature insusceptible of execution
by the court.
In this connection we may refer to a few
cases.
Raynor v. Stone, 2 Eden, 128, was
a case for specific performance of several
stipulations by the defendant in a lease.
Among others, were agreements
to mend
hedges and fences, and keep the mansion
house and other buildings in repair. The defendant having demurred, Lord Northington
allowed the demurrer, and in the course of
his opinion observed,
that the remark of
counsel, that he had no otficer to see to performance, was very strong.
"How," he remarked, "can a master judge of repairs in
husbandry?
What is a proper ditch or fence
in one place, may not be so in another.
How
can a specific performance of things of this
kind be decreed?
The nature of the thing
shows the absurdity of drawing these questions from the proper trial and jurisdiction."
In Gervais v. Edwards, 2 Dru. & War. 80,
specific performance of an agreement
between the parties for straightening a crooked
river which divided their lands was sought,
and the contract contained stipulations for
mutual compensation for the soil which might
be shifted from one to the other, and in regard to the contingent damages which might
The complainant waived
afterwards happen.
all right on his part to future and contingent
The chancellor. Sir Edward Sugdamages.
den, refused to decree performance, however,
and some of his observations are so explicit
a!ud appropriate, that a somewhat extended
quotation will not be deemed objectionable.
He said: "As tar as the merits of the case
go, I would decree the specific execution of
this contract; but I do not see how it is possible. If I execute it at all, I must execute
it in toto; and how can execute it prospectively?
The court acts only on the principle
of executing it in specie, and in the very
terms in which it has been made; therefore,

I
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wben you come to tlie specific execution of a
contract containing many particulars, you
may see that it is possible to execute it effectively.
The court cannot say that when
an event arises hereafter, it will then execute It.
In the case of a decree for the execution of a contract for the sale of timber, it is
no objection that it is to be cut at intervals;
that is certain, and there mere delay will not
prevent the court from executing it; there
the agreement is executed in specie; the
court decrees to one the very timber contracted for, to the other the very price.
If am
called on now to execute this agreement,
can only specifically execute
a portion;
whereas
am bound to execute it all."
He
afterwards added, "No precedent has been
cited; but, indeed, none is necessary.
It is
a question of principle; and
am clearly of
opinion that if gave a decree now, it would
not be a specific execution of the contract,
but only a declaration that there ought to be
a specific execution of it hereafter.
must
therefore leave the plaintiff to his remedy at
law."
Blackett v. Bates, 1 Ch. App. 117, was
where an award required that the defendant
should execute to the plaintiff a lease of the
right of such part of a railway made by the
IJlaintiff as was on the defendant's land, the
lease to be in the words set out in the award;
and that the defendant should be entitled to
run carriages on the whole line, on certain
terms, and might require the plaintiff to supply engine power, while the latter should
have an engine on the road; and that the
plaintiff, during the whole time, should keep
the entire railway in good repair. Differences having arisen about carrying out the
award, a bill was filed for specific performance, which was demurred to generally, for
want of equity. In support of the demurrer
it was pertinently observed by counsel that
"whether if the court had legislative power it
would be desirable to make parties perform
in specie all manner of contracts, was not
then the question. That the court only decreed specific performance when it could dispose of the matter by an order capable of
being enforced at once, and did not decree a
party to perform a continuous duty extending
over a number of years, but left the pai-ty to
his remedy at law."
Lord Cranworth acceded to this view, and observed, "that the court
had no means of enforcing the performance
of daily duties during the term of the lease;
that it could do nothing more than punish
the party by imprisonment or fine, in case of
failure to perform them, and might be called
on for a number of years to issue repeated
attachments for default."
He cited Gervais
V. Edwards
with approbation.
In Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, the
court acted on the same principle. The contract concerned the use and mode of enjoyment of a quarry, and. contained particular
stipulations as to the futme rights and privileges of the parties. Among other things,

I
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the court remarked, that "if performance be
decreed, the case must remain in court forever, and the court to the end of time may be
called upon to determine, not only whether
the prescribed quantity of marble has been
delivered, but whether every block was from
the right place, whether it was sound, or
whether it was of suitable size or shape or
proportion. It is manifest that the court cannot superintend the execution of such a decree. It is quite impracticable, and it is certain that equity will not interfere to enforce
part of a contract, unless that part is clearly
severable from the remainder." Port Clinton
R. Co. V. Cleveland & T. R. Co., 13 Ohio St.
541, is cited with approval. Among other authorities which tend to illustrate the subject,
see Baldwin v. Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 9 Sim. 393; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 529; De Rivafinolj v.
Corsetti, 4 Paige, 264; Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Dodd v. Seymour, 21 Conn.
476; Waters v. Taylor, 15 Ves. 10-25.
Without going further into this view of the
case, it is only needful to say, that it seems
obvious that the very nature of the provision
sought to be enforced is such as to render the
remedy impracticable.
But if this objection were not insuperable,
there would be still another in the want of details and lack of particularity and specification.
The specific location is not given for the
building, nor is there anything certain as to
the plan, size, shape, materials or arrangement of the building. All this appears to have
been left, by the assent of the parties, substantially to the judgment and discretion of
the grantees.

The only specification, the only limit upon
such judgment and discretion, the parties saw
fit to make, was that it should be suitable
for the convenience of the public. For many
purposes this might be considered
definite
enough.
It would be in a charter in which
the end to be obtained would be presented as
the object of the legislature, whilst everything
in regard to details and means would be rightly and purposely left to the company.
But
for a building contract, or an agreement to be
executed by the court, it Is not so.
the court were to attempt to decree, what
direction could It give as per contract, in regard to the plan, size, shape, materials, arrangement and cost?
what would now satisfy the interest of the public were known, it
might guide as to the present size and arrangement; but It could go no further. What
is needful now may be otherwise in time, and
future changes in the state of the country or
in business may whoUy disappoint all present calculations. The public interest may require many alterations. But the reference to
the public convenience gives no clue whatever as to the materials, or in regard to

If

If

other essential matters.
The other parts of the provision are also
marked by similar difficulties; but It is need-
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Among many othless to dwell upon them.
ers we cite the following authorities as going
to explain this feature of the case: McCllntock V. Laing, 22 Mich. 212; Tatham v. Piatt,
15 Eng. Law & Eq. 190; Harnett v. Yielding,
2 Schoales
& L. 549; Colson v. Thompson, 2
Wheat. 336; Boston & M. E. Co. v. Bartlett,
3 Cush. 224; German v. Machln, 6 Paige, 288;
v. Bennette, Har. (Mich.) 124;
McMurtrie
Webb V. Direct London & P. R. Co., 1 De
Gex, M. & G. 521, 9 Eng. Law & Eq. 249;
Stuart V. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 1 De Gex,
M. & G. 721, 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 112, and
comments on these cases In Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 1 De Gex, M. & G. 757,
15 Eng. Law & Eq. 358, and 5 H. L. 331;

South Wales Ry. Co. v. Wythes, 1 Russ. &
186, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880, and 31 Eng.
Law & Eq. 226. Also 3 Pars. Cent. 354 et
seq.; Fry, Spec. Perf. cc. 1, 3, 4.
On this phase of the case, then, the diflaculties are insurmountable.
The alternative request for an allowance of
damages, or something in the nature of compensation, by the court, must of course fail.
If the case stood upon any final ground
which would permit such an 'appeal to the
jurisdiction of chancery, it could not be justly sustained.
In the first place, the uncertainties and lack
of details which mark the case, the want of
land-marks, boundaries, and specifications,
the absence of proper data, and the aptness of
the subject for a jury, would induce the court
to decline. Pratt v. Law, 9 Cranch, 456;
Morss V. Blmendorf, 11 Paige, 277; Fry, Spec.
Perf. "Compensation," §§ 813, 814; 3 Pars.
Cont. 402, 403, and notes.
But again, if the writing is treated as a

J.
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promissory undertaking which is binding on
the defendant, what it stipulates for is chieflyand mainly a series of daily acts to extend
through all the future, and a full and complete award, which, according to the settled:
course of the court and the principles on
which alone it intervenes, is the only admissible one, would be utterly impossible upoikr
any data now afforded, or which can now beafforded.
So many changes of a nature to affect thequestion are not only possible but probable,,
that any attempt by the court to adjudgespecific compensation
in money, in lieu of performance for all future time of the requirements in the writing, would be wild and absurd.
A partial award, one for present damages, would not only be futile, but would bean unwarranted departure from principle.
The ground of equitable interference,
or at
least one ground, is, to do at once and in onecase final and complete justice. The court
always seeks to avoid piece-work determinations.
In the introduction to Adams, Eq. it is saidr
"The equity for performance with compensation may be enforced by either the vendor or
purchaser, but is of course more readily granted to the latter; in either case the defect must
and not a
be one admitting of compensation,
mere matter of arbitrary damages, and thegiven must be really compensacompensation
tion for a present loss, and not indemnity
against a future risk." Page 68. See, also,
the body of the work, page 109, margin, andC
cases cited.
For the reasons given the decree below must
be affirmed, with costs.
The other justices concurred.
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MAXUF'G

WM. ROGERS
(20

Atl.

467,

CO. v. ROGERS.

58 Conn.

356.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
17,

Feb.

1890.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford
county; Fenn, Judge.
This was a suit to enjoin the violation
of a contract between Frank W. Rogers
and the Win. Rogers Manufacturing Company and the Rogers Cutlery Company ai^'
follows: "(1) That said companies "will
employ said Rogers in the business to he
done by said companies, according to the
stipulations of said agreement, for the period of twenty-five years therein named, if
said Rogers shall so long live and dis-

charge the duties devolved upon him by
said Watrous as general agent and manager of the business to be done in common
by said companies, under the directions
and to the satisfaction of said general
agent and manager; it being understood
that such duties may include traveling for
said companies, whenever, in the judgment of said general agent, the interest o(
the business will be thereby promote-'
(2) The said companies agree to pay said
Rogers for such services so to be rendered,
at the rate of $1,000 per year for the first
five years of such services, and thereafter
the same or such larger salary as may be
agreed upon by said Rogers and the directors of said companies, said salary to
be in full during said term of all services to
be rendered by said Rogers, whether as an
employe or an ofiicer of said companies,
unless otherwise agreed.
(3) The said
Rogers, in consideration of the foregoing,
agrees that he will remain with and serve
said companies under the direction of said
Watrous, as general agent and manager,
including such duties as traveling for said
companies, as said general agent may devolve upon him, including also any duties
as secretary or other officer of either or
both of said companies, as said companies
may desire to have him perform at the
salary hereinbefore named tor the first five
years and at such other or further or different compensation
thereafter during the
remainder of the twenty-five years as he,
the said Rogers, and the said companies
may agree upon.
(4) The said Rogers
during said term stipulates and agrees
that he will not be engaged or allow his
name to be employed in any manner in
any other hardware, cutlery, flatware, or
hollow-ware business either as manufacturer or seller, but will give, while he shall
be so employed by said companies, his entire time and services to the interests of
said common business, diminished onlv by
sickness, and such reasonable absence for
vacations or otherwise as may be agreed
upon between him and said general agent. "
The complaint was held insufficient, and
the plaintiffs appealed.
F. Chatnberlin and E. S. White, for appellants. C. E. IngersoU and F. L. Hungerford, for appellee.

ANDREWS,

C.J. Contracts tor personal

service are matters for courts of law, and
equity will not undertake a specific performance.
2 Kent, Comm.
258, note
b;

Hamblinv.Dinneford,2Edw.Ch.529;
Sanquirico V. Benedetti,] Barb. 315; Haight v.
Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499; De Rivafinoli v.
Corsetti, 4 Paige, 264. A specific performance in such cases is said to be impossible
because obedience to the decree cannot be
compelled by the ordinary processes of the
court. Contracts for personal acts have
been regarded as the most familiar illustrations of this doctrine, since the court
cannot in any direct manner compel the
party to render the service. The courts in
this country and in England formerly held
that they could not negatively enforce the
of such contracts by
specific performance
means of an injunction restraining their
violation. 3 "Wait, Act. & Def. 754; Marble
Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 340; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill, 487 ; De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob.
(N. Y.)280; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fothergill
V.Rowland, L. R.17Eq.l32. Thecourtsin
both countries have, however, receded
somewhat from the latter conclusiim, and
it is now held that where a contract stipulates for special, unique, or extraordinary
personal services or acts, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual,
or are peculiar and individual in their
character, the court will grant an injunction in aid of a specific performance.
But
where the services are material or mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the
party will be left to his action for damages. The reason seems to be that services of the former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving the injured party adequate compensation in damages, while the lo.ss of services of the latter class can be adequately
compensated
by an action for damages.
2Story, Fq. Jur. § 958a ; 3 Wait, Act. & Def.
754; 3Pom.Eq. Jur. § 1343: California Bank
v.FresnoCanal,etc.,Co.,53 Cal.201; Singer
Se wing-Machine Co. v. Union Button- Hole
Co., 1 Holmes, 253, Lumley v. Wagner, 1
De Gex, M. & G. 604; Railroad Co. v. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880; Montague v.
Flockton, Li. R. 16 Eq. 189. The contract
between the defendant and the plaintiffs is
made a part of the complaint. The services which the defendant was to perform
for the plaintiffs are not specified therein,
otherwise than that they were to be such
asshould be devolved upon him bythegeneral manager; "it being understood that
such duties may include traveling for said
companies whenever, in the judgment of
said general agent, the interests of the
business will be thereby promoted;" and
also "including such duties as traveling
for said companies as said general agent
may devolve upon him, including also any
duties as secretary or otherofflcerofeither
or both of said companies as said companies may desire to have him perform."
These services, while they may not be material and mechauicul, are certainly not
purely intellectual, nor are they special, or
unique, or extraordinary; nor are they so
peculiar or individual that they could not
be performed by any person of ordinary
intelligence and fair learning. It this was
all there was in the contract it would be
almost too plain for argument that the
plaintiffs should not have an injunction.
The plaintiffs, however, insist that the
negative part of the contract, by which
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the defendant stipulated and agreed that
would not be engaged in or allow his
name to be employed in any manner in
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than the names of Smith or Stiles or John
Doe. There is nothing from which the
court can see that the use of the defendany other hardware, cutlery, flatware or ant's name by the plaintiffs is of any value
hollow-ware business, either as a manu- to them, or that its use as a stamp by
facturer or seller, fully entitles them to an their competitors would do them any ininjunction against its violation. Thej- jury other than such as might grow out
aver in the complaint, on information and of a lawful business rivalry.
If by reason
belief, that the defendant is planning with of extraneous facts the name of the defendcertain of their competitors to engage ant does have some special and peculiar
with them in business, with the intent and value as a stamp on their goods, or its use
purpose of allowing his name to be used or as a stamp on goods manufactured by their
employed in connection with such business rivals would do them some special injury,
as a stamp on the ware manufactured; such facts ought to have been set out so
md they say such use would do them that the court might pass upon them. In
great and irreparable injury. If the plain- the absence of any allegation of such facts
tiffs owned the name of the defendant as we niust assume that none exist. The
a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty plaintiffs also aver that the defendant inin protecting their ownership; but they tends to make known to their rivals the
make no such claim, and all arguments or knowledge of their business, of their cusanalogies drawn from the law of trade- tomers, etc., which he has obtained while
marks may be laid wholly out of the case. in their employ. But here they have not
There is no averment in the complaint shown facts which bring the case within
that the plaintiffs are entitled to use, or any rule that would require an employe
that in fact they do use, the name of the to be enjoined from disclosing business
defendant as a stamp on thegoods of their secrets which he has learned in the course
own manufacture, nor any averment that of his employment, and which he has conPeabody v. Norsuch use, if it exists, is of any value to tracted not' to divulge.
them. So far as the court is informed, the folk, 98 Mass 452. There is no error in the
defendant's name on such goods as the judgment of the superior court. Theother
plaintiffs manufacture is of no more value judges concurred.
he
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DANFORTH et al. t. PHILADELPHIA
CAPE MAY S. L. RY. CO.
(30 N. J. Eq. 12.)
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

&

Oct. Term,

1878.

Bill for specific performance.
and answer.

J. W. Griggs, for
House, for defendants.
RUNYON,

Cli.

Heard on bill

complainants.

W. A.

The bill is filed to obtain

a decree for specific performance, by the defendants, of a contract entered into between
the complainants, partners in business, and
by
them, on the 19th of December,
1877,
which the former agreed to construct, equip
and finish, for the latter, a single-track, narrow-gauge railroad, and telegraph line m connection therewith, from the terminus of the

Camden, Gloucester & Mount Ephraim Railway to high-water mark in the city of Cape
May, with stations, engine and freight houses,
machine and repair-shops, turn-tables, waterstations, &c., &c., and all necessary terminal
facilities, for $2,000,000, payable in the capital
stock and first mortgage bonds of the company.
By the contract, the complainants were to
complete the work within five months after
the bonds were negotiated and sold at a price
not less than ninety cents on a dollar of the
par value thereof; and it was stipulated that
they should not be sold at less than that price
without the consent of both parties.
The bill states that the complainants entered
on the work, and proceeded with it from the
date of the contract to the 20th of February
following; that there was, at the latter date,
due to them, under the contract, the sum of
■¥40,000, or thereabouts; that they were then
entitled to have an estimate made, but the
defendants refused to make it, or to pay them,
or to carry out the contract, which the complainants allege would be of great value to
them if performed; and, further, that the defendants cannot respond in damages for their
refusal to cany out the agreement;
and that
the complainants could profitably dispose of
the bonds and stock stipulated for as payment.
The bill prays that the defendants may be decreed to specifically perform the contract generally, and, also, that they may be required to
make the estimate before mentioned, and deliver bonds and stock to the complainants for
the amount which may be found due them
thereon.

The defendants' answer admits the contract and declares their willingness to perform
it, but alleges their inability to do so by reason of the provisions of an act of the legislature of this state (a supplement to the general
railroad law), approved on the 19th of February, 1878. By one of those provisions the
provision of the original act requiring that the
articles of association should not be filed until
at least $2,000 of stock for every mile of the

proposed railroad should have been subscribed
and ten per cent, paid thereon, was altered
so as to require that the entire amount of
$2,000 per mile shall be paid to the treasurer
of this state, to be repaid by him to the directors or treasurer of the company in the
manner specified in the supplement,
as the
work of constructing the railroad shall proBy the other, the provision of the origgress.
inal act which authorized the mortgaging of
the road, &c., of the company, to secure the
payment of their bonds to an amount not exceeding
the amount of the paid-up capital
stock, was altered by adding a provision that
if any person or persons shall issue such bonds
to any greater amount than the amount which
at the time of such issue shall have been
actually paid up on the capital stock of the
company, he, she or they shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor,
and, on conviction, be punished
by fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment at hard labor for not more than three
years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
These provisions of the supplement were therein expressly made applicable to corporations
already organized under the original act. The
defendants state that they have expended all
the money received by them on account of
their capital stock in the work on the road,
and that they are not able to comply with the
provisions of the supplement, and that, by the
terms of the supplement, their charter Is forfeited, by reason of their failure to comply
with the provisions of that act.
There are several considerations which forbid the granting of the relief prayed for in
this suit. If this court would undertake the
performance of such a contract as that stated
in the bill, a contract for building and equipping a long line of railroad, building station,
freight and engine houses, &c., &c. (and the
current and great weight of authority is decidedly against it,— Story, Eq. Jur. § 726; Ross
V. Union Pac. R. Co., 1 Woolw. 26, Fed. Gas.
No. 12,080; Fallon v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill.
121, Fed. Cas. No. 4,629; South Wales R. Go.
V. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880), the disability of the defendants would be a sufficient
reason for refusing.
Courts of equity will
never undertake to enforce specific performance of an agreement where the decree would
be a vain or imperfect act. Tobey v. County
of Bristol, 2 Story, 800, Fed. Cas. No. 14,06.j.
And the incapacity of the defendant to carry
the contract into execution affords a ground
of defence in a suit for specific performance.

Fry, Spec. Pert § 658.
In this case the defendants are willing

to

perform their part of the contract if they can
lawfully do so. They have never refused to
issue their bonds and stock to the complainants In accordance with the terms of the contract, except because of the provisions of the
supplement above referred to, under which,
they apprehend they may have lost their corporate existence, and by which. If their corporate existence be not lost, their directors
and officers who should act in the matter
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-would be liable to severe and ignominious
punishment for so doing. P. L. 1878, p. 23.
They have not complied with the provisions
of the supplement in reference to the amount
to be paid in on their capital stock, and have
not been able and are not able to do so. Only
ten per cent, of the amount of their capital
stock has been paid in. Their corporate powers are, according to the supplement, extinct,
and the corporation is dissolved. P. L. 1878,
p. 22. The complainants, however, insist that
the supplement is an unconstitutional law; that
it destroys their contract, which existed when
it was passed, and which was founded on the
faith of the original act; that it deprives
them of their vested rights thereunder, and
that it should be declared to be unconstitutional, and its provisions, so far as they are
subject to that objection, disregarded. But it
is in nowise necessary to consider that question; for, if there were no other valid objection, this court would not, under the circum-
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stances of the case, declare that the apprehensions, or doubts at least, of the defendants,
as to the validity of the supplement, are whol-

ly groundless, and direct

them to proceed, notwithstanding the penalties above mentioned,
to issue bonds according to the contract and in
violation of the prohibition of the supplement;
to subject themselves to indictment for misdemeanor and the consequences of conviction.
It is enough that the legislature has forbidden
them to issue the bonds to induce this court
to refuse to order them to issue them. But,
further, there is at least doubt whether the
company still has a corporate existence.
Though the court might, if the case were
free from these difaculties, direct the defendants to make the estimate of work already
done prayed for in the bill (Waring v. Railway Co., 7 Hai-e, 482), yet, for the considerations already presented, that relief must also
be denied.

The bill will be dismissed.

J-f/^v'
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BECK

v.

ALLISON.

(56 N. Y. 366.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

April

21, 1874.

Action for specific performance of covenants to repair contained in a lease executed
by defendant to Luke Poole & Co., of premises 44 Vesey street. New York, wlilcli lease
The facts
was held by plaintiff as assignee.
are stated in the opinion.
Andrew Boardman, for appellant.
MadFarlaud, for respondents.

Wm. W.

GROVER, J. This action was brought by
the plaintiff as assignee of a lease made by
the defendant of the premises known as 44
Vesey street, in the city of New York, for
two years, containing a provision for a renewal, at tlae option of the lessees, for a further term of three years, by giving the lessor
notice as therein provided, which notice had
been given as therein provided, for the specific performance of au agreement made by
the lessor to repair damages caused by fire.
The lease provided that all other repairs were
to be made by the lessees, and the case shows
that this agreement of the lessor was interlined after the preparation, but before the execution of the lease. The case shows that the
premises were nearly destroj^ed by fire while
in the occupation of the plaintiffs, under the
lease, so as substantially to require rebuilding; but the trial judge found that they could
be repaired, and the defendant must, after affirmance of the judgment by the general
term, be held in this court concluded by this
finding. The judge further found that a reasonable time for doing the requisite repairs
was four months.
The question is thus presented whether
equity will enforce the specific performance
of an agreement for making repairs of this
character.
The learned chief justice who
gave the opinion of the general term, after
an elaborate and learned examination of the
English authorities, arrived at the conclusion
that equity would specifically enforce the
for making repairs. In this he
agreements
differs from Judge Story, who after an examination and citation of some of the leading cases relied upon by the learned judge,
adopts precisely an opposite conclusion.
1
Story, Bq. Jur. 726, §§ 720, 727.
The accuracy of the conclusion of Judge Story is
strongly corroborated by the fact that in this
state, and so far as I am aware, in this country, no court of equity lias ever attempted
the exercise of any such power. The same
conclusion is substantially adopted
l)y a
learned English author of a work upon this
particular branch of equity jurisprudence,
who refers to most of the cases relied ux)on
by the learned judge. Fry, Spec. Perf. 19, §
48. I shall refer to only a few of the cases
cited by the judge, although I have examined
nearly all. City of London v. Nash, 1 Ves.
11, more fully reported, 3 Atk. 512, decided
by Lord Hardwicke, is much relied upon in

the opinion. In this case the chancellor stated that equity would enforce the perf oi-mance
of a building contract, for the reason that it
was an entire thing, but not a contract for repairs. While I am unable to see if the former
is tlius enforced, why the latter should not be,
for the reason that the former would be attended b.y about the same difiiculties as the
latter, and a legal remedy would be equally
applicable to both, yet the case is authority

against the conclusion of the general term in
the present ca se, as this is an agreement for
making repairs. It may be further remarked, that a specific performance of the contract to rebuild was not decreed, the chancellor being of opinion that that would be inequitable under the circumstances, and the
party injured by the breach of the contract
was left to his legal remedy for the recovery
The judgment given is no auof damages.
thority for enforcing the specific performance
of contracts to build. In the subsequent case
of Lucas v. Commerford, 3 Brown. 166, it
was expressly held by Chancellor Thurlow,
that there could not be a decree to rebuild, as
the court could no more undertake the conduct of a rebuilding than of a repair. I think
the soundness of the reason given a full answer to the criticism of this chancellor contained in the opinion with a view to impair
the authority of the judgment given in this
In Rayner v. Stone. 2 Eden, 128, a
case.
demurrer to a bill for the specific performance of covenants contained in a lease to repair hedges and the mansion house, was susAmong the
tained by Lord Worthington.
reasons assigned for the judgment was that
the court had no officer to see to the performance, which the chancellor said was to
him very strong. He asks, how can a master
judge of repairs in husbandry, etc.? He adds
that it is said that this is an equitable right,
and that it was insisted that he should put
the plaintiff in a better state than what he
could be at law, but the court had no jurisdiction to strip the defendant of the right to
try the supposed breach of covenant at law.
Besides, how can a specific performance of
The nature
things of this kind be decreed?
of the thing shows the absurdity of drawing
these questions from their proper trial and
jurisdiction.
These reasons apply with all
their force, to an attempt to enforce the specific performance of the contract in question.
The court must first adjudge what repairs are
to be made and the time within which they
are to be done. When this is accomplished
The idea
more serious difficulties remain.
tliat a court can appoint a receiver to take
possession
of the property and cause the
work to be done, with money furnished by
the defendant, would be, in the language of
Lord Worthington, absurd. The mode, if undertaken, must be for the court first specifically to determine what shall be done, and
VFhen and how, and then to enforce performance by attachment, as for contempt in case
of alleged disobedience. Then will arise not
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only the question, whether there has been
substantial performance, and if found, not,
whether the defendant had any such excuse
therefor as will exonerate him from the contempt charged, and in case of performance,
but not in as beneficial a manner as adjudged, the compensation that should be
made for the deficiency.
It is obvious that
the execution of contracts of this description
under the supervision and control of the
court would be found very difficult if not impracticable, while the remedy at law would
in nearly if not in all cases afford full redress for the injury. It is for these reasons
that such powers have never been exercised
It was for these reasons
in this country.
that the court in South Wales R. Co. v.
Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880, refused to
decree the specific performance of a contract
to construct a branch railway.
The case enforcing the specific performance of an agreement made by a railway company with a
land-owner, to construct an arch under their
road for his use, does not militate against
this doctrine. Damages in an action at law
would not, in such a case, afford adequate
redress.
Tlie same may be said of the case
enforcing a contract for the construction of a
wharf, etc. The want of an adequate remedy
at law has always been regarded as a proper
ground for sustaining a bill in equity. See
Wilson V. Furness R. Co., 9 Eq. Gas. 28.
What was said by Lord Hardwiciie in Rook
V. Worth, 1 "S'es. Sr. 460, was intended to apply to the particular facts of that case,
which related to questions as to the rights
of tenant in tail and the reversioner, which
could not well be protected in a legal action.
But I do not deem it necessary further to
As I understand
pursue the investigation.
the English cases, the power of enforcing the
specific performance of contracts for repairs
is not now exercised by courts of equity
there, and there is no authority for its exerThis being
cise by the courts of this state.
so, a court of equity had no jurisdiction as
such of the action.
But under the Code a plaintiff may unite
in the same complaint several causes of action, both legal and equitable, arising out of
the same transaction.
Code. § 1G7, subd. 1.
In the present case the rights of the plaintiff
under the agreement were stated in the complaint, and the failure of the defendant to
perform the same was also set out. The parties iiroeeeded to trial upon the claim made
by the plaintiffs for a specific performance of
the contract. The trial judge found that the
facts were not such as to authorize the granting of this relief, but as some evidence showing the value of the plaintifi^s' interest in case
of a prompt repair of the premises had been
given, the judge proceeded to give judgment,
that the lease should be canceled, and the
plaintiffs should recover of the defendant the
value of his interest in the premises, upon the
basis of the repairs to the building having
been completed in a reasonable time after the
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fire.
To this the defendant's counsel excepted. When the judge found that the plaintiffs
were not under the facts of the case entitled
to the equitable relief demanded (specific performance), the case as an action in equity
was terminated.
It then appeared that the
plaintiffs never had any equitable cause of
action against the defendant, adjudging a
cancellation of the lease was wholly immaterial.
This was the necessary result of a
recovery by the plaintiffs of their damages
for the unexijired term, consequent upon the
refusal of the defendant to perform his agreement to make the repairs.
The plaintiffs
could not recover these and retain any rights
under the lease.
Such a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs would bar an action brought
by the defendant against them for rent.
Under a system vesting equity and legal ju-

risdiction in different tribunals, the former
after determining that the complainant had
no equitable cause of action, did not retain
jurisdiction for the purpose of giving such
relief as he would be entitled to at law.
Kempshall v. Stone, 5 Johns. Ch. 193, and
cases cited.
It was only where the plaintiff
was entitled to equitable relief upon the case
made by him, but which could not be awarded, for the reason that it was not in the power of the defendant to perform the judgment
granting it, or that such relief would be
harsh and inequitable under all the circumstances of the case, that the court, as a substitute therefor, awarded ah equivalent in
damages,
thus ending the aontroversy, instead of sending the parties to a court of law
That was not this case.
for that purpose.
There was no incapacity of the defendant to
specifically perform the contracts if the plaintiffs were entitled to such relief. The court
should have held that they were not so enThis as
titled upon the case made by them.
before remarked terminated the case as a
suit in equity; and under a system vesting
equitable and legal jurisdiction in different
tribunals, the complaint should have been disBut jurisdiction of both classes of
missed.
action is now vested in the same tribunal,
the mode of trial only being different. If the
complaint contains an equitable and also a
legal cause of action. If tlie plaintiff upon the
trial of the former fails in establishing a case
entitling him to relief, he has still a right to
a ti'ial of the legal cause of action set out.
The defendant is not therefore entitled to a
dismissal of the complaint until the latter
has been tried. In the present case, the complaint stated the agreement of the defendant
to make the repairs, and the neglect of the
defendant to perform it; it failed to state
some other facts essential to the right of
the plaintiffs to recover the damages thereby sustained. The complaint might therefore
have been properly regarded as setting out
an equitable cause of action only, and upon
the failure of the plaintiffs in establishing
such a cause, properly dismissed. But it was
in the power of the court, upon terms deem-
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«d just, to allow an amendment of the pleadings, so that a legal remedy might be had in
the action, as from the lapse of time the statute of limitations may bar another action. I
think an opportunity should be given to the
j)laintifCs to obtain a legal remedy in this by

the proper amendment, and securing to the
defendant his right of trial by jury.
The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and a new trial orderedAll concur.
Judgment reversed.
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LEAR

V.

CHOUTEAU
(23

Supreme

et al.

111. 39.)

Court of Illinois.

Nov. Term, 1859.

Error to circuit court, St. Clair county; W.
H. Underwood, Judge.
Tills was a bill in chanceiy, i)y Pierre Chouteau, Jr., James Harrison and Felix Valle,
against Ferdinand Lear, to compel a conveyance to the complainants of certain coal and
therecoal lands, and privileges connected
with, purchased by the defendant, as was alleged, in trust for the complainants.
The attorney for the complainants testified
that he took down the notes from which the
exhibit was drawn from the directions of
Charles P. Chouteau and the defendant, when
together In his office; that he read the same
to the defendant, and said he believed it embodied the whole agreement, and all that was
necessary;
that the defendant replied, he believed it did; that the defendant was slightly
deaf; that when the agreement was drawn,
the "defendant expressly desired that some
time should be limited in it, in which he
should be required to commence operations,
and they fixed upon a month, that is to say,
understood Lear's wish at
this is what
the time."
The agreement or exhibit contained the following clause: That it "should not take effect until after one month's notice given to
said Lear, by Chouteau, Harrison and VaUe,
to that effect, unless the parties should mutually consent to a shorter time for the commencement of operations." Lear never signed
this agreement. The opinion states the other
material facts.

I

Koerner & Niles, John M. Krum, and E. W.
Decker, for plaintiff in error. George Trumbull, for defendants in error.

CATON, C. J. (after stating the facts).
There is no pretense for a resulting trust in
this case. The interests in the lands in controversy were purchased by Lear not for cash
down, but on time, to be paid for as the coal
should be taken out, and Lear gave his personal obligations for the payment of the purchase money, and took whatever title was
taken to himself. The agreement under which
these purchases were made could not create
a resulting trust, which can alone arise from
the fact, that a purchase is made In the name
of one, while the purchase money belongs to
another. Here no part of the purchase money
has been paid, and hence it is impossible that
a resulting trust could arise.
The subject matter of this controversy is
coal in lands, with the right to take and reThis is an interest in
move it therefrom.
lands, and by the statute of frauds all contracts concerning it are required to be in
writing, in order to be binding on the parties,
yet the well settled rules of both law and
equity require that those who would avoid
the obligations of such parol contracts by reason of the statute, must set up the statute by
HUTCH. EQ. JUB. — 16
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way of defense, or rely upon it by pleading
in some way, and if they will not do this, they
thereby impliedly waive the objection, that
the contract was not in writing. Here the
defendant has not relied upon the statute in
his answer, and it is now too late for him to
say that it was not in writing.
We must now
consider this case as, if no such statute existed.

We shall

assume, for the purposes of this
that the testimony of Mr. Hill shows
that Lear assented to the paper exhibit A, as
containing the terms of the agreement between
the parties under which these lands were purchased, and for which he agreed to assign
the contracts to the complainants, while we
confess that we are by no means satisfied
that such admission
was understandingly
made, or that Mr. Lear fully understood the
effect of the paper. But we shall place our
decision upon the terms and provisions of
the paper as exhibited. It shows such an
agreement as no court of chancery ever ought
to enforce specifically, even though the defendant agreed to all its terms. It is not every contract, although fairly and even understandingly made, which a com't of chancery
will decree to be specifically performed. Shall
we compel Lear to assign these purchases for
the consideration of the covenants and obligations which the complainants propose to asIt is a
sume by the execution of this paper?
paper by which Lear agrees to superintend
the opening and working these mines and to
devote all his time thereto, for which services the complainants are to pay him seventy
dollars per month till the mines are open, and
after that, two mills per bushel for the coal
Even
which shall be taken out and marketed.
if the contract stopped here, we cannot say
that it should be specifically performed. This
contract makes no provision for the payment
of the purchase money. By the original contracts to be assigned by Lear to the complainants, Lear had bound himself in personal
covenants to pay fifteen dollars per acre for
all the coal in ail these lands, and this paper
leaves him still obliged to pay this rent or
Was such the intention of
purchase money.
the pai-ties? Did Lear intend to bind himself
still to pay this money? Probably not, although such is the effect of the papers which
we are called upon to compel him to execute.
But the last clause in this exhibit "A," leaves
it without the least particle of value to Lear,
and places him' entirely at the mercy of the
complainants. It is this: "This agreement is
not to take effect until after one month's noHarritice given to said Lear by Chouteau,
son & Valle to that effect, unless the parties
hereto shall mutually consent to a shorter
time for the beginning of operations." Here
then the contract which constitutes the sole
consideration for these assignments is to remain a dead letter, till the complainants
choose to impart to it vitality by giving the
Till then, it is not to take
notice specified.
it is as if
effect; it is to have no existence;
decision,
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been written, except that Lear
is forever bound to hold himself in readiness
on one month's notice to enter into the service of the complainants on the terms specified. Of what worth is such a paper to
Lear— what consideration is it for the assignment of these purchases, which had cost him,
no doubt^ considerable labor and scientific
skill as a collier, as the case shows, and also
for which he had executed his obligations
amounting in the aggregate to a very large
sum? Nothing; absolutely nothing, and even
worse than nothing, for by it his hands would
be tied up so that he could not engage in other
enterprises of a permanent character, but
must ever stand with his hands folded, awaiting the pleasure of these gentlemen.
In such
a contract as this there is neither reciprocity,
fairness nor good conscience, and if the defendant was simple enough to consent to such
an agreement, a court of equity will not compel him to execute it specifically, but leave the
parties to their remedies at law, which has no
conscience and knows no mercy.
In order to
induce a court of equity to enforce specifically a contract, it must be founded on a good
consideration, it must be reasonable, fair and
just. If Its terms are such as our sense of

justice revolts at, this court wUl not enforce
it, though admitted to be binding at law.
Such is the character of this agreement —
there is not one reciprocal feature in it. Lear
is required to perform every thing on his
part, and binds himself to the performance
of future acts unconditionally, while the complainants are absolutely bound to nothing.
Some men delight in holding all the strings in
their own hands— holding others entirely at
their mercy, that they may make a merit of
justice and call it generosity, or crush down
their victim with a heavy hand and plead
the letter of the bond for a justification.
Such traits of character and such transactions are as abhorrent to equity as they are
detestable to the common appreciation of
mankind, and will look in vain for favor at
the hands of this court. "We will not say
that these complainants are fully obnoxious
to this censure, but this transaction looks
very like it if they fully comprehend the
scope of the agreement which they propose to give the defendant, and the position
in which they are seeking to place him.
The decree is reversed and the bill dismissed.

Decree reversed.
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JONES
(115

Supreme

V.

NEWHALL,

Mass. 244.)

Judicial Court of
Suffolk.

Massachusetts.

June 20, 1874.

Bill by Leonard S. Jones against Benjamin
B. Newhall to enforce specific performance
of a contract for tlie purchase of all the interest of complainant in the Worthington
Land Associates, and all the right and interest of Jones in any property belonging to
the Dorchester Land Association, the share
of said Jones consisting of 14 shares of stock
of said land association, together with two
certain mortgages.
Decree for plaintiff.
Case reported to the full court. Bill dismissed.
R. D. Smith & A. E. Jones, for plaintiff.
A. C. Clark, for defendant,

WELLS, J. Jurisdiction in equity is conferred upon this court by Gen. St. c. 113, §
2, to hear and determine "suits for the specific performance of written contracts by
and against either party to the contract,
and his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators and assigns."
The power extends alike
to written contracts of aU descriptions, but
its exercise is restricted by the proviso,
"when the parties have not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at the common
law." This proviso has always been so construed and applied as to make it a test, in
each particular case, by which to determine
whether jurisdiction in equity shall be entertained.
If the only relief to which the
plaintiff would be entitled in equity is the
same in measure and kind as that which he
might obtain In a suit at law, he can have
no standing upon the equity side of the
court, unless his remedy at law is doubtful,
circuitous, or complicated by multiplicity of
parties having different interests.
Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 6 Pick. 376,
396; Sears v. Boston, 16 Pick. 357; Wilson
V. Leishman, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 316, 321; Hilliard v. Allen. 4 Cush. 532, 535; Pratt v.
Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Glass v. Hulbert, 102
Mass. 24, 27; Ward v. Peck, 114 Mass. 121.
In contracts for the sale of personal property jurisdiction in equity is rarely entertained, although the only remedy at law
may be the recovery of damages, the measure of which is the difference between the
market value of the property at the time of
the breach and the price as fixed by the
contract.
The reason is that, in regard to
most articles of personal property, the commodity and its market value are supposed
to be substantially equivalent, each to the
other, so that they may be readily interchanged.
The seller may convert his rejected goods into money; the purchaser,
with his money, may obtain similar goods;
each presumably at the market price; and
the difference between that and the contract
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price, recoverable at law, will be full indemnity. Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick.
507, 511; Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
Harnett v. Yielding, 2 Schoales & L. 549,
553; Adams, Eq. 83; Fry, Spec. Perf.
§§ 12,

It is otherwise with fixed property like
real estate.
Compensation
in damages,
measured by the difference in price as ascertained by the market value and by the contract, has never been regarded in equity as
such adequate indemnity for nonfulfillment
of a contract for the sale or purchase of
land as to justify the refusal of relief in
equity. When that is the extent of the
right to recover at law, a bill in equity is
maintainable, even in favor of the vendor,
to enforce fulfillment of the contract, and
payment of the full amount of the price
agreed on.
Old Colony Railroad v. Evans, 6
Gray, 25.
Although the general subject is within the
chancery jurisdiction of the court, yet inadequacy of the damages recoverable at law
is essential to the right to invoke its action
as a court of chancery in any particular case.
The rule is the same whether applied to the
contracts for the sale of real or of personal
estate.
The difference in the application
arises from the difference in the character
of the subject-matter of the contracts in respect to the question whether damages at
law will afford full and adequate indemnity
to the party seeking relief.
If the character
of the property be such that the loss of the
contract will not be fairly compensated in
damages based upon an estimate of its market value, relief may be had in equity,
whether it relates to real or to personal estate.
Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
Duncuft V. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189, 199; Clark
V. Flint, 22 Pick. 231; Story, Eq. Jur. § 717;
Adams, Eq. 83; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 11, 23,
30,

37.

The property in question in this

case ap
pears to be of such a character.
It is not
material, therefore, whether the interest of
the plaintiff is in the nature of realty or of
personalty.
But the relief he seeks is not
such as to require the aid of a court of
equity. At the time this bill was filed the
only obligation on the part of the defendant
to be enforced either at law or in equity
was his express promise to pay a definite
sum of money as an installment towards the
purchase of certain property from the plaintiff. That promise is supported by the executory agreement of the plaintiff to convey
the property, contained in the same instrument, as its consideration; but in respect of
performance the several promises of the defendant are separable from the entirety of
the contract, and each one may be enforced
by itself as an assumpsit.
The plaintiff Is
not obliged to sue in damages upon his contract as for a general breach. He may recover at law the full amount of the install-
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ment due.
In equity he can have no decree
beyond that. He cannot come into equity
to obtain precisely what he can have at law.
Howe T. Nickerson, 14 Allen, 400, 406;
Jacobs V. Peterborough & S. E. Co., 8 Cush.
223; Gill v. BickneU, 2 Cush. 355; Eussell
V. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69.
The plaintiff has no occasion for any order
of the court in regard to performance by himself. At most, all that is necessary for him
to do in order to recover his judgment at
law, is to offer a conveyance of a portion of
his interest coiTespondlng to the amount of
the installment due.
We do not regard the fact, stated in the
report, that the defendant "also refused to
pay an assessment then due, or about to become due," for which he was bound by the
contract to provide, and hold the plaintiff
harmless; because that is immaterial upon
demurrer, there being no allegation in the
bill in reference to it. And besides, there
would be sufficient remedy at law for such a
breach, if it were sufficiently alleged and
proved.
If the plaintiff will be compelled to bring
several actions for Ms full remedy at law,
it is because he has a contract payable in
installments; that is, he may have several
causes of action.
But he may sue them severally, or he may join them all in one suit,
when all shall have fallen due, at his own
election.
He is not driven into equity to
escape the necessity of many suits at law.
It is true, as the plaintiff insists, that
a diiierent rule exists in the English courts
of chancery, and that in numerous cases, not
unlike the present, relief in equity has there
been granted by decree for payment of a
sum of money due by contract, although
equally recoverable at law. The maxim,
which, as we apply it, makes the want of
adequate remedy at law essential to the
right to have relief in equity in each case,
has always been attached to chancery jurisdiction. But in the English courts it has
been rather by way of indicating the nature
and origin of the jurisdiction, and defining
the class of rights or subjects to which it
attaches, than as a constant limit upon its
exercise.
Courts of chancery were created
to supply defects in proceedings at common
law. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 49, 54. Their jurisdiction grew out of the exigencies of the
earlier periods in the judicial history of the
country, and was from time to time enlarged
to meet those exigencies. Its limits, having
become defined and fixed by usage, have not
contracted as the jurisdiction of the common-law courts was extended.
It has always been held that jurisdiction once acquired in chancery, over any subject or class
of rights, is not taken away by any subsequent enlargement of the powers of the
courts of common law, nor by reason of any
new modes of remedy that may be afforded
by those courts. Story, Eq. Jur. § 64i; Snell,

Eq. 335;

J.

Slim v. Croucher,

1

De Gex, F. &

518.

Hence arose a wide range of concurrent
jurisdiction, within which chancery proceeded to administer appropriate remedies, without regard to the question whether a like
remedy could be had in the courts of law.
Colt V. Woollaston, 2 P. Wms. 154; Green v.
Barrett, 1 Sim. 45; Blain v. Agar, 2 Sim.
289; Cridland v. De Mauley, 1 De Gex & S.
459; Evans v. Bicknell,
6 Ves. 174; Burrowes V. Lock, 10 Ves. 470. One of its maxims was that there must be mutuality of
right to avail of that jurisdiction. Accordingly, if the contract or cause of complaint
was such that one of the parties might require the peculiar relief which chancery
alone could afford, it was frequently held
that the principle of mutuality required that
jurisdiction should be equally maintained in
favor of the other party, who sought and
could have no other relief than recovery of
the same amount of money due or measure
of damages as would have been awarded by
judgment in the court of law. Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; Walker v. Eastern Counties Ky. Co., 6 Hare, 594; Kenney v. Wexham, 6 Madd. 355.
In contracts respecting land there is an
additional consideration for maintaining jurisdiction in equity in favor of the vendor
as well as the vendee, which Is doubtless
much more influential with the English
courts than it can be here; and that is the
doctrine of equitable conversion. It is referred to as a reason for the exercise of jurisdiction at the suit of the vendor, in Cave
V. Cave, 2 Eden, 139; Eastern Counties Ry.
Co. V. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331; Fry, Spec.

Perf.

In

§ 23.

Massachusetts, instead of a distinct and
independent court of chancery, with a jurisdiction derived from and defined and fixed
by long usage, we have certain chancery
powers conferred upon the court of common
law, whose jurisdiction and modes of remedy as a court of law had already become extended much beyond those of English courts
of common law, partly by statutes and partly by its own adaptation of its remedies to
the necessities which arose from the absence
of the court of chancery. This difCerence in
the relations of the two jurisdictions would
alone give occasion for different rules governing their exercise. Black v. Black, 4 Pick.
234, 238; Tirrell v. Merrill, 17 Mass. 117, 121;
Baker v. Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No.
764.

The successive statutes by which the equity powers of this court have been conferred or enlarged have always affixed to their
exercise the condition that "the parties have
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at the common law." This has been construed as referring "to remedies at law as
they exist under our statutes and according to our course of practice." Pratt v. Pond,
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It has also been repeatedly held
that, in reference to the range of jurisdiction conferred, the several statutes were to
be construed strictly.
Black v. Black, and
UhCiTles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ubi
supra. No reason or necessity remains for
the maintenance of concurrent jurisdiction,
except for the sake of a more perfect remedy in equity when the plaintiff shall establish his right to it. And such we understand
to be the purport and intent of our statutes upon the subject.
Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232; Angell v. Stone, 110
Mass. 54.
A similar restriction upon the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts Is so construed
with great strictness. Oelricks v. Spain, 15
Wall. 211, 228; Grand Ohute v. Winegar,
Id. 373; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey,
13 Wall. 616; Parker v. Winnipiseogee
Lake
Ootton & Woollen Co., 2 Black, 545; Baker
V. Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No. 764.
See, also. Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531;
I'iscataquis F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 60 Me.

5 Allen, 59.

178.

Even in courts of general chancery powers
and of independent organization, while the
power to entertain bills relating to all matters which in their nature are within their
concurrent jurisdiction is maintained, yet
the usual course of practice is to remit parties to their remedy at law, provided that
be plain and adequate, unless for some reason of peculiar advantage which equity is
supposed to possess, or some other cause
influencing the discretion of the court. Kerr,
Fraud & M. 45; Blsp. Eq. § 200; also. Id.
§ 37; Snell, Eq. 334; Clifford v. Brooke, 13
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Ves. 131; Whitmore v. Mackeson, 16 Beav.
126; Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327;
Hoare v. Bremridge, L. B. 14 Eq. 522, 8 Ch.
App. 22.
The doctrine of Colt v. Woollaston, 2 P.
Wms. 154, and Gvpen v. Barrett, 1 Sim. 45,
thougn not expressly overruled, has been
questioned (Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J.
Ch. 215, 219), and does not seem to govern
the usual practice of the courts. See cases
above cited, and Newham v. May, 13 Price,
749.

But, independently of statute restrictions,
the objection that the plaintiff may have a
sufficient remedy or defense at law in the
particular case is a matter of equitable discretion, rather than of jurisdictional right;
and is therefore not always available on
demurrer. Colt v. Nettervill, 2 P. Wms. 304;
liamshire v. Bolton, L. R. 8 Eq. 294; Hill v.
Lane, L. R. 11 Eq. 215; Barry v. Croskey, 2
Johns. & H. 1.
According to the practice in this commonwealth, on the other hand, under the statutes relating to the exercise of jurisdiction
in equity, a bill is demurrable, not only if
it show that the plaintiff has a remedy at
law, equally sufficient and available, but also
if it fail to show that he is without such
remedy. Pool v. Lloyd, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 525,
529; Woodman v. Saltonstall, 7 Cush. 181,
Pratt V. Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Clark v. Jones,
Id. 379; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Mill
River Loan Fund Ass'n v. Claflin, 9 Allen,
101; Com. V. Smith, 10 Allen, 448; Bassett
V. Brown, 100 Mass. 355, 105 Mass. 551, 560.
The demurrer, therefore, must be sustained, and the bill dismissed.
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MARGRAE^
(57

Commission

v.

MUIR.

N. Y. 155.)

of Appeals of New York.

Jan.

'i'erm, 1874.

Appeal from order of the general term of
tlie supreme court in the Second judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of
plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee and granting a new trial.
This action was against the vendor for specific performance of a contract to convey a
lot of land, situate in Westchester county,
and for damages for breach of the contract
in case it could not be specifically performed.
The defendant is the widow of Alexander
Muir, who died intestate in 1858, seized of a
He left
lot of land in Westchester county.
six children, three of whom were yet minors,
when the contract in question was made.
The defendant, with her children, resided in
Brooklyn, and the plaintiff resided in WestShe
chester county, near the lot in question.
did not know what the lot was worth, but
he knew it was worth $2,000 in consequence
This knowledge
of its recent rise in value.
he concealed from the defendant and contracted with her to purchase it for $800. She
contracted in her own name, expecting that
those of her children who were of age would
unite with her in the conveyance, and that
she could get from the court the right to convey On behalf of her minor children. Before
the making of the contract, the lot had been
sold for taxes, and a lease thereof given in
At the time of makpursuance of such sale.
ing the contract, the plaintifC knew that the
lot belonged to defendant's children, and that
proceedings would have to be taken In some
court to give her the right to convey; and
he also knew that the land had been sold for
taxes, and this latter fact she did not know.
The referee found that the lot was worth
$2,000, and ordered judgment for the plaintiff for $1,200, the difference between the conFurtract price and the value of the lot.
ther facts appear in the opinion.

John Flanders, for appellant.
Glassey, for respondent.

Samuel

J.

EARL, C. This was an unconscionable
contract and could not be specifically enforced
on the ground of the inadequacy of the consideration. The plaintiff lived near the lot
The defendant lived at
and knew its value.
a distance and did not know its value. While
the plaintiff did not make any misrepresentations, he concealed his knowledge of the recent rise In value of the lot and took advantage of her ignorance, and thus got from her
a contract to convey to him the lot for but a
little more than one-third of its value. Such
a contract. It is believed, has never yet been
enforced in a court of equity in this country.
When a contract for the sale of lands is fair
and just and free from legal objection, it is
a matter of course for courts of equity to

specifically enforce it. But they will not decree specific performance in cases of fraud
or mistake, or of hard and unconscionable
bargains, or when the decree would produce
Injustice, or when such a decree would be
inequitable under all the circumstances. 2
Story, Eq. Jur. § 769; Will. Eq. Jur. 262;
Osgood V. Frankhn, 2 Johns. Oh. 1, 14 Johns.
527; Seymour v. Delancy, 6 Johns. Oh. 222,
3 Cow. 531.
Formerly, in case courts of equity refused
specific performance on the ground of mere
inadequacy of consideration, the party claiming performance stiU had his remedy by a
new action in the courts of law for damages
for the breach of contract, and in such courts
mere inadequacy of consideration, not so
great as to be evidence of fraud, was never
Hence if this action had been
a defense.
brought before the Code in the court of chancery, the equity of the bill being denied, jurisdiction of the action would not have beevi
retained to award such damages for a breach
of the contract as could be recovered in a
But the plaintiff would have
court of law.
been obliged to commence a new action at
This practice
law to recover his damages.
has however been changed by the Code; ana
now, equitable and legal jurisdiction being
united in the same court, a party can unite
in the same complaint both legal and equitable causes of action arising out of the same
Code, § 167.
I suppose it is
transaction.
perfectly competent for a party to set forth
in his complaint a cause of action for specific
performance of a contract to convey land,
and also a cause of action for damages for
breach of the contract, in case for any reason
it cannot be performed. If upon the trial, it
turns out that for any reason the equitable
relief cannot be granted, the plaintiff can
yet recover his damages if he is entitled to
any. Barlow v. Scott, 24 X. Y. 40; Bradley
V. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504; Pumpelly v. Phelps,
Id. 59.
In this case the referee denied the equitable relief, but awarded damages
for the
breach of the contract, and in this he did not
err, provided he adopted the proper rule of
damage.
The referee allowed the plaintiff
as damages the difference between the contract-price and the value of the land, thus
placing him in the position he would have
been if the contract had been performed.
In this I think he erred. The general rule in
this state, in the case of executory contracts
for the sale of land. Is that in the case of
breach by the vendor, the vendee can recover
only nominal damages, unless he has paid
part of the purchase-money, in which case he
can also recover such purchase-money and
interest.
Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167;
Bush V. Cole. 28 N. Y. 2G1; Pumpelly v.
Phelps, supra. See, also, Lock v. Furze, L.
R. 1 0. P. 441; Engle v. Fitch, L. R. 3 Q.
B. 314. But to this rule there are some exceptions based upon the wrongful conduct of
the vendor, as If he is guilty of fraud or caa

EQUITABLE REMEDIES.
ooDTey, but will not either from perverseness
or to secure a better bargain, or if he has
covenanted to convey when he knew he had
no authority to contract to convey; or where
it is in his power to remedy a defect in his
title and he refuses or neglects to do so, or
when he refuses to incur such reasonable expenses as would enable him to fulfill his contract. In all such cases, the vendor is liable

to the vendee for the loss of the bargain, under rules analogous to those applied in the
Here no fraud
sale of personal property.
He linew
was perpetrated on the vendee.
that the vendor did not have title to the
lands, and that she could not convey to him
without authority from some court; and he
knowing that the land was wox-th $2,000,
may be presumed to have known that no authority could be obtained to convey the land
for $800, without in some way practicing an
imposition upon the court. This latter knowlBelieving, as she did,
edge she did not have.
that $800 was a fair price for the land, she
had no reason to doubt that she could obtain authority to convey. Further than this,
he knew that the land had been sold for taxes
and a lease given. This she did not know.
Under these circumstances, she could not get
authority from the court to make a conveyance upon behalf of her minor children, and
it appears that she could not procure the tax
title. Hence, there is no ground for imputing to her any blame for not making such a
conveyance as her contract called for. These
facts do not call for the application of an exceptional rule of damages in this case.
The case of Pumpelly v. Phelps, supra, is
the widest departure from the general rule
of damages in such case that is to be found
in the books. In that case it was held, that
where the vendor, in an executory contract
for the conveyance of land, knew at the time
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made the contract that he had no title,
although he acted in good faith, believing
that he could procure and give the purchaser
a good title, he was yet liable for the difference between the contract-price and the value of the land.
But there are two features
which distinguish this case from that. In
that case, the vendee did not know that the
vendor had no title. Here, he did know it,
and he knew also that she could get no title
without imposing upon some court. Here also, even if she could have procured the authority of some court to convey, she still
would have been unable to give such a title
as her contract called for, on account of the
outstanding tax title which was unknown to
her when she contracted and which she could
not procure.
The plaintiff agreed, subsequently, to the
making of the contract, if defendant would
abate $100 from the contract-price, that he
would, at his expense, conduct the proceedings to procure from the court authority to
convey, she co-operating with him and would
subject to the tax title.
take a conveyance
This did not alter the position of the parties
so as to affect this case. She was in no sense
culpable in not co-operating with him in imposing upon some court, and to shield her
from the damages claimed in this case, she
was not obliged to allow him any thing on
account of the tax title. I am therefore of
opinion that the referee erred in the rule of
The recovery should have
damages applied.
been confined to the purchase-money paid
($25) and the interest thereon.
The general term did not therefore err in
reversing the judgment, and its order should
be affirmed and judgment absolute ordered
against the plaintiff, with costs.
he

All

concur.

Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.
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BIRD

V.

(30

Supreme

HALL

et al.

Mich. 374.)

Court of Michigan.

Oct. Term, 1874.

Appeal from circuit court, Marquette county; in chancery.

Parks & Hayden and Mitchel & Pratt, for
complainant. Ball & Black and C. B. Grant,
for defendants.
COOLBY,

J. A

short statement of this
in the bill, is, that
Bird contracted to purchase a lot of land of
Hall, and has partly paid for it; that lie then
contracted to sell the same land to McPee,
who also paid for it in part and was put in
possession, the balance of the purchase price
not being yet due; that Hall then, in disregard of complainant's rights, has given McFee a conveyance; that McFee is irresponsiis
ble, and complainant by this conveyance
deprived of his security for the balance
which is to become due to him hereafter from
JIcFee; and the bill prays that McFee be decreed to convey to complainant in speciflc
performance of the contract of Hall, in whose
shoes as his assignee he now stands.
It seems clear that a conveyance as prayed by the bill would be strictly equitable,
as it would place the parties where they have
agreed to place themselves by their contracts.
Complainant was entitled to a conveyance
from Hall on payment of the balance due
him, which he has offered to make, and he
case,

as It is set forth

was then entitled to hold the title until he is
paid in full by McFee. This is conceded by
defendants, but they insist that complainant
has at law an ample remedy against Hall,
if he suffers a loss in consequence of Hall's
conveyance to McFee, and that as it is not
alleged that Hall is irresponsible, there is no
sufficient ground for equitable interference.
What complainant loses by this conveyance is his security for the ultimate payment
by McFee. Whether a loss of the security
would result in loss of the debt cannot yet
be determined, and any present right of action at law against Hall would give him
nominal damages only. A right of action
against him at a future day, after the personal remedy against McFee had proved ineffectual, might or might ncft find him in
condition to respond, even if it be conceded
that at present he is entirely responsible.
Complainant cannot justly be compelled to
run this risk. These parties cannot be allowed to deprive him of his security and turn
him over to the contingencies of successive
suits at law after his demand has matured.
He has a right to be protected against the
suits and the contingencies by having ample
and effectual security in his own hands, and
the remedy in equity was alone adequate to
the case.
The decree must be reversed with costs,
and the cause remanded, with directions to
the court below to overrule the demurrer and
allow the defendant McFee to answer.
The other justices concurred.
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MERCHANTS' BANK
(55 N.

Y.

v.

THOMSON.

7.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 11, 1873.
Appeal from order of general term of the
supreme court In the Fourth judicial department, aflarming conditionally an order of special term directing Theodore F. Tuttle, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale, to complete his
purchase.
This action was to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendant, William P. Thomson,
to Guevera M. Waite, conditioned for the
payment of $1,070 In one year from date.
Helen A. Thomson, the wife of the mortgagor,
was made a nominal party defendant. Thei-e
were, however, no averments in the complaint
relating to her. She did not join in the mortgage, which was upon the undivided onefourth part of certain real estate situate in
the city of "Watertown. Personal service was
had upon all the defendants, and no defence
was interposed by any of them. The whole
amount of the mortgage was due. The usual
decree of foreclosure was entered May 10,
1872.
A. W. Wheelock, sheriff of Jefferson
county, was directed by the decree to conduct
the sale, which took place June 6, 1872.
The premises were struck off to Theodore
F. Tuttle, for $3,350, he being the highest bidder. The purchaser requested a delay for a
short time; this was granted, and at the suggestion of the sheriff that a specified time
should be stated by the terms of sale, it was
agreed to be completed on the tenth of June.
After the sale Tuttle requested to be released,
upon the ground that his bid was too high, but
this plaintiff refused and Tuttle was repeatedly urged to complete the sale. On the twenty-fifth of June, the sheriff formally tendered
to him a deed of the premises and demanded
payment.
On the 5th of July, 1872, an order
was made by Mr. Justice Mullin, requiring
Tuttle to show cause at an adjourned special
term, on the tenth of the same month, why he,
Tuttle, should not pay the amount of his bid,
and receive from the sheriff a deed. On that
day a hearing was had at said special term;
Tuttle appeared and opposed on the ground of
defect of title, because of the inchoate dower
right of Helen A. Thomson. An order of reference was granted to a referee to inquire as
to the facts and circumstances occurring at
the sale, etc., and report the same, with his
opinion. Pursuant to this order, the testimony of Tuttle and others was taken by said
referee, who reported the same, with his opinion that Tuttle should be required to receive
the sheriff's deed and pay the amount of his
bid. Pending the taking of the testimony before the referee, Helen A. Thomson, for the
purpose of relinquishing her contingent dower
right, executed a quit-claim deed of the premises to J. F. Moffatt, who, with his wife, also
executed a quit-claim deed to Tuttle. Upon
motion to confirm the report, the special term
ordered that Tuttle complete his purchase by
receiving the sheriff's deed of the premises and
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the quit-claim
chase-price,

deeds,

and paying

the pur-

with interest from day of

sale.

Upon appeal to the general term it was ordered that such order be reversed, unless
plaintiff should, within thirty days, deliver toTuttle a valid release of the dower right of
the mortgagor's wife, together with the sheriff's deed; if such release and deed were so.
delivered, then order affirmed.
L. J. Dorwin, for appellant. Samuel Hand,

for

respondent.

FOLGER, J. When Thomson executed themortgage which was foreclosed, he was married. The mortgage was not given for the purchase-money, nor did his wife join In executing It. Hence it did not affect her inchoate
right of dower in the premises.
Though she
was made a party to the action of foreclosure,,
she was not barred of that right by the judgment therein. There is no allegation in thecomplaint that the mortgage was prior, or superior, or hostile, to her right or interest.
There is the general clause in the judgment
that the defendants be foreclosed of all right
in the premises.
But her inchoate right of
dower was not in issue, and there could be no.
valid adjudication adverse to it. Moreover a
foreclosure action is not the proper mode tolitigate rights claimed in priority or hostility
to the mortgage.
A judgment passing upon
them is erroneous.
A person claiming dower
by title paramount to the mortgage cannot bebrought into court in such a suit to contest
the validity of her dower. Lewis v. Smith,
9 N. Y. 502.
The position is the same as
she had not been made a party to the foreclosure action.
The title made by the referee's sale in the
action was subject then to this inchoate right
of dower. And that was the sole objection ta
the title, made by the purchaser. It is ordinarily a good objection. Where there is an
outstanding inchoate right of dower in thepremises,
unknown to the purchaser at thetlme of the sale, the court will not compel
him to take a deed and complete his purchase.
Fltts V. Hoitt, 17 N. H. 530; Mills v. Van
Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412. And see Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298. And this is so in judicial
sales when the sale is not made at the risk of
the purchaser. McGown v. Wilkins, 1 Paige,
120; Spring v. Sandford, 7 Paige, 550.
The
attempt to obviate this objection by the execution and tender of the quit-claim deed from
the wife to Moffatt, and of that from hlm>
to the purchaser, though it showed the willingness of the vendor to meet the requirements
of the referee and of the court at special term,
was futile. Moffatt was a stranger to the title..
A quit-claim or release, by a married woman
to a stranger to the title, is ineffectual to divest her of an inchoate right of dower. Malloney v. Horan, 49 N. Y.
Marvin v.
Smith, 46 N. Y. 571. But a release from thewife, executed directly to the purchaser, in.
connection with the sheriff's deed to him,
will free the premises and give him a good.

if

Ill;
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The order of the general term
title thereto.
directs this. There is no suggestion but that
this direction has been or will be followed,
and we must treat the case as if it had been
■done.

Then the only groUnd upon which the purchaser now stands, in declining to complete
his contract, is that so much time has elapsed
since the sale, that he may not be compelled
to take the premises, although the title be free
from objection. Doubtless the later tendency
of courts of equitable jurisdiction is to hold
that time is material, and is in many cases of
the essence of the contract. Inexcusable laches
and delay will debar a party from the relief
which, they being absent, he might have by a
Judgment for specific performance. This question has been much considered of late in this
court. Delavan v. Duncan, 4& N. Y. 485;
Finch V. Parker, Id. 1; Hubbell v. Von
Schoening, Id. 326; Peters t. Delaplaine, Id.
362. It seems that whether specific performance shall be adjudged depends much upon
the circumstances of each ease, of which the
lapse of time unexcused is one. It is not yet
the rule however that the time fixed in a contract for the performance of it, is necessarily
■of its essence.
Tlie mere efflux of time will
not of itself always lead to a denial of relief.
When the lapse of time is occasioned or accompanied by a refusal or a failure to claim
or act under the contract, and is so great or
of such characteristics as to amount to a
waiver or abandonment of the contract, the
party who comes not into court until after
■such delay will have forfeited all claim to equity. Can this be said of the vendor in this
case? The sale was made on the 6th day of
June, 1872. By the conditions of sale the time
for the completion was, at the request of the
purchaser for delay, stated to be on the 10th
day of that month. It is evident however that
this day was not deemed essential.
The sheriff wished a memorandum of the sale, that
there might be no misunderstanding of the
terms, and the 10th day of the month was
named in it but not as peremptory. A few days
after the day of sale the purchaser made known
a desire to be relieved from his bid, but put
his wish upon the ground of his bid being too
large. He was not relieved nor was he in
anywise led to suppose that he would be. On
the contrary, frequent claims were made upon
him to complete his contract. On the 25th day
of that month a formal tender was made to
Mm of a deed by the sherifC, and a demand for
perfoi-mance.
On the 5th day of July, 1872,
■on his refusal to perform, these proceedings
were commenced to compel performance by him
and they have been pending ever since. Certainly there is no delay here which from its length
or other characteristic indicates an intention in
the vendor to waive or abandon the contract.
Rather the vendor showed himself In the
oft-quoted language of Lord Alvanley (Milward V. Earl of Thanet, 5 Ves. 720, note), "deThe vendor to be
sirous, prompt and eager."
■sure was not "ready," which is a part of the

phrase in that case. But it is noteworthy, that
it was not until after compulsory proceedings
were begun against the purchaser, that he
raised the objection to the title that it was incumbered with an inchoate right of dower.
Before that his refusal was put only upon the
excess of his bid over the real value of the
lands; a claim which is not shown to be well
founded. It thus appears that up to the commencement of proceedings to compel performance and for a time after that all delay arose
from either the indecision of the purchaser in
determining whether he would or would not
take the land or from an untenable objection
taken by him. In such case and whenever the
delay is attributable to the party resisting performance, he will not be allowed it as a deMonro v. Taylor, 3 Macn. & Gr. 713fense.
723; Morse v. Merest, 6 Madd. 26; Spurrier
v. Hancock, 4 Ves. 667. Nor does it appear
from the papers that the lapse of time which
of the
has occurred since the commencement
proceeding is to be laid at the door of the
vendor alone. The order of reference to take
proofs seems to have been granted on the request of the purchaser, and to enable him to
establish his objections. If there has been delay in executing that order before the referee
(and there seems to have been a greater lapse
of time there than elsewhere), the purchaser is
not more exempt from blame therefor than
the vendor. And besides that, had the true
and at that time the only reliable objection of
the purchaser, that made to the title, been put
forth in the first instance as the ground for a
refusal to perform, the vendor is not to be defeated if within a reasonable time thereafter
he takes proceedings to test the validity of the
objection. Southworth v. Bishop, etc., 8 Hare,
212; Paton v. Rogers, 6 Madd. 256. Still less
can a vendor be said to be dilatory who by the
prompt initiation of compulsory proceedings
forestalls and provokes an objection to his
title, which when made he at once sets about
to obviate and does obviate to the satisfaction
of each tribunal in turn before which the matter comes. If a party coiues recenti facto, for
a specific performance, the suit is treated
with indulgence and generally with favor by
the court. Marquis, etc., v. Boore, 5 Ves.
See, also, 2
719, and cases cited in note.
Sugd. Vend. 30 et seq.; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. «
777. We do not think that the vendor is to
be barred of its relief by reason of the mere
efflux of time since the sale.
It is stated in the text-books and in the
cases, that if by reason of delay arising
from an imperfection of title, the circumstances of the transaction and of the parties
have materially changed, so that e<iual justice may not be done to both by adjudging
specific performance, judgment therefor will
not be given. See Taylor v. Longworth, 14
Pet. 172, per Story, J. And it is intimated
in one of the points of the appellant that by
reason of the defect of title he has been unable to secure a loan upon the premises with
which to pay the purchase-money; that the
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property has greatly depreciated in value;
that at the time of the sale he could have resold without loss, and that now the property
is unsalable. There are no facts presented in
this case which sustain the intimations of
the appellant's point and afford a basis upon
which he may rest the application of this
rule in his behalf. Nor is any authority cited
that without such facts shown there will
be a presumption that
the
circumstances
have materially changed in the time elapsed,
so that it will be of evil to the defendant to
now hold him to his contract. It is said by
Bronson, J., in Jackson v. Edwards, 22 Wend.
498-510, to the eftect that it needs not proof
of a change of circumstances, to show that
delay in perfecting the title must be injurious to the purchaser, but that the bare fact
of delay, inasmuch as that it of necessity
prevents a purchaser from dealing with the
propertj' as his own, excuses him from accepting the title when at last it is perfected.
It is to be observed however that there was
in that case proof put in of a serious change
in the circumstances subsequent to the sale.
The remarli of the learned judge was obiter.
Sentor Yerplanck, the only other member of
the court who delivered an opinion, concurred
in the result arrived at by Bronson, J., as to
the effect in that case of the material change
of circumstances which had taken place.
But
he puts his conclusion upon the facts as
shown by the proofs, and holds that from
these the court below was warranted in concluding that the delay had injuriously affected the purchasers.
am unable to find
tliat the dictum of Bronson, J., has ever been
though in McKay v.
cited with approval;
Carrington, 1 McLean, 50-60, Fed Cas. No.
8,841, it is said that it may be presumed that
the embarrassment of the title, and the failure to obtain possession of the land for a
number of years, essentially injured the interests of the purchaser by preventing a
sale by him. If the dictum in Jackson v.
Edwards is to be adopted as a rule, it will
be applicable to every case, where there has
been any lapse of time occasioned by a
remediable defect of title, and the purchaser
And this would be to
resists performance.
set aside a current of authority, that where
the vendor comes in a reasonable time to
enforce the contract, prepared to obviate
the objections made to his title, he shall have
relief. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 777.
It is well recognized as one of the grounds
on which a court of equity adjudges a specific performance, that by lapse of time it
has become impossible to strictly perform
the contract, and so the party has lost his
remedy at law. But if the very lapse which
gives occasion for the court to Interfere
may be used to prevent its action, without
any proof that the lapse has been of detriment, this ground of interference Is effectually done away with. Time, though not ordinarily of the essence of the contract, may
become so if, by its effluxion, a change of

I
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value, or other material change of circumstances,
has been produced.
Certainly it
should be made to appear that such effect
has in fact followed.
If the court, without
facts shown, might speculate as to the effect
of delay upon the interests of parties. It is
quite as reasonable, at many periods of our
history, to surmise that in the lapse of time
circumstances have changed to the benefit
of the purchaser, as otherwise. Some of the
cases above cited (from 49 N. Y.) show this.
The true rule must be that if the delay of
itself is unreasonable and unexcused,
it is
enough to relieve the unwilling party from
the contract; and that delay, though not in
itself unreasonable, if it has made way for an
intermediate and material change of circumstances,
detrimental to the interests of defendant if obliged to perform, will have the
same effect; but. that in the latter case it
must so appear to the court from the facts
shown in the case.
These views would lead to a simple affirmance of the order of the general term,
but for another consideration.
The order
of the special term directed that the purchaser pay his bid, with interest from the
day of the sale. It gave no direction as to
rents and profits, in the meantime, of the
lands sold.
It does not appear either who
had in the meantime
the possession
of the
lands, though it may be inferred that the
purchaser had not.
The order of the general term affirmed that of the special term,
on condition that the plaintiff should, within
thirty days thereafter, deliver to the purchaser the sheriff's deed of the premises, and
a release by the wife of the mortgagor of
her inchoate right of dower.
We have assumed that this deed and this release have
been ready for the purchaser, and would have
been delivered to him within the specified
time, had he been ready to receive them and
pay the purchase-money. But is not according to the rules governing such cases to compel the purchaser, who is out of possession,
and is not under an especial contract, so
stringent in its terms as of itself to lead to
that result, to pay interest on the purchasemoney, when the vendor has not been ready
to make a good title. In such case the purchaser is bound to pay interest, and to take
the rents and profits of the lands in lieu
thereof, only from the time when a good tiForteblow v. Shirley,
tle is first shown.
cited in Binks v. Lord Kokeby, 2 Swanst.
222; Paton v. Rogers, 6 Madd. 256; Jones
Indeed, it is at the
V. Mudd, 4 Russ. 118.
option of the purchaser whether to take the
rents and profits and pay interest, or to
relinquish the rents and profits and to be exempt from the payment of interest. Dias v.
And see Worrall v.
Glover, 1 Hoff. 71.
Munn, 53 N. Y. 185.
The order of the special term and that of
then, so far
the general term are erroneous,
as they direct the payment of interest by
the purchaser from the date of the sale up
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to the time of the readiness to deliver the
deed and release, provided for by the order

of the general term. And though the order
of the general term should be affirmed in
its general scope, it should be modified in
this particular to agree with the facts. As
the exact state of the facts does not yet ap-

pear, the terms of the judgment of this court
will have to be settled on the presentation
of them by the parties.
Neither party should have costs against the

other in this court
All concur.
Ordered accordingly.

EQUITABLE REMEDIES.
HUBBELL

V.

VON SOHOENINGY. 326.)

et

al.

(49 N.

Court of Appeals

of New York. May 3, 1872.
Action to compel the specific performance
of a contract for the sale of three lots on One
Hundred and Twenty-First street in the city
of New York.
There was a judgment for
defendant, from which plaintiff appealed.
The following are the principal facts in the
case: Defendants, husband and wife, contracted to convey to plaintifC premises in
New York belonging to the wife, the purchase-money to be paid and deed delivered
January 24, 1S68. On the 23d, plaintiff applied to defendants' attorney, at whose office
the contract was to be performed, for an extension of time to enable him to complete
searches.
The attorney promised to send
him word when the defendants arrived next
day, so that he could see them about it Not
receiving any word, plaintifC waited until
four p. m. the next day, and then went to the
office, where he found the husband, who informed him the wife had been there at noon,
and had gone home, and would have nothing more to do with it; he was also informed he could not see her that night.
The
next morning plaintiff sought the defendants at their house, with the money to make
the tender, but was told they were not at
home.
He thereupon tendered the money to
the attorney at his office. This was Saturday. On Monday, plaintiff again sought the
defendants, but was unable to find the wife.
Thereupon he brought suit for specific performance.
Samuel Hand,
and George W.

for appellant.
iS''an

A. Lansing
Slyck, for respondents.

ALLEN, J. There were no laches on the
part of the plaintiff, nor any delay in the
assertion of his rights. He has shown himself, in the language of the cases, "ready,
•desirous, prompt, and eager" to carry out
the contract and have a performance of it.
The brief delay of a few hours in making a
formal tender of the purchase-money and
•demanding
a conveyance of the property,
was explained and excused.
He had not,
for some reason, completed his searches, and
satisfied himself as to the title, and the day
before that appointed for the performance
of the contract he applied to the attorney
of the defendants, at whose office the parties
were to meet, for an extension of the time
to enable him to complete his searches, and
the attorney promised him that he would
send bun word as soon as the defendants
came to his office, if they arrived the next
day, so that he might see them about it.
Not receiving any message from the attorney the next day, he had reason to believe,
either that the parties had not arrived or
that they had assented to his request He
might reasonably and properly rely upon this
promise of the attorney, and it should not
J>e imputed to him as laciies or as evidence
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of an indifference to, or an unwillingness to
perform the contract, that he did so. The
plaintiff had all of the 24th of January within which to perform the contract, as no
hour was named for that purpose. He did
not wait for the promised notice from the
defendants' attorney, but during the business
hours, and late in the afternoon of that day,
went to the office and there found Mr. Von
Schoening, one of the contracting parties,
and was told by him that he would have
nothing more to do with him, that he did
not pay the money that same day, he did
not fulfill his agreement and' he would have
nothing more to do with it. The feme defendant had been there in the earlier part of
the day but had left, and the plaintiff was
told he could not see her that night. The
next morning the plaintiff sought the defendants early at their own house at Harlem, with the money to make the tender of
the purchase-money and was told they were
not at home. He then tendered the money
to the attorney at his office, and this being
Saturday, on the Monday following he again
sought the defendants to tender the money
to them personally, but was unable to find
Mrs. Von Schoening, who was the owner of
the property. She evidently kept out of the
way, and the complaint was verified on the
same day.
In Duffy v. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y.
223, we held the plaintifC entitled to a specific
performance against the vendor and the person to whom he had conveyed the premises
with notice of the contract, although the
money was not paid or tendered at the hour,
the purchaser acting in good faith and intending to perform, and supposing, from the
acts and declarations of the agent and attorney of the seller, that the money would be
received at a later hour in the day.
Time, in the performance of an agreement
either for the sale or purchase of real property, is always material, and a court of equity will not, any more than a court of law,
excuse laches and gross negligence in the assertion of a right to a specific performance.
But time is not of the essence of the contract, unless made so by the terms of the
contract; and therefore, although there may
not, when time has not been made essential,
be performance at the day, if the delay is
excused and the situation of the parties or
of the property is not changed so that injury
will result, and the party is reasonably vigilant, the court will relieve him from the consequences of the delay and grant a specific
performance. Kadclifte v. Warrington,
12
Ves. 326; More v. Smedburgh, 8 Paige, 600;
Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige, 352. Each
case must be judged by its own circumstances.

A party may not trifie with his contracts
and still ask the aid of a court of equity.
Neither will the law be administered in a
spirit of technicality, and so as to defeat the
ends of justice. In this instance there is no
vexation, no rpom for suspicion of any trick

254

EQUITABLE KEMEDIES.

on the part of tlie plaintifC; at most, it was
a mistake in depending upon the promise of

the defendants' attorney to advise him when
the defendants arrived, if they should arrive on the day fixed for tlie performance of
the contract.
It was assumed by the learned judge on
the trial that one of the parties could, by
notice to the other, make time of the essence
of a contract, when by its terms it was not
made so. This may be questionable, but
need not be considered.
The party in such
case, if the operation and effect of the contract are to be essentially changed so as to
vary his rights or duties at the volition of
the other, should have reasonable notice in
advance of the time when he will be called
upon to act. Here no such notice was given,
but, on the contrary, the plaintiff was put
at ease by the promise of the attorney of
the defendants. Doubtless a party may be
held to a strict performance as to time and
put in default for non-performance— that is,
a default in law; and whether equity would
relieve would depend on circumstances. But
to do this the party seeking to put the other
in default must not only be ready and willing
to perform, but he must tender performance

at the time and demand performance from
the other. Von Schoening testified that a
deed had been prepared and was ready, but
the plaintiff was not notified of the fact, and
it was not shown or offered to him. The defendants took especial pains to prove by the
feme defendant, the owner of the premises,
that she had never authorized any one to
complete the contract or to receive the money
for her, and she was not at the place of performance when the plaintiff called. The
plaintiff was not in default, and was not put
in default by any acts or offers of the defendants. The judge before whom the cause
was tried has not found that the defendants
put the plaintiff in default by an offer and
a demand of performance, and the evidence
would not have justified such a finding. But
he has found that the plaintiff had failed to
perform, and therefore was not entitled to
relief merely by reason of a casual and justifiable delay of a few hours In making a
formal tender of performance. In this we
think there was error.
The judgment should be reversed "and a
new trial granted.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.

EQUITABLE REMEDIES.
LAMB
(8 N.

V.

W.

Supreme

HINMAN

et al.

709, 46 Mich. 112.)

Court of Michigan.
Appeal from Berrien.

April

Edward Bacon, for complainant.
for defendants.

Severens,

COOLEY,

J.

27,

18S1.

Henry F.

Specific performance is pray-

ed in this case of an oral contract alleged to
have been made by complainant with Hugh

Lamb, his father, now deceased. The defendants are the administrator and heirs at law of
Hugh Lamb. The case made by the bill is
that on or about October 12, 1872, Hugh

Lamb owned a certain 80-acre lot of land in
the township of Warsaw, of the value of
about $2,400, upon which he lived alone; that
he was then 72 years of age, and very infirm;
that among his infirmities was an ungovernable temper which rendered it difficult for
others to live with him; that he had been letting his land on shares and had not succeeded
well in so doing; that he had no team, little
live stock and few farming utensils; that
complainant was then a married man, living
with his wife and two children about a mile
from his father; that his father went to see
him, and after talking over his affairs and circumstances,
entered into a verbal agreement
with him in substance and effect, as follows:
On the part of complainant it was agreed
that as soon as suitable preparations could be
made, complainant with his wife and family
should remove to his father's dwelling-house
on the land aforesaid, and live with him during the remainder of his life, and should give
him suitable care and attention, and should
farm the land, rendering to his father annually two-fifths of all the wheat and one-half of
all the corn raised on the land, all to be delivered on the land, the wheat in the half
bushel and the corn in the shock or row; that
complainant should furnish the seed, farming
utensils and team for use on the farm, and
supply his father with suitable board, lodging,
washing and mending, and on the part of said
Hugh Lamb it was agreed that he should pay
annually to complainant $75, and let complainant have the south 40 acres of the land
and give him a good and sufficient deed thereof; that this agreement was fully performed
on his part to the satisfaction of his father;
that complainant took possession of the south
40 as his own In July, 1873, and has since cultivated and Improved the same; that his father often promised to give complainant a deed
of said south 40, but neglected to do so, and
died without having given a deed, In September, 1878, and that since his death the
heirs at law and the administrator appointed
to settle his estate refuse to recognize and perform the agreement; wherefore complainant
prays the aid of the court.
udant answered, denying that Hugh
The
Lamb ever made such an agreement, and the
case was brought to a hearing on pleadings
and proofs. We are convinced by the proofs

255

that a contract substantially as set up In the
bill was made by the parties, and that complainant has strong equities in his favor which
should be recognized if no inflexible rules of
law forbid. The evidence that proves the contract discloses little discrepancies in the understanding of particulars, but not such as to
make us doubt the parties having agreed upon the terms of an arrangement as complainant now describes them.
If there is any doubt as to the precise terms
of the contract, it concerns the time when
the deed was to be given. The complainant
seems to have expected
his father would
give him a deed without any great delay; but
the agreement fixed no time; and as the retention of the title constituted the father's secm-ity for the performance by complainant, it
was not unnatural that he should delay putting the security out of Ms hands. If the contract had been in writing, Hugh Lamb would
have bad the legal right to decline to part
with the title so long as he lived; and it is no
reason for declining specific performance of
the oral contract that complainant had expected his father would so far confide in him
as to make the deed In person instead of leaving It to be made by his heirs. We think,
therefore, that so far as proof of the contract
is concerned, the case Is sufficiently made out
to answer the requirements of cases relied upon by defendants. Case v. Pelers, 20 Mich.
298; Wright v. Wright, 31 Mich. 380.
But it is said there has been no such part
performance as can take the case out of the
statute of frauds. The most Important act of
part performance was the taking possession
of the land, occupying and cultivating it during the father's life. But this It is said was
not in fact the complainant's possession, but
the possession of the father; so that on this
branch of the case there is substantial failure
to make out any recognizable equity. Thereason why taking possession under an oral
contract is recognized as a ground for specific
performance when payment of the purchaseprice Is not, is that In one case there is no
standard for the estimate of damages when
the contract is repudiated,
and In the other
there is a standard that is definite and certain. A purchaser who takes possession of
land under an oral purchase Is likely In so
doing to change very considerably— perhaps
wholly— the general course of his life as previously planned by him; and if he is evicted
any estion a repudiation of the contract,
mate of his loss by others must In many cases
guess-work. The rule, therefore,
be mere
rests upon the element of uncertainty, and not
upon any technical ground of excluslveness Iq
And upon this point no caseon
the possession.
Its equities could be plainer than this. Complainant abandoned one home and made a
new one In reliance upon the oral contract;
occupied the land bargained for and cultivated
It for six years in confidence that the contract would be performed; and it Is not toomuch to say that the whole course of his sub-
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sequent life was probably changed in consequence.
To deny relief under such circumstances for no other reason than that he did
not occupy exclusively, would be to make the
whole case turn upon a point in itself unimportant as affecting the real equities.
The

case is within Kinyon v. Young, 44 Mich. 339,
6 N. W. 835.
The decree of the court of chancery was in
favor of complainant, and it must be affirmed
with costs.
The other justices concurred.

EQUITABLE REMEDIES.
STEWARD

V.

(4 Sandf.

WINTERS

et al.

Ch. 588.)

Court of Chancery of New York. May, 1847.
Motion to dissolye an injunction, restraining tlie defendants from carrying on the
auction business, or seUing goods at public auction, in the store number eighteen William
street, in the city of New York; and from
conducting therein any business other than
the regular dry goods jobbing business.
On the 2d day of February, 1S47, the complainant, being the owner of that store, leased
to the defendant, Winters, the first floor and
cellar, for two years from the first day of
May then next, at the yearly rent of fifteen
hundred doUai-s,
payable quarterly.
The
lease, executed by both parties, contained the
following stipulation next following the demising clause, viz.:
"The store to be occupied for the regular dry goods jobbing business, and for no other kind of business; and
the store is not to be relet, without the written consent of the party of the first part;
there is to be no marking or lettering on the
granite, and no alteration in the shelving, or
in the store otherwise, unless by the consent
of the party of the first part"
On the first of May, 1S47, Winters entered
into possession of the premises, and immediately, in connection with the defendant
Sayres, under the firm of Sayres & Winters,
commenced selling goods there at auction,
and continued to sell at auction daily, till the
service of the injunction, suspending over the
door the customary auctioneer's flag.
Advertisements of their sales were published daily
in the morning papers, in the columns of auctions, with the heading:
"J. B. Sayres, Auctioneer. By Sayres & Winters, Store No. 18
William Street. This day, at 10 o'clock, at
the auction rooms. Dry goods," &c. &c.
On the sixth of May, the complainant notified Winters in writing, that he was violating
the stipulation in the lease by selling at auction, and that the complainant would insist
on its being enforced; but Winters continued
the auction sales as before.
The complainant owned several stores adjoining to and in the immediate neighborhood of the premises let to Winters, most of
which were let to tenants carrying on the
regular dry goods jobbing business; Winters'
doings annoyed those tenants, and they complained of it to the complainant.
The occupants of the lofts over Winters, who were also tenants of the complainant were annoyed
by the auction sales; and those sales were
thereby, as he insisted, injuriously affecting
his interests in respect to his stores as tenements, to prevent which was one reason for
The bill stated
his inserting the restriction.
that the auction business is not the regular
dry goods jobbing business, and the conducting of the former in the demised premises,
was a violation of the stipulation in the lease.
The defendants, in support of the motion insisted in affidavits, that the business conduct—
HUTCH.EQ.JUB. 17
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ed by them was

within the terms contained
in the lease; and they showed that the complainant owned a store opposite the demised
premises in the same street, which he
had
leased for an auction store;
and that several
other auction stores were close by.

J. Slosson, for complamant
for defendants.

I

E. Sandford,

SANDFORD, V. O.
have no doubt that
the business of selling goods at auction, is
prohibited by the terms of the
covenant in
the lease, and that the lessee when he executed the lease, knew perfectly well that the
lessor intended to exclude the auction business.
The philological authority cited by the
defendants, does not bear them out.
Dr.
Webster defines a "jobber" to be, "a merchant who purchases goods from Impoi-ters
and sells to retailers."
An auctioneer does
not purchase at all. He sells the goods of
others for a commission.
Without wasting time upon the well established distinction between a dry goods jobber
and an auctioneer, which is too clearly
marked to be confounded or obliterated by
affidavits,
will proceed to the only question
in the cause, that of jurisdiction.
It is said, that the remedy at law for damages is adequate, and that so far from there
being an u-reparable injury by the continuance of the breach of this covenant, it is
shown that there can be no injury at all.
apprehend that we are not to regard this
subject in the manner indicated by the latter
proposition.
The owner of land, selling or
leasing it, may insist upon just such covenants as he pleases, touching the use and
mode of enjoyment of the land; and he is
not to be defeated when the covenant is broken, by the opinion of any number of persons,
that the breach occasions him no substantial
injury.
He has a right to define the injury
for himself, and the party contracting with
him must abide by the definition.
In the case of the bakery (Macher v. Foundling Hospital) in 1 Ves. & B. 188, hereafter
cited, I have no doubt a great many witnesses might have been found, who would
have testified, that the bakery was not an annoyance to them, or to any but over sensitive
persons.
And in Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige,
254, the injury to the complainant, if tested
by the opinions of witnesses, would scarcely
have resulted in even nominal damages, in
an action at law.
It is not necessary that the act complained
of, should amount to a nuisance in law, either
Nor Is the court to enter
public or private.
into a comparison, and permit a tenant to
carry on some trades as less offensive than
others, where the covenant prohibits the former.
Per Lord Bldon, in Macher v. Foundling Hospital, 1 Ves. & B. 188.
So far as the injury is concerned.
It Is
therefore unnecessary for the complainant to
establish that It wUl be irreparable; or on a

I
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continuing covenant, that it will be substantially injurious.
The question remains, is there an adequate
remedy at law?
In the first Tjiace, it is manifest that at
law a new cau«e of action will arise every
If
day that the defendants sell at auction.
the lessor avail himself of his full rights at
This
law, he will sue daily for damages.
would lead to a multiplicity of suits, harassing to both parties, and highly obnoxious to
the censure of a court of equity.
Then if the suits were brought, how is it
possible to estimate the actual damages? A
jury might enter into a wide field of conjecture, without any certainty of coming out of
it at the point of justice to the parties. The
jurors might infer that the continuance of an
premises,
auction business in the demised
would for years diminish the rent of the adjoining property, and render the premises less
desirable to good tenants. But any estimate
of damages
on that basis,
however well
founded, would be wholly conjectural.
A
different jury might imagine that the conducting of an auction business,
would enhance the value of the adjoining premises,
and refuse to give any damages.
And witnesses could undoubtedly be produced, whose
opinions would sanction a finding in either
of these modes.
I think that in a case where the parties
by an express stipulation, have themselves
determined that a particular trade or business conducted by the one, will be injurious
or offensive to the other, and there is a con-

tinuing breach of the stipulation by the one,
which this court can perceive may be highly
detrimental to the other, although on the
facts presented, it is not clear that there is
injury, and it is manifest that
a serious
the extent of the injury is difficult to be ascertained or measured in damages; it is the
duty of the court by injunction, to restrain
further infractions of the covenant, thereby
preventing a multiplicity of petty suits at
law, and at the same time protecting the
rights of the complainant.
The principles to be extracted fjom the following authorities, in my judgment, sanction
this jurisdiction.
refer to HiUs v. Miller,
3 Paige, 254; Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige,
351; Ranliin v. HusJiisson, 4 Sim. 13; Barret V. Blagrave, 5 Ves. 555 (same case, 6 Ves.
104, where the jurisdiction
was virtually conceded on the motion to dissolve the injunction); Lord Grey de Wilton v. Saxon, 6 Ves.
106; Macher v. Foundling
Hospital, before
cited; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 928.
As I remarked at the outset, the legal right
is entirely free from doubt, so that the objection frequently made, previous to a trial
of the right at law, does not exist. Therefore, the argument of Sir James Wigram, V.
C, in Rigby v. Great Western R. Co., is exceedingly applicable; and in this respect, his
argument is not impaired by the judgment
of the Chancellor of England in the same
case, on dissolving the injunction.
4 Railway
& Can. Cas. 175, 1 Coop. t. Cott. 3.
The motion to dissolve the injunction must
be denied, with costs.
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MANHATTAN MANUFACTURING & FERTILIZING CO. V. NEW .lERSEY STOCKYARD & MARKET CO. et al.
(23

N.

J.

Eq. 161.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
1872.

May Term

Bill for an injunction.
Heard on a rule to
show cause why an injunction should not issue.

Mr.. McCarter, for complainant.
I. W.
Scudder and Mr. AYinfield, for defendants.

ZABRISKIE, Ch. The complainant is a
corporation of the state of New Yorli, doing
business at Communipaw.
The defendant,
the stock yard company, a corporation of this
state, owns a large and extensive abattoir or
slaughter-house at Communipaw. It has not,
for some years, slaughtered animals there,
but let to butchers the privilege of slaughtering their animals in the abattoir.
Previous to August, 1870, the blood and other remains of animals thus slaughtered there by
the butchers, not being removed or properly
cared for, had created a stench which became
a nuisance to the adjoining country, and the
company was resti'ained by an injunction
from permitting the business to be carried on
there, unless on condition of having the blood
and offal perfectly cared for. The butchers
paid for the privilege of slaughtering there,
and left the blood and offal on the premises,
to be cared for by the stock yard company.
These difficulties became a serious embarrassment in the enterprise. The complainant
undertook to manage this, and to remove and
manufacture the blood and other abandoned
refuse left on the premises by the butchers,
so as to prevent any public or private nuisance that might else arise from them.
To effect the objects of this arrangement,
the stock yard company, on the 5th of August, 1870, made a lease to the complainant
of certain premises adjoining the abattoir, for
the specified business of manufacturing and
preparing fertilizers and manures, and the
The term was
materials for that purpose.
for twenty years from April 20th, 1867, with
privilege of renewal, and the rent to be paid
was fifteen per cent, of the net profits of the
business. The lease contained this provision:
"The parties of the second part shall also
have the refusal and exclusive right of saving and taking all the blood of animals
slaughtered in the abattoir and sheep-house
of the parties of the first part, and of saving
and taking the animal matter and ammonia
from the rendering tanks of the parties of
the first part, and of using the same in their
business;" and also this agreement on part
of the complainant: "Said parties of the second part hereby bind themselves to save all
that is possible of the blood from the animals slaughtered, and the animal matter and
ammonia from the tanks, to prevent any ef-
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fluvia or stenches from escaping, and to prevent any and all nuisance from being created in any manner whatsoever, either in saving the blood, animal matter, or ammonia, or
in converting the same into articles of commerce."
The lease was executed by the president of
the stock yard company, in the name of the
company,
by affixing its common seal and
his signature. The execution was duly
proved, and the lease recorded in Hudson
county clerk's office, August 20th, 1870.
The complainant, on faith of the lease,
erected on the demised premises expensive
buildings and machinery for the purpose of
the manufacture.
These were completed by
January 9th, 1871.
In the meantime arrangements had been made by the complainant with the stock company and its employes
for coagulating the blood on the premises,
and for preventing nuisances arising from
slaughtering in the abattoir.
Part of this
coagulated blood had, with complainant's acquiescence, been delivered to Jolm J. Craven,
one of the defendants, for making experiments or manufacturing it.
In April, 1871, the stock yard company
leased its abattoir to Henry R. Payson and
David H. Sherman, two of the defendants,
who have since carried on the business under the name of D. H. Sherman & Co. The
defendant, Isaac Freese, who was in the employ of the stock yard company as superintendent, and continued in the employ of D.
H. Sherman & Co. in the like capacity, entered into partnership with the defendant
Craven, who was also in the employ of the
stock yard company at the making of its
lease to the complainant, and with the defendant Sherman, under the name of "The
Bergen Manufactm-ing Company," for the
purpose of manufacturing albumen and fertilizers.
After January 9th, 1871, the complainant
demanded all the blood of the animals slaughtered at the abattoir, but Craven made an arrangement with certain butchers who slaughtered there, for saving and taking the blood
of the animals slaughtered by them, and this
was permitted by Sherman & Co., and Freese,
their superintendent; and a large part of the
blood is thus taken and delivered to Sherman, Freese and Craven, and is lost to the
complainant.
By the record of the lease to the complainant, Sherman, Craven and Freese had constructive notice of its contents, and also it is
clear that they, as well as Payson, had actual notice. They do not deny this, but take
the ground that the blood, like all otlier parts
of the animal slaughtered, belongs to the
butcher, and that they or the stock yard company can no more control or deliver it than
they could control the flesh or hides. That
the butchers having discovered that the blood
has a merchantable value, have a right to
dispose of it for their own benefit; and that
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determined to sell it, and not
Craven was under no obligaIt, and his firm might receiye
without breach of faith.
This defence, at first sight, is seemingly
good; but it wholly rests upon the correctness of the premises, to wit, that the stocli
yard company had not the right or power
It is
to control the disposition of the blood.
not claimed that it had, before the complainant's lease, granted to any one the priviIf it had, for a
lege of slaughtering there.
term unexpired, it would have lost the control. Before that, they had permitted butchers to slaughter there without any provision
about disposing of the blood or offal. It
tuay, by custom, have been the effect of such
contract, that the butcher might leave the
blood and ofCal to be removed by the company. If left, the company was liable for
any nuisance occasioned by it. It cannot be
doubted that the company could have required, as a condition, that the butcher should remove the blood and ofCal. It had the right to
prevent any one from using the abattoir who
would not comply.
Before the lease to the
complainant, this condition would have been
deemed a burden on the butchers, and might
have injured the business of the company.
It was in difficulty by reason of the nuisance
caused by leaving these matters, and the
injunction growing out of it. It was relieved by this lease.
The consideration was
the exclusive right to talie the blood and
offal which was secured by covenant to the
complainant.
After that, the company had
the same right to demand of every one using
the abattoir that he should leave these matters for the complainant, as it had to require
him to remove them.
This could have been
annexed as a condition to every permission
to use the abattoir, as well as the condition
to pay for the use. And this, by its covenant, the company was bound to do. D. H.
Sherman & Co., as the lessees, are bound by
the same covenant. And Freese, Craven and
Sherman having notive of this obligation before they commenced
their business, are
bound to refrain from interfering with these
rights of the complainant, and from taking
the blood and other matters which it is entiwhen they had
to abandon it,
tion not to buy
it through him

tled to take. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phila. 7T4;
De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De Gex & J. 276.
The facts that Freese and Craven transferred to the complainant their claim to a patent for making albumen from blood, and
took part in the arrangements for the lease
by the company in whose employ they were,
and that Craven interfered by these negotiations with the butchers after he was repulsed"
in his attempt to get into the employ of the
complainant, do not give greater validity
to the complainant's right; they may 'show
bad faith and vindictiveness, and that they
are not entitled to any favorable consideration beyond their legal rights.
The injunction applied for is not a mandatory injunction;
it is not to require the delivery of the blood, but to restrain Craven
from taking it, and the other defendants
from suffering or permitting any other person
than the complainant to take it.
For this injury there is a remedy at law,
but it is not an adequate remedy. The value
of the blood is no measure of the injury, and
it is hardly possible to compute the damages
which the injury may occasion. And redress
at law could only be obtained by a continued
series of suits through the twenty or forty
years of the complainant's term. It is a
case peculiarly
proper for the preventive
remedy by injunction.
Shreve v. Black, 4 N.
J. Eq. 177.
The defendants, in their answers, deny
that the seal of the stock yard company was
affixed to the lease by authority of the directors. The bill alleges that the stock yard
company made and executed the lease under
its corporate seal, and sets out a lease with
the seal affixed, and signed by the president.
The answer of the company is not verified by
any one who has knowledge of the facts.
The present secretary swears that he believes the facts to be true. Any deed of a
corporation, under its corporate seal and
signed by the proper officer, is presumed to
have been executed by authority of the corporation, until the contrary is clearly shown.
Leggett V. New Jersey Manuf'g & Banking
Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 541.
There is no proof here
to overcome this presumption.
The injunction must issue as prayed for.

EQUITABLE BEMED1E3.
TRUSTEES OP COLUMBIA COLLEGE
V. LYNCH.
(70 N. Y. 440.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

Sept. 1877.

Action to restrain the carrying on of busi-

ness on premises situate on tlie north-east
corner of Fiftieth street and Sixth avenue in
the city of New Yorls, upon the ground that
the premises were subject to a covenant reserving the property exclusively for dwelling-houses.
The westerly portion of the block in question, prior to 1860, belonged to Joseph D.
Beers, from whom defendant Lynch acquired
title, and the portion adjoining on the east
|)elonged to the plaintiffs.
In July, 1859, an agreement was executed
whereby Beers, in consideration of similar
reciprocal covenants therein contained on the
part of the plaintiffs, did for himself, his
heirs and assigns, in respect to the lands
which he then owned, covenant with the
plaintiffs, their successors and assigns, that
his lands above mentioned should be subject
That Beers, his
to the following covenants:
heirs or assigns, his or their tenants, and
others occupying his said lands, should not
permit, grant, erect, establish or carry on in
any manner on any part of said lands any
stable, school-house, engine-house or manufactory or business whatsoever; or erect or
build, or commence to erect or build, any
building or edifice, with intent to use the
same, or any part thereof, for any of the purposes aforesaid.
The agreement was recorded, and defendant Lynch took her lot expressly subject to
the conditions and restrictions of the agreement of Beers and the plaintiffs.
The trial court found that the opposite side
of Sixth avenue, between Fiftieth and FiftyFirst streets, was entirely occuijled by the
Broadway railroad stables; there was a grocery store on the south-east corner and a
liquor store on the south-west corner of Sixth
avenue and Fiftieth street; and Sixth avenue, in that vicinity, was occupied as a busiThere was judgment for defendness street.
ant, from which plaintiffs appealed.
Samuel Hand,
S. P. Nash, for appellants.

for respondents.

ALLEN, J. It was competent for the plaintiffs and Mr. Beers, from the latter of whom
the defendants derive title, while they were
the owners of adjoining tracts or parcels of
land In the city of New York, by mutual
covenants to regulate the use and enjoyment
of their respective properties, with a view to
the permanent benefit and the advancement
in value of each. The mutual and reciprocal
covenants of the contracting parties constituted a good consideration for the covenants
All that is reand agreements of both.
undertaking
of one of two
the
quired, when
contracting parties gives the consideration
for the undertaking of the other, is that there
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should be mutuality; covenants or undertakings by each, that each should come under
some obligation, or release some right to the
other; but a perfect reciprocity in the undertakings, or equality in the obligations assumed or rights released, is not involved in
or essential to the sufficiency of the considerations. Equality is not of the essence of
mutuality.
It sulfices that some promise or
covenant has been made, or some right given
up; and the adequacy of the same, as a consideration to support the undertaking of the
other party, in the absence of fraud, is for
the parties to determine.
A covenant is well
supported in law and in equity by any consideration, however slight. In this case it is
not material to inquire whether the covenant
of the plaintiffs is, as viewed from our standpoint, the perfect equivalent of that of Mr.
Beers. It was accepted by the latter as a
sufficient consideration for the covenant made
by him, and tliere is no evidence before us
to impeach the agreement as one not fairly
and honestly made.
The agreement itself is not void, as in restraint of trade or as imposing undue restrictions upon the use of property.
Covenants, conditions and reservations, imposing
like restrictions upon urban property, for the
benefit of adjacent lands, having respect to
light, air, ornamentation, or the exclusion of
occupations which would render the entire
property unsuitable for the purposes to
which it could be most advantageously devoted, have been sustained, and have never
They have
regarded as impolitic.
been
been enforced at law and in equity without
question. The restrictions are deemed wise
by the owners, who alone are interested,
and they rest upon and withdraw from general and unrestricted use but a small portion of territory within the corporate limits of any city or municipality, and neither
It Is
public or private interest can suffer.
not alleged in the answer, nor was it proved
upon the hearing, that there has been any
change in the character of the locality, the
surroundings of the premises, or the occupation of contiguous property, or the business
of the vicinage, which has rendered it inexpedient to observe the covenant, or made a
disregard of it indispensable to the practical
and profitable use and occupation of the
premises, so that it might be inequitable to
compel a specific performance of the agreeIf such a defense could avail, it has
ment
not been interposed, so that the facts found
by the learned trial judge, in respect of the
character of the buildings, and the business carried on at this time in the Sixth avenue, are immaterial and cannot affect the
result.
The pm-pose and intent of the parties to
the agreement is apparent from its terms
The agreement repreceded by the recital.
cites the ownership by the respective parties
of adjacent premises particulai-ly described,
and these constitute the subject-matter of
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tlie mutual covenants. There was no privity of estate or community of interest between the parties, but each could, by grant,
create an easement in his own lands for the
benefit of the lands owned by the other, and
the pui'pose of the agreement was to create
mutual easements, negative in their character, for the benefit of the lands of each.
It was the design to impose mutual and corresponding restrictions upon the premises
belonging to each, and thus to secure a uniformity in the structure and position of
buildings upon the entire premises, and to
reserve the lots for, and confine their use
to, first-class dwellings, to the exclusion of
trades and all business, and all structures
which would derogate from their value for
The purpose clearly disprivate residences.
closed was, by the restrictions mutually imposed by the owners respectively upon the
use of their several properties, to make the
lots more available and desirable as sites for
residences,
and the agreement professes to,
and does In terms, impose, for the common
benefit, the restrictions in perpetuity, and
to bind the heirs and assigns of the respecThis should be construed
tive covenantoi's.
as a grant by each to the other in fee of a
negative easement in the lands owned by
the covenantors.
An easement in favor ofand for the benefit of lands owned by thu-d
persons,
can be created by grant, and a
covenant by the owner, upon a good consideration, to use, or to refrain from using,
his premises in a particular manner, for the
benefit of premises owned by the covenantor, is, in effect, the grant of an easement, and the right to the enjoyment of it
will pass as appurtenant to the premises in
respect of which it was created.
Reciprocal
easements of this character may be created
upon the division and conveyances
in severalty to different grantees of an entire
tract, and they may be created by a reservation in a conveyance,
by a condition annexed to a grant, or by a covenant, and
even a parol agreement of the grantees.
Curtiss V. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 73; Tallmadge
V. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 10.5; Gibert v.
Peteler, 38 Barb. 488, affirmed, 38 N. Y. 165.
The right sought to be enforced here is an
or, as it is sometimes
easement,
ealled, an
amenity, and consists in restraining
the
owner from doing that with, and upon, his
property which, but for the grant or covenant, he might lawfully have done, and
hence is called a negative easement, as distinguished from that class of easements
which compels the owner to suffer something to be done upon his property by another.
Washb. Easem. 5. Easements of all
kinds may be created and exist in favor of
any third person, irrespective of any privity of estate or community of interest between the parties; and. In this respect,
there is no distinction between negative
easements
and those rights that are more

generally known as easements, as a vray, etc.
A covenant by the owner with A. B., his
heirs and assigns, that it should be lawful
for them at all times afterward to have
and to use a way by and through a close,
etc., was held to be an actual grant of a
way and not a covenant only for the enjoyHolms v. Seller, 3 Lev.
ment of such right.
Peteler,
supra; Washb.
305;
Gibert
v.
Easem. 22, 28, and cases cited in note 1. A
negative easement, by which the owner of
lands is restricted In their use, can only be
created by covenant in favor of other lands
not owned by the grantor and covenantor.
The covenant made by Beers was valid and
binding upon him, and had he retained the
ownership of the premises, it would have
been specially enforced by a court of equity.
Upon a disturbance of the easement by him,
it was capable of being enforced by the appropriate remedies at law or in equity at
the suit of the owner of the dominant tenement, at the time of the violation of the
covenant.
The plaintiffs appear to retain
the ownership of the premises to which the
easement is appurtenant, and therefore this
action is properly brought by them. Equity
has jurisdiction to compel the observance of
covenants made for the mutual benefit and
protection of all the owners of lands, by
those owning different parcels of the lands,
and to secure to those entitled the enjoyment
of easements
or servitudes annexed by
grant, covenant, or otherwise to private estates.
2 Story, Eq. Jur. 926a, 927; Barrow
V. Richard, 8 Paige, 351.
It is strenuously urged, in behalf of the
defendants and respondents, that there was
no privity of estate between the mutual
covenantors and covenantees, in respect of
the premises owned by them respectively,
and which were the subjects of the covenants and agreements, and that the covenants did not therefore nm with the lands,
binding the grantees, and subjecting them
to a personal liability thereon. This may be
conceded for all the purposes of this action.
It is of no importance whether an action at
law could be maintained against the grantees of Beers, as upon a covenant running
with the land and binding them.
Whether
it was a covenant running with the land or
a collateral covenant, or a covenant in gross,
or whether an action at law could be sustained upon it, is not material as affecting
the jm-isdiction of a court of equity, or the
right of the owners of the dominant tenement to relief upon a distm'bance of the
easements.

The covenantor Beers bound himself, and
in equity charged the premises with the observance of the covenant, and thus impressed this easement upon the lands then
owned by him in favor of the lands then
and now owned by the plaintiffs.
A right
in respect of the defendant's lands, and
affecting the use in behalf of the plaiutiflis
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aiifl their lands existed, whicli while Beers
continued the owner, equity would have
enforced, and this right was a right in perpetuity, going with and attaching to the
lands in the hands of all subsequent gi-antees taking title with notice of its existence.
An owner may subject his lands to any servitude, and transmit them to others charged
with the same; and one taking title to
lands, with notice of any equity attached
thereto, or any outstanding right or claim
affecting the title or the use and enjoyment
of the lands, takes subject to sucli equities
and such right or claim, and stands in the
place of his grantor, bound to do or forbear
to do whatever he would have been bound
to do or forbear to do.
Lord Cottenham
uses this language:
"If an equity is attached to property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand
in a different situation from the party from
whom he purchased."
Tulk v. Moxhay, 2
Phila. 774. In the case cited a covenant between grantor and grantee in respect to the
use of the granted premises was enforced
against subsequent grantees thereof, with
notice.
The rule is of universal application,
as stated by Lord Cottenham.
Tallmadge v.
East River Bank, supra; Story, Eq. Jur. §§
395, 397.
Here each successive grantee from
Beers, the covenantor, down to and including the defendant Lynch, the present owner, not only had notice of the covenant and
aU equities growing out of the same, but
took their title in terms subject to it, and
impliedly agreeing to observe it. It would
be unreasonable and unconscientious to hold
the grantees absolved from the covenant in
equity for the technical reason assigned that
it did not run with the land, so as to give an
action at law.
A distinguished judge answered a like objection in a similar case by
saying in substance, that if an action at law
could not be maintained, that was an additional reason for entertaining jurisdiction
in equity and preventing injustice.
The action can be maintained for the establishment and enforcement of a negative easement created by the deed of the original proprietor, affecting the use of the premises
now owned and occupied by the defendants,
of which they had notice, and subject to
There is no equity or
which they took title.
reason for making a servitude of the character of that claimed by the plaintiffs in the
lands of the defendant, an exception to the
general rule which charges lands in the
hands of a purchaser with notice of all existing equities, easements and servitudes. The
rule and its application does not depend upon the character or classification of the equities claimed, but upon the position and eqThe lanuitable obligation of the purchaser.
guage of courts and of judges has been very
uniform and very decided upon this subject,
and all agree that whoever purchases lands
upon which the owner has imposed an ease-
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ment of any kind, or created a charge which
would be enforced in equity against him,

takes the title subject to all easements, equities and charges
however created,
of
which he has notice. Parker v. Nightingale,
6 Allen, 341; Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch.
App. 654; Carter v. WiUiams, IS Wkly. Rep.
593, before Vice Chancellor
.Tames; Wolfe
V. Prost, 4 Sandf. Ch. 72; Tulk v. Moxhay,
supra; Whiting v. Union R. Co., 11 Gray,
359; Gibert v. Peteler, supra; Barrow
v.
Richard, supra; Greene v. Creighton, 7 R.
I. 1; Bronner v. Jones, 23 Barb. 153. The
grantees from Beers became entitled to the
benefits of the corresponding covenants on
the part of the plaintiffs, and of the easement in their lands, and in the pm'chase
had recompense for any diminution in the
value of their own lands by reason of the
restrictions upon their use.
Should it appear that the plaintiffs had parted with
their title, it might be questionable whether
they could maintain the action. The right
exists for the benefit of the owners of the
lands for the time being, and it may be
waived or released by them, and it would
seem they would be the proper parties to
bring the action. At most, the plaintiffs
would be but the dry trustees of the covenant for the benefit of their grantees, and
in equity and in all cases under the present
system of practice, the real party in interest
should bring the action. But the plaintiffs'
right of action, if a cause of action exists,
does not appear to have been questioned,
so
that no question as to parties is in the case.
The cases in which it has been held that
an action at law will not lie, upon a covenant restricting the use of the lands against
the grantees of the covenantor, when there
was no privity of estate between the covenantor and covenantee, do not aid us in determining whether there may not be relief
in equity for a violation of the equitable
right resting upon and growing out of the
covenant treated as in substance a grant,
and the consideration upon which it was
made.

The author of the American note to Spencer's case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. (6th Am. Ed.)
167, recognizes the distinction between the
binding obligation at law of covenants not
running with the lands and the equitable
rights recognized and enforced in equity in
He says, speaking of such a
such cases.
"But although the covenant,
covenant:
when regarded as a contract, is binding only
between the original parties, yet, in order
to give effect to their intention, it may be
construed by equity as creating an incorporeal hereditament (in the form of an easement) out of the uncouveyed estate, and rendering it appurtenant to the estate conveyed; and when this is the case, subsequent
assignees will have the right and be subject
to the obligations which the title or liabiUty
to such an easement creates."
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In Hills V. Miller, 3 Paige, 254, and Trustees of Watertown v. Oowen, 4 Paige, 510,
and Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige, 351, there
could have been no recovery at law, or actions on the covenants; but upon the deeds
and instruments in writing, under seal, it
was held that easements had been granted
out of the property sought to be charged,
which had come by assignment to the hands
of the defendants, which were intended by
the parties to be appurtenant to lands owned by the plaintiffs;
and the observance of
the easements was enforced.
Barrow v. Richard, although differing in
circumstances from the present case, was
decided upon the ground that is controlling
here, that the parties intended to create mutual easements for the benefit of the owners
of the whole tract, and that the want of a
remedy at law would sustain, rather than
defeat, the jurisdiction of equity, and that
the covenant should consequently be enforced by injunction against those who held
the land to which it related. The lands of
the defendants are equitably chargeable
with the easement created by Beers, and
the objection that the easement is not obligatory upon the defendants as a contract,
cannot avail as a defense to a suit in equity
to restrain the defendants by injunction from
its violation and a destruction of the easement.

There is no waiver of the covenant and
surrender of the easement, alconsequent
leged in the answer, proved upon the trial,
or found by the judge. The building was of
the class of buildings permitted by the easejnent and suitable for occupation as a private residence. It was not specially adapted to any other use, and the plaintiffs were
not bound to foresee, before its completion,
that it could or would be applied to any
purpose prohibited by the covenant.
So far

was reasonable.
The plaintiffs did not stand by nnd keep
silence when it was their duty to speaJi, and
the defendants have a building which they
may use for purposes contemplated by the
parties. It was assumed by the judge at
the trial, and does not appear to have been
questioned that the businesses carried on by
the defendants Yates and Blaisdells were
violations of the covenants and forbidden
by it. If they were not, that was a proper
question to be litigated upon the trial, and
may be tried upon the new trial which must
be had.
There is nothing in the record from
which we can determine, that if permitted,
such businesses will not defeat the object
and purpose of the agreement of the parties, and deprive the plaintiffs of the substantial benefit of the covenant
If the occupation and use of the premises by the defendants In the manner reported by the
judge is in contravention of the spirit, as
well as the letter of the covenant, the question of damages is wholly immaterial.
Upon that question men might differ, and It
might be thought that the damages. If any,
were so trifling as to be Inappreciable, but
the parties had the right to determine for
themselves in what way and for what purposes their lands should be occupied irrespective of pecuniary gain or loss, or the
effect on the market value of the lots.
Doubtless another trial wUl, upon other
facts, present other questions, and there may
be objections to a recovery not disclosed by
the record, but upon the record before us
the judgment must be reversed and a new
trial granted.
as appears, their objection

All concur, except RAPALLO
LER, JJ., absent
Judgment

reversed.

and
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also, the verdict was against the defendants; and the same is true of the alleged
partial failure of consideration.
3. The next ground is, that on the
trial at
law, letters from the joint defendant, Campbell, containing admissions adverse
to the
Mr. Hart, for appellant. Mr. Mills, contra. defence, were read in evidence to the jury;
and the bill avers that Campbell was not
CURTIS, J., delivered the opinion of the truly informed concerning the subjects on
which he wrote, and that, until the letters
court.
The complainant filed his bill in the cir- were produced at the trial, the complainant
cuit court of the United States for the district was not aware of their existence, and so was
of Ohio, and, that court having ordered the surprised.
To this there are two answers, either of
bill to be dismissed, on a demurrer, for want
of equity, the complainant appealed.
which is sufficient.
The first is that the comThe object of the bill is to obtain relief plainant and Campbell, being jointly interestagainst a judgment at law, founded on three ed in the purchase and ownership of thepromissory notes, signed by the complainant, property for which these notes were given,
and the joint defendants in the action at
and one Campbell, since deceased.
A court of equity does not Interfere with law, and there being no allegation of any coljudgments at law, unless the complainant has lusion between Campbell and the plaintiff in
an equitable defence, of which he could not that action, the complainant cannot be alavail himself at law, because it did not lowed to allege this surprise. If he did not
amount to a legal defence, or had a good de- know what admissions Campbell had made,.
fence at law, which he was prevented from he might, and with the use of due diligence,
availing himself of by fraud or accident, would have known them; and he must beunmixed with negligence of himself or his treated, in equity as well as at law, as if he
agents.
Marine
Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 had himself made the admissions.
Another answer is, that if there was surCranch, 333; Creath v. Sims, 5 How. 192;
prise at the trial, a motion for delay, as is"Walker v. Robbins, 14 How. 584.
The application of this rule to the case practiced in some circuits, or a motion for a
stated in the bill leaves the complainant no new trial, according to the practice In others,
equity whatever.
afforded a complete remedy at law.
4. The
The contract under which these notes were
complainant asserts that he has
taken was made in December, 1841. One of claims against the defendant, and he prays
the notes is dated in December, 1841, and that, inasmuch as the defendant resides out
the others in January, 1842. In April, 1848, of the jurisdiction of the court, these claims
suit was brought on the notes. In October, may be set off against the judgment recover1850, the trial was had and judgment re- ed at law by the decree of the court upon this
covered.
The reasons alleged by the bill for bill. But upon this subject the bill states,
enjoining the judgment are:
speaking of the aption at law: "Your orator
1. That the consideration of the notes was
frequently conferred with L. D. Campbell,
the sale of certain property, and the com- one of his attorneys, in reference to the said
plainant and Campbell were defrauded in cause, and frequently spoke to him of the
that sale. But this alleged fraud was plead- claims which your orator and said Andrew
ed, in the action at law, as a defence to the Campbell had against the said Hinckley, as
notes, and the jury found against the de- hereinafter specifically set forth; but the said
fendants. Moreover, upwards of six yea-s Campbell, attorney, regarded the defence
elapsed after the sale, and before the suit pleaded as so amply sufficient as that neither
was brought; and the vendees, who do not he nor your orator ever thought It necessary
pretend to have been ignorant of the alleged to exhibit said demands against said Hinckley
fraud during any considerable part of that as matter of defence, could it even have been
period of time, did not offer to rescind the done consistently with the defence made as
contract, nor did they, at any time, either aforesaid."
return or offer to return the property sold.
He purposely omitted to set off these al2. The bill alleges certain promises to have leged claims in the action at law, and now
been made by an agent of the defendant, con- asks a court of equity to try these unliquicerning the time and mode of payment of dated claims and ascertain their amount, and
the notes when they were given. These promenable him to have the same advantage which
ises could not be availed of in any court, aa he has once waived, when it was directly
a defence to the notes; for, to allow them
presented
to him in the regular course of
such effect, would be to alter written con- legal proceedings.
Courts of equity do not
tracts by parol evidence, which cannot be assist those whose condition is attributable
done in equity any more that at law, in the only to want of due diligence, nor lend their
absence of fraud or mistake. Sprigg v. Bank aid to parties, who, having had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, have
, of Mount Pleasant, 14 Pet. 201.
But whatever substance there was In this purposely omitted to avail themselves of it.
It is suggested that courts of equity have
defence, it was set up, at law, and upou this

How. 443.)
Supreme Court of the United
States. Dec.
Term, 1S54.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
court.
(17
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an original jurisdiction in cases of set-off, tiff's claim for relief, on the ground that the
and that this jurisdiction is not taken away defendant resides out of the state, and that
by the statutes of set-off, which have given therefore he should have the aid of a court
the right at law. This may be admitted, of equity, to subject the judgment at law to
though it has been found exceedingly difficult the payment of the complainant's
claim.
to determine what was the original jurisdic- When the complainant elected not to file these
tion in equity over this subject. 2 Story, Bq. claims in set-off in the action at law, he
656, 664.
But whatever may have been its knew that defendant, who was the plaintiff
exact limits, there can be no doubt that a in that action, resided out of the state. If
party sued at law has his election to set off his that fact was deemed by the complainant inclaim, or resort to his separate action. And sufficient to induce him to avail himself of
if he deliberately elects the last, he cannot his complete legal remedy. It can hardly be
come into a court of equity and ask to be supposed that it can induce a court of equity
allowed to make a different determination, to interpose to create one for him. The quesand to be restored to the right which he has tion is not merely whether he now has a
once voluntarily waived. Barker v. Elkins, 1 legal remedy, but whether he has had one
Johns. Ch. 465; Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason,
and waived it. And as this clearly appears,
^1, Fed. Cas. No. 5,765.
equity will not interfere.
Similar considerations are fatal to the plainThe decree of the court below is affirmed.
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GRI]' I'^ITII
(25

Supreme

V.

Atl. 427,

HILLIARD.
G4

Vt. 643.)

Court of Vermont, General Term.
Nov. 5. 1892.

Appeal from cliancery pourt, Rutland
county; Taft, ChancoUor.
Action by Silas L. Griffitli against John
H. Hilliard. From a decree sustaining a
demurrer to plaintiff's bill for an injunction and dismissing the bill pro fomia,
orator appeals. Reversed and modified.
J. C. Baker, for orator. H. A. Barman,
for defendant.

START, J. The defendant, John H. Hilliard, by the demurrer contained in his
answer, claims that a court of equity has
no jurisdiction of the matters alleged in
the bill. The bill alleges, among other
things, that the orator is the owner of
the land in question; that its substantial
value is made up of the wood and timber
growing thereon; that some of the defendants, under a license from the defendant, Hilliard, have entered upon the land,
are engaged in cutting and drawing timlier
therefrom, and threaten to continue to do
so. For the purpose of determining the
question now beforH the court, these allegations must be taken as true. To permit this wood and timber to be cut in the
manner the defendants
are doing, and
threatening to do, under a license from
defendant, Hilliard, is to permit a destruction of the orator's estate as it has been
held and enjoyed.
The power of a court
of equity to interpose by injuuction to
prevent irreparable injury and the destruction of estates is well established, and
this power has been construed to embrace
trespasses of the character complained of
in the orator's bill. Where trespass to
property consists of a single act, and it is
temporary in its nature and effect, so that
the legal remedy of an action at law for
damages is adequate, equity will not interfere; but if, as in this ease, repeated
although
acts are done or threatened,
each of such acts, taken by itself, may not
be destructive to the estate, or inflict irreparable injury, and the legal remedy
may, therefore, be adequate for each single act if it stood alone, the entire wrong
may be prevented or stopped by injunction. Smith V.Rock, 59 Vt. 232.9 Atl. Rep.
551; Langdon v. Templeton, 61 Vt. 119, 17
Atl. Rep. 839; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S.

5 Sup. Ct. Rep. ^DS; Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703; Power Co. v. Tibbetts,
31 Conn. 165; Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 28;
Livingston
v. Livingston, 6 .Tohns. Ch.
(Law Ed.) 496; High, Inj. 724-727; Shipley
V. Ritter, 7 Md. 408; Scudder v. Trenton
Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq.694; 1 Pom.
539,

Eq. Jur. § 245; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1357;
Murphy v! Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. Rep.
418.

In the case of Murphy v. Lincoln, supra,
the bill charged the committing of several
trespasses by the defendants by drawing
wood and logs acros.H the orator's land.
The defendants claimed a right of way.
The court ftjund the is.sue of fact in favor
of the orator, and held that a court of
equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of a series of trespasses, although
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the legal remedy be adequate for each single act if it stood alone. It is said by
Judge Story in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, (volume 2, §§ 928,
929:) '"If the
trespass be fugitive and temporary, and
adequate compensation
can be obtained
in an action at law, there is no ground
to justify the interpositiou of courts of
equity. Formerly, indeed, courts of equity were extremely reluctant to interpose
at all, even in regard to cases of repeated
trespasses;
but now there is not the
slightest hesitation it the acts done or
threatened to be done to the property

would be ruinous or irreparable, or would
impair the just enjoyment of the property
in the future.
In short, it is now granted
in all cases of timber, coals, ores, and
quarries, where the party is n mere trespasser, or where he exceeds the limited
right with which he is clothed, upon the
ground that the acts are, or may be, an
irreparable damage to the particular species of property. " In Iron Co. v. Rey mert,
supra. It is said that mines, quarries, and
timber are protected by injunction, upon
the ground that injuries to and depredations upon them are, or may cause, an
irreparable damage, and also with a
view to prevent a multiplicity of actions
for damages, which might accrue from
continuous violations of the rights of the
owners; and that it is not necessary that
the right should be first established in an
action at law. In Erhardt v. Boaro, supra, Mr. Justice Fikld says: "It is now
a common

practice in cases where irremediable misclilet is being done or threatened, going to the destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores from a mine, or the cutting
down of timber, or the removal of coal,
to issue an injunction, though the title to
the premises be in litigation. The authority of the court is exercised in such cases,
through ils preventive writ, to preserve
the property from destruction pending
legal proceedings for the determinatiOB
of the title."
Wlien it appears that the title is in dispute, the court may, in its di.scretion, issue a temporary injunction, and continue
it in force for such time as may be necessary to enable the orator to establish his
title in a court of law, and may make the
injunctiim perpetual when the orator has
his title; or the court
thus established
may proceed and determine which party
has the better title; or it may dismiss the
bill, and leave the orator to his legal remedy. Bacon V. Jones, 4 Mylne & C. 433;
Diike of Beaufort v. Morris, 6 Hare, 340;
Campbell v. Scott, 11 Sim. 31; Kerr, Inj.
209; Ingraham v. Dunnell, 5 Mete. (Mas.^;.)
US; Rooney v. Soule, 45 Vt. 303; Wing v.

Hall, 44 Vt. 118; Lyon v. McLaughlin, 32
Vt. 423- Hastings v. Perry, 20 Vt. 278;
Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. Rep. 258;
Barry V. Harris, 49 Vt. 392. In Bacon v.
Jones, supra, Lord Cuttenham says:
"The jurisdiction of this court is founded
upon legal right. The plaintiff cominginto
court on the assumption that he has the
legal right, and the court granting its assistance on that ground. When a party
applies for the aid of a court, the application for an injunction is made either during the progress of the suit or at the hear-
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and in both cases, I apprehend, great
latitude and discretion are allowed to the
court in dealing with the application.
When the application is for an interlocutory injunction, several courses are open.
The court may at once grant the injunction siinpliciter, without raore,— a course
which, though perfectly competent to the
court, is not very likelylo be taken where the
defendant raises a question as to the validity of the plaintiff's title; or it may follow

ins;

cise of the discretionary power which th&
court possesses. The orator, by his hill,
makes out a strong case forequitable consideration. The sole value of the premises in question is in the wood and timber
growing tliereon. The orator has heretofore held and occupied them for the purpose of manufacturing lumber and charcoal from such timber and wood. He has
expended large sums of money in the erection of mills and coal kilns, in building
roads, and in procuring teams and workmen for the prosecution of said business,
and has made contracts for the sale of
said manufactured products. The defendants are engaged in cutting and removing
that which constitutes the chief valne of
the estate, and threaten to continue to do
so. These acts, if continued, will work a
destruction of the estate, and render it of
no value for the purpose for which it has
The case is one
been held and enjoyed.
peculiarly within the province of a court
of equity, through its preventive writ, to
interpose and stop the mischief complained
of, and preserve the property from destruction. The defendant, John H. Hilliard, having, before any evidence has been
taken or hearing had, put in issue the orator's title, insisted that this issue be
tried in a court of law, the case is one in
which the court may properly, in its discretion, require the orator to establish his
title in such court before proceeding further with the cause, and such will be the
order of this court. The pro forma decree
of the court of chancery is reversed ; the
demurrer contained in the answer of the
defendant, John H. Hilliard, is overruled;
the orator's bill is adjudged sufficient, and
defendant's (Hilliard's) answer is ordered
brought forward, from which it appears
that the orator's title to the premises is in
controversy;
therefore the cause is remanded to the court of chancery, with direction to that court to retain the cause,
and continue in force the injunction for
such time as, in the opinion of said court,
may be necessary to enable the orator to
bring and prosecute to final judgment
such action or actions as may benecessary
to establish bis title in a conrt of law;
and, in default of the orator so establishing his title within the time aforesaid, the
orator's bill to be dismissed, as against
the defendant, John H. Hilliard, with
costs.
But if the orator shall, within the
time aforesaid, by a final judgment in his
favor in a court of law, establish his title
to the premises as against the defendant,
John H. Hilliard, then the court will enter
a decree making perpetual the temporary
injunction, and make such order in relation to costs as to the court shall seem

the more usual, and, as I apprehend, more
wholesome, practice in such a case, of
either granting an injunction, and at the
same timedirectingtheplaintiff to proceed
to establish his title at law, and suspending the grant of the injunction until the
result of the legal investigation has been
ascertained, the defendant, in the mean
time, keeping an account.
Which of these
several courses ought to be taken must
depend entirely upon the discretion of the
court, according to the case.
When the
cause comes to a hearing, the court has
also a large latitude left to it; and I am
far from saying that a case may not ari^e
in which, even at that stage, the court
will he of opinion that the injunction may
properly be granted without having recourse to a trial at law. The conduct and
dealings of the parties, the frame of the
pleadings, the nature of the patent right
and of the evidence by which it is established, these and other circumstances may
combine to producesuch a result, although
this is certainly not very likely to happen,
and I ara uot aware of any case in which
it has happened.
Nevertheless
it is a
course unquestionably competent to the
court, provided a case be presented wl.'ich
satisfies the mind of the judge that such a
course, if adopted, will do justice between
the parties.
Again, the court may at the
hearing do that which is the more ordinary course, — it may retain the bill giving
the plaintiff the opportunity of first establishing his right at law. There still
remains a third course, the propriety of
which must also depend upon the circumstances of the case, — that of dismissing the
bill at once." Although BacouT. Jones was
a case relative to a oatent right, the remarks of the lord chancellor are applicable
to any case in which the orator's title is
in dispute.
The case of the Duke of Beaufort V. Morris, supra, was a bill for an injunction toprotect the orator'sooal mines
from injury from the water flowing into
them from the defendant's colliery; and it
was ordered that the bill be retained for
12 months, with liberty to the orator to
bring such actions as he might be advised
were necessary, and that the injunction issued in the cause be continued for such
time.
meet.
We think the granting of the temporary
Injunction in this case was a proper exerTAFT,

J.,dld not sit.
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(21 N.

et al. v.

COOPER.

CARLISLE

J.

et al.

Eq. 576.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
Nov. Term, 1870.
Pitney, for appellants Carlisle and
Mr. Vanatta and Mr. Shipman, for
respondent Cooper.
Mr.

■others.

DEPUE, J. The counsel of the defendant, as a preliminary matter, submitted to
the court the question, -whether the court of
chancery has jurisdiction to try the question
of nuisance or no nuisance, involved in this
cause.
Upon the abstract question whether a court
of equity has jurisdiction over nuisances,
whether they come within the class of public or of private nuisances, very little need
Whatever contention there is at
be said.
the bar, or disagreement among judicial
minds, as to the principles on which that
jurisdiction should be administered, there is
no room for controversy that such jurisdiction pertains to courts of equity. It is a
settled principle that courts of equity have
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law
in cases of private nuisances; the interfercase
ence of the former in any particular
being justified, on the ground of restraining
irreparable mischief, or of suppressing interminable litigation, or of preventing multiplicity of suits. Ang. Water Courses, § 444;
2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 925; Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 157; Scudder
V. Trenton Del. Falls Co., Id. 694; Burnham
V. Kempton, 44 N. H. 79.
The doctrine of the English courts is that
the jurisdiction of courts of equity over
nuisances, not being an original jurisdiction
for the purpose of trying a question of nuisance, but being merely a jurisdiction in aid
of the legal right for the purpose of preserving and protecting property from injury
pending the trial of the right, or of giving
effect to such legal right when it has been
established in the appropriate tribunal, the
court will not, as a general rule, entertain
jurisdiction to finally dispose of the case,
where the right has not been previously established and is in any doubt, and the defendant disputes the right of the complainUnant or denies the fact of its violation.
der such circumstances the court will, ordinarily, do nothing more than preserve the
property in its present condition, if that be
necessary, until the question of right can
Semple v. London & B.
be settled at law.
R. Co., 1 Eng. Ry. Cas. 120; Blakemore v.
Canal Navigation, 1 Mylne
Glamorganshire
6 K. 154; Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co.,
7 De Gex, M. & G. 4.36; Same Case on appeal, 7 H. L. Cas. 600; Elmhirst v. Spencer,
2 Macn. & G. 45; Kerr, Inj. 332, 340; 2 Story,
Eq. Jur. § 925b; Ang. Water Courses, § 452.
It is said in the ninth edition of Story on
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Equity Jurisprudence that in the American
courts the rule of the English law requiring
the complainant's legal rights to be first established in a court of law before a court of
equity will give relief, has, in general, not
been enforced in its strictness.
2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 92od. In our own state it has been/
somewhat relaxed. The mere denial of theS
complainant's right by the defendant in his {
answer will not oust the court of its juris- \
diction by injunction.
Shields v. Arndt, 4 N. {
J. Eq. 235; Holsman v. Boiling Spring
Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335.
So, also,
when the complainant has for a long time
been in the undisputed possession of the
property or enjoyment of the right with respect to which he complains, and the acts
of the defendant which constitute the injury to such property or the invasion of
such right have been done recently before
the filing of the bill, the court of chancery
has entertained jurisdiction to decide and
The landispose of the entire litigation.
guage of Chancellor Pennington on this subject in Shields v. Arndt has been very generally approved, and the principle he states
has been adopted by the courts of this state.
He says: "It was not so much against the
general jurisdiction of the court that the objection is raised, as to its exercise when the
defendant, as in this case, denies the comIt is the province of this
plainant's right.
court, as the defendant's counsel insist, not
to try this right, that belonging alone to a
court of law, hut to quiet the possession
whenever that right has been ascertained
If it be intended to say that
and settled.
a defendant setting up this right by his answer thereby at once ousts this court of jurisdiction,
cannot assent to it, for it would
put an end very much to the exercise of an
important branch of the powers of the court.
■* If it be intended to go no further
*
*
than that it is a question which should be
sent to law in cases of doubt, and often
should, before injunction, be first there established by trial and judgment, then I agree
A long enjoyment by a
to the proposition.
party of a right will entitle him to restrain
a private nuisance, even though the defendant may deny the right, and the court will
exercise its discretion whether to order a
trial at law or not, always inclining to put
the case to a jury if there be reasonable

I

doubt."
The decree in that case was against complainant, on the ground that he had not established by the proofs in the cause his right to
the stream in question as an ancient water
On appeal to the senate, sitting as a
course.
court of appeal, the decree was reversed by
a vote of eleven to seven, and a perpetual
injunction was decreed. Minutes of the Court
of Errors and Appeals, June 19, 1844.
In Shields v. Arndt the complainant had
been in the enjoyment of the flow of water
upon his land without interruption, until just
before the bill was filed. In the other cases
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in which cham,ery has granted relief on final
the complainant was
decree by injunction
either in the full enjoyment of the right,
which was protected from threatened invasion when the hill was filed, or his right
originally was not disputed, and its continued
existence was clearly established at the hearing, and the act of the defendant which interrupted the enjoyment of it had been done
within a recent period before the bill was
filed.
Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N. J. Bq. 57;
Brakely v. Sharp, 10 N. J. Eq. 206; Earl v.
DeHart, 12 N. J. Eq. 280; Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N. J. Eq. 335;
Delaware & B. Canal Co. v. Camden & A. R.
Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 321; Same Case on appeal,
18 N. J. Eq. 546; Morris Canal & Banlsing
Co. V. Central R. Co., 16 N. ,T. Eq. 419.
'In Holsman y. Boiling Spring Bleaching
Co. the bill was filed to enjoin the defendants
from polluting a stream, which flowed in its
accustomed channel through the lands of the
complainant. The defendants were incorporated in the year 1859 for the purpose of carrying on the business of bleaching and finishing cotton and woolen goods, and soon after
became the owners of a tract of land, pond,
and mill -premises above the lands of the complainants, and erected thereon a large mill
and works, which were put in operation in the
summer of 1860. The bill charged that in
the fall of 1860, in consequence of large quantities of chemical matter and other impurities
discharged from the defendants' works into
the stream, the water was filled with offensive matter, discolored and polluted, and rendered unfit for domestic purposes, producing
offensive odors, which infected the air of the
neighborhood,
and penetrated
the dwellings,
so that the complainants were compelled to
refrain from aU use of the water for famUy
or other purposes; by reason whereof they
were unable to use or enjoy their said propand of
erty as they had been accustomed
right ought to do, or to sell the same at a
fair price. The bill was filed on the 5th day
of February, 1861. The defendants, in their
answer, did not deny the erection of their
works, or the discharge of chemicals and other matter therefrom into the stream, but insisted that the nuisances of which the complainants complained were not occasioned
They further
thereby, but by other causes.
alleged that the lands and mill site used and
occupied by them had been used and occupied as a mill site for more than twenty
years, and that the business of fulling and
dying had been there carried on for more
than that period of time, and that they had
thereby acquired a prescriptive right to use
said stream for manufacturing purposes, although the same might taint and discolor the
water. The cause was brought to a hearing
on the pleadings and evidence, and the chancellor decreed a perpetual injunction. That
the water in the stream upon the complainants' land had, since the erection of the defendants' works, become discolored, polluted,

and unfit for domestic or ornamental purposes, and that the complainants' premises
had thereby been rendered uncomfortable, inconvenient,
and undesirable, for the purposes
for which they were designed and used, were

not denied by the answer, and were fully
The chancellor
established by the evidence.
decided that where a complainant seeks protection in the enjoyment of a natural water
course upon his land, the right will ordinarily
be regarded as clear, and that the mere fact
that the defendant denies the right by his
answer or sets up title in himself by adverse
user will not entitle him to an issue before
With respect
the allowance of an injunction.
to the defendants' claim of a prescriptive
right to pollute ihe waters along the complainants' lands, he examined the evidence,
and found that although the mill site occupied by the defendants may have been used
for the purpose of dying for the period of
twenty years, theie was no evidence In the
cause that the materials discharged into the
stream anterior to the erection of the defendants' works were such in character or quantity as to pollute the waters in front of the
complainants' lands, and that consequently
there was no proof whatever of any adverse
user in the defendants, or those under whom
In this aspect of the evidence
they claimed.
touching the adverse right set up by the defendants, this case, like those which preceded
of the practice of the
it, is an illustration
courts of equity in this state to take complete
cognizance of matters of nuisance, where the
complainant has previously been in the undisputed enjoyment of a right, and the bill is
filed promptly upon the commission of the
act of interference with such right, and the
evidence does not raise any serious question
as to the fact of the existence of the complainants' right when the bill is filed. That
it was not intended to assert the power of the
court of chancery to ultimately dispose of
questions of nuisance, without regard to the
state of the evidence bearing on the question
as to the «existence of the complainants' right,
and the situation of the parties previous to
the filing of the bill, is shown by the remarks
of the chancellor In his opinion as to the necessity that the party's right should be clear
to entitle him to the remedy by injunction
in cases of private nuisance, as well as by
the opinion of the same cliancellor in the case
of New Jersey Zinc Co. v . New Jersey FrankUnite Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 322, in which he expresses his repugnance
to deciding a question of right in real property, where the defendant was In possession, and a real controversy arose as to the superiority of the titles
of the respective parties; a repugnance which
was only overcome by the fact that no motion had been made to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and that both parties were
desirous that the question of the rights of
the parties should be decided.
The same doctrine has repeatedly been enunciated by the
courts of this state as the controlling prin
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ciple by which the com.! of chancery is guided
in exercising its undoubted jurisdiction over
the subject of private nuisances.
Scudder v.
Trenton Del. FaUs Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 604; Southard v. Morris Canal & Banliing Co., Id. 519;
Shreve v. Voorhees, 3 N. J. Eq. 25; Outcalt
V. Disborough, Id. 214; Hulme v. Shreve,
4
N. J. Eq. 116; Shi-eve v. Black, Id. 177;
Cornelius v. Post, 9 N. J. Eq. 196; Wolcott
V. Melick, 11 N. J. Eq. 204; Haisht v. Morris
Aqueduct, 4 Wash. C. C. 601, Fed. Cas. No.
5,902.
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bill

alleges the seisin of the farm in question
by the complainants, and that the same
bounds on Black river, which from time immemorial had been used and accustomed
to flow and run by and along the said farm
in its natural and accustomed channel, free
and clear of all obstructions whatever; and
that prior to 1846 the flow of the said river
along the complainants' said farm was not
in any wise affected by the defendant's dam,
or the pondage thereof. The charge is that
the defendant, in October or November, 1846,
increased the height of his dam and its appendages, the exact amount of such increase
being unknown to the complainants, and
that since that time the farm of the complainants has been overflowed by water
backed upon it by the defendant's dam. The
bill was filed on the 17th of September, 1866.
The answer was filed on the 28th of November, 1866.
In it the seisin of the complainants of the farm was admitted. It was also
admitted that the efficient height of the dam
was increased in 1846, and that thereby the
backwater on the complainants' farm was
increased. The insistment was that the increase in the height of the dam in 1846 was
only nine inches, and that on the 23d of November, 1866 (two months after the filing
of the bill), the defendant had reduced his
dam nine inches, whereby its efficient height
was made what it was before 1846. Upon
this branch of the case the defendant put his
defence on the ground that, having complied
with the object of the bill, there was no reason for continuing the litigation.
Furthermore, at the time of the filing of
the bill two suits at law, brought by Eliza
Carlisle, one of the complainants, and who
was in possession, were pending against the
defendant, to recover damages for injuries
sustained by reason of the overflow of these
lands by the raising of the dam in 1846.
One of these suits was brought in 1861, the
These causes having been
other in 1866.
taken down for trial to the Morris circuit,
at the term of January, 1867, the defendant
relinquished his plea to one of the courts of
the declaration in each case, in which such
injury was complained of, and confessed the
cause of action, and submitted to pay subJudgments were accordstantial damages.
ingly entered for the plaintiff in those suits
on the 6th of June, 1867, transcripts whereof
were made exhibits in this cause.
The extent to which the complainants were
entitled to have the defendant's dam reduced in order to effect an entire abatement
of the nuisance could not be settled by an
ordinary action at law for overflowing the
complainants' land. The facts necessary to
fix tlie proper measure of such relief could
only be ascertained by the verdict of a jury
upon an issue specially framed for that pur-

The principle supported by these eases was
not impaired by the decision of this coui't in
Morris & E. R. Co. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq.
530.
In that case the appeal was from an
order of the chancellor for a preliminary
injunction, on depositions talien under a rule
to show cause. The premises on which the
defendants were about to lay their track were
within the limits of an old turnpike, which
had been vacated under legislative authority
to enable the defendants to use a part of the
same for their purposes, on the faith of which
they acquired the title to the fee, and for
twenty years had occupied it for a single
track, and other purposes connected
with
their business. The right of the complainant
for the protection of which the bill was llled
was not at all clear, and the injury on which
he based his claim to equitable relief was
slight, and the injunction stopped an important public work. As already observed, the
jurisdiction of courts of equity over the subject-matter of nuisances is not an original
jurisdiction.
It does not arise from the fact
that a nuisance exists, but results from the
circumstance that the equitable power of the
court is necessary to protect the party from
an injury, for which no adequate redress can
be obtained by an action at law, or its interference is necessary to suppress interminable litigation for the recovery of damages
for an actionable wrong. As a condition to
the exercise of that power, it is essential that
the right shall be clearly established, or that
it should previously have been determined
by the action of the ordinary tribunals for
the adjudication of the rights of the parties;
and the injury must be such in its nature or
extent as to call for the interposition of a
court of equity.
In the case now under consideration the
defendant had been in the use of his dam, as
it was at the time of the filing of the bill,
since 1853, unmolested by the complainants
or their ancestor, until 1861, when the first
of the actions at law was brought. It is
therefore insisted by the defendant's counsel, that the suit is prosecuted not for relief
in aid of a legal right, but for establishing a
legal right, the appropriate tribunal for the
determination of which is a court of law.
But the decisive answer to this position of
counsel lies in the fact that the right of the pose.
The complainants' right to such relief as is
complainants at the time of the filing of the
by the bill being admitted by the
sought
by
the
rights
those
of
bill, and the invasion
defendant, are admitted by the answer. The answer, and also having been established
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in the suit at law, tlie sole question of fact
in controversy was wliether the defendant
Tiad effected an abatement of the admitted
nuisance by lowering his dam to its level
The inquiry
Taefore the increase of 1846.
necessary to decide that controversy may
at least
toe made in the court of chancery;
there is nothing in the subject-matter of that
investigation, that by established rules of
equity procedure would entitle the party to
an issue as of course.
Even in the case of
an heir at law, who is entitled to an issue
as a matter of course when the controversy
is as to the factum of a will, if he does not
dispute the will, but merely denies that certain portions of the land passed by the words
of description, a court of equity has full
jurisdiction to determine the question thus
raised without granting an issue, or may
Ricketts
grant such issue, at its discretion.
A court of
V. Turquand, 1 H. L. Cas. 472.
equity has jurisdiction to ascertain and determine the rights of parties under a reservation, in a grant of a water privilege, of
so much water "as is necessary for the
use of a forge and two blacksmith's bellows," without requiring the right to be settled at law.
Olmstead v. Loomis, 9 N. Y.
423.

In Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co., which
was before Vice Chancellor Wood (2 Jur.
before Lord
'[N. S.] 1132), and afterwards
•Chancellor Cranworth (3 Jur. [N. S.] 221, 7
De Ges, M. & G. 436), and subsequently before the house of lords (5 Jur. [N. S.] 1319,
7 H. L. Cas. 600), the complaint was that
the complainant, who was a market gardener, was injured by a nuisance arising from
the manufacture of gas by the defendants
on the premises adjoining his garden.
The
■complainant, in 1854, brought his action at
law to recover damages for such nuisance.
The cause came on for trial' before Lord
Chief Justice Jervis, and by consent was referred to Sergeant Channel to settle the
«,mount of damage (if any) which had been
occasioned, with power to order what, if
anything, should be done between the parIn January, 1856, the arbitrator reties.
ported the amount of damages, for which
judgment was entered, but he failed to make
any report as to what should be done by
the defendants to obviate the injury to the
In May, 1857, a bill was filed by
plaintiff.
Broadbent to enjoin the company from continuing the nuisance. The vice chancellor
decrefed a perpetual injunction.
This decree was affirmed on appeal by Lord Chancellor Cranworth, and was sustained on appeal by the house of lords. It appeared in
evidence that after the submission in 1854,
and before the date of the award, alterations had been made in the works, which, it
was insisted, made the award as to the state
of things in 1854 no longer conclusive as to
the state of things in 1S56; and the objection was taken that no relief could be obtained by injunction 'until the fact whether,

under the existing condition of the defendants' works a nuisance was created, was
ascertained by the verdict of a jury. The
In moving the
objection was overruled.
of affirmance. Lord Chancellor
judgment
"It is said that a new trial
Campbell says:
here,
because there had been
necessary
was
That there had been some
some alterations.
alterations after the submission is proved.
I consider that that is a point upon which
it is for an equity judge to form his opinion. If there has once been a trial at law,
and the plalntifiE's right has been established
at law, I think it is for the equity judge to
determine, when the application is made for
the injunction, whether the nuisance continues or whether it has been abated; and
if he is of opinion that it has not been abated,
but that it still continues, then it is his
It seems to
duty to grant an injunction.
me very strange to contend that because a
party who commits a nuisance chooses to
make some alteration, even although he may
do it bona fide, it is to be laid down as a
rule that there must be another trial, and
that toties quoties as often as the parties
shall make any alteration there must still
I think the vice chancellor
be another trial.
did well in investigating whether the nuisance continued, and that it was quite unnecessary for him to order a second trial in
order to try a fact which had been already
investigated and established."
Lord Kingsdown, in expressing his concurrence, is equally explicit.
His language is: "I perfectly
admit that if it could have been shown
upon the application for the injunction that
alterations had been made which had had
the effect of removing the evil which the
plaintiff had complained of in the action, he
would, of course, not have obtained any injunction.
But I am not at all prepared to
admit that the court was bound to ascertain
that fact by directing the trial of an action
at law.
It remained for the party who resisted that application to show that those
alterations had been made which were effectual for the purpose; and if the court,
upon the evidence, had reasonable doubt upon that subject, it might, for the information of its conscience, have directed a trial;
but it was equally competent to do it, and
in my opinion it was its duty, if it saw, upon
the examination of that evidence, that the
evil had not been diminished, to act upon
that conviction, and to grant the injunction
which it actually did grant."
The case, from the opinions in which these
extracts have been taken, is the same as that
now before the court, except that this case
is strengthened by the fact that the nuisance complained of is admitted by the answer, and the alterations which are claimed
to have removed it were made after the bill
was filed.
It was further urged upon the argument
with much earnestness that although it
might be competent
for the court to de-
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termine the question in controversy, yet
that, under the circumstances of this case,
an issue should have been allowed for the
determination of the disputed facts by the
I verdict of a jury.
The power of courts of equity to order the
V /trial of an issue of fact which the court is
XT / itself competent to try, ought to be sparing/ ly exercised, and a practice of sending or¥ dinary matters to the decision of a jury,
ought not to be established. Where the
truth of facts can be satisfactorily ascertained by the court without the aid of a
jury, it is its duty to decide as to the facts,
and not subject the parties to the expense and
delay of a trial at law. But in cases where
the evidence is so contradictory as to leave
the decision of a question of fact in serious
doubt, and superior advantages of testing the
credit of witnesses by viva voce examination in open court, and of applying the facts
and circumstances proved in the cause to the
decision of disputed points, may be obtained by means of a trial before a jury, it is
proper that an issue should be awarded.
Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff, 2 N. J.
Eq. 118; Miller v. Wack, 1 N. J. Eq. 205;
Bassett v. Johnson, 3 N. J. Eq. 417; Hildreth
V. Schillenger,
10 N. J. Eq. 196; Lucas v.
King, Id. 277; Fisler v. Porch, Id. 243;
Black V. Lamb, 12 N. J. Eq. 108; same case
nomine; Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. Eq. 455; 2
Daniell, Gh. Prac. 1086, 1285; Short v. Lee,
2 Jac. & W. 465; Dexter v. Providence Aqueduct Co., 1 Story, 387, Fed. Cas. No. 3,864;
Dale V. Roosevelt, 6 Johns. Ch. 255; Hammond v. Puller, 1 Paige, 197; Apthorpe v.
Gomstock, 2 Paige, 482; Townsend v. Graves,
3 Paige, 453.
The granting or refusing an issue is a
matter of discretion, and no application was
made to the chancellor for an issue. The
case of Carlisle v. Cooper, 18 N. J. Eq. 241,
in which the question of jurisdiction was
raised, was not between these parties. The
subject matter of the controversy there, was
the dam complained of in this case, but the
complainant in that cause was John D. G.
Carlisle, and the application to the chancellor was not an application for a feigned
In the answer in this case, the defendissue.
ant, after stating the abatement of his dam
nine inches, submits and insists "that if
shall insist that the dethe complainant
fendant has not reduced his dam to the
height it was prior to the year 1846, and
insists upon trying that question in this
honorable court, that this honorable court
is not the appropriate tribunal in which to
try and decide that question." A replication
was filed, and the parties proceeded to take
their evidence. A court of equity is an appropriate tribunal to decide that question.
The case was submitted to the chancellor for
decision on its merits, without objection to
the mode of trial. The submission of it to
him without applying for an issue, concludes
the parties from objection now to the mode
JUK. — 18
HUTCH.
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of trial. Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige, 577.
The position was also taken that the complainants had lost their right to relief by
long delay. Mere delay in applying to the
court is frequently a ground for denying a
preliminary injunction, and is also a reason for courts of equity refusing to take
cognizance of a case where there is a remedy at law. But where the legal right is
settled, and the more efficacious remedy of
a court of equity is necessary to complete
relief, delay is no ground for a denial of its
aid, unless it is coupled with such acquiescence as deprives the party of all right to
equitable relief. A person may so encourage
another in the erection of a nuisance, as not
only to be deprived of the right of equitable
relief, but also to give the adverse party
an equity to restrain him from recovering
damages at law for such nuisance.
Williams
V. Earl of Jersey, 1 Craig & P. 91.
So a party who knowingly, though passively, encourages another to expend money under an erroneous opinion of his rights, will not be
permitted to assert his title, and thereby defeat the ■just expectation upon which such
expenditure was made. Dann v. Spurrier, 7
Yes. 231; Rochdale Canal Co. v. King, 2
Sim (N. S.) 78; Same Case, on final hearing,
21 Eng. Law & Eq. 178; Eamsden v. Dyson,
L. R. 1 H. L. 140; Dawes v. Marshall, 10
C. B. (N. S.) 697; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer,
1 Johns.
Ch. 354; Ross v. Elizabeth-Town
& S. R. Co., 2 N. J. Eq. 422; Hulme v.
Shreve. 4 N. J. Eq. 116; Morris & E. R. Co.
V. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 531; Raritan Water-Power Co. v. Veghte, 21 N. J. Eq. 463.
The defendant's case is not within either of
these principles. He did not make his expenditure in erecting his dam, and increasing
the capacity of his mill, either upon the encouragement of the complainants' ancestor,
or under an impression that he had the right
to cast the water back to the extent it was
held by his dam. He knew that by so doing he would interfere with the complainants' farm. He claims that he obtained that
privilege from the complainants' ancestor,
under a vei'bal agreement that he was to be
permitted to flow as much of his lands as he,
the defendant, saw fit, if he paid him therefor at the same i-ate as the defendant paid
one Horton for lands on the opposite side of
the stream. Upon such alleged agreement
the defendant sought his remedy, after the
actions at law were brought, by a bill for
its specific performance, and was denied relief. Carlisle v. Cooper, IS N. J. Eq. 241.
The adjudication and decision of that question in that case concludes the rights of
these parties.
The damages paid by the defendant in the
two suits at law amounted to $500. The injury done to the farm of the complainants
by the backwater, rendered a part of their
land comparatively useless, and the evidence
shows that a nuisance was created on it
deleterious to health, and that the enjoy-
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ment of the premises was thereby impaired.
B'or such injuries an actiqn at law furnishes
no adequate remedy, and the party enjoined
is entitled to the protection of a court of
equity hy abatement of the nuisance. Holsman V. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.
J. Eq. 335; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 92(3.
As the facts wei-e when the bill was filed,
the nature and extent of the injury sustained by the complainants were such as to
entitle them to relief in a court of equity,
and it would be an extraordinary proposition that a defendant, after the institution
of the suit for such relief, should be enabled
to defeat complete redress by a partial abatement of the nuisance, thus mitigating but
not removing the evil, upon an insistment
that the effects of such portion of the nuisance as still remained were not of sufficient
consequence
to entitle the complainant to
ask that perfect relief which he was entitled to when he sought his remedy.
The prayer of the bill is that the exact
amount of the increase in the height of the
dam in 1846 may be ascertained, and that the
defendant may be ordered and decreed to
abate said dam, and reduce it to its original height, as it was prior to the year 1846,
and remove the obstructions caused thereby to the flow of the river; or that the same
may be abated and reduced in height under the directions of the court. The complainants are entitled to the relief prayed for.
The appeal upon the merits raises the question whether the relief which was granted by
the chancellor, is such as is warranted by
the evidence.
^
The exact import of the decree is that the
/ defendant is entitled to maintain his dam at
the height of the present stonework and the
mudsill thereon and the sheathing, with the
right to place on the mudsill, for the whole
i
length thereof, movable gates of plank of the
width of seven inches, reaching a line nine
Inches above the said mudsill, and no higher;
and that by means of these contrivances the
defendant shall be entitled to use the water
of said river, subject to the obligation in
times of freshets or high water, to so raise
the said gates as that the surface of the
water shaE not be raised above a line drawn
twelve and a quarter inches above the top of
the mudsill.
The dam was built originally in 1827. It
then consisted of a stone wall with a sUl
upon it, and was about thirty-six feet long.
In 1828 or 1829, the superstructure was increased by the addition of posts twelve inches
long, with a cap piece on the top nine inches
The space between the cap piece and
wide.
the sill, at each end, was boarded up tight.
The rest of the space was occupied by gates
nine or ten Inches wide, leaving a space between the top of these gates and the underside of the cap, through which the water
flowed under the cap piece. In 1846 it is admitted that the structure of the dam was
raised, and in 18.52 changes were made which

increased its power of retaining and throwing
back the water. In 1866, when the bill was
filed, the superstructure consisted of a sill
nine inches in height, on which were set
posts twenty-one inches high, on which was
placed a cap piece nine inches in height, and
the space between the siU and cap piece was
closed by solid planking at each end, and
movable gates In the intermediate space, thus
making the efficient height of the superstructure above the stone wall thirty-nine Inches.
It was reduced nine inches in 1866, leaving its
present height thirty inches, and the decree
of the chancellor directs a further reduction
of twelve inches, reducing the height of
the superstructure above the stone wall to
eighteen inches, which consists of the height
of the sill of nine inches, and the height of the
sheathing and gates upon it of nine inches additional. The effect of these operations will
be to reduce the height of the dam, including
the stone wall, sheathing, siU, and gates, to
about what was originally in 1828, including
the stone wall, sill, and gates, which then
made up the dam, but without taking into aec:ount the fact that the solid planking between
the cap piece and the sill at each end, joined
close up to the cap piece.
The principle of law stated by the chancellor, that the extent of the right acquired by
adverse user is not determined by the height
of the structm-e, but is commensurate with
the actual enjoyment of the easement, as
evidenced by the extent to which the land of
the owner of the servient tenement was habitually or usually flowed during the period
of prescription, rests upon sound reasoning,
by authority. Ang. Water
and is supported
Courses, §§ 224, 379; Burnham v. Kempton,
44 N. H. 78. The introduction into the rule
requiring continuity of enjoyment to acquire
a prescriptive right of the qualification of
habitual use, as applied to the effect of the
structure, is the only qualification that Is permissible where the easement is such that its
enjoyment is profitable only from a continuous
use, as an easement to overflow lands.
That the decree of flowage upon the lands
of another fixes the extent of the right, is
shown by a variety of cases. The owner of
the easement is not bound to use the water in
the same manner, or to apply it to the same
mill. He may make alterations or Improvements at his pleasure, provided no prejudice
thereby arises to the owner of the servient
tenement, in the increase of the burden upon
his land. Luttrel's Case, 4 Coke, 87; Saunders
V. Newman, 1 Barn. & Aid. 258. So it Is not
necessary
that the dam should have been
maintained for the whole period upon the
same spot, if the extent of fiowage is at aU
times the same.
Davis v. Brigham, 29 Me.
391;
Stackpole v. Curtis, 32 Me. 383. A
change in the mode of use, or the purpose for
which It is used, or an increase in capacity
of the machinery which is propelled by the
water, will not effect the right, if the quantity
used is not increased, and the change is not
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to the prejudice of others.
Ang. Water
Courses, §§ 228-230;
Hale v. Oldroyd, 14
Mees. & W. 789; Baxendale v. McMurray, 2
Ch. App. 790; easier v. Shipman, 35 N. Y.
533; AVhittier v. Cocheco Co., 9 N. H. 455;
Washb. Easem. p. 279, § 38; JHulme v. Shreve,
4 N. J. Eq. lie.
This rule is clearly stated by Chancellor
Green in the Holsman Case, thus: "Where an
action Is brought for overflowing the plaintiff's lands by backwater from the defendant's mill dam, it establishes no title by adverse enjoyment to prove ^that the defendant's mill has been in existence over twenty
years, or that the dam has been in existence
for that period. The question is not how high
the dam is, but how high the water has been
held, whether it has been held for twenty
years so high as to affect the land of the
plaintiff as injuriously as it did at the time the
action was brought."
As a general rule the height of the dam
when in good repair and condition, including
such parts and appendages as make its efficient height in its ordinary action and operation, fixes the extent of the right to flow,
witiout regard to fluctuations in the flowage which are due to accidental causes, such
as a want of the usual repairs, or the variation in the quantity of water in the stream
in times of low water or drought, or in the
pondage of the dam by its being drawn down
by use. Washb. Easem. p. 105, § 54; Co well
V. Thayer, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 253; Jackson v.
Harrington, 2 Allen, 242; Wood v. Kelley, 30
Me. 47. But an user, to be adverse, must be
under a claim of right, with such circumstances of notoriety as that the person against
whom the right is exercised may be made
aware of the fact, so as to enable him to resist the acquisition of such right before the
Cobb v.
period of prescription has elapsed.
Davenport, 32 X. J. Law, .'509. Occasional use
of flash boards for short periods, when little
or no injury may be done, as an exception to
the general rale not to keep them on, does
not amount to the open, uninternipted, and
notorious adverse use necessary to establish
Pierce v. Travers, 97
a prescriptive right.
Mass. 306. If used for the full period of twenty years, only during times of low water, a
prescriptive right will not be acquired thereby to keep the water up to the height of such
Marcly v.
boards during the whole year.
Schults, 29 N. Y. 346. There may be such
continuity of use of flash boards as that they,
in efCect, are part of the permanent structure,
and by such user a right to flow by means of
a permanent dam, to the height of such boards
may be acquired. Whether the user has been
such as to establish the right, is a question of
fact for the jury. Noyes v. Sillman, 24 Conn.
15.

the dam of 1828 there were two gates,
each fourteen feet long, and the solid planking between the mudsill and the cap piece
The difoccupied four feet at each end.
ference between the superstructure of the
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dam of 1828, in Its efCect in flowing the
lands of the complainants, and that ordered
by the chancellor in his decree, is quite inconsiderable. But with respect to the condition of the superstructure of the dam, and
the mode of its use between 1828 and 1846,
and from 1846 to 1853, there is a great contrariety in the evidence.
The conflict relates to the use of boards to close up the
space between the tops of the gates and
the cap piece, thus making the top of the
cap piece the line of the tumble; to the
washing away of the superstructure of 1828,
and its being replaced by a structure of a
different construction; to the use of gates
of variable widths, and at times of nothing
more than boards upon the sill, kept in place
by pegs and starts. With this conflict in the
evidence the case was submitted to the
chancellor on its merits.
The evidence touching the extent of the
prescriptive right to flow the lands of the
complainants by means of the permanent
structure of the dam and movable gates,
and also to the use of flash boards, is reviewed by the chancellor.
His conclusion is, that there is not sufficient proof of an use of the flash boards
in such a deflnite manner, or at certain fixed
times or occasions, as to establish a qualified right to use them, when they operate
to raise the water to any extent on the
land of the complainants, and that the right
to maintain the permanent structure of the
dam, and to raise the water upon the complainants' lands by the use of the gates, is
such as I have mentioned as the substance
of the decree.
It is not proposed to examine the evidence in detail; a portion of it has been
referred to by the chancellor in his opinion.
It is sufficient to say that his conclusions
on all these points are supported by direct
testimony, and are consistent with the collateral facts proved, and in my judgment
are sustained by the weight of the evidence
in the cause.
Objection was made to that portion of the
decree which provided for the raising of
the gates in times of freshets and high water. As the prescriptive right to the use or
flow of water originates from its accustomed use, the right may be qualified as to
times, seasons, and mode of enjoyment, by
the character of the use from which the
right has originated. Ang. Water Courses,
382;
Bolivar Manuf'g Co. v.
224,
§§ 222,
Neponset Manuf'g Co., 16 Pick. 241; Marcly
V. Schults, 29 N. Y. 346; Burnham v. Kempmay be upton, 44 N. H. 78. Prescriptions
on condition in restraint of the mode in
which the prescriptive I'ight is to be enjoyed, or may have annexed to them a duty
to be performed for the benefit of the person against whom the prescription exists.
Kenchin v. Knight, 1 Wils. 2.-)H, 1 W. Bl. 49;
Brook V. Willet, 2 H. Bl. 224; Gray's Case,
5 Coke, 70; Lovelace v. Keynolds, Cro. Bliz.
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Colton v. Smith, Cowp. 47; PadForrester, 3 Man. & G. 903.
In the lease to Thompson for the year
1829, the defendant Inserted a covenant requiring the tenant to hoist the gates in time
of high water, if need be, so that no damage
should be done. Similar covenants are contained in subsequent leases, and the evidence is that it was the uniform practice of
the tenants, in the use of the dam and its
apperidages,
to control the height of the
water in the pond in times of high water
by raising the gates, and permitting it to
<low off.
Like the use of flash boards, only
in times of low water, this mode of user
qualifies the right which the defendant acquired from user, and the portion of the
decree which regulates the management of
the gates is necessary to restrain the flowage of the complainants' lands to what it
was accustomed to be during the time of
prescription.
In Robinson v. Lord Byron the injunction
was to restrain the defendant from using
dams, weirs, shuttles, flood gates, or other
erections, otherwise than he had done before the 4th of April, 1785, so as to prevent
the water flowing to the complainants' mill
in such regular quantities as it had ordinarily done before the said 4th of April. 1
Brown, Oh. 588. A decree of a like nature
was made by Lord Eldon in Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192.
The decree, by its reference to the cap
piece as fixing the extreme height to which
the water may be raised by the use of the
54G,

dock

563;
V.

gates when shut, is probably more specific
in its directions than is usual; but it removes all uncertainty in the adjudication
of the court as to the extent of the rights
The complaint
of the respective parties.
that the exercige of the defendant's right to
the water is thereby made impracticable is
without foundation. That it might be more
conveniently exercised if his right was enlarged, is no reason why it should be enlarged by the sacrifice of the rights of the
The
without compensation.
complainants
objection that the decree fixes the form and
construction of the dam perpetually, seems
to me to be of greater force. The expression in the decree on which this objection
is founded was probably used through inadvertence. Let the decree be amended by
declaring the defendant's rights as therein
in substance declared, and directing the
abatement of so much of the present dam
as the chancellor has declared to be unlawful.
Tlie appeal of the complainants is based ■
on the allegation that the stonework of the
dam was raised by the defendant in 1846.
The chancellor decides that it was not, and
he is supported in this by the clear weight
of the evidence.
With the exception of the formal modification above mentioned the decree is affirmed in all respects. Both parties having
appealed, and neither party succeeding on
the appeal, the aflBrmance is without costs
to either in this court.
The decree was affirmed.
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GRAVES, O. J. The complainants, nineteen In number, bemg separate owners and
-occupants
of valuable residences in a small
specified district in Detroit, substantially used
for dwellings, have united in a complaint
.against the defendant, in which they maintain
that he uses certain premises he occupies, not
far off on Woodbridge street, in such manner as to be a nuisance, and specially and
neatly injurious to them in property, comfort and health.
His business is that of forging, which he
■conducts
in low, wood buildings, and on a
large scale. He employs steam and consumes
.a large amount of bituminous coal.
He works
four steam hammers, one of which weighs
thirty-five hundred pounds. The smoke and
.soot from his works are often borne by the
wind in large amounts to the premises of
■complainants,
and sometimes enter their
dwellings by the chimneys and the slight
-cracks by the doors and windows, in such
as to be extremely offensive and
measure
harmful, and the noise from his steam hammers Is frequently so great at complainants'
places as to be disagreeable and personally
liurtful, whilst the jar produced by the largest
greatly annoys complainants and their families, and seriously disturbs the sick, and in
damage
to
substantial
causes
■some cases
dwellings.
The complainants pray that defendant may
"he enjoined from carrying on his works in a
■way thus wrongful and injurious.
Upon answer and proofs, the com't below
made a decree in accordance with the prayer
•of the bill, and the defendant appealed.
He objects first, that the case is not rightly
on the ground that complainants
■■constituted,
rare separate owners with distinct property interests, and the attorney general is not a
party.
Upon the circumstances of this case, we
The
think the objection not maintainable.
lights asserted by complainants, and for
which they ask protection, are alike, and the
grievance stated in the bill and charged
against defendant has one source, and operates in the same general manner against
the agreeing and equivalent rights of all the
If his works as conducted are
complainants.
a nuisance to complainants, they are a nuiThe case presance to all in the same way.
sents no diversity to cause embarrassment in
■dealing with it, and we should only sacrifice
;substance to useless form by giving any sanelion to the point, if there was no authority to
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favor its rejection. But without going far,
we are able to cite such authority.
Scofield
V. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; Middleton v. Flat
Itiver Booming Co., 27 Mich. 533; Peck v. Elder, 3 Sandf. 126, and opinion of the chancellor in a note; Reid v. Gitford, Hopk. Ch. 416.
It is next objected, tliat the bill should have
been sworn to.
It was framed as a mere
pleading, and was not constructed upon the
theory that it might be requisite to use it as
a sworn statement on which to base an application for preliminary relief.
The only relief contemplated was such as
would be grantable on final hearing, and the
case exhibited is within the ordinary jurisdiction, and stands on no peculiar ground
which might call for a verification of the bill.
The point is not warranted by reason, or the
course of the court. Moore v. Cheeseman, 23
Mich. 332; At water v. Kinman, Har. (Mich.)
243.

A further objection is, that a trial at law
was needful before seeking the aid of equity.
This position is not maintainable.
The legislature have expressly declared that equity
shall have jurisdiction "in all matters concerning nuisances where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, and may
grant injunctions to stay or prevent nuisanComp. Laws 1871, § 6377.
ces."
And this
language Implies that the jurisdiction may not
be merely assistant,
but is independent and
ample in those cases where a remedy at law
would not be plain, adequate and complete.
That the law could afford no such remedy
Even before this declarahere. Is manifest.
tory provision, the chancellor asserted the jurisdiction fully. White v. Forbes, Walk. Ch.
See, also, Soltau v. De Held, 9 Eng.
112.
Law & Eq. 104.
When the cause is thus within the jurisdiction, the authority of the court is plenary, and
is not dependent upon steps at common law.
If, on a view of the circumstances, the court
feels that there ought to be a finding, it may
in its discretion require one, but Is not bound
to do so.
The defendant further urges that some of
complainants have establishments not far
away, which are liable to objections similar to
those made against his, and that therefore he
ought not to be enjoined at their Instance.
Assuming the fact to be as supposed, It afThat comfords no valid answer for him.
plainants are distinct wrong-doers In the same
way, neither lessens his wrong or disables
them from making legal complaint of it.
Their wrongdoing must be tried by itself. It
cannot be investigated and decided in the proceedings against him.
The point is also taken, that complainants
in defendant's operations,
so far acquiesced
that the court ought not to listen to their application to enjoin him.
His operations which are objected to, were
only about two years before the
commenced
suit, and the large hammer was not purchased until a year later.
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And it appears from the ease that complaint was made to the common council, on
the part of some of complainants, and, as I
Infer, some months before the suit, of the
Injurious character of defendant's business,
and that he was informed of it, and moreover, that one of complainants, Mr. Robinson, complained in person, a considerable
time before the bill was filed.
Indeed, the evidence
is clear, that defendant knew at an early day, that his operations were regarded by complainants, or
some of them, as wrong and hurtful, and
that they were not assenting.
The facts, as to time and circumstance,,
are strong to show that there was no acquiescence, either in the sense of conferring
a right on him to continue, or in the sense
of depriving complainants of the right to
seek and obtain equitable Interference.
Looking into the record, we notice that as
the answer
a further ground of defense,
specifies
several establishments in the vicinity which are claimed to be as detrimental
in their operations as that of defendant.
But this, if true, cannot aid him. If others in
the same neighborhood are maintaining nuisances, and even nuisances of similar character, it is no reason for refusing to stop one
maintained by him, or, what is the same
thing, for allowing him to continue his nuisance because other independent parties are
doing wrong in the same way.
When nuisances, or establishments alleged
to be nuisances, exist in separate hands, they
must be proceeded against separately, and it
is a matter of no legal moment which is taken
first, and which last; nor is it of any legal
consequence
that prosecution is carried on
only against one at the same time. Meigs v.
Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 199; St. Helen's Smelting
Co. V. Tipping, 11 H. L. Gas. 642; Thorpe v.
Brumfitt, 8 Ch. App. 650, 6 I5ng. R. 554.
Coming to the main controversy, and considering the locality, character and value of
defendant's works, and the way they are
used, and considering the locality, value and
character of complainants' dwellings, and the
ettect produced by defendant's operations,
dues the proof clearly establish the charge
We think it does.
made by complainants?
The general principle is that every person
must so use his own as not to cause injury
to his neighbors, and this principle is intelligible enough.
But there is often considerable difficulty in its application ; and where
the question relates to the uses to which near
proprietors choose to put their separate and
respective holdings, and especially in places
where the population is dense, and pursuits
and tastes are various, or in manufacturing
and mining districts, the difficulty sometimes
becomes serious.
In such instances, the question can be satisfactorily solved in no other way than by
taking a fair practical view.
The subject cannot be safely dealt with by
resorting to subtle refinements and nice

theories. Extreme claims must give way, and.
men must yield somewhat in a spirit of accommodation and concession, and measurably
recognize and respect the actual exigencies of
One living in
time, place and circumstances.
the country must accept country life, and oneliving in a city must accept city life. Thosfr
activities which are right in themselves and
belong to the neighborhood and are reasonable in their mode, may not be quite agreeable to the fastidiousness of some, or the
special or peculiar susceptibilities of others,
but those thus affected must bear their little'
discomforts if they choose to stay where they
are so caused, and a resident of a trading or
manufacturing neighborhood must submit tO'
such ordinaiy personal annoyances as are
fairly incidental to such legitimate trading
and manufacturing as is there carried on in a
reasonable way; and of course the existence
of these slight personal annoyances can afford
no ground for saying that the concerns causing them are not suitably situated, and are
therefore nuisances.
But tfie requirement to bear thus much,,
may not be extended to extraordinary personal hurts or discomforts caused by means
which, beyond "fair controversy, ought to beregarded as exceptive and unreasonable," and
it cannot "apply to circumstances the immediate result of which is sensible injury to the
It is not appropriatevalue of the property."
to say that the injurious work is fitly and
rightly located, and that the business is lawful in itself, when the ground of complaint
is, that it causes a real and serious direct injui-y to the property of another. However
lawful the business may be in itself, and
however suitable in the abstract the location
may be, they cannot avail to authorize the
conductor of the business to continue it in a
way which directly, palpably and substantially damages the property of others; unless,
indeed, the operator is able to plant himself
on some peculiar ground of grant, covenant,
license or privilege, which ought to avail
against complainants, or on some prescriptiveright, and which in this country can rarely
happen.
There is nothing of the kind here.
In the present case, the proof is clear that
the defendant's works are so situated and
conducted as to cause wrong and injury in
regard to both person and property, and ta
an extent which justifies the complainants in
objecting as they do. The grievances shown,
are not such in their cause, nature and objective effects, as to warrant the court in
saying they must be borne in deference t*
practical exigencies.
The case of Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich..
448, is, however, cited as authority against
the decree made by the court below. But
the governing facts there were entirely different.
The complainant's residence was situated in the very heart of a quarter substantially, and, indeed, almost wholly abandoned'
as a spot for living, and devoted to diverse
trades and noisy occupations. He resided in
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the upper stoiy of his building, and liad

been
■accustomed to rent the lower floor as a store
-or warehouse, thus himself recognizing that

the locality was so completely a business one
that he might naturally and properly derive
profit from the use of his own rooms under
him as a noisy business establishment.
The
mill of which he complained was in an adJoining building, and the evidence conduced
to prove that it was well constructed, and
that the machlneiy was run with care, and
was really less noisy than some other near
occupations.
The mode of working was in
itself unexceptionable, and the substantial
matter of complaint, as shown by the evi■dence, was the personal discomforts experienced by complainant and his famUy, in the
chambers where they resided adjacent to the
mill.
As he chose to stay in a building partly
^iven up to business, and in the midst of a
trading and manufacturing district, he was
mot entitled to enjoin the legitimate occupations, reasonably and fairly conducted about
him, because their natural incidents were annoying and unpleasant to him and his family.
Here the circumstances are wholly difCerThe defendant's works have been go.ent.
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ing but a short time, are not very expensive,
and not of a permanent character. They are
placed on leased ground, under a short term,
and are practicably removable without veiy
great inconvenience or cost. Other sites reasonably eligible in respect to the protitable
prosecution of the business may be had, and
where surrounding proprietors would not be
wronged.
On the other hand, the complainants' dwellings are in a part of the city appropriated
almost whoUy to residences,
and the place
is among the most suitable and desirable for
the purpose.
The buildings are generally
costly and substantial, and some of them
have grounds expensively improved. The total value is very large, and in comparison
with it the value of defendant's establishment proper is a mere trifle. The case of Gilbert V. Showerman cannot apply.
On the whole, as already stated, we think
the complainants have clearly made out their
I'ights to the relief prayed, and that the decree below must be afflrmed, with costs.

COOLBY and CAMPBELL,

GHRISTIANCy, J.,

JJ.,

concurred.

did not sit in this case.
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county, in chancery; George M. Buck,
Judge.
F. J. Atwell, for appellant. Spafford
TryoB and A. J. Mills, tor complainant.
LONG, J. The bill was filed inthiscaiiae
for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from cutting and removing any of the
timber or trees standing or growing upon
the premises described in the bill, and from
committing or permitting any waste of
said premises. The bill alleges that complainant is the owner in fee of the premises, containing about 160 acres subject to
That the
a life-estate in the defendant.
complainant derived his title through a
sheriff's deed, upon an execution sale to
satisfy a judgment against Seth H. Felt.
That said Seth H. Felt derived his title
through a deed made and executed to him
by the defendant, Horatio O. Felt, and his
wife. That at about the time of conveyance of said premises to Seth H. Felt he
made, executed, and delivered a lease in
writing to Horatio O. Felt and wife. This
The
lease is set out in full in the record.
bill also alleges that said Horatio O. Felt
is in actual possession and occupancy of
the premises under and by virtue of said
lease, and that his wife is now deceased.
That upon about nine acres of said premises is growing and standing a large
amount of valuable oak and other timber,
fit for sawing and lumbering purposes,
and that said timber constitutes a large
portion of the value of said premises. The
bill then states: "Your orator further
shows that the said Horatio O. Felt has
caused to be cut, and is causing to be cut,
and is cutting, lumbering, and removing
from said premises, a large portion of said
timber and trees (growing thereon, and
threatens to continue so to do, and has
already cut about five acres of said timber.
Your orator further shows that thereby
the said Horatio O. Felt is committing
waste upon said premises and irreparable
injury thereto, and materially lessening
Your orator further
the value thereof.
shows that if the said Horatio O. Felt is
permitted to continue to cut down said
timber and lumber, and commit waste
upon said premises, as aforesaid, and is
not restrained from so doing by an order
and injunction of this honorable court, the
value thereof will be depreciated to the
amount of at least five hundred dollars.
And your orator further shows that said
cutting and removing ot said timber and
said

lumber

upon

said

premises by said

Felt has been and is being done without
the authority or consent of your orator,
and against hiswislies and direction thereon, and without any authority or right
In said Felt so to do. All of which actings and doings of the said Horatio O.
Felt, who is made defendant herein, are
contrary to equity and good conscience,
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury,
and oppression of your orator. " The lease
set out in thebill of complaint was executed

before thecomplainant derived his title under the sheriff's deed, and contains the following clause. "To have and to hold the
said demised premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parties of the second
part, their executors, administrators, and
assigns, for and during and until the full end
and term of their natural lives, bo long aa
either of them shall live, yielding and paying therefor, durina the continuance of the
lease, unto the said party of the first part,
nothing; this lease being given in consideration of the second parties having conveyed the premises herein described to the
first party, and under no consideration
whatever are the second parties to be removed from the possession of the said'
premises except as they shall voluntarilysurrender their rights under this lease.
And it is expressly understood that thesecond parties are to have asfull and complete control of said premises, while they
or either of them shall live, as though such
conveyance had not been made. " A general demurrer was filed, and on the hearing in the court below was overruled, and
decree entered for complainant making the
injunction perpetual. Defendant appeals.
The claim of counsel forthe complainant
is that on the premises there are only
about nine acres of growing timber ; that
this timber is needed for the use of the
farm, and its destruction makes a case of
actionable waste, to be restrained by injunction. The rights of the parties must
be determined by the constructicm given
to these clauses in the lease above quoted.
The title to the premises was in defendant, Horatio O. Felt. When he and his
wife deeded the same, they took back this
lease, by the terms of which they were to
have and to hold the premises "for and
during and until the full end and tern>
of their natural lives, so long as either
of them shall live, yielding and paying * » * nothing."
The consideration was the conveyance of the premises to Seth H. Felt. It is further provided
in the lease that the lessees are not to be
removed from the premises on any consideration whatever, except as they miglit
voluntarily surrender their rights under
the lease. Then follows the clause which
it is claimed gives the defendant the right
to take the timber in question. "And it
is expressly understood that the second
parties are to have as full and complete
control of said premises, while they or
either of them shall live, as though sucb
conve.yance had not been made." The
complainant acquired all the rights in
the premises under his purchase at the execution sale that Seth H. Felt had, but
with notice of all the conditions in this
lease. It is therefore contended by counsel that the lease eave defendant the same
Interest or property in the estate as he had
before he and his wife conveyed the lands
to Seth H. Felt, and that he can deal with
it in all respects as though he was the
owner, the only limitation being that ot
duration of the estate, and that the clauses
in the lease above set out in effect are
equivalent in meaning with the old clause
in leases without impeachment tor waste.
Counspl for defendant insists that the
doctrine laid down in Stevens v. Rose, 6l>
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2m, 37 N. "W. Kep. 205, fully sustains
las claim tbat the defendant has the right
to remove this timber, and do all other
acts that he could have done as owner in
tee, and that the defendant's
estate is not
impeachable
for waste. His claim is not
sustained by that case. It was there held
that the words "to have and to hold, and
to use and control as the lessee thinks
proper for his benefit during his natural
life, " clearly import a lease without impeaclinient forwaste,and that the defendant had the right to do all those acts
which such a tenant may exercise, but
that the words were not to be treated as
importing a license to destroy or injure
the estate, but to do all reasona.ble acts
consistent with the preservation of the estate which otherwise might in law be
waste. In the present case it is conceded
that there are only 9 acres of timber on
rhe whole 160-acre tract, that the defendant has already cut about ,5 acres, and
threatens to cut and carry away the remainder.
have never understood the
rule of the common law to be so broad as
contended for by counsel for defendant.
The clause "without impeachment
lor
waste" never was extended to allow the
very destruction of the estate itself, but
only to excuse permissive waste. 10 Bac.
Abr. p. 468, tit. " Waste. " In Packington
V. Packington, decided in 1744, and cited
by Bacon, (reported 3 Atk. 215,) the plaintiff alleged that the defendant. Sir H.
Packington, had cut down a great number
of trees, and had threatened to cut down
and destroj- them all. Lord Hakdwicke
granted an injunction to restrain the
waste. The lease in the case was made
without
impeachment
of waste.
Mr.
Greenleat in his Cruise on Real Property,
(volume 1, p. 129,) lays down the rule
thus: "The clause without impeachment
of waste, is, however, so far restrained in
equity thatit does not enable a tenant for
life to commit malicious waste so as to destroy theestate, which is called 'equitable
waste,' for in tliat case the court of chancery will not only stop him by injunction,
but will also order him to repair if possi" In
10 Bac.
ble the damage he has done.
Abr. tit. " Waste, " p. 469, it is said: "So,
where a lease ■was made by a bishop for
twenty-one years without impeachment of
waste, of land that had many trees upon
it, and the tenant cut down none of the
trees till about half a ytar before the expiration of his term, and then began to
fell the trees, the court granted an injunction ; tor, though he might have felled
trees every year from the beginning of his
term, and 'then they would have been
growing up again gradually, yet it is unreasonable that he should let them grow
till towards the end of his term, and then
sweep them all away; for, though he had

I

power to commit waste, yet this court
will model the exercise of that power;"

citing
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Abraham

Bubb, Freem. Ch.
law no prohibition
against waste lay against the lessee for
life or years deriving his interest from the
act of the party. The remedy was connned to those tenants who derived their
mterest from the act of the law, but the
timber cut was, at common law, the property of the owner of the inheritance, and
the words in the lease " without impeachment of waste" had the effect of transferring to the lessee the property of the timber. Bowles' Case, 11 Coke, 79; Co. Litt.
220a.
The modern remedy in chancery by
injunction is broader than at law, and equity will interpose in many cases, and stay
waste where there is no remedy at law.
Chancery will interpose when the tenant
affects the inheritance in an unreasonable
and unconscientious manner, even though
the lease begranted without impeachment
of waste.
4 Kent, Comm. (13th, Ed.) 78;
Perrot v. Perrot, 3 Atk. 94; Aston v. Aston,
1 Ves. Sr. 2(J4; Vane
v. Barnard, 2 V-ern.
738; Kane v. Vanderburgh, 1 Johns. Ch. 11.
In the case of Kane v. Vanderburgh, supra, it was said: "Chancer.v goes greater
lengths than the courts of "law in staying
waste. It is a wholesome jurisdiction, to
be liberally exercised in the prevention of
irreparable injury, and depends on much
latitude of discretion in the court. " In
this state an action on the case for waste
is authorized by chapter 271, How. St.
This has superseded the common-law
reuiedy, and relieves the tenant from the
penal consequences of waste underthe statute of Gloucester, as the owner now recovers no more than the actual damages which
the premises liave sustained, wliile that
statute gave by way of penalty the forfeiture of the place wasted, and treble damages; and this harsh rule was adopted by
many of the American states by the early
statutes. Thisstatutegivinga rightot action in courts of law for waste does not,
however, deprive the court of chancery of
jurisdiction in proceedings
to restrain
o3.

At

v.
the common

threatened waste.
There can be no doubt that the defendant in the present case has much of the
character of a tenant in fee, but he cannot
destroy the inheritance.
He may taken
the timber for his own use, and do all
those acts which a prudent tenant in fee
would do. Hpcannot pull down the buildings or destroy them, or cut and destroy
fruit trees, or those planted for ornament
and shelter; neither can he be permitted
to entirely strip the land of all timber, and
convertitiutolumber,and8ellit
a way from
It is not claimed that the
the inheritance.
timber is being used tor betterments on
the premises, butitisadmitted thatthelifetenant is selling it for his own gain and profit. The demurrer was properly overruled.
The decree of the court below will be affirmed, with costs.
The other justices
concurred.
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LYON, J. It is sufficiently averred in the
complaint that the defendant Weidenfeller,
acting under the authority and orders of the
regularly constituted authorities of the defendant city, is about to destroy fences,
fruit and ornamental trees and shrubbery
standing and growing upon premises evened
by the plaintifC and occupied by him as his
residence and homestead;
that the pretense for
so doing is that such fences, trees and shnabbeiT are within the limits of public streets;
but that such pretense is unfounded in fact,
and the defendants have no lawful authority
to do the threatened acts.
On the facts averred it is clear that the
plaintiff is entitled to an injunction as prayIt is quite true that
ed in the complaint.
the courts will not interfere by injunction to
restrain the committing of a mere trespass,
for which. If committed, the recovery of damages in an action at law would be an adequate remedy.
It Is also true that the courts
will interfere by injunction and prevent a
threatened injury, which, if inflicted, will be
iiTeparable.
An injury is irreparable when it is of such
a nature that the injured party cannot be
adequately compensated
therefor in damages, or when the damages which may result

therefrom cannot be measured by any, cerHigh, Inj. § 460,
tain pecuniary standard.
and cases cited.
It is said by Judge Story
that: "If the trespass be fugitive and temporary, and adequate compensation can be
obtained in an action at law, there is no
ground to justify the interposition of courts
of equity. Formerly, indeed, courts of equity
were extremely reluctant to interfere at all
even in regard to cases of repeated tresBut now there is not the slightest
passes.
hesitation, if the acts done or threatened to
be done to the property would be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair the just enjoy2 Story,
ment of the property in future."
Eq. Jur. § 928.
That the threatened injuries which this action was brought to prevent, would, if inflicted, be irreparable, in the legal acceptation of that term, and would greatly impair
the just enjoyment of the plaintiff's property,
is perfectly well settled. No one will seriously contend that a money compensation is an
adequate remedy for the loss of the trees
and shrubbery which the complaint avers the
defendants threaten to destroy; and it would
be a denial of justice were the courts to refuse the plaintiff the protection he asks, and
thus permit his home to be permanently deSee High, Inj. § 467, and cases
spoiled.
cited.

We think the complaint states a cause of
action against both defendants, and that
there is no misjoinder of causes of action,
and no defect of parties. We do not decide
whether or not the complaint states facts
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover
damages,
but only, that if the averments
therein contained are true, he is entitled to
the injunction prayed.
Order affirmed.
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